Publications

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 3, 2023

May 3, 2023 - ISW Press

Russia accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against the Kremlin on May 3. Social media footage circulated on May 3 shows a drone detonating near a flagpole on top of the Kremlin Senate Palace building in Moscow as two unidentified people climbed up the dome of the building. The Kremlin accused Ukraine of orchestrating “a planned terrorist attack” with the intent of assassinating Russian President Vladimir Putin and clarified that Putin was not at the Kremlin at the time of the attack and was therefore unharmed. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, stressed that Ukraine did not conduct the attack.

Iran Update, May 2, 2023

May 2, 2023 - ISW Press

Iranian officials and members of the clerical establishment have expressed increased concern over the safety of religious figures in recent days. Former Intelligence and Security Minister and Shia cleric Hojjat ol Eslam Ali Fallahian called on Friday prayer leaders to learn self-defense during an interview with reformist news outlet Entekhab on May 2. The Islamic Propaganda Coordination Council—a regime body responsible for organizing official ceremonies and public events—separately issued a statement on May 2 urging law enforcement and security services to decisively confront "thugs." The council issued this statement in response to the killing of Assembly of Experts member Ayatollah Abbas Ali Soleimani on April 26. The council chairman—Mohammad Hossein Musa Pour—is a cleric and former governor of Qom City, Qom Province. Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan additionally discussed Soleimani’s murder with Qom Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah Mohammad Saedi on April 29, possibly to discuss measures to protect clerics.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 2, 2023

May 2, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is increasing its production of precision missiles for use against Ukraine. Shoigu highlighted the state-owned Tactical Missiles Corporation as a model defense enterprise, stating that is successfully beginning mass production of missiles and will develop plans to double its current production output in the near term. Shoigu’s focus on precision missile production aligns with a shift in Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)’s rhetoric focusing on Russia‘s use of precision missiles to strike military infrastructure targets in Ukrainian rear areas, likely aiming to similarly appear proactive and demonstrative positive Russian actions amid growing concerns in the Russian information space about a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Iran Update, May 1, 2023

May 1, 2023 - ISW Press

Iranian leadership dismissed several economic officials and emphasized fighting corruption between April 27 and May 1 to improve Iran’s economy, which is very unlikely to precipitate the meaningful economic change necessary to curb inflation and stabilize the Iranian rial. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on parliament and the Raisi administration to fight economic corruption during a meeting with workers, labor organization members, and Raisi administration officials on April 29. President Ebrahim Raisi has engaged in numerous symbolic economic engagements in recent days. Raisi dismissed 15 unspecified managers in Khuzestan Province to demonstrate his administration’s “intolerance” of corruption during a two-day trip to this province on April 27-28. Raisi additionally ordered the formation of a working group on April 30 to “follow up on the issues” raised by Khamenei in his April 29 meeting with workers without providing further details. Raisi called on his administration to address the needs of contract workers and retirees—who have organized widespread strikes and protests in recent weeks—during a MAPNA Company event for International Workers’ Day on May 1.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 1, 2023

May 1, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile strike against Ukraine on the night of April 30 to May 1. Ukrainian sources reported that nine Tu-95 and two Tu-160 strategic bombers took off from Murmansk Oblast and near the Caspian Sea and launched 18 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles at Ukraine. Ukrainian air defense shot down 15 of the missiles. Geolocated footage from Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, shows that one of the missiles struck the Pavlohrad Chemical Plant and caused a massive explosion on impact. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 1 that the strikes targeted Ukrainian military-industrial objects and successfully disrupted the production of military resources. The Russian MoD has recently shifted its rhetoric and is actively describing strike campaigns, likely in an effort to portray a proactive approach to growing concerns in the Russian information space regarding a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Russian milbloggers claimed that the missiles struck Ukrainian air defense systems and a transportation hub in Pavlohrad. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat noted that the fact that both the Tu-95 and Tu-160s carried far fewer missiles than their maximum load suggests that Russia continues to struggle with adequate production of such munitions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 30, 2023

April 30, 2023 - ISW Press

ISW is publishing a special edition campaign assessment today, April 30. This report details changes in the Russian military command since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine without a clear and doctrinal command structure and his reluctance to appoint an overall theater commander have had lasting effects on the structure of the Russian command in Ukraine. Putin’s regular command changes have led to an increasingly factionalized Russian military and disorganized command structures that are degrading the Russian military’s ability to conduct a cohesive campaign in Ukraine. Factions are not a phenomenon particular to the Russian military, although their current dynamics within the Russian military are shaping decision making to an unusual degree. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin have been deliberately vague about most of these command changes. ISW’s timeline of the changes is based on official Russian statements as well as analysis of unconfirmed claims and reports from Russian, Ukrainian, and Western sources. The exact dates of command changes are based on the first reporting of a change and may not correspond with the formal date on which a change occurred. These command changes were likely not discrete events resulting from decisions made suddenly but were instead drawn-out bureaucratic affairs.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 29, 2023

April 29, 2023 - ISW Press

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin threatened to withdraw Wagner forces from Bakhmut if the Russian military command fails to provide more ammunition to the Wagner mercenaries. Prigozhin stated in an interview with a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger on April 29 that the Wagner mercenaries will continue to fight in Bakhmut but will need to “withdraw in an organized manner or stay and die” if the situation does immediately not improve. Prigozhin stated that Wagner needs about 80,000 shells per day — its previous shell allowance prior to apparent Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) efforts to reduce Wagner’s influence. Prigozhin added that Wagner is only receiving 800 of the 4,000 shells per day that it is currently requesting. Prigozhin claimed that Wagner and Deputy Commander of Russian Forces in Ukraine Army General Sergei Surovikin developed a plan to “grind” the Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut that deprived Ukraine of its initiative on the battlefield. Prigozhin’s mention of Surovikin is likely an attempt to publicly affiliate with Surovikin as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s favor is shifting away from Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s network. Prigozhin is likely attempting to regain access to more ammunition as Putin is once again reshuffling the Russian military leadership in a way that may favor Prigozhin.

Iran Update, April 28, 2023

April 28, 2023 - ISW Press

President Ebrahim Raisi will visit Damascus on April 3 to initiate several economic projects, possibly to reinvigorate Iran’s economy by securing resources outside of Iran. Reuters reported on April 28 that Raisi will visit Syria on May 3 for a two-day trip, citing an informed source. An Iranian president has not visited Syria since 2011, when the Syrian civil war commenced. The source stated that the recent Iran-Saudi rapprochement and dialogue between Syria and other Arab states prompted the visit. The Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)-affiliated news outlet Al Akhbar reported that Raisi’s two-day visit would result in several economic agreements. An unidentified source cited by Al Akhbar claimed that Raisi’s visit is a part of a larger effort to broaden the Axis of Resistance’s activities beyond its current military activity. Iranian Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazarpash announced on April 25 that Iran intends to connect trade through Iran, Iraq, and Syria via a rail link to reduce tariffs and facilitate banking exchanges during a multi-day visit to Damascus. Bazarpash reported on April 26 that the Iranian-Syrian Joint Economic Forum established eight new committees focused on Iranian investment, energy, and electricity. Iran has cancelled previous economic projects in Syria, including the construction of two power stations on March 13, because the Assad regime sought to pay for the project in raw phosphate.

Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, April 27, 2023

April 28, 2023 - ISW Press

Iraq and Syria. ISIS activity in Syria increased in the first quarter of 2023, in contrast with statements by the commander of the US-led counter-ISIS coalition, who that ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria had “decreased dramatically.”[1] ISIS attacks increased in the Syrian desert since 2022. ISIS attacks in northeastern Syria did decrease, but the decrease is likely due to the group’s prioritization of central Syria. ISIS’s continued ability to maintain support zones in Syria means that it remains a risk to Iraq’s hard-won stability, especially due to Iraq’s inability to successfully destroy ISIS support zones in rural areas.

Sahel. Overstretched security forces cannot contain al Qaeda–linked and IS-affiliated militants across Mali. Al Qaeda–linked militants have very likely established new support zones in central Mali despite increased counterterrorism efforts. The group is likely using these havens to support attacks on security forces in central and southern Mali—including the region surrounding Mali’s capital. Security forces are also unlikely to disrupt IS-affiliated militants growing support zones in northeastern Mali as they give more priority to the challenges in more politically sensitive areas of central and southern Mali.

Somalia. Al Shabaab suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attacks are continuing to pose a significant long-term threat to Somali counterterrorism efforts in north-central Somalia. The SVBIED attacks are exacting unsustainable human costs on US-trained Somali special forces and will undermine crucial local support for the Somali government. Al Shabaab will continue to halt Somali forces and exact an unsustainable human cost, barring improved Somali tactics or a second front that diminishes al Shabaab’s ability to concentrate its resources.

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, April 28, 2023

April 28, 2023 - ISW Press

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Shandong aircraft carrier strike group conducted exercises in the Philippine Sea from April 13 to April 24, likely to maintain operational readiness and demonstrate the ability to isolate the Philippines during Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s visit.

China may attempt to expand the state security apparatus’ reach in foreign companies via the new anti-espionage law revision.

Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) Chairman and potential presidential candidate Ko Wen-je refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, likely to broaden his appeal to KMT and DPP leaning voters in the upcoming 2024 Taiwanese presidential election.

The KMT is portraying Taiwanese Vice President and DPP presidential nominee Lai Ching-te (William Lai) as out-of-touch with popular concerns possibly to center the presidential election narrative around livelihood issues while the KMT formulates its cross-strait election messaging.

Potential KMT presidential candidate Gou Tai-ming (Terry Gou) may frame himself as preserving cross-strait stability and Republic of China (ROC) autonomy by promoting a foreign policy that does not align Taiwan explicitly with the United States or China.

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