Publications

Iran Update, March 1, 2023

March 1, 2023 - ISW Press

CTP assesses with moderate confidence that the Iranian regime is tolerating a country-wide, coordinated campaign to poison Iranian school girls. Social media users documented incidents of chemical poisoning at 26 girls’ schools throughout the country on March 1 alone. Hundreds of Iranian schoolgirls have reported respiratory and neurological poisoning symptoms since November 2022, many of whom have required hospitalization. The first reported incident occurred on November 30, 2022, in Qom City, Qom Province when 18 Shahed Razaviyeh Secondary School students reported experiencing nausea, coughing, difficulty breathing, heart palpitations, and lethargy. Initial poisoning cases primarily affected female high school students in Qom. In recent weeks, however, poisoning cases have spread across Iran and have also targeted elementary, middle school, and university students, as well as less frequent incidents at boys’ educational facilities. CTP recorded a significant increase in poisoning cases on March 1, with students from at least 26 schools falling ill. Most poisonings on March 1 occurred in Tehran and Ardabil Provinces. It remains unclear why these cities appear to have been disproportionately targeted.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 1, 2023

March 1, 2023 - ISW Press

The Kremlin may leverage an amendment to Russia’s Criminal Code increasing punishments for "discrediting" the war in Ukraine to promote further self-censorship among the critical ultranationalist community, prompting pushback from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and prominent milbloggers. Chairman of the Russian State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin announced on March 1 that the Duma could ratify amendments to the Russian Criminal Code introducing harsher punishments for discrediting participants of the Russian "special military operation," including "volunteers," as soon as March 14. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) labels irregular armed formations fighting in Ukraine—specifically the Wagner Group—as volunteers. Volodin stated punishments would include a fine of up to five million rubles (about $66,450), five years of correctional or forced labor, or a sentence of 15 years in prison. Russian President Vladimir Putin previously stated on February 28 that Russia must "identify and stop illegal activities of those who are trying to weaken [Russian] society" and identify those who "use separatism, nationalism, neo-Nazism as a weapon." Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has long called on the Kremlin to punish anyone who spoke poorly of Wagner under the guise of ensuring that all participants of the war are protected under existing laws against discrediting the Russian Armed Forces. However, Prigozhin released a suggested adjustment to the amendments in response to Volodin’s statement, arguing the amendment should not punish criticism of senior Russian MoD and Wagner Group commanders. Prigozhin argued constructive criticism "is necessary" to ensure Russian commanders use their powers "transparently and responsibly." Prigozhin may be concerned that the Kremlin could use the expanded amendment to crack down on or, at minimum, promote self-censorship practices among ultranationalist milblogger communities who regularly criticize senior Russian commanders, and likely seeks to balance his desired protection of the Wagner Group with retaining the freedom for himself and friendly milbloggers to criticize the Russian military.

Iran Update, February 28, 2023

February 28, 2023 - ISW Press

Regime incompetence and mismanagement is driving further protest activity and popular frustration toward the regime and may unite citizens with disparate grievances. The regime is facing several concurrent crises over its mishandling of economic, ecological, and security issues. The regime is continuing to victimize its people with a range of different problems, stoking anti-regime frustration across many different demographics.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 28, 2023

February 28, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian authorities appear to be escalating their promotion of false flag information operations to distract from their lack of tangible battlefield gains and slow down the provision of Western tanks and other aid in advance of expected Ukrainian counter-offensives. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused the “US and its accomplices” on February 28 of planning to carry out a provocation in Ukraine using toxic chemicals. The Russian MoD relatedly claimed on February 19 that Ukrainian officials are planning false-flag attacks at hazardous radiation facilities in Ukraine to accuse Russian forces of indiscriminately striking such sites. The apparent uptick in fallacious biochemical and nuclear false flag warnings accompanies a concerted Russian false flag information operation accusing Ukraine of preparing for an invasion of Russian-occupied Transnistria, Moldova. Russian President Vladimir Putin also notably re-introduced nuclear rhetoric into the Russian information space during his address to the Russian Federal Assembly on February 21 when he announced Russia’s intent to suspend participation in START. The recent resurgence of several standard Russian information operations in the form of false flag warnings and tired nuclear threats suggests that Russian officials are increasingly trying to mitigate the informational impacts of a continued lack of Russian battlefield successes as well as to slow down the provision of Western tanks and other equipment in advance of expected Ukrainian counter-offensives. ISW has previously reported on the correlation between Russian information operations and battlefield realities, particularly when Russian forces are failing to take significant ground in offensive operations in Ukraine. The Russian MoD and top Russian officials will likely escalate their engagement with such information operations as the ongoing Russian offensive in Luhansk Oblast nears culmination and the opportunities for Ukrainian counter-offensives grow.

Iran Update, February 27, 2023

February 27, 2023 - ISW Press

Protest activity in Iran is rising and returning to levels not seen since the end of 2022. CTP has recorded an uptick in demonstrations in recent weeks, most of which have focused on the worsening economic conditions in Iran. Costs of goods and services have risen over 53 percent since February 2022, and the Iranian rial continues to depreciate dramatically. The rial fell to a record low on February 26, valuing at around 600,000 to the US dollar. CTP previously reported that the rial fell to 500,000 for one dollar on February 21. The economic nature of these protests diverges slightly from the rest of the Mahsa Amini movement, which focused primarily (but not exclusively) on socio-cultural and political grievances. These economically motivated protests may nevertheless add momentum to and build on the Mahsa Amini movement, as CTP previously suggested.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 27, 2023

February 27, 2023 - ISW Press

Russian officials are promoting an information operation that falsely frames Russia’s war in Ukraine as existential to the continued existence of the Russian Federation. In an interview with TV channel Rossiya-1 on February 26, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that he does not know if "such an ethnic group as the Russian people can survive in the form in which it exists today" if the West succeeds in "destroying the Russian Federation and establishing control over its fragments." Putin accused the collective West of already having plans "set out on paper" for the destruction of the Russian Federation in its current form. Putin also remarked that Russia had to suspend its participation in the START treaty in order to ensure its strategic stability and security in the face of a concerted Western effort to use START to cripple Russia’s strategic prospects.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 26, 2023

February 26, 2023 - ISW Press

ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, February 26. This report focuses on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attempt to avoid ordering involuntary mobilization by launching a series of irregular volunteer force generation campaigns since late May 2022 and the consequences of that attempt. Putin sought to satisfy the requirement for replacements following Russian defeats around Kyiv by conducting a voluntary recruitment campaign building on the existing campaigns already being conducted by quasi-official ultranationalist groups such as the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) or the Wagner Group. Putin unsuccessfully attempted to establish new all-volunteer formations over the summer that competed with other existing quasi-official formations. Putin eventually abandoned his volunteer recruitment campaign after Ukrainian forces liberated much of Kharkiv Oblast between September 6 and September 11, ordering partial reserve mobilization on September 21.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 25, 2023

February 25, 2023 - ISW Press

UK, French, and German officials are reportedly preparing a NATO-Ukraine pact that falls far short of the protections Ukraine would receive from NATO membership and appears to reflect a desire to press Ukraine to accept a negotiated settlement on unfavorable terms. The Wall Street Journal reported that the exact provisions of the pact are undecided, but the officials indicated that the pact will provide advanced military equipment, arms, and ammunition to Ukraine, but not Article V protection or a commitment to station NATO forces in Ukraine—falling short of Ukraine’s aspirations for full NATO membership. The officials stated that the pact aims to provision Ukraine so that Ukrainian forces can conduct a counteroffensive that brings Russia to the negotiating table and deter any future Russian aggression. The Wall Street Journal noted that these officials expressed reservations about the West’s ability to sustain a prolonged war effort, the high casualty count that Ukraine would sustain in such a prolonged war, and Ukrainian forces’ ability to completely recapture long-occupied territories like Crimea, however. The Wall Street Journal contrasted these officials’ private reservations with US President Joe Biden’s public statements of support—which did not mention peace negotiations—and with Central and Eastern European leaders’ concerns that premature peace negotiations would encourage further Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin has given no indication that he is willing to compromise on his stated maximalist goals, which include Ukraine’s “neutrality” and demilitarization—as well as de facto regime change in Kyiv, as ISW has consistently reported.

Iran Update, February 24, 2023

February 24, 2023 - ISW Press

Iranian regime security forces escalated against prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid on February 24 after months of relative restraint. Security forces surrounded Zahedan’s Grand Makki Mosque, where Abdol Hamid gives his weekly Friday sermons, assaulted some nearby worshippers, and reportedly attempted to enter the mosque. The regime reportedly stationed snipers around Zahedan and disrupted local internet services as well. Abdol Hamid lamented on social media that he could not livestream his Friday sermon due to the severity of these restrictions. The regime has significantly increased its security presence in Zahedan since January 2023 to deter Abdol Hamid from criticizing the regime. However, these security forces have largely refrained from interfering with Abdol Hamid’s weekly sermon and the ensuing protests until this point, likely to avoid enflaming domestic unrest further. Security forces conducted a brutal crackdown against citizens in Zahedan on September 30, 2022, which was the initial driver of the weekly Friday protests during the last five months.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 24, 2023

February 24, 2023 - ISW Press

The Kremlin did not comment on the first anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, likely because Russia has failed to achieve any of its stated objectives and has not made significant territorial gains since July 2022. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his administration made no statements relating to the anniversary even though Putin has made numerous public appearances over the past three days. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev made inflammatory claims that Russia will win the war and reiterated that it is vital for Russia to achieve its goals to "push back the borders that threaten [Russia] as far as possible, even if they are the borders of Poland." ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin has been using Medvedev to sustain information campaigns targeting Western military support for Ukraine and to deflect attention from Russia's military failures.[3] Medvedev's statements highlight the fact that the Kremlin is continuing to pursue its unrealistic maximalist goals even though it has no meaningful successes to offer the Russian people after a year of costly war in Ukraine.

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