ISW hosted an on-the-record conversation about counterinsurgency in Afghanistan with Major General Charles Gurganus and Brigadier Stuart Skeates on April 16, 2013.
The recently announced accelerated shift to a "support role" in Afghanistan could become a guise to withdraw if "support" means just a few thousand counterterrorism forces and trainers.
Three thousand troops are not sufficient to keep even a single U.S. military base in Afghanistan after 2014. This report, released with AEI's Critical Threats Project, describes how to calculate the force requirements for keeping one base in Afghanistan after 2014.
Leaving a bare-bones U.S. presence will risk a return of the Taliban—and civil war.
The Afghan National Army (ANA) is arguably the most respected institution in Afghanistan. Keeping it that way as it becomes more self-sufficient will contribute to all of NATO’S post-2014 strategic aims.
A suicide bombing in Kabul on December 6 targeted the head of the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS), Asadullah Khalid, in an event that has rattled Afghan elites and rekindled controversy between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The success of transitioning security responsibility to the Afghans is contingent upon their willingness and ability to receive the handoff.
On November 30, 2012, the Institute for the Study of War welcomed Major General (Promotable) James Huggins and Lieutenant Colonel (Promotable) J.B. Vowell to The Army and Navy Club to discuss the effects of the surge in Afghanistan and the challenges that remain.
Will the United States continue to conduct counterterrorism operations in South Asia? That question is central to any discussion about U.S. troop presence and mission in Afghanistan.