Three thousand troops are not sufficient to keep even a single U.S. military base in Afghanistan after 2014. This report, released with AEI's Critical Threats Project, describes how to calculate the force requirements for keeping one base in Afghanistan after 2014.
Leaving a bare-bones U.S. presence will risk a return of the Taliban—and civil war.
The Afghan National Army (ANA) is arguably the most respected institution in Afghanistan. Keeping it that way as it becomes more self-sufficient will contribute to all of NATO’S post-2014 strategic aims.
The success of transitioning security responsibility to the Afghans is contingent upon their willingness and ability to receive the handoff.
Will the United States continue to conduct counterterrorism operations in South Asia? That question is central to any discussion about U.S. troop presence and mission in Afghanistan.
This monograph provides a framework for understanding operational art in counterinsurgency campaigns. In addition to the framework, the monograph describes how one set of strategic civil-military leaders achieved sufficient alignment in order to produce unity of effort and coherency of action throughout the civil-military organization.
In an effort to bring the war in Afghanistan to a swift conclusion, the Obama administration is trying to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table.