Iran Update, January 18, 2024

Iran Update, January 18, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

• The Pakistani armed forces conducted cross-border attacks targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran. Iranian officials and state media attempted to deescalate after the Pakistani airstrikes.
• The Houthi supreme leader, Abdulmalik al Houthi, stated that US and UK vessels have become legitimate targets for Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi said that the group would interpret an attack on the Houthis as an attack on KH in a letter to the Houthi supreme leader.
• Palestinian fighters are attacking Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. This activity is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas is likely reinfiltrating some of these areas.
• Israeli forces destroyed Hamas’ main weapons manufacturing facility in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip. Israeli clearing operations are likely one of the factors constraining Palestinian militias‘ ability to conduct indirect fire attacks into Israel.
• The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) raided an outpost of Hamas’ Southern Khan Younis Battalion in southern Khan Younis City. Palestinian fighters launched multiple attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around Khan Younis City.
• Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters six times across the West Bank. Israeli forces continued raids targeting Palestinian fighters in the Tulkarm refugee camp.
• Lebanese Hezbollah claimed five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. Unspecified fighters launched three rockets into the Golan Heights from Syria as well.
• Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri, and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki discussed efforts to “strengthen national sovereignty” in a meeting.
• Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reiterated that he seeks to restructure the presence of US-led coalition forces in Iraq during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.
• Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian discussed the January 15 IRGC drone and missile strikes in Erbil, Iraq, with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji in a phone call.
• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting US forces in Himu, northeastern Syria.
• The Jordanian Royal Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian-linked drug smuggling operations in southern Syria.

 

 

The Pakistani armed forces conducted cross-border attacks targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran, on January 17.[1] Pakistan announced that it fired a combination of drones, rockets, and air-launched standoff munitions to target Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF) sites in Iran.[2] The BLA and BLF are Baloch ethno-separatist groups that maintain ongoing insurgencies inside Pakistan. Pakistan framed the strikes as responses to Iran’s failure to prevent Baloch separatist groups based in Iran from conducting attacks inside Pakistan.[3] Pakistani media reported that the strikes killed and/or injured seven BLF fighters.[4] Pakistani Foreign Affairs Ministry officials emphasized that the strikes did not target the Iranian regime. The Pakistani strikes follow the IRGC’s drone and missile strikes on two Jaish al Adl headquarters in Koh Sabz, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan on January 16.[5]

Iranian officials and state media attempted to deescalate after the Pakistani airstrikes on Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 18. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry summoned the Pakistani Charge d’affaires and condemned the Pakistani strikes but added that Iran will not allow unspecified “enemies” to strain the “good and brotherly” relations between Iran and Pakistan.[6] Media outlets tied to the Iranian armed forces highlighted that the Pakistani strikes did not target the Iranian state, referencing the statement from the Pakistani Foreign Affairs Ministry. The outlets also emphasized that Pakistan respects Iran’s territorial integrity.[7] Several national and provincial Iranian security officials reported that there were 10 to 12 civilian causalities from the strikes but added that those individuals were not Iranian nationals.[8]

The Houthi supreme leader, Abdulmalik al Houthi, stated that US and UK vessels have become legitimate targets for Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[9] Abdulmalik made the statement in a speech criticizing US support for Israel on January 18 after US strikes targeted 14 ready-to-launch missiles in Houthi territory on January 17.[10] The Houthis claimed that they attacked an “American ship” for the first time on January 15.[11] The group previously claimed falsely that it targeted only vessels that aided Israel, were bound for Israel, or were Israeli-owned.[12] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted merchant vessels without connections to Israel, however.[13] Abdulmalik made veiled threats on January 11 that the Houthi attacks would target the vessels of other countries that supported US strikes on Houthi military targets.[14]

Kataib Hezbollah (KH) Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi said that KH would interpret an attack on the Houthis as an attack on KH in a letter to the Houthi supreme leader on January 17.[15] Houthi Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister and influential powerbroker Hussein al Ezzi threatened on January 16 that the Houthis could expand their targeting of commercial shipping beyond the Bab al Mandeb through coordination with unspecified actors.[16] These statements are meant to underscore further to the international audience the extent to which Iran’s ”Axis of Resistance” can fight as a regional coalition. KH is a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which has claimed over 100 attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began.[17]

The United States conducted preemptive strikes on January 17 and 18 that targeted Houthi missiles prepared to fire on merchant vessels.[18] CENTCOM stated the missiles posed an imminent threat to merchant vessels and US Navy ships in the region and that the US strikes will degrade the Houthi’s capability to continue attacks on international shipping. Local Yemeni sources reported that the first round of strikes hit five governorates in Yemen.[19]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters are attacking Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. This activity is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas is likely reinfiltrating some of these areas. Palestinian militia activity increased slightly during the past week in the northern Gaza Strip after Israeli forces reduced their presence there and transitioned to targeted raids. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli armored personnel carriers east of Tuffah neighborhood in Gaza City.[20] The militia also fired a thermobaric rocket at Israeli forces in Sheikh Ijlin.[21] The militia separately claimed five attacks targeting Israeli armor and dismounted infantry east of Jabalia using mortars and RPGs.[22] The military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al Quds Brigades, fired anti-tank guided missiles and small arms targeting Israeli forces as they advanced east of Jabalia.[23] A Palestinian activist reported on January 18 that Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters clashed on the outskirts of Jabalia.[24]

Israeli forces continue to operate in the northern Gaza Strip to destroy militia infrastructure and locate remaining Palestinian fighters. The IDF Air Force conducted several airstrikes on January 18, targeting Palestinian fighters who posed a threat to Israeli ground forces.[25] The Yiftach Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) identified Palestinian fighters rigging a vehicle to explode, which later detonated during a firefight.[26] The 179th Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) located explosively formed penetrators (EFP), RPGs, and military equipment in Sabra neighborhood of Gaza City on January 18.[27]

Israeli forces destroyed Hamas’ main weapons manufacturing facility in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip. The facility included weapons manufacturing sites, including some meant for rockets, and a command-and-control site located along the Salah al Din Road west of Bureij.[28] Israeli forces recently located additional manufacturing facilities in Maghazi, Bureij, and Nuseirat.[29] The IDF 36th Division, Yahalom Combat Engineering Unit, and Israeli air elements discovered and destroyed dozens of tunnel shafts that connected hundreds of kilometers of underground passages.[30] The New York Times reported on January 16 that the IDF now believes that there are more tunnels underneath the Gaza Strip than previously thought.[31]

Israeli clearing operations are likely one of the factors constraining Palestinian militias‘ ability to conduct indirect fire attacks into Israel. Israeli forces have destroyed several rocket launchers and stockpiles during clearing operations in the Gaza Strip.[32] The rate of cross-border indirect fire attacks claimed by Palestinian militias from the Gaza Strip decreased from an average of roughly 13 daily attacks between October 11 and November 23 to an average of roughly 4.6 attacks between December 1 and January 18. The humanitarian pause lasted from November 23 to December 1. Militia fighters continue to use mortars and rockets to defend against Israeli ground operations in the Gaza Strip, however.[33]

The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) raided an outpost of Hamas’ Southern Khan Younis Battalion in southern Khan Younis City on January 18.[34] The battalion‘s outpost included office space and multiple training facilities. The outpost served as the office for the battalion‘s commander and other unspecified Hamas commanders. The IDF seized intelligence files, "combat management documents,” and various small arms and explosives. Israeli forces conducted airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters while operating in southern Khan Younis area.[35]

Palestinian fighters launched multiple attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around Khan Younis City on January 18. The al Qassem Brigades targeted Israeli armored and engineering units in Khan Younis City using Yassin 105 anti-tank RPGs.[36] The al Qassem Brigades claimed that it detonated a house borne IED (HBIED) in Bani Suheila, killing and wounding 30 Israeli soldiers clearing the building.[37] The al Qassem Brigades did not provide evidence for its assertion. Al Qassem Brigades fighters targeted Israeli forces in a house in eastern Khan Younis using a thermobaric munition, killing five Israeli soldiers.[38] The National Resistance Brigades—the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed that its fighters targeted an Israeli armored vehicle using a tandem charged rocket in Batn al Sameen in western Khan Younis City.[39] The al Quds Brigades claimed its fighters fought Israeli forces advancing in central, eastern, and southern Khan Younis City.[40]

 

 

 

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) released evidence of Gazan Education Ministry staff participating in military training as part of the al Qassem Brigades.[41] The IDF posted three images showing official al Qassem Brigades documents requesting certain teachers be given leave for training. The IDF said that the al Qassem Brigades delivered the letters directly to the head of the Gazan Education Ministry in Khan Younis.[42]

Israeli forces killed the Hamas officer responsible for interrogating suspected spies in the Gaza Strip on January 17. The IDF reported that the officer's death “significantly impacts” Hamas’ ability to develop and enhance its capabilities to strengthen and improve itself as an organization.[43] 

The Gaza Strip continues to experience the longest, largest-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began. NetBlocks reported on January 18 that the Gaza Strip entered the seventh day of the telecommunications blackout.[44]

The al Qassem Brigades fired rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Kissufim in southern Israel on January 18.[45]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters six times across the West Bank on January 18.[46] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces in Zawata, near Nablus. The group also clashed with Israeli forces in Qalqilya, injuring an Israeli Border Police officer.[47]

Israeli forces continued raids targeting Palestinian fighters in the Tulkarm refugee camp on January 18.[48] The operations have been ongoing for over 35 hours at the time of writing. The IDF said that it has arrested 15 wanted individuals and destroyed weapons, explosives, and military equipment.[49] The IDF also said that Israeli forces have killed eight Palestinian fighters during operations in the Tulkarm camp, including in an Israeli airstrike.[50] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and al Quds Brigades clashed with Israeli forces in Tulkarm and the Tulkarm refugee camp, respectively, during the operations.[51]

An attacker attempted to stab Israeli police officers at a bus stop in Jerusalem on January 18.[52] The attacker wounded two people before Israeli police killed the attacker. An Israeli source said that the attacker is suspected of carrying out a separate attack on a tourist in Tel Aviv earlier on January 18. The motive of the attack is unclear.

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) claimed five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 18.[53] LH continues to target Israeli military positions along the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF Air Force attacked LH military infrastructure, including rocket launch sites, in multiple locations in southern Lebanon.[54]

Unspecified fighters launched three rockets into the Golan Heights from Syria on January 18.[55] Israeli forces responded by shelling the rocket launch sites in southern Syria.[56]

Unnamed Lebanese officials stated that LH rebuffed US proposals to deescalate fighting along the Israel-Lebanon border. Western media reported that LH rejected a US proposal to pull LH fighters seven kilometers away from the border with Israel.[57] Israeli and Western media reported that LH said that it will continue launching rockets targeting Israel until there is a full ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[58] Unnamed Lebanese officials stated LH is open to the Lebanese government mediating a deal with Israel over unspecified disputed areas along the Israel-Lebanon border once the Israel-Hamas war ends.[59]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri, and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki discussed efforts to “strengthen national sovereignty” in a meeting on January 18.[60] Fayyadh, Ameri, and Maliki probably discussed the ongoing Iranian-backed military and political campaign to expel US forces from Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has attacked US positions in Iraq and Syria over 100 times since the Israel-Hamas war began.[61] Several of these militias, such as Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, are part of the PMF.[62] The militia attacks on US forces prompt US self-defense strikes, which Iranian-backed Iraqi actors then misrepresent as “violations” of Iraqi sovereignty. They use these supposed “violations” to pressure the Iraqi federal government to order the complete removal of US forces from Iraq. The United States reserves the right to protect its forces in Iraq, which are deployed at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government to fight ISIS.[63]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reiterated that he seeks to restructure the presence of US-led coalition forces in Iraq during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on January 17 and 18. Sudani stated that he plans to end the presence of US-led coalition forces in Iraq but remains open to cooperating with countries in the US-led coalition on “armament, training, and equipment.”[64] Sudani made this statement during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on January 17. NATO has a separate mission in Iraq that does not operate under the US-led coalition. Sudani similarly said in an interview with Reuters on January 10 that Iraq remains open to engaging in security cooperation with the United States, including with the United States advising and training the Iraqi Security Forces.[65] Sudani also told European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on January 18 that he hopes to engage in “bilateral security coordination” with “friendly countries” following the withdrawal of US-led coalition forces.[66] These statements are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Sudani is trying to retain some international military presence in Iraq, such as through bilateral security agreements with International Coalition member countries.[67] The continued presence of US forces would fail to meet Iranian-backed Iraqi militia demands for a complete and immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Iraq.

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian discussed the January 15 IRGC drone and missile strikes in Erbil, Iraq, with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji in a phone call on January 18.[68] Araji is also a member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[69] The IRGC conducted drone and missile strikes targeting what it claimed were Israeli Mossad-affiliated facilities and individuals in Erbil.[70] Ahmadian emphasized that Iran will not tolerate any Israeli operation in Iraq. Iranian officials said on January 17 that the IRGC strikes in Erbil were targeting “Mossad agents,” not Iraq.[71] Iranian leaders have long accused Mossad of maintaining a network in Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations into Iran. Iraqi state media did not widely cover the phone call between Ahmadian and Araji.

IRGC-affiliated media claimed that it likely killed a second Mossad-linked individual in the January 15 IRGC drone and missile strikes in Erbil, Iraq.[72] Iran did not provide evidence for these claims. Iraqi federal and Kurdish regional officials called Iran’s claims that Mossad operated a headquarters in Erbil as ”unfounded” and " baseless.”[73] Iranian state media alleged that Iraqi citizen Suleiman Amin Nader, also known as Azhi Amin, directed terrorist operations in Iran, including by aiding the assassination of senior Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhri Zadeh in November 2020. An Erbil-based, Kurdistan-focused freedom of expression and human rights watchdog reported that Azhi Amin was a PUK intelligence official who defected.[74] Amin began supporting Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) official and Kurdish Regional Prime Minister Masoud Barzani after his defection, according to the watchdog.[75] The watchdog also reported Amin was not present where the IRGC struck with drones and missiles. KDP media reported on January 17 that the strike in Erbil killed a prominent businessman, his daughter, and one of his employees at his house.[76]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting US forces in Himu, northeastern Syria, on January 18.[77] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq last targeted US forces in Himu on January 10.[78]

The Jordanian Royal Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian-linked drug smuggling operations in southern Syria on January 17.[79] The strikes targeted two sites in Suwayda Province—one warehouse and two houses.[80]

Iranian Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan traveled to China to increase security and law enforcement cooperation.[81] Radan met with Chinese Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong and Chen Wenqing, a member of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Politburo who oversees intelligence, law enforcement, and legal affairs.[82] Radan discussed strengthening cooperation to combat cybercrimes, drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism.[83] Chinese state media reported that Radan and Wang side a memorandum of understanding to strengthen law enforcement cooperation.[84] Radan commented that he hopes the agreement will facilitate Sino-Iranian cooperation to combat terrorism.[85] Wang additionally proposed the formation of a trilateral security institution between China, Iran, and Pakistan to combat terrorism.[86]

Radan’s visit could be part of the Iranian effort to build an increasingly adaptive and sophisticated police and surveillance state.[87] Iranian leaders have tried to replicate the success that the CCP has had imposing social control over its respective population.[88] Iranian leaders have, in particular, embraced emerging technologies, such as advanced algorithms, artificial intelligence, and facial recognition, to this end.[89] Radan traveled to Moscow in June 2023 for similar discussions on increasing Iranian law enforcement and security cooperation with Russia.[90]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron in Davos on January 18.[91] Abdollahian said that the United States and United Kingdom have no right to hold the security of the region “hostage” to benefit Israel. Cameron asked Abdollahian to use Iran’s influence to stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.

Abdollahian discussed fighting regional terrorism with the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan on January 18.[92] Abdollahian stated that it was necessary to maintain good relations between Iran and Turkey in light of ”some issues of recent days.” Abdollahian stated it was the responsibility of every country in the region to decisively fight terrorism. The Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister gave a statement following the call and urged Iran and Pakistan to avoid escalation in the region.[93]

Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Erani announced on January 18 that the Alborz destroyer is escorting Iranian commercial ships in the Red Sea.[94] IRGC-affiliated media previously reported that the Alborz destroyer entered the Red Sea on January 1.[95] The Artesh is Iran’s conventional military and has larger surface combatants than the IRGC Navy. The Alborz has routinely conducted “anti-piracy” operations in the area since 2010 and operated around the Red Sea at least since December 2023.[96]

 

 

[1] https://twitter.com/PakistanFauj/status/1747827365466759314 ; https://twitter.com/PakistanFauj/status/1747844530664333789 

[2] https://twitter.com/PakistanFauj/status/1747910861937942598 ; https://twitter.com/OSPSF/status/1747854558905151498 ; https://twitter.com/AirOpsSyndicate/status/1747918909372498168 ; https://twitter.com/AnasMallick/status/1747909689818628425 ; https://twitter.com/PakistanFauj/status/1747917565651992882

[3] https://twitter.com/PakistanFauj/status/1747844530664333789

[4] https://twitter.com/khorasandiary/status/1747898216169796049 ; https://twitter.com/zarrar_11PK/status/1747915038588051872

[5] https://t.me/mediaadl/314;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/10/26/3024317;

https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14021026000997;

https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/645412;

https://apnews.com/article/iran-iraq-militant-bases-attack-05c7530d66fb0...

[6] https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/738536 ; https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14021028000294/; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/645657 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/10/28/3025043/ ; https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14021028000493/

[7] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/10/28/3024998; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/645575/

[8] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/10/28/3025075 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85358345/; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/10/28/3025199; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/10/28/3024990 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/645587

[9] https://twitter.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1747963068447895735 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/44288

[10] https://t.me/C_Military1/44288 ; https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1747796789087125645

[11] https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1746963037183967466

[12] https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1747720606068465702 ; https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1745053062161482147

[13] https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1734468816267014655 ; https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1739710180017795152

[14] https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1745575975251812598

[15] https://t.me/centerkaf/4195 ; https://www.kataibhezbollah dot me/news/3351

[16] https://twitter.com/hussinalezzi5/status/1747428151473397912?s=20

[17] https://twitter.com/thestevennabil/status/1735786874416009607?s=20 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate120923 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-str...

[18] https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1747796789087125645/history ; https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1748052643543683356

[19] https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1747769599980916915

[20] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1385 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1384 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1397

[21] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1395

[22] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1386; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1390; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1391; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1393; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1394

[23] https://t.me/sarayaps/17230

[24] https://t.me/hamza20300/204875

[25] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1747876414458614204

[26] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1747876424092918238

[27] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1747876424092918238

[28] https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1748031325192229137

[29] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1747997572298420641

[30] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1747997402227728813

[31] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/16/us/politics/israel-gaza-tunnels.html

[32] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1747510504845660487;  https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1734458938991554695

[33] https://t.me/sarayaps/17232; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1393

[34] https://www.idf dot il/174279

[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-28-2023 ; https://www.idf dot il/174279

[36] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1387 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1392 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1382

[37] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1381

[38] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1380

[39] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4087

[40] https://t.me/sarayaps/17231

[41] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1747980948107374945

[42] https://www.facebook.com/khanedu.net/posts/671901028296043/?paipv=0&eav=...

[43] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1747510502656237788

[44] https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1747985277178573131

[45] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1399

[46] https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2835; https://t.me/Ta3be2a/5113; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2837; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2838; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2834; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1747961359231225881; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1747961363887018481

[47] https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2837; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2838; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1747961363887018481

[48] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1747961349383073810

[49] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1747961359231225881

[50] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1747961377971397083

[51] https://t.me/alredalsrey/572; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/2835 ; https://t.me/Ta3be2a/5113

[52] https://www dot jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-782761; https://twitter.com/YWNReporter/status/1748009120861433988

[53] https://t.me/C_Military1/44270 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/44276 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/44283 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/44285 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/44299

[54] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1748044402570789055

[55] https://twitter.com/SAMSyria0/status/1748085770986942546 ; https://t.me/damascusv011/20454 ; https://t.me/damascusv011/20452 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/golan-sirens-triggered-by-3-rockets-from-syria-that-landed-in-open-fields/

[56] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/golan-sirens-triggered-by-3-rockets-from-syria-that-landed-in-open-fields/

[57] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-rejected-us-overture...

[58] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/lebanese-officials-hezbollah-rejects-us-proposals-for-cooling-fighting-with-israel/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-rejected-us-overture...

[59] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-rejected-us-overture... ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/lebanese-officials-hezbollah-rejects-us-proposals-for-cooling-fighting-with-israel/

[60] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1101834

[61] https://apnews.com/article/iraq-iran-militia-pmf-airstrike-baghdad-e6cd1....

[62] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-30-2023

[63] https://dod.defense.gov/OIR/#:~:text=One%20Mission%2C%20Many%20Nations.,.... ;

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/09/iraq-us-troops-removal-00134564

[64] http://www.alahad dot iq/?page=article&itemId=184523

[65] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-seeks-quick-exit-us-force...

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-10-2024

[66] https://alghadeertv dot iq/archives/253460

[67] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-17-2024#_ed...

[68] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85357830

[69] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/29050-Qasim-al-Araji-declines-nomination-for-Iraqi-premiership https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-badr-organiz...

[70] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/645242

[71] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14021027000903

[72] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/10/26/3024345

[73] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/kurdistan/1601202421 ; https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/kurdistan/1601202420

 

[74] https://twitter.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1747282241065992194

[75] https://twitter.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1747282241065992194

[76] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/kurdistan/170120241

[77] https://t.me/elamharbi/232

[78] https://t.me/elamharbi/219

[79] https://suwayda24 dot com/?p=22157 ; https://suwayda24 dot com/?p=22160

[80] https://suwayda24 dot com/?p=22157

[81] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1402102618848/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF-%DA%86%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%AF

 

[82] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/5997688;

https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14021027001082;

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moscow-hold-russia-china-security-t...

 

[83] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/5997688;

https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14021027001082

[84] http://www.news dot cn/20240116/1d23d28f476645e78b58e6ab8314b6b6/c.html

[85] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/5997688

[86] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/5997688

[87] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Whatever-it-t...

[88] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Whatever-it-t...

[89] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Whatever-it-t...

[90] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-27-2023

[91] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14021028000507/

[92] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14021028000446/ ; https://mfa dot ir/portal/newsview/738519

[93] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/1/18/pakistan-iran-attacks-...

[94] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/645663

[95] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2024/01/01/3015758 ; https://www.farsnews dot ir/en/news/14021012000135; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/10/11/3015684

[96] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-2-2024