Iran Update, March 24, 2023

Nicholas Carl, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, and Johanna Moore

March 24, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The US has become entangled in a regional escalation pattern between Iran and Israel. Iranian-backed militants conducted a kamikaze drone attack on US forces in northeastern Syria, killing one American, on March 23.[1] Iran likely ordered the attack in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes on Iranian-backed targets in Syria. Israel has conducted several such strikes in recent days, including attacking Iranian-backed positions at Aleppo International Airport on March 22, as CTP previously reported.[2] Senior Iranian military officers frequently threaten that they will hold the US accountable for Israeli attacks in Syria.[3]

The drone attack triggered an escalation cycle between the US and Iran, a timeline of which is presented here:

1.      Iranian-backed militants conducted a kamikaze drone attack on a maintenance facility at a US base near Hasakah in northeastern Syria on March 23. The attack killed an American contractor and injured six additional Americans.[4]

2.      The US conducted airstrikes on at least two Iranian-backed militant positions in eastern Syria on March 23 in retaliation for the drone attack. Some outlets have circulated unconfirmed claims that the US killed 11 Iranian-backed militants in the airstrikes.[5]

3.      Likely Iranian-backed militants conducted a rocket attack on the US base at the Green Village base in eastern Syria on March 24, likely in retaliation for the US airstrikes. The militants used ten rockets in the attack but did not damage or injure US assets and personnel.[6]

4.      Social media and Syrian outlets reported additional Iranian-backed attacks on US forces, using drones, rockets, or both, in the evening of March 24. This situation is developing at the time of this writing. CTP will provide further information in future updates.[7]

These Iranian actions suggest that Tehran is prioritizing its military efforts in Syria over its simultaneous diplomatic and political efforts in Syria. Iran has sought to consolidate its military position around Aleppo and moving weapons into Syria in recent weeks, using aid sent after the February 6 earthquake as cover, as CTP previously reported.[8] Iran has simultaneously encouraged the Assad regime in recent weeks to repair its ties with regional states, such as Saudi Arabia, which would move Syria closer to normalizing its position in the region. Doing so, in turn, would provide the IRGC an opportunity to secure lucrative contracts for reconstruction projects in Syria at a time when Iran is facing rapidly worsening economic conditions domestically. Tehran’s continued efforts to entrench itself militarily in Syria and its escalations against the US and Israel risk destabilizing Syria and undermining any diplomatic effort to normalize Assad’s position in the region. Qom Friday Prayer Leader Mohammad Saidi captured this point on March 24, stating that diplomacy with the Gulf states will not end Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance.[9]

The US airstrikes on March 23 are insufficient to deter Iran from conducting further attacks against US forces in the region, especially in Syria. The Iranian attacks on March 24 demonstrate that Tehran remains willing to order its proxies to conduct attacks that risk killing Americans in the region. Tehran has furthermore demonstrated that it is willing to risk the assets and personnel that it has brought into Syria to achieve its military aims, despite repeated Israeli airstrikes in recent weeks. This persistence suggests the American and Israeli airstrikes have not yet imposed a high enough cost on the regime.

Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid on March 24 emphasized Iran is facing an economic crisis and requires political reform in refuting the main arguments that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made in his Nowrouz address. Abdol Hamid stated that “the problem of the country is not just the economy and bread, the problems of the country are political problems.”[10] This statement violates the implicit order Khamenei gave in his Nowrouz speech on March 21 to cease discussions of political challenges and focus on the economy.[11] It also inverts Khamenei’s argument that addressing economic problems will solve Iran’s political and cultural issues by asserting that political problems are, in fact, the cause of Iran’s economic crisis.[12] Abdol Hamid furthermore stated that Iran’s economic problems are partially attributable to corruption, a possible criticism of the regime’s focus on “controlling inflation” and “increasing production” as the keys to improving Iran’s economic health.[13] Abdol Hamid’s challenge to Khamenei’s Nowrouz address is anomalous in a country where the supreme leader’s words are regarded as written in stone. Abdol Hamid’s decision to cross Khamenei’s red line and explicitly discuss political issues underscores that he does not intend to back down from his criticisms of the regime.

Abdol Hamid additionally challenged the regime narrative that Iran is a true democracy. He stated that most elections in Iran have been “appointments” rather than true elections and that the Guardian Council—the regime body tasked with vetting and approving political candidates—only allows the public to vote for “presidential candidates who don’t have the ability to run the country.”[14] Regime officials and media often portray elections as proof that Iran is a true democracy.[15] They additionally frame participation in elections as evidence of the public’s continued support for the Islamic Republic.[16] Abdol Hamid may have challenged the regime’s claims about Iranian democracy in his sermon because Khamenei specifically described Iran as an “Islamic democratic system” in his Nowrouz speech.[17]

Abdol Hamid’s criticism of the Guardian Council may be testing the red lines about constitutional reform that Khamenei set in his Nowrouz address. Article 99 of the Iranian Constitution tasks the Guardian council with “supervising elections.”[18] Abdol Hamid may have been calling on the Guardian Council to increase the number of candidates it allows to participate in elections, in which case a constitutional amendment would not be necessary. He may have contrastingly been calling for the elimination of the Guardian Council, which would require constitutional change. Khamenei implied on March 21 that those who call for constitutional change are counterrevolutionaries, as CTP previously reported.[19] Regardless of Abdol Hamid’s intention, criticizing an institution whose duties are engrained in the Iranian constitution immediately after Khamenei shut down debates about constitutional change underscores that Abdol Hamid will likely continue to challenge the principles and values underpinning the Islamic Republic.

Abdol Hamid may perceive that he has more room to not only criticize the regime in general, but also confront Khamenei more directly, due to decreased securitization in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province in recent weeks. CTP recorded increased securitization in Zahedan on February 24 and March 3.[20] Security forces have been less noticeable and confrontational during weekly Friday protests in Zahedan since March 3, however. This de-escalation may be emboldening Abdol Hamid further and encourage additional verbal attacks on Khamenei and the regime in the weeks ahead.

Key Takeaways

  • The US has become entangled in a regional escalation pattern between Iran and Israel.
  • Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid on March 24 responded to and challenged the main arguments that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made in his Nowrouz address.
  • At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces.
  • Multiple US officials expressed alarm over the Iranian nuclear program and reiterated the US commitment to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces on March 24. CTP assesses with high confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province[21]

  • Size: Medium to large
  • Demographic: Zahedan residents protesting after prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid’s Friday sermon

CTP assesses with low confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province[22]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Individuals gathered around the grave of a killed protester


The Khuzestan Neighborhood Youth tweeted on March 23 a political manifesto allegedly prepared by the Union of Iranian Provincial Combatants, detailing how the organizations plans to conduct a revolution.[23] The manifesto called for further protests, widespread worker strikes, and the support of foreign governments.

Shiraz Friday Prayer Leader Lotfollah Dezhkam announced that “popular institutions” launched a “people’s outreach system” to enforce mandatory veiling in this city during his Friday sermon on March 24.[24] Dezkham stated that the individuals in this system have received “training” to confront noncompliance with the hijab law. IRGC officials previously announced plans to reestablish morality patrols and mobilize the Basij to enforce mandatory veiling in Qom, as CTP reported on March 17 and 20.[25]

Nuclear Program

Multiple US officials expressed alarm over the Iranian nuclear program and reiterated the US commitment to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley stated on March 23 that Iran could stockpile enough fissile material for a single nuclear weapon within two weeks and could weaponize in several months.[26] Milley’s remarks echoed Undersecretary of Defense Colin Kahl’s February 28 statement that Iran could stockpile enough fissile material for a single bomb within 12 days. US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla similarly stated that Iran’s breakout timeline is less than 14 days and that it already has “sufficient nuclear material for manufacture of several nuclear explosive devices.”[27] These statements are consistent with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) publicly available reports about the Islamic Republic’s current stockpile of highly enriched uranium and the number of its operating advanced centrifuges.[28] Iran has more than triple the amount that the IAEA considers a “significant quantity” of highly enriched uranium (even if not weapons-grade) needed to produce a single compact nuclear explosive, as CTP previously reported.[29]

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian continued diplomatic engagements with regional officials on March 24. Amir Abdollahian a held a phone call with Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani to discuss bilateral cooperation on March 24.[30] Amir Abdollahian also held a phone call with the Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Sayyid Badr al Busaidi on March 23 to discuss the Sultan of Oman’s upcoming trip to Tehran, US sanctions, Iran-EU relations, and the recent rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia.[31] Amir Abdollahian held a phone call with Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal bin Farhad on March 23, as CTP previously reported.[32] Yemeni news outlet Al Khabar al Yemeni reported that Farhad requested Iranian mediation between Saudi Arabia and the al Houthi movement.[33]

External Security and Military Affairs

IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pak Pour inspected units stationed along the Iranian border with Armenia and Azerbaijan on March 23.[34] This visit follows IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency reporting on March 22 that the Azerbaijani army may be planning to invade Syunik Province, Armenia, which borders Iran to its south.[35] Tensions have flared between Iran and Azerbaijan in recent months over Baku’s efforts to create a land corridor running through Armenian territory, which Iran believes would block their access to European and Russian markets. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Ali Bagheri Kani met with Armenian Foreign Affairs Minister Ararat Mirzoyan during an official visit to Yerevan, Armenia on March 22, as CTP previously reported.[36] Bagher Kani committed to a lasting peace in the Caucasus and fostering a “peaceful dialogue” in the region.

At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces in Iraq on March 24. CTP assesses with high confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Nasariyah, Dhi Qar Province[37]

  • Size: Medium

Baghdad, Baghdad Province[38]

  • Size: Medium
  • Protest activity: Protesters gathered in the streets; vans carrying protesters were seen passing through checkpoints

The Shia Coordination Frameworka loose coalition of pro-Iranian political parties in Iraqreversed a previous decision to withhold salaries for Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) employees, according to a report from UK-based Al Sharq Al Awsat.[39] An unnamed source from the Coordination Framework claimed that the coalition reached an agreement with the KRG to form political alliances that will sideline Moqtada al Sadr and his supporters from political activity.[40] Kurdish, Turkmen, and Arab parliamentarians from Kirkuk disagreed over whether to include Article 35 in the list of proposed amendments to the Iraqi election laws put forward by former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki. Kurdish Kirkuk parliamentarians voted in favor of a select number of amendments on March 19 on the condition that the Coordination Framework removed Article 35 from the agenda.[41] However, Kurdish and Arab parliamentarians from Kirkuk threatened on March 22 to withdraw their vote backing Maliki’s amendments in retaliation for removing the article.[42] Arab parliamentarians from Kirkuk threatened to boycott a vote on the remaining election amendments unless Article 35 is put up for a vote in Parliament.[43] The Shia Coordination Framework may have agreed to pay the salaries of KRG employees to secure votes from Kurdish parliamentarians in favor of Maliki’s amendments if Article 35 is included on the agenda. Iraq’s parliament is scheduled to vote on the remaining election law amendments March 25.[44]

Minority and independent Iraqi political parties and activists have called for a sit-in outside Iraq’s parliament building March 24 to protest the Maliki-backed election laws.[45] Iraqi political activist Ayham Rashad reported that members of the Sadrist Movement will participate in the sit-in as well.[46] Protesters have blocked access to Iraq’s parliament building previously as a tactic to delay or block Parliament from holding sessions.[47] A Coordination Framework-affiliated lawmaker from Babil Province and Sheikh of the Botif tribe Ahmed Fawaz al Watifi mobilized and armed members of his tribe to counter protesters gathered outside Parliament on March 24.[48] Watifi is an associate of Nouri al Maliki.



[3] http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1400/09/29/2629184/


[5] https://www.syriahr dot com/en/293088/


[7];;; https://deirezzor24 dot net/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2/


[9] https://www.farsnews dot ir/qom/news/14020104000441

[10] https://abdolhamid dot net/persian/2023/03/24/13569/

[11] https://www dot leader dot ir/fa/content/26385/%D8%B3%D8%AE%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%B6%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85

[12] https://www dot leader dot ir/fa/content/26385/%D8%B3%D8%AE%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%B6%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85

[13] https://www dot irna dot ir/news/85062598/%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8-%DB%B1%DB%B4%DB%B0%DB%B2-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%85-%D9%88-%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF; http://www dot president dot ir/fa/143067

[14] https://abdolhamid dot net/persian/2023/03/24/13569/

[15] https://www dot irna dot ir/news/83606055/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%87%D9%86%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B2%D8%B1%DA%AF-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C

[16] https://www dot irna dot ir/news/83679793/%D8%AD%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%BE%D8%B4%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%AD%DA%A9%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA

[17] https://www dot leader dot ir/fa/content/26385/%D8%B3%D8%AE%D9%86%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%B6%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85







[24] https://www dot asriran dot com/fa/news/883849/%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%87-%D8%B4%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87%E2%80%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%85%E2%80%8C%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A8%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8%DB%8C






[30] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85064630/%DA%AF%D9%81%D8%AA-%D9%88%DA%AF%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%81%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%86%D8%AE%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1

[31] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1402010401421/%DA%AF%D9%81%D8%AA%DA%AF%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%81%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88-%D9%87%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C


[33] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/720080/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%DB%8C%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%DB%8C%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AC%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%AF

[34] http://www.defapress dot ir/fa/news/580128

[35] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020101000591/گزارش%E2%80%8Cها-از-تحرکات-ارتش-جمهوری-آذربایجان-در-منطقه


[37] ; ;

[38] ; ; ; ;

[39] https://aawsat dot com/home/article/4229976/%d8%aa%d8%b3%d9%88%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a5%d9%82%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%82%d9%84%d8%a8%d8%aa-%d9%85%d9%88%d9%82%d9%81-%c2%ab%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%b3%d9%8a%d9%82%d9%8a%c2%bb-%d9%85%d9%86-%c2%ab%d9%83%d8%b1%d8%af%d8%b3%d8%aa%d8%a7%d9%86%c2%bb

[40] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1 ;

https://aawsat dot com/home/article/4229766/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b5%d8%af%d8%b1-%d9%8a%d9%83%d8%b3%d8%b1-%d8%b5%d9%85%d8%aa%d9%87-%d8%a8%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%88%d8%a9-%d8%ba%d8%a7%d9%85%d8%b6%d8%a9-%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%b1%d9%82%d8%a8-%c2%ab%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%88%d8%b1-%d9%85%d9%87%d9%85%d8%a9%c2%bb

[41] https://www dot

[42] https://www dot

[43] https://www dot ;

https://www dot


[45] https://www dot ;

https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%82%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%BA%D9%8A%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%AA-%D9%8A%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%81 ;

[46] https://www.alaraby dot


[48] ; ; ;