Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1, 2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1, 2024

Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 1, 2024, 6:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on June 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a large-scale drone and missile strike mainly targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of May 31 to June 1. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported on June 1 that Russian forces launched 47 Shahed-136/131 drones and 53 missiles, including 35 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles from aircraft over the Caspian Sea, four Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea, an Iskander-K cruise missile from occupied Crimea, 10 Kalibr cruise missiles from the northeastern Black Sea, and three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from aircraft over occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 46 Shahed drones, 30 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles, the Iskander-K cruise missile, and four Kalibr cruise missiles, and noted that Russian forces have not abandoned their intentions of destroying Ukrainian fuel and energy infrastructure. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash noted that Russian forces have recently intensified their combined drone and missile strikes against Ukraine and continue efforts to exhaust Ukraine's scarce air defense assets.[2] Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that Russian missiles struck energy facilities in Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kirovohrad, and Ivano-Frankivsk oblasts.[3] Ukrainian state-owned hydroelectric power plant (HPP) regulator Ukrhydroenergo reported that Russian strikes critically damaged equipment at two unspecified HPPs, and Ukraine's largest private energy operator DTEK reported that Russian strikes seriously damaged two unspecified thermal power plants (TTP).[4] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck the Kremenchuk HPP in Kirovohrad Oblast, the Dnipro HPP in Zaporizhia Oblast, the Burshtyn TPP in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, and the Ladyzhyn TPP in Vinnytsia Oblast.[5] Ukrainian officials also reported damage to civilian areas, critical infrastructure, and energy facilities in Kharkiv, Lviv, Vinnytsia, Odesa, and Kherson oblasts, and Zaporizhzhia City.[6]

The current lack of clarity about US restrictions on Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory misses an opportunity to deter further Russian offensive efforts across the border into northern Ukraine. US National Security Council Director for Europe Michael Carpenter told the Voice of America in an interview published on May 31 that the US policy allowing Ukrainian forces to strike certain Russian military targets in Russia "applies to counter-fire capabilities that are deployed just across the [Ukrainian] border [into Russia]" and "is meant to enable Ukrainians to defend themselves against what would otherwise be a Russian sanctuary across the border."[7] Responding to a question about whether this policy permits Ukrainian strikes with US-provided weapons across the border from Sumy Oblast, Carpenter responded vaguely "yes, across the border for Russian attacks that are coming across, where otherwise Russians would enjoy a relative sanctuary." Politico reported on May 31 citing two people close to the Ukrainian presidential administration that Ukrainian officials are frustrated that Ukrainian forces are "restricted to the border area in Kharkiv [Oblast]" when using US-provided weapons to strike Russian territory, however.[8] Carpenter's comments and the Politico report together suggest there is ambiguity on what the US has explicitly authorized regarding these strikes amid signaling that the US is open to expanding these authorizations to other areas in Ukraine should Russian forces launch offensive operations elsewhere along the international border area.

This US ambiguity misses an opportunity to deter Russian preparations for offensive operations elsewhere across the border into northern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have recently warned that Russian forces are also concentrating forces in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts across the border from Sumy Oblast, and ISW has previously assessed that even a limited grouping would achieve its desired effect of drawing and fixing Ukrainian forces to this area.[9] The Kremlin may decide to launch offensive operations in different Ukrainian border oblasts outside of Kharkiv Oblast if it believes it can continue to mass forces across the border without risk of Ukrainian strikes. Ukrainian forces would be forced to defend against such offensive operations before the US grants explicit authorization necessary for cross-border strikes outside of areas bordering Kharkiv Oblast. The increased likelihood of other Russian offensive operations in northern Ukraine would require Ukrainian forces to reallocate existing resources to deter or defend against the offensive operations, creating opportunities for Russian forces elsewhere in the theater to exploit. US clarity that Ukraine can use US-provided weapons against Russian ground forces concentrations in Russia that appear to be preparing for imminent cross-border operations would likely change Russian commanders' calculations about the wisdom of making such ostentatious preparations. ISW continues to assess that the US should allow Ukraine to strike all legitimate military targets in Russia’s operational and deep rear with US-provided weapons.

Individual Western governments are stipulating disparate policies about Ukraine's future use of Western-supplied F-16 fighter jets. Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo stated on May 28 that Ukraine will only be able to use Belgian-supplied F-16s on the territory of Ukraine.[10] It is unclear from De Croo's statement, however, if Belgium will allow Ukraine to use Belgian-supplied F-16s to conduct strikes on Russian territory from Ukrainian airspace. Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren stated on May 31 that the Netherlands has stipulated no restrictions on Ukraine's use of Dutch-supplied F-16s and that Ukraine can use these F-16s "above or on Russian territory" as long as Ukraine follows Article 51 of the UN Charter and international humanitarian law."[11] Article 51 of the UN Charter notably stipulates that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against" a UN member state — a reminder that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory in the context of the Russian invasion are part of Ukraine's inherent right of self-defense.[12] Continued variations in Western governments' F-16 policies will require Ukraine to track which aircraft Ukrainian forces can and cannot use to conduct certain strikes, complicating Ukraine's ability to plan and conduct aviation operations using F-16s.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that some Ukrainian reserve brigades remain understrength and stated that the slow arrival of US security assistance is complicating Ukrainian efforts to effectively commit reserves to ongoing defensive operations.[13] Zelensky published excerpts from an interview with the Guardian on June 1 wherein he stated that the arrival of US security assistance to Ukraine has so far been slow and insufficient to equip reserve brigades sufficiently in order to conduct rotations for frontline units.[14] Zelensky stated that Russian forces understand that Ukrainian forces have understrength reserves and cannot commit reserves without appropriate materiel and that this fact has incentivized Russian efforts to stretch Ukrainian forces along a wider front in eastern and northeastern Ukraine.[15] Zelensky stated that sufficient security assistance will allow Ukraine to bring reserve brigades to their intended end strength and prevent Ukrainian forces from having to draw forces from eastern Ukraine to defend in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[16] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi recently reported that Russian forces aim to force Ukrainian forces to commit available reserves to the defensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and the Russian military command may assess that Ukrainian forces lack the combat ready reserves required to respond to all ongoing Russian offensive operations in eastern and northeastern Ukraine.[17] The arrival of resumed US security assistance at scale to the frontline, reportedly expected in June or July 2024, will aid Ukrainian efforts to bring reserves closer to their intended end strength and stand up planned new brigades.[18]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large-scale drone and missile strike mainly targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of May 31 to June 1.
• The current lack of clarity about US restrictions on Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory misses an opportunity to deter further Russian offensive efforts across the border into northern Ukraine.
• Individual Western governments are stipulating disparate policies about Ukraine's future use of Western-supplied F-16 fighter jets.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that some Ukrainian reserve brigades remain understrength and stated that the slow arrival of US security assistance is complicating Ukrainian efforts to effectively commit reserves to ongoing defensive operations.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, and Avdiivka.
• The Russian Ministry of Justice designated the "Way Home" social movement, a movement of relatives of mobilized Russian servicemembers that has been calling for their relatives' demobilization, as a "foreign agent" on June 1.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Fighting continued in the Lyptsi direction on June 1, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Fighting continued near Lyptsi and between Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi) and Lukyantsi (northeast of Lyptsi) on May 31 and June 1.[19] A Ukrainian commander operating in the Lyptsi direction stated on May 30 that Russian forces are attempting to concentrate infantry near Hlyboke and are transferring infantry to the area with light armored vehicles, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).[20] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 31 that the Russian offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast has stalled because Russian forces could not effectively isolate the battlefield, Ukrainian drones have prevented Russian infantry from advancing, and Russian counter-battery warfare has failed to constrain Ukrainian artillery fire.[21]

 

Fighting continued in the Vovchansk direction on June 1, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces continued assaults near and within Vovchansk on May 31 and June 1, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 1 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk and Starytsya (west of Vovchansk).[22]

Ukrainian officials continue to warn that Russian forces could launch offensive operations in the Zolochiv direction (northwest of Kharkiv City). Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on June 1 that Ukrainian officials are concerned that Russian forces may intensify their actions in the Zolochiv direction and that Ukraine is monitoring Russian behavior in the area.[23] Synehubov reported on May 30 that Russian forces have not concentrated a "strike group" in the Zolochiv direction but that Russian forces could redirect forces from the Lyptsi and Vovchansk directions to the Zolochiv direction for offensive operations.[24] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 26 that Russian forces are preparing for new offensive actions and are concentrating a grouping of an unspecified size near the Ukrainian border 90 kilometers northwest of Kharkiv City, which could allow Russian forces to launch offensive operations in the Zolochiv direction.[25] Russian concentrations near the Zolochiv direction and possible offensive operations in the area are likely intended to further fix and draw Ukrainian forces along a wider front in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Kupyansk amid continued fighting along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on June 1. Geolocated footage published on May 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Novoselivske (southeast of Kupyansk).[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east and southeast of Stelmakhivka (southeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[27] Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kyslivka, Berestove, and Stelmakhivka; southwest of Svatove near Novoyehorivka, Druzhelyubivka, and Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske; and southwest of Kreminna near Dibrova on May 31 and June 1.[28] Elements of the Russian 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and the 288th Artillery Brigade (1st GTA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[29]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued attacks in the Siversk direction near Rozdolivka (south of Siversk) and near Ivano-Darivka and Vyimka (both southeast of Siversk) on May 31 and June 1, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[30]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced east of Chasiv Yar amid continued ground attacks in the area on June 1. Geolocated footage published on June 1 shows that Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of Ivanivske (east of Chasiv Yar).[31] Additional geolocated footage published on May 31 shows a Russian MT-LB cross the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal near Kalynivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar) and drop off at least 10 Russian infantry.[32] The footage shows a Ukrainian drone promptly striking at least a third of the infantry and the Russian MT-LB then driving along a road to the northwest as the remaining infantry disperse.[33] The prompt Ukrainian strike against the Russian infantry group suggests that Ukrainian forces have extensive visibility in the area, and ISW assesses that the Russian infantry group likely did not survive the assault and that Russian forces were not able to establish enduring positions in the area as a result of this particular activity. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces may be approaching the east bank of the canal but noted that no Russian sources have claimed that Russian forces have crossed the canal since a recent Ukrainian report stating that Russian forces had crossed the canal.[34] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated on May 17 that Russian forces had reached the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal and sometimes crossed the canal with infantry "at first" but that Russian forces "did not last long" on the west bank of the canal.[35] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces did cross the canal but provided no further details.[36] Fighting also continued in eastern Chasiv Yar, northeast of Chasiv Year near Bohdanivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Kurdyumivka on May 31 and June 1.[37]

 

Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on June 1 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced west of Solovyove (northwest of Avdiivka) and southeast of Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka).[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Avdiivka near Novopokrovske and north of Netaylove, and west of Avdiivka near Semenivka and  Yasnobrodivka.[39] Russian forces also continued ground attacks northwest of Avdiivka near Zelene Pole, Novooleksandrivka, Novoselivka Persha, Yevhenivka, and Prohres; west of Avdiivka near Umanske; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske on May 31 and June 1.[40]

 

Russian forces continued ground attacks west and southwest of Donetsk City on June 1, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued advancing within central Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City), and one milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers west from Solodke (southwest of Donetsk City).[41] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Fighting also continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Paraskoviivka, and Vodyane on May 31 and June 1.[42] Elements of the Russian 57th Infantry Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly fighting in forest areas east of Kostyantynivka, elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly fighting south of Kostyantynivka, and elements of the 10th Tank Regiment (3rd AC) are reportedly fighting near Paraskoviivka.[43] Elements of the Russian 95th Infantry Regiment (formerly 123rd Infantry Regiment, 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) and 95th Spetsnaz Brigade are reportedly operating near Vuhledar.[44]

 

Fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka) on May 31.[45] Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) continue to operate near Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[46]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 1, but there were no changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces opened a new direction of attack near Nesteryanka (west of Robotyne), likely referring to recent Russian offensive operations near Novoandriivka and Shcherbaky (both west of Robotyne).[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Shcherbaky and noted that fighting in the area has previously been positional.[48] Positional fighting continued near Robotyne, east of Robotyne near Verbove, north of Roboytne near Novodanylivka, northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka, and west of Robotyne near Novoandriivka on May 31 and June 1.[49]

 

Positional fighting continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on the evening of May 31, but there were no reports of ongoing fighting in the area on June 1.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are operating on Frolova and Nestryha islands in the Dnipro River Delta and on islands near Kozachi Laheri and Korsunka.[51]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian Ministry of Justice designated the "Way Home" social movement, a movement of relatives of mobilized Russian servicemembers that has been calling for their relatives' demobilization, as a "foreign agent" on June 1.[52] The Kremlin has previously suppressed the "Way Home" movement's protests, and Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported that Kremlin outlets RIA Novosti and TASS did not report the movement's "foreign agent" designation on June 1.[53] In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Soviet leadership experienced first-hand the influence that social movements of relatives of Russian soldiers wielded, and the Kremlin likely aims to censor and discredit similar movements before they garner similar influence.[54]

Select Russian milbloggers discussed the possibility of Russia introducing political commissars to the Russian military. One Russian milblogger called for the return of political commissars to monitor the implementation of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) orders and to collect information for the Russian MoD.[55] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD already has a political commissar institution, but it is not functional.[56] A third milblogger argued that Russian political commissars will not be effective without first fixing "demotivating factors" among Russian servicemembers, such as poor training, insufficient equipment, significant losses, the lack of troop rotations, and the lack of a timeline for demobilization.[57] Another milblogger claimed that these new political commissars would have a poor ideology and claimed that Russia needs a state ideology, particularly one centered around a long war for the commissars to be effective.[58] The United Kingdom MoD reported on May 27 that the Russian MoD is issuing a new journal for political instruction that aims to indoctrinate Russian soldiers into the Kremlin's justifications for the war in Ukraine.[59]

European Union (EU) High Commissioner Josep Borrell stated on June 1 that the EU does not have evidence that the People's Republic of China (PRC) has supplied Russia with arms but noted that the distinction between arms and non-arms is unclear since some items are considered dual use.[60] Borrell stated that Chinese exports to Russia have increased significantly in the past two years and that the EU is monitoring any possible Chinese sanctions evasion measures.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec stated on June 1 that its subsidiary High Precision Complexes has created the "Depesha" and "Buggy" multifunctional robotic systems, which Russian forces are testing on the battlefield in Ukraine.[61] Rostec stated that the "Depesha's" load capacity is 150 kilograms and the "Buggy's" capacity is 250 kilograms. Rostec stated that Russian forces can use the remote-controlled robotic systems to deliver provisions, ammunition, and fuel to the frontline; evacuate wounded; conduct strikes on personnel and fortifications; and mine territory. Rostec stated that both systems can act as ground-based kamikaze drones that detonate upon contact with a target.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Kremlin mouthpieces expressed anger at Western efforts to censor and arrest Russian journalists and propagandists justifying Russia's war against Ukraine and Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Legal Director for the Clooney Foundation for Justice's Docket Project Anna Neistat told Voice of America in an interview published on May 30 that the Clooney Foundation is appealing to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and European countries to investigate and prosecute Russian propagandists and journalists intentionally "incit[ing] genocide" and spreading propaganda justifying an "aggressive war."[62] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov responded to Neistat's interview on May 31 and claimed that this effort is "crazy," and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova called this effort political persecution.[63] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev criticized and threatened Clooney Foundation co-founder and actor George Clooney.[64]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://t.me/ComAFUA/303 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02yGtfm3GRzrU9QdNSwSeN7c8qsqXhKucKZ97VKoWbEGgVMeThGaG29XXXx3yVZM7Zl ; https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-26-2/

[2] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/06/01/u-povitryanyh-sylah-zsu-rozpovily-pro-kombinovanu-ataku-voroga-1-chervnya/

[3] https://www.facebook.com/german.galushchenko/posts/pfbid0itRBnSbZv94B7Gn1TErZYRvWka5RceiQ7T9LxckXAPPSuj1jyZmhfwRjceR9arFYl ; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/2893 ; https://suspilne dot media/758847-ukrenergo-e-poskodzenna-obladnanna-na-energoobektah-u-5-oblastah/

[4] https://www.facebook.com/uhepress/posts/pfbid0ocRfEwE7CY9B82iBTdzdnFuB31Z9z4mFy4QWc8jHsztg44Vt6jFHKQYUv4YMQoJul ; https://t.me/dtek_ua/1562

[5] https://t.me/rybar/60575 ; https://t.me/sashakots/47053; https://t.me/epoddubny/20022; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16042

[6] https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/14226 ; https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/951 ; https://t.me/vinnytskaODA/12802 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/7891 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/29611 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/29616 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/5367 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/9653 ; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/20079; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/3591 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/758841-rf-udarila-iskanderom-po-balaklii-vranci-1-cervna-poraneni-11-ludej-sered-akih-vosmero-ditej-i-vagitna-zinka/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/758735-1-cervna-golovni-novini-harkova-ta-oblasti-udar-po-balaklii/

[7] https://www.voanews.com/a/white-house-q-a-us-policy-evolves-with-threats-against-ukraine/7638583.html

[8] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/31/biden-ukraine-kyiv-zelenskyy-00161082

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2024

[10] https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-belgium-zelenskiy-military-aid/32966513.html

[11] https://fd dot nl/politiek/1518085/minister-ollongren-ik-vind-dat-oekraine-het-recht-heeft-militaire-doelen-over-de-grens-aan-te-vallen

[12] https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text#:~:text=Article%2051,maintain%20international%20peace%20and%20security.

[13] https://www.facebook.com/watch/zelenskyy.official/?ref=embed_video ; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2024/06/1/7458707/ ;

[14] https://www.facebook.com/watch/zelenskyy.official/?ref=embed_video ; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2024/06/1/7458707/ ;

[15] https://www.facebook.com/watch/zelenskyy.official/?ref=embed_video ; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2024/06/1/7458707/ ;

[16] https://www.facebook.com/watch/zelenskyy.official/?ref=embed_video ; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/rus/news/2024/06/1/7458707/ ; 

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051824

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051824 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2024%C2%A0; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/44063 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20262 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a5KDhC5QzJ6vgXa26QFGXrTAG8LxJCnW4AcoZq1HarqQSeZMKwTv3Z5d8AEsutZkl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031UtLQZpJ3p3Gq6U65NoN6uAwVj6VKdvZ1wjWdLH6e5u8hizNegDyGQAs2x2JfpXyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0232Dm1a66tS49cXkNjhYWerjK1tbJd3MTQiV7pE6h4tSCNazBnAvf8CkThLPeZY5al

[20] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BQw--o6dnqg ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/742913-sproba-nastupu-rf-na-pivnoci-harkivsini-so-vidbuvaetsa-na-prikordonni-10-travna/

[21] https://t.me/playcivilization/1473

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031UtLQZpJ3p3Gq6U65NoN6uAwVj6VKdvZ1wjWdLH6e5u8hizNegDyGQAs2x2JfpXyl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/39305 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20262 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11312 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/44063 ;

[23] https://t.me/synegubov/9806

[24] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/757631-udarnogo-skupcenna-rosijskih-vijsk-poblizu-zolocivskoi-gromadi-nemae-sinegubov/

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052624

[26]  https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5691

[27] https://t.me/motopatriot/23481

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FzMJPLwxZw2CH65Bh5NBBnT9HgcMe6MiLsM4Qci2jrkCpMfMJBZ3yDUEpuhuuq81l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0232Dm1a66tS49cXkNjhYWerjK1tbJd3MTQiV7pE6h4tSCNazBnAvf8CkThLPeZY5al ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031UtLQZpJ3p3Gq6U65NoN6uAwVj6VKdvZ1wjWdLH6e5u8hizNegDyGQAs2x2JfpXyl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a5KDhC5QzJ6vgXa26QFGXrTAG8LxJCnW4AcoZq1HarqQSeZMKwTv3Z5d8AEsutZkl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/39305 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69456 ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/19201

[29] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125572

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FzMJPLwxZw2CH65Bh5NBBnT9HgcMe6MiLsM4Qci2jrkCpMfMJBZ3yDUEpuhuuq81l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mhvJDquszbipmiUPje5pHZ4uZ88wDTNgAMfcF7192mQVaAgzKHMr3X12dJ7bNKil; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0232Dm1a66tS49cXkNjhYWerjK1tbJd3MTQiV7pE6h4tSCNazBnAvf8CkThLPeZY5al; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0232Dm1a66tS49cXkNjhYWerjK1tbJd3MTQiV7pE6h4tSCNazBnAvf8CkThLPeZY5al; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a5KDhC5QzJ6vgXa26QFGXrTAG8LxJCnW4AcoZq1HarqQSeZMKwTv3Z5d8AEsutZkl

[31] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5697; https://t.me/Phoenix_ORKOhub/129

[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5702; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/15561

[33] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5702; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/15561

[34] https://t.me/motopatriot/23491

[35] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bf-_1fjJuxc

[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11339

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mhvJDquszbipmiUPje5pHZ4uZ88wDTNgAMfcF7192mQVaAgzKHMr3X12dJ7bNKil; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0232Dm1a66tS49cXkNjhYWerjK1tbJd3MTQiV7pE6h4tSCNazBnAvf8CkThLPeZY5al; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031UtLQZpJ3p3Gq6U65NoN6uAwVj6VKdvZ1wjWdLH6e5u8hizNegDyGQAs2x2JfpXyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a5KDhC5QzJ6vgXa26QFGXrTAG8LxJCnW4AcoZq1HarqQSeZMKwTv3Z5d8AEsutZkl

[38] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1796889255815299423; https://x.com/small10space/status/1796831369412149740; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5699; https://t.me/osirskiy/709

[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125547; https://t.me/motopatriot/23495; https://t.me/dva_majors/44063; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11338

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mhvJDquszbipmiUPje5pHZ4uZ88wDTNgAMfcF7192mQVaAgzKHMr3X12dJ7bNKil; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0232Dm1a66tS49cXkNjhYWerjK1tbJd3MTQiV7pE6h4tSCNazBnAvf8CkThLPeZY5al; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031UtLQZpJ3p3Gq6U65NoN6uAwVj6VKdvZ1wjWdLH6e5u8hizNegDyGQAs2x2JfpXyl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a5KDhC5QzJ6vgXa26QFGXrTAG8LxJCnW4AcoZq1HarqQSeZMKwTv3Z5d8AEsutZkl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11334; https://t.me/dva_majors/44063; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11338

[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11313; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11337

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FzMJPLwxZw2CH65Bh5NBBnT9HgcMe6MiLsM4Qci2jrkCpMfMJBZ3yDUEpuhuuq81l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mhvJDquszbipmiUPje5pHZ4uZ88wDTNgAMfcF7192mQVaAgzKHMr3X12dJ7bNKil; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mhvJDquszbipmiUPje5pHZ4uZ88wDTNgAMfcF7192mQVaAgzKHMr3X12dJ7bNKil; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031UtLQZpJ3p3Gq6U65NoN6uAwVj6VKdvZ1wjWdLH6e5u8hizNegDyGQAs2x2JfpXyl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/11337; https://t.me/wargonzo/20262

[43] https://t.me/rusich_army/14948 (Kostyantynivka and Paraskoviivka)

[44] https://t.me/wargonzo/20272; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125507 (Vuhledar); https://ria dot ru/20230223/donbass-1853760019.html

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031UtLQZpJ3p3Gq6U65NoN6uAwVj6VKdvZ1wjWdLH6e5u8hizNegDyGQAs2x2JfpXyl

[46] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/125513

[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69463; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/11755

[48] https://t.me/dva_majors/44063

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0232Dm1a66tS49cXkNjhYWerjK1tbJd3MTQiV7pE6h4tSCNazBnAvf8CkThLPeZY5al ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031UtLQZpJ3p3Gq6U65NoN6uAwVj6VKdvZ1wjWdLH6e5u8hizNegDyGQAs2x2JfpXyl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/9685

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031UtLQZpJ3p3Gq6U65NoN6uAwVj6VKdvZ1wjWdLH6e5u8hizNegDyGQAs2x2JfpXyl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/9685

[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/44063

[52] https://t.me/istories_media/6492 ; https://t.me/astrapress/56735; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18890

[53] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18899; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020324

[54] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020324

[55] https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/10359

[56] https://t.me/DmitriySteshin/10864

[57] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1009

[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/43827 

[59] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2024

[60] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/shangri-la-dialogue-speech-high-representative-josep-borrell-security-asia-pacific-region_en

[61] https://rostec dot ru/media/pressrelease/rostekh-sozdal-pervyy-v-mire-nazemnyy-fpv-dron-kamikadze-depesha/

[62] https://www.golosameriki.com/a/anna-neistat-interview/7636139.html

[63] https://t.me/tass_agency/251976; https://t.me/tass_agency/251959

 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/252002

[64] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1796847265878888814 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/252109; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/69473