Publications

Belarus Warning Update: Belarusian President Lukashenko Reaches Agreement with the Kremlin for Russian Intervention

August 15, 2020 - ISW Press

4:00 pm EDT: Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenko and the Kremlin have reached an agreement for a potential Russian intervention to crush protests. Lukashenko stated Russia is prepared to intervene in Belarus in a meeting with the Belarusian general staff the evening of August 15: Lukashenko stated "we have an agreement with the Russian Federation in the framework of the Union State and the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization). These moments are fitting to this pact. We agreed that at the first request there will be comprehensive assistance provided to ensure the security of the Republic of Belarus.” Belarusian state media edited its reporting on Lukashenko’s statement at 9:45 pm local time to insert the comment that Lukashenko would only invite Russian forces “in the event of external military threats.” Lukashenko will likely increasingly frame the protests as foreign-backed to legitimize calling for a Russian intervention and in a continuing effort to separate protest leaders from the mass of the Belarusian people.

Belarus Warning Update: Russian Hybrid Intervention into Belarus is Likely Imminent

August 15, 2020 - ISW Press

12:00 pm EDT: A Russian hybrid intervention into Belarus to support Belarussian president Lukashenko is likely imminent. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko had a phone call on August 15 to discuss the situation in Belarus. Putin thanked Lukashenko for returning 32 detained Wagner personnel on August 14. The Kremlin’s readout of the call stated “all problems that have arisen will be resolved soon” and characterized the protests as “destructive forces” trying to harm the Union State. A Kremlin intervention would likely consist of Russian forces in unmarked uniforms supporting crackdowns on protesters. The Kremlin has not previously characterized the protests in Belarus as destructive. Kremlin-linked media outlets reported neutrally and slightly sympathetically towards protests in Belarus as of August 14.

Belarus Warning Update: Russia May Send "Little Green Men" to Belarus

August 14, 2020 - ISW Press

Russia may send irregular forces into Belarus to quash growing protests against Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenko. A senior Kremlin media official’s August 14 statement supporting such a move is a significant inflection in Moscow’s characterization of the protests in Belarus. It could be part of a new Russian information campaign to shape conditions for a Russian-backed intervention into Belarus under the pretext of restoring order. A Russian intervention in Belarus that resulted in the stationing of Russian ground forces in the country would dramatically increase the threat to NATO’s ability to protect the Baltic States and mark another advance in Putin’s efforts to regain Russian suzerainty over the former Soviet Union.

Iraq Situation Report: August 5-11, 2020

August 14, 2020 - ISW Press

Iran’s proxy militia network in Iraq is accelerating its attacks on US facilities and Iraqi contractors working with the US-led Coalition, undermining Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s attempts to demonstrate strength and stability ahead of the next round of the US-Iraq Strategic Dialogue. Likely Iranian proxies claimed two real and one false IED attack on Iraqi contractors and likely conducted two rocket attacks on the US Embassy. The proxies aim to discourage Iraqi cooperation with the US-led Coalition and make Kadhimi appear weak ahead of the Dialogue. Kadhimi will likely struggle to constrain militia activity in the leadup to the next round of the Dialogue on August 20, which will cover a variety of mutual interests including US-Iraqi security cooperation and the future of US forces in Iraq.

Russia in Review: Turmoil in Belarus Benefits the Kremlin

August 14, 2020 - ISW Press

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will likely survive current mass protests but will emerge substantially more vulnerable to Russian pressure. Lukashenko claims to have won the August 9 election with 80 percent of the vote, sparking mass protests. Lukashenko is successfully containing the demonstrations and forced leading opposition candidate Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya to flee to Lithuania and denounce the protests. Lukashenko’s domestic position is nevertheless weakened by these unprecedented displays of public opposition, and his ability to resist pressure from the Kremlin is reduced.

The Kremlin Leverages Cyber Cooperation Deals

August 13, 2020 - ISW Press

The Kremlin is successfully expanding its global cyber footprint to contest the West by signing cooperation deals in the field of international information and communications technologies (ICTs). The Kremlin prioritizes these deals to set conditions to expand its access to global technical networks and infrastructure, as well as to develop its human networks and institutional links around the world. The Kremlin launched this campaign in 2014, shortly before releasing an updated information security doctrine in 2016, which continues to guide Russian cyber policy. This campaign supports the Kremlin’s strategic goal of subverting Western global influence via nontraditional means. The Kremlin will likely use these deals to increase its cyber-attack capabilities and expand influence in key regions. The Kremlin may additionally use these deals to garner support for a Kremlin-friendly resolution on ICTs in the UN to shape international norms in cyberspace.

Iraq Situation Report: July 29 - Aug. 5, 2020

August 7, 2020 - ISW Press

Iran-aligned actors continue to resist Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s campaign to steadily implement his core promises to the Iraqi people. Kadhimi demonstrated tangible success in holding security forces accountable for unlawful violence against protesters by arresting members of the Iran-aligned Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) and removing the group’s commander. Kadhimi fulfilled another central promise by setting a date for early elections in June 2021, drawing backlash from entrenched political elites who fear losing their power base through free and fair elections. Kadhimi still faces an uphill battle to hold these elections; Iraq’s parliament must pass a new elections law, draw electoral districts, and approve new rules for the Supreme Federal Court before the elections can be held.

Syria Situation Report: July 22 - Aug. 4, 2020

August 6, 2020 - ISW Press

The COVID-19 outbreak in regime-held Syria is likely spreading at a significant rate and increasing internal economic and social pressures on the Assad regime. A regime official estimated there are over 112,000 cases in Greater Damascus alone. The regime is likely incapable of preventing the spread. The outbreaks in regime areas will likely spread to anti-Assad controlled areas in the northwest and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-held areas in the northeast, further threatening stability in those regions.

Iraq Situation Report July 22-28, 2020

July 31, 2020 - ISW Press

Iran’s Iraqi proxy militias are accelerating their campaign to constrain Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s attempts to reign in militias and reclaim Iraqi sovereignty.

Iraq Situation Report: July 15-21, 2020

July 24, 2020 - ISW Press

Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s efforts to preserve Iraqi sovereignty by shifting its regional relationships away from Iranian domination have been met with a mix of successes and setbacks. The hospitalization of the King of Saudi Arabia forced Kadhimi to cancel his symbolically important first planned foreign visit to Saudi Arabia on July 20. Iran capitalized on the cancellation, dispatching its foreign minister in a pre-planned visit to Baghdad and then hosting Kadhimi in Tehran for meetings with Iran’s Supreme Leader as Kadhimi’s de facto first foreign trip. The United States continued to pressure Gulf countries to increase their energy cooperation with Iraq even as Prime Minister Kadhimi faced domestic and foreign resistance from neighboring Iran. Demonstrators are holding Kadhimi responsible for Iraq’s insufficient electricity supply, diluting his popular support. Continued criminal activity by Iran-backed groups, including the kidnapping of a German activist in Baghdad and repeated threats toward Iraqi allies, will also damage Kadhimi’s ability to secure buy-in from regional and global partners.

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