Publications

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 2, 2024

December 2, 2024 - ISW Press

Prominent voices within the Russian information space continue to emphasize that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine that results in anything less than total Ukrainian capitulation.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 1, 2024

December 1, 2024 - ISW Press

The Russian MoD reportedly replaced Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel with Colonel General Alexander Chaiko who will reprise his previous assignment as commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria, though it remains unclear how Russian operations in Syria may change.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 30, 2024

November 30, 2024 - ISW Press

Kremlin officials responded to Syrian opposition forces' offensive into Syrian regime-held territory on November 29 and 30 and expressed interest in using the Astana Process to respond to the situation. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un during his unannounced trip to Pyongyang on November 30.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29, 2024

November 29, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to laud the technical specifications of the recently launched Oreshnik ballistic missile and threaten additional Oreshnik strikes against Ukraine as part of an intensified Russian reflexive control campaign aimed at forcing the West and Ukraine into self-deterrence. Putin addressed members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) Security Council in Astana, Kazakhstan, on November 28 and reiterated several claims about the Oreshnik ballistic missile, with which Russian forces struck Dnipro City on November 21.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 27, 2024

November 27, 2024 - ISW Press

Ukrainian forces continue to leverage Western-provided weapons to conduct strikes using more complex strike packages against military objects in Russia's deep rear.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 26, 2024

November 26, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian officials continue to demonstrate that the Kremlin aims to seize more territory in Ukraine than it currently occupies and is unwilling to accept compromises or engage in good faith negotiations, no matter who mediates such talks. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin claimed on November 26 that Russia is open to negotiations but stated that Russia "categorically rejects" any "freezing" of the current frontline or the creation of a demilitarized zone.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 25, 2024

November 25, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian forces continue to make significant tactical advances in western Donetsk Oblast and are coming closer to enveloping Velyka Novosilka and advancing towards important Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying the rest of western Donetsk Oblast and running into eastern Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 24, 2024

November 24, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated. The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023. Russian forces’ advances in southeastern Ukraine are largely the result of the discovery and tactical exploitation of vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s lines. Russian forces have been making gradual, tactical advances in southeastern Ukraine since Fall 2024. Russian forces notably have not been able to restore operational maneuver seen during the initial months of Russia's full-scale invasion, and the current Russian tactical advances, although quicker now than in the months of positional warfare that characterized most of 2023 and early 2024, is still far below the Russian rate of advance in March 2022. Russian forces have succeeded in taking advantage of the seizure of Vuhledar for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast, contrary to an incorrect previous ISW assessment that forecasted otherwise. ISW presents the following courses of action (COAs) that the Russian command may be considering given Russian forces’ recent advances.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 23, 2024

November 23, 2024 - ISW Press

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely attempted to cover up the recent removal of the acting commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Colonel General Gennady Anashkin following widespread accusations within the Russian information space that Anashkin's subordinates submitted false frontline progress reports to superiors.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 22, 2024

November 22, 2024 - ISW Press

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian military leadership continue to extol the ballistic missile that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on November 21, likely in an effort to artificially inflate expectations of Russian capabilities and encourage Western and Ukrainian self-deterrence.

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