ISW Senior Research Analyst Jeffrey Dressler discusses the possibility of French withdrawal from Afghanistan following the deadly shooting.
Afghan National Army (ANA)
Damage to the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam in the early hours of June 6 caused massive flooding of the Dnipro River delta, river wetlands, estuaries, and shoreline settlements in Kherson Oblast. Russian and Ukrainian sources began reporting loud noises resembling explosions emanating from the KHPP (across the Dnipro River in the Nova Kakhovka area about 55km northeast of Kherson City) between 0200 and 0230 local time on June 6, followed by reports of rushing water and an overall increase in the water level of the Dnipro. Ukraine’s Kherson Oblast Administration announced the evacuation of several raions (districts) of the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast as of 0730 local time and reported that the Tyahinka, Odradokamianka, Beryslav, Ivanivka, Mykilske, Tokarivka, Ponyativka, Bilozerka, and Ostriv areas had been partially or completely flooded. Russian Kherson Oblast occupation officials announced the evacuation of the Nova Kakhovka, Hola Prystan, and Oleshky raions. Ukrainian officials noted that over 80 settlements are within the flood zone in Kherson Oblast. General Director of Ukraine’s hydroelectric power plant regulator Ukrhydroenergo Ihor Syrota said that water is draining from the Kakhovka Reservoir at a rate of 15-20cm an hour, which Syrota stated means that the reservoir will be entirely dry in the next four days. A researcher at the Ukrainian Department of Water Bioresources at the Kherson Oblast Agrarian and Economic University, Yevhen Korzhov, noted that the rate of water discharge from the dam may lead to flooding as far downstream as Kizomys, about 120km southwest from the KHPP. A Russian milblogger claimed that the water level in Nova Kakhovka, immediately adjacent to the KHPP, reached as high as 11m. Various Russian sources additionally highlighted footage showing that several east (left) bank settlements, including Oleshky, Korsunka, and Dnipryany, are entirely or nearly entirely underwater.
Leaving a bare-bones U.S. presence will risk a return of the Taliban—and civil war.
The Afghan National Army (ANA) is arguably the most respected institution in Afghanistan. Keeping it that way as it becomes more self-sufficient will contribute to all of NATO’S post-2014 strategic aims.
The success of transitioning security responsibility to the Afghans is contingent upon their willingness and ability to receive the handoff.
Will the United States continue to conduct counterterrorism operations in South Asia? That question is central to any discussion about U.S. troop presence and mission in Afghanistan.
Following NATO’s Chicago Summit in May 2012, defense officials met in Brussels October 10 to discuss issues facing the NATO alliance. The mission in Afghanistan was their primary focus, and the meeting produced several critical strategic announcements.
This monograph provides a framework for understanding operational art in counterinsurgency campaigns. In addition to the framework, the monograph describes how one set of strategic civil-military leaders achieved sufficient alignment in order to produce unity of effort and coherency of action throughout the civil-military organization.