Israel–Hamas War (Iran Updates)

This page collects the refocused Iran Updates that ISW and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute began publishing on October 7, 2023. ISW and CTP refocused the Iran Update to cover the Israel–Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance.

Click here to view the updates published from October 7 to December 31, 2023.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. ISW and CTP at the American Enterprise Institute provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in ISW's campaign assessments of the Israel-Hamas war. 


 

Iran Update, April 27, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps 

Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Key Takeaways:

  • Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to target Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure across the Gaza Strip.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last information cutoff on April 26.
  • Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 26.
  • Yemen: The Houthis launched three ballistic missiles targeting two commercial vessels in the Red Sea on April 26.
  • Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it launched one drone targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Haifa on April 26.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and the public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces continued to target Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure across the Gaza Strip. The IDF Air Force struck over 25 militia targets across the Gaza Strip since CTP-ISW's last information cut off on April 26.[1] The 679th Armored Brigade directed an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters who the IDF said were preparing to fire at Israeli forces from a building in an unspecified area of the Central Gaza Strip.[2] The IDF Air Force targeted a vehicle transporting eight Hamas fighters in the central Gaza Strip.[3] The IDF Air Force also struck a rocket or mortar launch position in Khan Younis as Palestinian fighters prepared to fire from the position.[4]

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine targeted Israeli forces east of Khan Younis.[5]

The IDF reported on April 27 that the Israeli Defense Ministry began construction of a humanitarian aid distribution area on the coast of the central Gaza Strip.[6] This aid distribution point will service the US-constructed pier off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last information cutoff on April 26.[7]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 26.[8]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Houthis launched three ballistic missiles targeting two commercial vessels in the Red Sea on April 26.[9] US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that the Houthis launched three anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Barbados-flagged, Liberia-operated Maisha and United Kingdom-owned, Panama-flagged Andromeda Star.[10] CENTCOM and British maritime security firm Ambrey reported minor damage to the Andromeda Star.[11] The Houthi military spokesperson claimed the attack targeted the Andromeda Star, adding that Houthi forces also shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over Saada Governorate, northern Yemen.[12]

 

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it launched one drone targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Haifa on April 26.[13] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim. Israeli officials and media have not commented on the claimed attack at the time of this writing.

Iran Update, April 26, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps 

Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Christina Harward, Liam Karr, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Public meetings between officials from Russia, Belarus, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea have surged in recent days, with at least 10 high-level bilateral meetings between April 22 and 26, underscoring the deepening multilateral partnership these states are constructing to confront the West. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting of defense ministers in Astana, Kazakhstan on April 26.[1] Shoigu met with PRC Minister of National Defense Dong Jun on the sidelines of the meeting and highlighted the “unprecedented” level of Russo-Sino relations.[2] Shoigu also met with Iranian Defense Minister Mohammed Reza Ashtiani and stated that Russia is prepared to expand Russo-Iranian military and military-technical cooperation.[3] Ashtiani is primarily responsible for managing arms procurement and sales and the Iranian defense industrial base, which makes these meetings particularly noteworthy. Dong and Ashtiani held a bilateral meeting and called for increased Sino-Iranian cooperation, including in the defense and military spheres.[4] Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin also met with Dong and Ashtiani at the SCO meeting on April 26.[5] The April 26 SCO meeting marked Iran’s first SCO meeting as a member state since joining the organization in July 2023.[6]

The SCO meetings are only the latest in a series of bilateral meetings between Russia, Belarus, the PRC, Iran, and North Korea. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Representative to the Russian President for Middle East and African Countries Mikhail Bogdanov met with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Ali Bagheri Kani in Moscow on April 26.[7] Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev met with PRC Communist Party Politburo member Chen Wenqing on April 23 in St. Petersburg and discussed strengthening cooperation between Russian and PRC intelligence services.[8] Patrushev also met with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian in St. Petersburg on April 24, and they signed a memorandum of understanding between the two countries’ security councils.[9] A North Korean delegation led by Minister for External Economic Relations Yun Jong Ho traveled to Iran on April 23.[10] Head of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Department of International Military Cooperation Major General Valery Revenko met with Iranian Deputy Minister of Defense and rector of the Malek Ashtar University of Technology Mehdi Jafari on April 22 in Minsk.[11] Although the details and results of these various bilateral meetings are unclear, the overt increase in their number and frequency is notable and demonstrates the group’s increased eagerness to publicly display its military and political cooperation in its competition and confrontation against the West.

The above text is featured in the Institute for the Study of War’s Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment published on April 26, 2024.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political and Political Affairs and chief nuclear negotiator Ali Bageri Kani met with Russian and Chinese officials in a BRICS meeting in Moscow, Russia on April 25. Bagheri Kani discussed the importance of bilateral ties and regional issues with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister for Middle East and North Africa Affairs Mikhail Bogdanov and PRC Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs Zhai Jun.[12]

Western reporting has exaggerated how much Hamas has moderated its position toward Israel following an interview with a top Hamas official.[13] Western media reported that Khalil al Hayya, the deputy chairman of Hamas' Political Bureau, said during an interview on April 25 that Hamas is prepared to reach a truce of five or more years with Israel and implied that Hamas would turn into a political party and turn its military wing into “the national [Palestinian] army” if Israel recognizes a fully sovereign Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.[14] Western reporting framed Hayya‘s statements to mean that Hamas‘ military wing would “dissolve“ if Israel recognized a fully sovereign Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.[15] Hayya did not mention abandoning Hamas’ objective of destroying Israel, nor did he say that the new ”sovereign Palestinian state” would recognize Israel.

Hamas sees control over the Gaza Strip and West Bank as an interim step in the destruction of the Israeli state. Hayya’s interview is entirely consistent with this position. Hamas’ military wing’s website says that the group can “accept the interim liberation of parts of Palestine” and an “interim truce” but that these interim steps only “serve as a warrior’s rest stop.”[16] The same page adds that during this interim period, Hamas will not recognize Israel, and Hayya did not indicate that Hamas would do so.[17] A five-year truce would serve Hamas’ purposes by allowing the group to prepare for the next round of fighting. Hamas started the current war by breaking a period of relative calm between itself and Israel on October 6, and there is no reason to believe Hamas will honor a future “truce.”

Iran is attempting to expand Iran’s economic influence in Africa by increasing its economic ties with non-Western partners. Iran likely aims to use these economic ties to circumvent sanctions. Iran held its second annual Iran-Africa Trade Summit in Tehran, Iran, on April 26. Iran’s Ministry of Industry, Mine, and Trade organized the event.[18] Iranian media reported that officials from over 30 African Union member states attended the summit.[19] It is unclear how many African Union member state officials attended the inaugural event in 2023. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi gave a speech at the summit stressing the need to strengthen trade between Iran and African nations.[20]

The Raisi administration has long sought to expand Iran’s economic influence in Africa as part of its “neighborhood policy.”[21] Raisi focused his July 2023 trips to Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe—then marking the first Iranian presidential visit to Africa in 11 years—on improving economic ties with these countries.[22] Increased Iranian economic cooperation with African states will not enable the regime to fix the structural flaws in its economy, however. Greater bilateral trade with foreign countries would enable Iran to increase its capital inflows but will not solve the problems that cause Iran’s economic instability. Fundamental economic reforms—such as reducing the dominance of parastatal organizations in Iran’s economy and combatting corruption and nepotism—would be necessary to meaningfully improve Iran’s economy.[23]

Raisi held separate and private meetings about improving economic ties with Zimbabwean Vice President Constantino Chiwenga and Burkinabe Prime Minister Apollinaire J. Kyélem de Tambèla on the sidelines of the trade summit.[24] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and regime-affiliated outlets have previously encouraged increased economic engagement with Africa to obtain gold payments that Iran can use to evade sanctions.[25] Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe are among the top ten gold producers on the continent, making Raisi’s meetings with officials from these countries particularly noteworthy.[26] Israeli media reported that Zimbabwe signed a uranium deal with Iran in 2013, which Zimbabwe has since denied.[27]

Iran may seek to export arms to some African Union member states like Burkina Faso as part of its effort to improve ties with African states. Iranian officials have repeatedly expressed interest in using arms sales to generate revenue for the economy, particularly following Iran’s success in supplying Russia drones to use in Ukraine.[28] The Burkinabe, Malian, and Nigerien juntas could be amenable to such sales to combat the growing Salafi-jihadi threat in their countries. Weapons sales from Tehran could address their needs while aligning with their anti-Western and aggressively militarized counterinsurgency outlooks.[29] Iran has sent Ababil-3 multi-role and Mohajer-6 multi-role drones to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Western Sahara since 2021, setting a potential precedent for future shipments to the Sahel.[30] Turkey currently supplies drones to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. However, Burkina Faso has purchased Turkish drones as recently as April 8.[31]

Iran is facing an increasing threat from Salafi-jihadi groups in southeastern Iran. Iranian security forces conducted a drone strike targeting a vehicle carrying “anti-Iran militants” roughly 60 kilometers southeast of Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on April 25. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that the strike killed two “terrorists” but provided no further details on the identity of the targeted individuals.[32] Iran’s use of drones to target these “terrorists” is exceptional, and the choice to use drones in this capacity suggests that Iran is facing an increasingly tenuous security environment in southeastern Iran. The strike follows the Balochi Salafi-jihadi group Jaish al Adl’s unprecedented attacks in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on April 14. CTP previously noted that the April 14 attacks highlighted the uptick in anti-regime militancy and the increasingly precarious state of the Iranian internal security environment.

The US Department of Defense reported on April 26 that the United States began construction on a floating pier off the coast of the central Gaza Strip.[33] This US-constructed pier will serve as an additional route for humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. The US Defense Department told the Wall Street Journal that the World Health Organization (WHO) will inspect the aid in Cyprus and commercial vessels will transfer the aid to the US-constructed floating pier.[34] US Army vessels will transport the aid from the floating pier to a temporary pier connected to the Gaza Strip by a causeway. Trucks from a “third country” will transport the aid from the temporary pier to distribution centers run by the United Nations and ”others.”[35] The BBC cited unspecified US officials who said that the US-constructed floating pier will be operational in early May.[36]

US Department of Defense Spokesperson Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder clarified that unidentified Palestinian fighters mortared the marshaling yard where humanitarian aid will be distributed.[37] CTP-ISW reported on April 25 that unspecified Palestinian fighters mortared construction facilities for the US-built pier in the central Gaza Strip. Israeli media reported that the mortars struck engineering equipment close to the pier.[38]

Egypt’s General Intelligence chief Abbas Kamel met with Israeli negotiators in Israel on April 26 to revive ceasefire negotiations. Israeli and Western media reported that Egyptian officials were pessimistic that an agreement could be reached. Israeli officials told the Egyptian delegation that Israel would agree to a hostage exchange that releases 33 hostages instead of the proposed 40 hostages under the US-backed ceasefire proposal.[39] Israel would agree to a ceasefire less than six weeks long in exchange. Israel believes that there are 33 civilian women, children, elderly, and wounded hostages being held in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has refused any hostage exchange agreement that does not include a permanent ceasefire, a full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and the unimpeded return of displaced people to the northern Gaza Strip.[40] Hamas’ negotiating stance has not changed since December 2023.[41] The Wall Street Journal reported that the Egyptian delegation is hoping to use these ceasefire talks to “buy time” for the United States and regional states to pressure Israel to pause preparations for an operation into Rafah citing Egyptian officials “familiar with negotiations.”[42]

Key Takeaways:

  • China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia: Public meetings between officials from Russia, Belarus, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea have surged in recent days, with at least 10 high-level bilateral meetings between April 22 and 26, underscoring the deepening multilateral partnership these states are constructing to confront the West.
  • Russian Defense Minister Shoigu also met with Iranian Defense Minister Mohammed Reza Ashtiani and stated that Russia is prepared to expand Russo-Iranian military and military-technical cooperation.[43] Ashtiani is primarily responsible for managing arms procurement and sales as well as the Iranian defense industrial base as defense minister, which makes these meetings particularly noteworthy.
  • Hamas: Western reporting has exaggerated how much Hamas has moderated its position toward Israel following an interview with a top Hamas official in which the Hamas official said Hamas would adhere to a five-year truce if Israel recognized a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Hamas sees control over the Gaza Strip and West Bank as an interim step in the destruction of the Israeli state and it views any truce with Israel as temporary.
  • Iran in Africa: Iran is attempting to expand Iran’s economic influence in Africa by increasing its economic ties with non-Western partners. Iran likely aims to use these economic ties to circumvent sanctions. The IRGC has previously advocated obtaining access to gold in Africa to circumvent sanctions.
  • Southeastern Iran: Iran is facing an increasing threat from Salafi-jihadi groups in southeastern Iran. Iran used a drone to strike “terrorists” in southeastern Iran. Iran’s use of drones to target these “terrorists” is exceptional, and the choice to use drones in this capacity suggests that Iran is facing an increasingly tenuous security environment in southeastern Iran.
  • Humanitarian Aid in the Gaza Strip: US Department of Defense Spokesperson Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder clarified that unidentified Palestinian fighters mortared the marshaling yard where humanitarian aid will be distributed.
  • Negotiations in the Gaza Strip: Israeli and Western media Egyptian officials are pessimistic that an agreement could be reached between Israel and Hamas to reach a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has not meaningfully changed its negotiating position since December 2023 and refuses to free the hostages it holds without a full Israeli withdrawal from the Strip and a permanent ceasefire.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) conducted separate mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in the Netzarim corridor.[44] The Netzarim corridor is where Israeli forces have established forward operating bases and outposts to facilitate future raids into the northern Gaza Strip.

The US State Department paused its earlier decision to restrict military aid to the Netzah Yehuda Battalion under the Leahy Law.[45] The Netzah Yehuda Battalion is an ultra-orthodox IDF unit that operates mostly in the West Bank. CBS News reported on April 26 that the State Department is reviewing ”additional information regarding the status of the [Netzah Yehuda Battalion]” from Israel and that there was no official determination on the possible Leahy Law violations.[46] Three US sources with knowledge of the issue told Axios on April 20 that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was planning to announce that the United States will ban US military assistance and training provided to the Netzah Yehuda Battalion under the 1997 Leahy Law. The Leahy Law makes it illegal for the US government to fund assistance for foreign security forces in which there is credible information that implicates a unit in the gross violation of human rights. Blinken reported that Israel did not effectively investigate the Netzah Yehuda Battalion for the accused violations.[47]

The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement conducted one rocket attack from the Gaza Strip targeting Sderot on April 26.[48] This is the third consecutive day the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement has conducted rocket attacks into southern Israel.[49]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel 

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last information cutoff on April 25.[50] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces during Israeli operations in the Balata refugee camp in Nablus.[51]

The IDF detained five individuals across the West Bank on April 26.[52] The IDF also separately detained two individuals suspected of planning an attack on a farm in the central West Bank.[53] The IDF confiscated an axe and knives from the suspects.[54]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 25.[55]

Hezbollah said that it fired anti-tank guided missiles, rockets, and mortars targeting Israeli vehicles in Ruwaisat al Alam in Shebaa Farms on April 25.[56] The IDF reported that the attack killed an Israeli civilian.[57] This attack is one of the three attacks noted above.

The IDF conducted an airstrike on April 26 targeting a senior Jamaa al Islamiya member in the Western Bekaa district, roughly nine miles north of Shebaa farms.[58] The IDF airstrike occurred 19 hours after the Hezbollah attack targeting Shebaa Farms on April 25. The IDF said that the Jamaa al Islamiya commander was responsible for several attacks targeting Shebaa Farms and that he “cooperated” with Hamas in Lebanon.[59] Jamaa al Islamiya was founded in 1964 as the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.[60]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Unspecified actors launched a one-way attack drone that killed four Yemeni nationals at the UAE-operated Khor Mor Gas field in Sulaymaniyah Governorate, Iraq, on April 26.[61] The Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Masrour Barzani condemned the attack and stated that the drone “came from a nearby region within Iraq.”[62] Barzani is probably referring to federal Iraq, which describes the areas outside the Kurdistan Region. Unspecified actors conducted drone and rocket attacks that briefly suspended gas production at Khor Mor in January 2024.[63]

The Houthis claimed that they attacked a Liberian-flagged merchant vessel MSC Darwin in the Gulf of Aden and separately launched ballistic missiles and drones targeting unspecified targets in Eilat, Israel, on April 25.[64] US CENTCOM reported that the Houthis launched one anti-ship ballistic missile into the Gulf of Aden but added that it did not damage any ships or cause any injuries.[65] CENTCOM forces destroyed one Houthi unmanned surface vessel and one Houthi unmanned aerial vehicle in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on April 25.[66] CTP-ISW did not observe any media reporting that corroborated the Houthi’s claimed ballistic missile and drone attacks targeting Eilat.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported an unspecified explosion and added that two missiles damaged a commercial vessel 14 nautical miles from al Mokha, Yemen, on April 26.[67] A Yemeni journalist reported that the Houthis launched a ballistic missile from near Taiz around the same time as the UKMTO report.[68]

 

Iran Update, April 25, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Amin Soltani, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Hamas and Palestinian factions are targeting and threatening to target the humanitarian pier in the central Gaza Strip that is meant to distribute aid to the northern Strip. Israeli media report that unspecified Palestinian fighters mortared construction facilities for the US-built pier in the central Gaza Strip on April 25.[1] The mortars struck engineering equipment close to the pier. The World Health Organization (WHO) director general said on April 22 that WHO aid missions to hospitals in northern Gaza have been only “partly successful” due to delays at checkpoints and ongoing fighting in the Gaza Strip.[2] Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Khalil al Hayya separately implied that Hamas would attack any non-Palestinian presence in the Gaza Strip “at sea or on land.”[3] The US-built pier will be off the coast of the Gaza Strip.[4] The decision by Hamas and other Palestinian militia factions to target the pier will further constrict international aid organizations’ ability to distribute aid in the Gaza Strip.[5]

Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al Araji met with two senior Russian officials in St. Petersburg, Russia, on April 24 and 25 after meeting with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Adm. Ali Akbar Ahmadian on April 23. Araji discussed intelligence cooperation and “the situation in the Middle East” during two separate meetings with Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and Russian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Sergei Vershinin on April 24 and 25 respectively.[6] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Adm. Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Patrushev on April 24, one day after Ahmadian met with Araji.[7] Araji and Ahmadian discussed expelling US and international coalition forces from Iraq.[8] The Russian ambassador to Iraq has repeatedly met with senior Iraqi military and political figures, including Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, in 2024 to discuss expanding security cooperation and Russian investment into Iraq.[9] CTP-ISW assessed on February 20 that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence there.[10] Araji is a member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[11]

The IDF conducted a relief-in-place/transfer of authority in the Netzarim corridor on April 25. The Nahal Brigade transferred responsibility for its area of operations to the IDF 2nd Reservist Infantry Brigade and 679th Reservist Armored Brigade on April 25.[12] An Israeli Army Radio journalist reported on April 15 that the IDF 2nd Carmeli Brigade and 679th Armored Brigade will secure the Netzarim corridor and the temporary US-built pier in the central Gaza Strip.[13] The Nahal Brigade will rest to prepare for Israeli operations in Rafah.[14]

Key Takeaways:

 

  • Humanitarian Aid in the Gaza Strip: Unspecified fighters targeted the humanitarian pier in the central Gaza Strip that is meant to distribute aid to the northern Strip. Unspecified Palestinian fighters mortared construction facilities for the US-built pier in the central Gaza Strip on April 25.
  • Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Khalil al Hayya separately implied that Hamas would attack any non-Palestinian presence in the Gaza Strip “at sea or on land.” The US-built pier will be off the coast of the Gaza Strip.
  • Iraq in Russia: The Iranian-linked Iraqi National Security Adviser discussed intelligence cooperation and “the situation in the Middle East” during two separate meetings with senior Russian officials in St. Petersburg. Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence there.
  • Rafah: The IDF Nahal Brigade transferred responsibility for its area of operations in the Netzarim corridor to the IDF 2nd Reservist Infantry Brigade and 679th Reservist Armored Brigade on April 25. The Nahal Brigade will leave the Gaza Strip and rest to prepare for Israeli operations in Rafah.
  • Iran: The Iranian judiciary confirmed the death sentence of 33-year-old dissident Iranian rapper Tomaj Salehi on April 25.

Iran Update, April 24, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear divided on whether to resume attacks targeting US forces. Emirati state media reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah (KH) is advocating for the resumption of attacks but that some militia leaders disagree with KH, citing unidentified Iraqi political and security sources.[1] Emirati state media furthermore reported that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, did not approve the recent attacks on US forces on April 21 and 22, citing unidentified sources “close to Baghdad and [the Iranian-backed Iraqi] armed factions.”[2] These reported fissures are consistent with other recent reports that KH announced the resumption of attacks on US forces on April 22 and then later rescinded the announcement.[3] KH pushing to restart attacks on American forces is unsurprising, moreover, since the group previously disputed orders from the IRGC Quds Force to halt attacks on US targets in February 2024.[4] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq (True Promise Corps) separately criticized unspecified Shia leaders on April 18 for abandoning their efforts to expel US forces, possibly suggesting that the group similarly wants to resume attacks.[5]

KH and other militias supporting the resumption of attacks are responding at least partly to the recent visit of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to Washington, DC. Sudani discussed bilateral security cooperation with US officials during his visit, and his administration signaled that it had arrived at a timeline for the end of the US-led international coalition mission in Iraq.[6] KH’s push to resume attacks suggests that it is dissatisfied with Sudani following the visit. Sudani does not seek the removal of US forces, as CTP-ISW previously reported, placing him at odds with some of the Iranian-backed Iraqi factions, including KH. These fissures highlight the risk that KH and other militias could resume regular attacks on US positions independently.

Iran is continuing to collaborate with other revisionist countries, such as Russia and North Korea, to advance their mutual agendas and undermine the West. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Adm. Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Russian counterpart, Nikolai Patrushev, on April 24 while attending the 12th Russian International Security Summit in St. Petersburg.[7] Ahmadian and Patrushev signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to deepen bilateral security cooperation during their meeting.[8] Iran separately hosted a state delegation from North Korea on April 23, marking the first to visit Tehran since 2019.[9] North Korean External Economic Relations Minister Yun Jong Ho led the delegation, which is particularly noteworthy given his prominent involvement in North Korean cooperation with Russia.[10] Yun Jong Ho met with a Russian delegation in Pyongyang in December 2023 and later traveled to Moscow in March 2024.[11] This flurry of meetings highlights the extent to which Iran, Russia, and North Korea are cooperating on several fronts in pursuit of their revisionist ambitions.

Iranian officials could discuss military and nuclear cooperation, among other things, with the North Korean delegation in Tehran. Iran and North Korea have a long history of such cooperation that began in the 1990s with the Iranian purchase of North Korean missile technologies.[12] Some Western analysts have hypothesized that Iran could provide drones and/or energy products to North Korea in exchange for help with the Iranian missile and nuclear programs.[13] Pyongyang could furthermore seek to learn from the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel and the performance of Iranian systems against US and partner air defenses.

Iran and North Korea are separately aligned in their military support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Iran has provided drones and other forms of support to Russia, as CTP-ISW has reported extensively.[14] North Korea has similarly given ballistic missiles to Russian forces to use against Ukrainian targets. Russia had fired around 50 North Korean-sourced missiles as of March 2024, according to Ukrainian officials.[15]

Key Takeaways: 

  • Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear divided on whether to resume attacks targeting US forces.
  • Iran: Iran is continuing to collaborate with other revisionist countries, such as Russia and North Korea, to advance their mutual agendas and undermine the West.
  • Gaza Strip: Several Israeli defense and security officials told international media outlets that the IDF is fully prepared for a clearing operation into Rafah.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least five locations across the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF Air Force conducted a “broad attack” on approximately 40 Lebanese Hezbollah targets around Aita al Shaab, near the Israel-Lebanon border.

Iran Update, April 23, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Ashka Jhaveri, Karolina Hird, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Hamas military spokesperson Abu Obeida called on April 23 for the anti-Israel protest movement in Jordan to escalate.[1] Abu Obeida called on the “Jordanian masses” to escalate their actions and “raise their voice” against Israel.[2] Jordanian demonstrators in Amman chanted references to Abu Obeida shortly after Hamas released his speech.[3] Pro-Palestinian protests in Jordan and around the Middle East have frequently celebrated Obeida and have sometimes responded to his calls for demonstrations. Some demonstrators have ascribed special significance to his words, especially in the first months of the Israel-Hamas war.[4] Jordanian protests had decreased in frequency, size, and scope in recent daysuntil Obeida’s speechdue to arrests and protester fatigue.[5] Abu Obeida‘s praise for the Jordanian protest movement as “the most important“ masses against Israel mirrors the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) military spokesperson’s statement of support for the Jordan protest movement on April 4.[6]

Abu Obeida’s call for Jordanians to take a more active role against Israel is consistent with the Iranian desire to expand its militia networks into Jordan. A prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia threatened to create and arm a new 12,000-man Iranian proxy in Jordan on April 1, which CTP-ISW assessed may reflect a greater, more confrontational, shift in the Iranian strategy vis-a-vis Jordan.[7] Such a militia is likely aspirational and not currently a feasible undertaking, but Abu Obeida’s speech could be meant to spur participation and organization along these lines. Tehran and its regional allies seek to expand their position in Jordan because Jordanian territory could grant them land routes through which to transfer materiel into the West Bank as well as a possible opportunity to disrupt Israeli overland trade through the kingdom. An active and well-armed Iranian-backed militia based out of Jordan would also significantly advance Iran’s military encirclement of Israel.

Abu Obeida’s praise of Jordan notably focused on the “Jordanian masses” not the Jordanian state, which is consistent with Iran and its Axis of Resistance increasingly criticizing and threatening Jordanian political leadership for its Israel policy in recent months. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah specifically criticized Jordanian leaders on April 15 for supporting the US and Israeli interception of the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[8] IRGC-affiliated media separately warned Jordan that it would be Iran’s “next target” if it supported an Israeli strike into Iran.[9] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have also called for the dismantlement of Israel’s “land bridge” through Jordan, on which Israel has increasingly relied to compensate for reduced trade activity at the Port of Eilat due to the Houthis’ anti-shipping campaign in the Red Sea.[10]

Key Takeaways: 

  • Jordan: Hamas military spokesperson Abu Obeida called for the anti-Israel protest movement in Jordan to escalate.
  • Gaza Strip: An unspecified Israeli security official reiterated to the Wall Street Journal the Israeli intent to conduct a clearing operation in Rafah.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in three locations across the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least six attacks into northern Israel.
  • Iraq: US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller confirmed that an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia recently attacked US forces in Syria.
  • Iran: Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian traveled to St. Petersburg, Russia, to attend the 12th Russian International Security Summit.

Iran Update, April 22, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have resumed their attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria. Unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militia fighters launched at least five rockets from Zummar, Ninewa Province, Iraq, targeting US forces at the Rumaylan Landing Zone in Hasakah Province, Syria, on April 21.[1] The Iraqi government confirmed that unspecified fighters fired rockets at an international coalition base in Syria.[2] The Iraqi government reported that Iraqi security forces burned a vehicle in western Ninewa Province that the fighters had used to launch rockets toward Syria.[3] An unspecified US official separately told Reuters on April 22 that unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militants launched at least two drones targeting US forces at Ain al Asad airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, which is south of the Euphrates River.[4] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah typically conducts attacks targeting US forces south of the Euphrates River, such as at Ain al Asad airbase in western Iraq and al Tanf Garrison in southeastern Syria.[5] Other militias, including Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, typically conduct attacks targeting US forces north of the Euphrates River.[6] Syrian media reported that the US-led international coalition separately conducted an airstrike targeting a missile launch site in Zummar.[7]

Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated social media channels reportedly announced on April 21 that Kataib Hezbollah had resumed attacks targeting US forces in the region.[8] These channels said that Kataib Hezbollah chose to resume attacks due to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s lack of progress in negotiations to remove US forces from Iraq during Sudani’s recent visit to the United States. Kataib Hezbollah denied on April 21 that it had released such an announcement. The two attacks in Syria and Iraq notably came one day after Sudani returned to Iraq from his visit to the United States.[9]

Kataib Hezbollah previously suspended its attacks targeting US forces in January 2024 following a one-way drone attack that killed three US personnel in northeastern Jordan.[10] US media reported in February 2024 that Kataib Hezbollah “fiercely resisted” IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani’s orders to suspend its attacks.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed on April 10 that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could decide to resume attacks targeting US forces if Sudani’s visit to the United States failed to result in tangible steps toward removing US forces from Iraq.[12]

Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais Khazali warned on April 10, for example, that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would use force to expel US forces from Iraq “if diplomatic efforts fail.”[13] Asaib Ahl al Haq has been less responsive to Iranian direction relative to other Iranian backed militias during this war.[14] Some Western analysts have assessed that Asaib Ahl al Haq attack cells operate both north and south of Euphrates River.[15]

Unspecified fighters also launched at least one drone targeting US forces at the al Tanf Garrison on April 1.[16] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias did not continue attacks between April 1 and April 21. CTP-ISW has not observed Iranian-backed Iraqi militias acknowledge the April 21 attacks, nor have these militias announced that they have resumed their campaign against US forces.

Hardline Iranian parliamentarian and member of Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Javad Karimi Ghodousi tweeted on April 22 implying that if granted permission, Iran could test its first nuclear weapon within one week.[17] Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Deputy Chairman Shahriar Heydari stated on April 22 in response to Karimi Ghodousi’s tweet that Iran has no ”intention” to build or use nuclear weapons.[18] Heydari cited Khamenei’s 2003 fatwa as the reason Iran is not seeking to acquire or use nuclear weapons. Heydari stated that Karimi Ghodousi's tweet may have been taken out of context.

Some Iranian regime hardliners have similarly begun openly discussing Iran’s ability to procure a nuclear weapon. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Nuclear Security and Protection Corps Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Haghtalab announced on April 18 that Iran will change its “nuclear doctrine and policies” if an Israeli strike targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities.[19] Haghtalab made these comments prior to the Israeli strike on April 19 that targeted a TOMB STONE radar at an Artesh base in Esfahan, 112 km south of Natanz Nuclear Complex. A former head of Iran’s nuclear agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, implied during a televised interview in February 2024 that Iran could develop a nuclear bomb.[20] Unspecified officials and experts told the Washington Post on April 10 that Iran is closer to nuclear weapons capability now than at any prior time in Iranian history.[21] CTP-ISW noted in December 2023 that Iran’s decision to increase its enrichment rate of 60 percent purity uranium was consistent with the long-standing CTP-ISW assessment that Iran has developed a nuclear program that it intends to use to produce a nuclear arsenal.[22]

The Iranian hardliners' statements contradict Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s 2003 fatwa against the acquisition, development, and use of nuclear weapons.[23]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei praised senior military commanders for their role in the April 13 drone and missile strike against Israel on April 21.[24] Khamenei made this statement during a meeting with senior commanders from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Artesh, Armed Forces General Staff, and Law Enforcement Command (LEC). Khamenei stated that “the willpower of the Iranian nation and armed forces” matters more than how many munitions Iran launched or how many munitions hit their target. Khamenei’s statement suggests that the Iranian attack sought to inflict damage on the state of Israel, given that Khamenei is implying the number of munitions that did hit their target was lower than expected. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Iranian April 13 missile-drone attack on Israel very likely intended to cause significant damage in Israel.[25]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq and Syria: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have resumed their attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria.
  • Iran: Hardline Iranian parliamentarian and member of Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Javad Karimi Ghodousi implied that if granted the permission, Iran could test its first nuclear weapon within one week.
  • Nothern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias conducted several attacks targeting the IDF in Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in six locations across the West Bank. 
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias conducted several attacks targeting the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip on April 22. Hamas fighters fired sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars targeting Israeli forces near Beit Hanoun.[26] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the current war, mortared Israeli forces east of Beit Hanoun.[27] The IDF has conducted multiple raids targeting Palestinian militias in Beit Hanoun in recent weeks.[28] These attacks and the IDF’s raids indicate that Palestinian militia cells remain in Beit Hanoun, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on April 22. The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) directed an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters in an unspecified area of the central Gaza Strip.[29] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared Israeli forces east of Bureij in the central Gaza Strip on April 22.[30]

Unspecified Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 20 that Hamas is considering removing its political leadership from Qatar.[31] Hamas denied reports on April 20 that it was moving its leadership out of Qatar.[32] Hamas leaders have lived in Doha, the capital of Qatar, since 2012.[33] Qatar has served as a mediator for ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas during the current war. Unspecified Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal that Hamas has recently contacted at least two countries in the region, including Oman, to ask about the possibility of Hamas political leaders relocating to the two countries.[34]

The Israeli War Cabinet met on April 21 to discuss Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip and ceasefire negotiations.[35] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that members of the negotiating team were conducting “false briefings” to the media and ”seeding desperation among” hostage families, adding that these briefings harm the effort to return Israeli hostages.[36] Netanyahu also alleged during a recent security cabinet meeting that Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant was leaking information from sensitive meetings.[37]

A flotilla of ships is preparing to sail from Turkey to the Gaza Strip in an attempt to breach Israel’s naval blockade on the Gaza Strip, according to Freedom Flotilla Coalition organizers.[38] An organizer said that the flotilla would include a cargo ship carrying food, water, ambulances and medical supplies. The same organizer said that Turkish port authorities are still discussing the ships’ point of departure. The Freedom Flotilla Coalition has participated in similar missions for the Gaza Strip. Israeli naval forces raided a Turkish-dispatched coalition flotilla in 2010 in international waters in the Mediterranean Sea.[39] Israeli forces killed at least nine, mostly Turkish, pro-Palestinian activists during the raid and suffered seven Israeli soldiers wounded[40] Turkey responded to the incident by recalling its ambassador and cancelling military exercises with Israel.[41]

The World Health Organization (WHO) director general said on April 22 that WHO aid missions to hospitals in northern Gaza have been only “partly successful” due to delays at checkpoints and ongoing fighting in the Gaza Strip.[42] The director general said that humanitarian aid missions need “safe and sustained passage” into the Gaza Strip to deliver aid to people in critical condition. Palestinian militias have continued to mortar Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip’s Netzarim Corridor. Netzarim Corridor is where Israeli forces have established forward operating bases and outposts to facilitate future raids into the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF also has checkpoints in the corridor to control the flow of aid to the north.[43]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in six locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last information cutoff on April 21.[44] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Israeli forces in the Balata refugee camp and Silat al Dhahr refugee camp in the northern West Bank.[45] Unspecified Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces during a raid near Tubas, Hebron, and Jerusalem.[46] Palestinian media reported that unspecified Palestinian fighters detonated an IED near an Israeli settlement east of Qalqilya.[47]

Israeli media reported that violence broke out between Palestinians and Israeli settlers in Burka, east of Ramallah on April 21. Israeli media said that Palestinian and Israeli civilians threw rocks at each other and set a car and building on fire.[48] Palestinian Authority-affiliated media cited local officials who said that Israeli settlers attacked the Palestinian village of Burka from the north and the west, setting fire to a sheep barn and attempting to ignite a house.[49] Israeli media reported that that there were six casualties and that Israeli forces arrived on the scene.[50]

Two Palestinians rammed Israeli civilians with a car in Jerusalem. The suspects attempted to fire a rudimentary submachine gun at the civilians before fleeing the scene.[51] The Israeli police detained the two Palestinians, who the Israeli Police said were originally from Hebron.[52] Israeli media reported that the two have familial relations with known members of Hamas’ military wing in the West Bank.[53] Palestinian Authority-affiliated media reported that the IDF closed checkpoints northeast of Jerusalem following the attack.[54]

Israeli officials criticized US plans to block military aid to an IDF unit due to alleged human rights abuses in the West Bank. Three US sources with knowledge of the issue told Axios that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is expected to announce that the United States will ban US military assistance or training providing for the Netzah Yehuda Battalion, which is an ultra-orthodox IDF unit that operate mostly in the West Bank.[55] Blinken is ordering an end to these provisions under the 1997 Leahy Law, which makes it illegal for the US government to fund assistance for units of foreign security forces in which there is credible information implicating a unit in the gross human rights violation.[56] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the decision targeting an IDF unit “the height of absurdity and a moral low” and said that he will act against the US plans.[57] Israeli War Cabinet member Benny Gantz told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a phone call that the decision would be a “mistake” and “harm Israel’s international legitimacy.”[58]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 21.[59] Hezbollah fired a salvo of approximately 35 rockets at Ein Zeitim in northern Israel in response to recent Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon.[60] The IDF shot down a ”suspicious aerial vehicle” near Kiryat Shmona.[61]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant discussed Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah’s attempts to establish a presence in Syria with local IDF commanders during a visit in the Golan Heights on April 21 .[62] Gallant stated that the IDF is “actively preventing” Hezbollah and Iranian-backed militias from establishing positions along the Golan Heights-Syria border.[63] The IDF Air Force and ground forces have repeatedly targeted Iranian-backed militia positions near the Golan Heights-Syria border.[64] The IDF said on April 9 that it will not allow Hezbollah to establish a presence in southern Syria and will hold the Syrian Arab Army responsible for Hezbollah activity in Syria.[65] The IDF said on April 7 that Iranian-backed fighters have fired at least 35 rockets into the Golan Heights from southern Syria since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.[66]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iranian media claimed on April 21 that the IRGC attacked a “secret American base” in Israel’s Negev Desert during Iran’s April 13 missile and drone attack on Israel.[67] IRGC-affiliated media claimed that the US base, named ”Position 512,” maintains radar facilities that monitor missile attacks on Israel.[68]

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi emphasized the importance of friendly relations during his first trip to Pakistan on April 22 since Iran and Pakistan exchanged cross-border strikes against each other in January 2024.[69] Raisi emphasized the strong relations and ”deep religious and historical bonds“ between Iran and Pakistan during separate meetings with the Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on April 22.[70] Iran and Pakistan signed eight memoranda of understanding (MOU) aimed at increasing cooperation in areas such as security, free trade, judicial proceedings, and the media.[71] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian separately called Raisi’s visit a ”turning point” in Iran-Pakistan relations during a phone call with his Pakistani counterpart on April 22.[72]

The Iranian regime emphasized the need to strengthen Iran’s defense capabilities following Israel’s April 18 airstrike that damaged Iranian military infrastructure. The Israeli airstrike damaged an S-300 air defense system’s TOMB STONE radar at the Eighth Shekari Artesh Air Force base northeast of Esfahan City, Esfahan Province.[73] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri chaired a meeting with the Passive Defense Organization on April 20 to discuss “maintaining and improving preparations” to confront unspecified threats.[74] The Passive Defense Organization is an Iranian regime institution responsible for defending Iran's civilian, military, cyber, and nuclear infrastructure from attacks.[75] The Iranian Parliament separately approved parts of a plan to strengthen and develop the Defense Innovation and Research Organization’s “scientific research and defense innovations.”[76] The Defense Innovation and Research Organization operates under the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry. The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned the Defense Innovation and Research Organization in August 2014 for “for engaging in or attempting to engage in activities that have materially contributed to...the proliferation of WMD."

Iran Update, April 21, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The IDF concluded a major, multi-day “counterterrorism operation” in the Nour Shams Refugee Camp, Tulkarm, on April 21. Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Nour Shams, killing 14 Palestinian fighters.[1] The IDF Duvdevan unit arrested 15 wanted persons, destroyed two improvised explosive device manufacturing facilities and dozens of explosives, and seized ammunition during operations in the camp. Palestinian fighters wounded ten Israeli soldiers in the operation.[2] Palestinian journalists reported that the IDF had killed a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) commander in Tulkarm on April 19.[3] The same PIJ commander attended the funeral of other Palestinian fighters killed in fighting in Tulkarm, confirming that the commander survived the Israeli operation.[4]

Several Palestinian militias called for the mobilization of armed Palestinians across the West Bank in response to the IDF’s Nour Shams operation. Hamas, the Lions’ Den, the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades published statements calling for a mass uprising and armed retaliation against the IDF.[5] Those Palestinian militias and others claimed 15 attacks on Israeli forces, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and Israeli border towns on April 21.[6]  PIJ’s Jenin Battalion conducted nine of the 15 attacks.[7] PIJ said that they were responding to the Israeli raid in Nour Shams.[8] Palestinians also conducted unclaimed attacks targeting Israeli checkpoints near Hebron and in the Jordan Valley.[9] The timing of these unclaimed attacks suggests that they are in response to the calls for mobilization. An unspecified group planted an improvised explosive device near Ramallah on April 21. The fighters had connected the IED‘s detonator to a Palestinian flag so that when an Israeli attempted to remove the flag, the IED detonated.[10]

Palestinians also participated in marches and a general strike on April 21 in response to the IDF’s Nour Shams operation.[11] Hamas called for a general strike on April 21.[12]

Key Takeaways:

  • Gaza Strip: The IDF did not publish information about Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip on April 21. Palestinian militias claimed only one attack targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip.
  • West Bank: The IDF concluded a major, multi-day “counterterrorism operation” in the Nour Shams Refugee Camp, Tulkarm, on April 21. Several Palestinian militias called for the mobilization of armed Palestinians across the West Bank in response to the IDF’s Nour Shams operation.
  • Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 20.
  • Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed one drone attack targeting an unspecified site in the Golan Heights on April 20.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Local Palestinian media reported the Israel Defense Force (IDF) Air Force conducted airstrikes in several areas of the Gaza Strip on April 21. The strikes targeted sites in Gaza City, the central Gaza Strip, and Rafah.[13]

The IDF did not publish information about Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip on April 21.

Palestinian militias claimed only one attack targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on April 21. The National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli armor near the Turkish Hospital in Mughraqa, near the Netzarim corridor.[14]

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and IDF Southern Command commander Yaron Finkelman approved plans for future operations in the Gaza Strip on April 21.[15]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad launched rockets targeting an Israeli military site in southern Israel on April 20 after CTP-ISW's data cut-off.[16]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

See topline.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 20.[17] Hamas fighters in Lebanon targeted an Israeli military base in northern Israel with 20 122mm Grad rockets.[18]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed one drone attack targeting an unspecified site in the Golan Heights on April 20.[19] CTP-ISW cannot verify this attack claim. Israeli officials and media have not commented on the attack at the time of this writing.

Iran Update, April 20, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Amin Soltani, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Key Takeaways:

  • Gaza Strip: The Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct “targeted raids” along the Netzarim corridor in the central Gaza Strip on April 20.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces conducted operations in the Nour Shams Refugee Camp, Tulkarm for a second day and engaged fighters from several Palestinian militias, including PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades on April 20.
  • Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 19.
  • Iraq: The Iraqi Defense Ministry reported that an explosion occurred at the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Kalsu Headquarters in Babil Province on April 19. No Iraqi government body characterized the explosion as a ”strike.”

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and the public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to target military infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip on April 20. The 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division) and the IDF Air Force struck a rocket launch site in Beit Hanoun after Palestinian fighters launched rockets targeting Sderot on April 20.[1] The IDF Air Force separately targeted Palestinian fighters and infrastructure to support Israeli forces operating in the area.[2]

PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades have conducted two rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip targeting Sderot and Nir Am in southern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 19.[3]

The Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades–the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah–mortared Israeli forces operating southeast of the Zaytoun neighborhood, Gaza City.[4]

The Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct “targeted raids” along the Netzarim corridor in the central Gaza Strip on April 20.[5] Israeli forces raided Palestinian militia positions and killed fighters operating in the area.[6] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed separate mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces in unspecified areas of the “Netzarim Axis,” which refers to the Israeli-built highway Route 749. Route 749 bisects the Gaza Strip.[7]

IDF Southern Command commander Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkleman and the 162nd Division commander met to discuss the division’s operations in the Gaza Strip.[8]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces conducted operations in the Nour Shams Refugee Camp, Tulkarm for a second day and engaged fighters from several Palestinian militias, including PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades on April 20.[9]

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations across the West Bank, including Nour Shams Refugee Camp, since CTP-ISW's data cut off on April 19.[10] Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades shot at Israeli forces stationed checkpoints in Jenin and Tulkarm.[11]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 19.[12]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Iraqi Defense Ministry reported that an explosion occurred at the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Kalsu Headquarters in Babil Province on April 19.[13] The explosion killed one PMF member and injured eight Iraqi Army soldiers according to the Defense Ministry. Local footage showed secondary explosions at Kalsu Headquarters, which suggests that the explosion occurred at a weapons storage facility.[14] The United States and Israel denied rumors that they had conducted a strike targeting the base.[15] Iraq’s Air Defense Command reported that it did not detect any drones or aircraft in the air at the time of the explosion.[16] Improper weapons storage has previously caused accidental detonations at PMF weapons storage facilities.[17] The Defense Ministry reported that it initiated an official investigation into the cause of the explosion.[18] No Iraqi government body characterized the explosion as a ”strike.”

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed one drone attack targeting Eilat, southern Israel, on April 19.[19] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed that its attack on Eilat was in response to Israel’s “targeting of the Popular Mobilization Forces camps.” 


Iran Update, April 19, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Israel conducted retaliatory airstrikes targeting an Artesh Air Force base in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province, Iran, on April 18 in response to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[1] Western and Israeli media reported that Israeli aircraft over unspecified airspace outside Iran fired at least three missiles targeting an Artesh airbase in Esfahan. The Artesh is Iran’s conventional armed forces.[2] An analyst with commercial satellite firm Hawkeye360 posted satellite imagery showing an S-300PMU2 surface-to-air missile battery position in Esfahan, adding that the strike may have damaged an S-300PMU2 surface-to-air missile battery’s target engagement radar.[3] Russia provided the S-300 to Iran in 2016.[4] Iranian state media and local Iranian social media users suggested that Israel targeted the Eighth Shekari Artesh Air Force Base.[5] One senior US official told ABC News that Israel targeted an Artesh radar site that is part of the air defense system protecting the Natanz Nuclear Complex, which is Iran’s main uranium enrichment facility approximately 170 kilometers north of Esfahan.[6] The International Atomic Energy Organization, along with Western and Iranian media, reported that Israel did not damage any of Iran’s nuclear facilities.[7]

Iranian state media and local Iranian social media users separately reported air defense activity over Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, on April 18.[8] Iranian officials told The New York Times that Israel attempted to conduct a separate attack on unspecified targets in Tabriz.[9] IRGC-affiliated media claimed that Iranian air defense systems intercepted a “suspicious object,” which caused sounds of explosions over Tabriz. The IRGC-affiliated media outlet added that Iranian facilities in Tabriz “have not been exposed to any harm.”[10]

Iranian officials and media downplayed the severity of Israel’s April 18 airstrikes, suggesting that Iran will not respond to the strikes “forcefully” and “painfully.”[11] The regime has claimed it would respond to Israeli retaliation for the Iranian April 13 attack targeting Israel “forcefully” and “painfully” since April 16.[12] Iranian officials and media claimed that Iranian air defense systems shot down small drones over Esfahan, not missiles.[13] Senior Iranian military officials, including Artesh Commander Maj. Gen. Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brig. Gen. Kiomars Heydari, claimed that Iranian air defense systems intercepted “suspicious aerial objects,” which caused sounds of explosions over Esfahan.[14] Some Iranian media outlets claimed that Iran’s air defense systems shot down drones, despite Israeli reporting that Israel used long-range missiles to conduct the airstrikes.[15] Israel has previously conducted attacks inside Iran using small explosive-laden drones.[16] IRGC-affiliated media circulated videos highlighting the “secure and peaceful” atmosphere in Esfahan, including near nuclear facilities and the Eighth Shekari Artesh Air Base.[17] IRGC-affiliated media similarly claimed that Tabriz, East Azerbaijan, was “in complete calm” hours after reports of explosions near the city.[18]

The IDF Air Force likely conducted airstrikes targeting Syrian Arab Army (SAA) air defenses and other positions in Daraa Province on April 18. The Syrian Defense Ministry reported that Israel targeted air defense positions and caused “material losses” in southern Syria at 1955 ET on April 18, approximately 90 minutes before confirmation of an Israeli attack on Iran.[19] Local Syrian media reported that Israel targeted an SAA radar battalion near Qarfa, Daraa, and an SAA 112th Brigade position in Izraa City, Daraa.[20] The IDF has previously targeted SAA air defenses and positions in Daraa Province in retaliation for rockets fired into the Golan Heights.[21] Israeli media reported in 2020 that the SAA’s 1st Corps, which is responsible for areas of southern Syria near the Golan Heights, is closely affiliated with Lebanese Hezbollah.[22] The IDF has said that it will not allow Hezbollah to establish a presence in southern Syria and that the IDF will hold the SAA responsible for Hezbollah activity in Syria. [23]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Israel conducted retaliatory airstrikes targeting an Artesh Air Force base in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province, Iran, in response to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack targeting Israel.
  • Syria: Israel likely conducted airstrikes targeting Syrian Arab Army (SAA) air defenses and other positions in Daraa Province.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force struck military infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: US and Israeli officials held a high-level virtual meeting to discuss a possible Israeli military operation in Rafah.
  • Political Negotiations: Unspecified US and Saudi officials told the Wall Street Journal that the United States is attempting to negotiate a deal in which Israel would recognize Palestinian statehood in exchange for diplomatic recognition from Saudi Arabia.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces engaged fighters from several Palestinian militias, including Hamas and PIJ, during an operation in the Nour Shams Refugee Camp, Tulkarm.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iraq: Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq Secretary General Mohammad al Tamimi criticized the Shia Coordination Framework for supporting Iraqi President Mohammed Shia al Sudani’s visit to Washington, DC.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force struck military infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip on April 19. The 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division) and IDF Air Force struck rocket launchers and a weapons depot in an area in Beit Lahia from which Palestinian fighters had recently fired rockets at Ashkelon, southern Israel.[24] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) launched two rocket salvos targeting Ashkelon on April 18.[25]

Palestinian militias conducted several indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on April 19. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, mortared Israeli vehicles southeast of the Zaytoun neighborhood in southeastern Gaza City.[26] PIJ fired rockets targeting Israeli forces and Israeli positions east and southeast of Gaza City.[27] Israeli forces are operating in southeastern Gaza City to conduct raids against Palestinian fighters and secure the Netzarim corridor, where Israeli forces have constructed a highway to support military operations in the northern Gaza Strip.[28]

The Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) killed several Palestinian fighters in an unspecified area in the central Gaza Strip on April 19.[29] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a secular leftist Palestinian group fighting alongside Hamas in the war, fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in the east of the central Gaza Strip on April 18.[30]

The IDF Air Force struck approximately 25 military targets to support IDF ground forces operating in the Gaza Strip on April 19.[31] The targets included military buildings, observation posts, and rocket launchers.

Unspecified US and Saudi officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 18 that the United States is attempting to negotiate a deal in which Israel would recognize Palestinian statehood in exchange for diplomatic recognition of Israel from Saudi Arabia.[32] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on January 10 that normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel is still possible.[33] Saudi Arabia told the United States in February 2024 that it will not proceed with normalization with Israel “unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized.”[34] The Wall Street Journal reported that Saudi officials have privately suggested that they would normalize ties with Israel if Israel gave verbal assurances that it would engage in talks on Palestinian statehood.

The United States is offering Saudi Arabia a “more formal” defense relationship with the United States, US assistance to help Saudi Arabia acquire civil nuclear power, and Palestinian statehood as part of the deal. Unidentified US officials claimed that this part of the negotiation is in its final stages. US officials argued that Iran’s attack on Israel on April 13 should be evidence to Israel that integration with Saudi Arabia can improve its defense against Iran. The Wall Street Journal noted that the deal may aid Israel in a potential exit strategy from the Gaza Strip. Several Arab countries have said that if Israel publicly makes progress in establishing a Palestinian state, they will participate in a post-war Gaza Strip.

US and Israeli officials held a high-level virtual meeting on April 18 to discuss a possible Israeli military operation in Rafah.[35] This is the second such meeting to discuss Rafah since April 1.[36] US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met with Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and Israeli National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi. US and Israeli officials agreed on the ”shared objective to see Hamas defeated in Rafah.”[37] US officials expressed concerns over the potential operation in Rafah, and the Israeli officials agreed to take these concerns into account and hold future discussions.[38] Unspecified US officials familiar with a similar meeting on April 1 said that Israel presented a plan to move 1.4 million civilians out of Rafah but that the Israeli plan excluded concepts for access to food, water, and other civil services.[39] US and Israeli officials also discussed Iran’s attack on Israel and new US sanctions targeting Iran during the April 18 meeting.[40]

PIJ launched a second salvo of rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Ashkelon in southern Israel shortly after the first on April 18.[41] CTP-ISW reported the first salvo targeting Ashkelon in the April 18 update.[42]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged fighters from several Palestinian militias, including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), during an operation in the Nour Shams Refugee Camp, Tulkarm.[43] Hamas reported that fighters from its battalion in Jenin were involved in clashes in Tulkarm.[44] The IDF reported that three Israeli soldiers sustained injuries during clashes with Palestinian fighters who used small arms and improvised explosive devices (IED).[45] Palestinian sources reported that Israeli forces killed at least five Palestinians, including a senior commander in PIJ’s Tulkarm Battalion.[46]

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 18, including multiple engagements in Nour Shams refugee camp.[47] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms targeting Israeli forces near an Israeli settlement north of Hebron.[48]

The United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two entities on April 19 for fundraising on behalf of two violent Israeli extremists in the West Bank. [49]The groups, Mount Hebron Fund and Shlom Asiraich, established crowdfunding campaigns to raise thousands of dollars for two men whom the United States sanctioned in February 2024. The United States sanctioned the two men in February under an executive order that targeted those perpetrating violence in the West Bank.[50] The European Union separately imposed sanctions on four individuals and two entities for their connection to Israeli settler violence.[51]

The IDF responded to a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report on April 18 about the rise in Israeli settler violence in the West Bank.[52] The IDF told CNN that Israeli soldiers who fail to protect Palestinians from settler violence or take part in such attacks face disciplinary action.[53] The IDF conceded that its forces had witnessed some Israelis attacking Palestinians. HRW reported that the Israeli military has not protected Palestinians from settler violence and on some occasions participated in the attacks.[54]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 18.[55] Hezbollah targeted Israeli surveillance equipment in three attacks using unspecified weapons.

The IDF 869th Combat Intelligence Battalion (91st Division) identified Hezbollah fighters in Aita al Shaab, southern Lebanon, and directed an airstrike targeting them.[56] Hezbollah announced that one of its fighters died but did not provide further details.[57]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq Secretary General Mohammad al Tamimi criticized the Shia Coordination Framework on April 19 for supporting Iraqi President Mohammed Shia al Sudani’s visit to Washington, DC.[58] Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq reportedly has ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al Haq and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba.[59] Tamimi previously threatened on March 27 to resume attacks targeting US forces if Sudani did not establish a timeline for US troops to withdraw from Iraq during his visit to Washington, DC.[60] Tamimi accused unspecified leaders of the Shia Coordination Framework of becoming too concerned with politics and abandoning their efforts to remove US forces from Iraq. Tamimi also questioned their dedication to remove US forces from Iraq. Tamimi argued that Iraq cannot have a relationship with the United States while US forces remaining Iraq.[61]

An online shipping tracker confirmed that the IRGC intelligence gathering ship, the Behshad, returned to Bandar Abbas port, Hormozgan province, Iran, on April 18.[62] Bloomberg reported on April 18 that the Behshad left the Red Sea on April 4 to return to Iran.[63] The Behshad provides the Houthi movement with real-time intelligence, enabling them to target ships that have turned off transponders.[64] Western and Israeli media speculated that Israel would target the Behshad in retaliation for Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[65]

 


Iran Update, April 18, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Kathryn Tyson, Amin Soltani, Ashka Jhaveri, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iran is likely engaging in a coordinated information effort to deter an Israeli strike targeting its nuclear facilities and reassure its domestic population about Iran’s ability to protect such facilities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Nuclear Security and Protection Corps Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Haghtalab announced on April 18 that Iran will change its publicly stated “nuclear doctrine and policies” in the event of an Israeli strike targeting its nuclear facilities.[1] Haghtalab also said that the Iranian National Passive Defense Organization—one of the regime bodies responsible for defending its civilian, military, and nuclear infrastructure from attacks—has plans in place to face “any threat from” Israel.[2] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) evacuated its inspectors from Iranian nuclear facilities on April 16. The IAEA cited concerns that Israel might strike Iranian nuclear facilities in response to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile strikes targeting Israel.[3]

Most of Iran’s official state media apparatus, including media outlets controlled by the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC)—the main regime body overseeing Iranian nuclear policy—highlighted Haghtalab’s announcement.[4] This reporting suggests that officials at the highest levels of the Iranian government endorsed the announcement, including the SNSC and the Office of the Supreme Leader. Western officials and analysts have often expressed concern that a US or Israeli strike targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities would spur Iran to renew its nuclear weapons program.[5] Iran is likely seeking to exploit this long-standing concern to influence Israeli calculations. Iran is also likely seeking to exploit this concern to influence Western governments to place pressure on Israel not to strike Iran’s nuclear program. The Iranian regime has also long touted its nuclear program as a significant national achievement and probably seeks to reassure its population that it will protect its nuclear accomplishments.[6]

Iran’s attempt to deter an Israeli retaliatory strike does not mean that Iran will not pursue nuclear weapons development, however. Iranian officials have long said that Iran will not weaponize its nuclear program, citing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s 2003 fatwa outlawing nuclear weapons.[7] Haghtalab’s announcement contradicts Khamenei’s stated opposition to nuclear weapons development and marks a notable departure from previous regime rhetoric with respect to its nuclear policies. CTP-ISW previously assessed in December 2023 that Iran has pursued a series of nuclear advancements consistent with the desire for a nuclear arsenal.[8] The announcement also coincides with several senior Iranian officials, including IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, expressing that the recent escalation cycle between Iran and Israel has significantly altered Iran’s external security calculus in an unspecified manner.[9]

Houthi leader Abdulmalik al Houthi claimed on April 18 that the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping have extended “from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.”[10] The Houthis claimed on April 7 that they conducted two attacks targeting two commercial ships in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.[11] CTP-ISW cannot confirm that these attacks occurred and did not observe any reporting that corroborated the Houthi claims. The Houthis have said on multiple occasions that its maritime attack campaign aims to blockade Israel to support the Palestinian people.[12] The Houthis have expressed an aspiration to expand their attacks targeting Israeli shipping in the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope.[13] The Houthis do not yet have this capability, but such a capability would allow the Houthis to attack alternate shipping routes that bypass the Red Sea. These attacks have forced major shipping companies to avoid the Red Sea and instead go around the Cape of Good Hope, which imposes additional time delays and costs on trade between Europe and Asia.[14] Houthi attacks have had limited success in “blockading” the Israeli port of Eilat on the Red Sea. Eilat’s revenue decreased by 80% between November 2023 and December 2023.[15]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Iran is likely engaging in a coordinated information effort to deter an Israeli strike targeting its nuclear facilities and reassure its domestic population about Iran’s ability to protect such facilities.
  • An unnamed senior US official told ABC News that Israel is unlikely to retaliate against Iran until after the Passover holiday.
  • Yemen: Houthi leader Abdulmalik al Houthi claimed that the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping have extended “from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.”
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force struck Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Central Gaza Strip: The IDF concluded a week-long operation targeting Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure near Nuseirat in the central Gaza Strip.
  • Political Negotiations: Hamas Deputy Political Bureau head Musa Abu Marzouk said that Hamas will not withdraw from ceasefire negotiations or drop its maximalist demands, which include a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iraq: The Iraqi government and private sector signed 14 memoranda of understanding (MOU), primarily in energy and finance, with US companies.

Iran Update, April 17, 2024

click here to read the full report with maps

Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Ashka Jhaveri, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF reported that Israeli forces led by the Northern Brigade (Gaza Division) conducted raids targeting Hamas and PIJ sites in Beit Hanoun over the previous week.
  • Central Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel, including a complex drone and anti-tank guided missile attack that injured 18 Israelis, including 14 IDF soldiers.
  • Iran: A small demonstration occurred outside the Jordanian embassy in Tehran, protesting the Jordanian support in intercepting the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance have adopted a more confrontational strategy vis-a-vis Jordan in recent months.
  • Senior Iranian political and military officials reiterated their threats that Iran would respond “severely” if Israel retaliates for the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel
  • Syria: The Wall Street Journal reported that Iran ordered IRGC personnel to evacuate military sites across Syria in anticipation of possible Israeli strikes.
  • Iraq: An adviser to the Iraqi prime minister, Subhan al Mullah Jiyad, claimed that the US-Iraqi Higher Military Commission has “set a schedule” for the withdrawal of the US-led international coalition from Iraq.
  • Yemen: US CENTOM reported that it destroyed two drones in Houthi-controlled Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on April 17 that Israeli forces led by the Northern Brigade (Gaza Division) conducted raids targeting Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) sites in Beit Hanoun over the previous week.[1] Israeli forces had collected intelligence on the sites from questioning Palestinian fighters, revealing that Hamas and PIJ used a school building for military activity as well as the civilians inside for cover from Israeli targeting. The IDF said that Israeli forces ordered civilians to vacate the building prior to the raid. The IDF detained and killed an unspecified number of Palestinian fighters in the building.

Palestinian militias conducted several attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on April 17. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, claimed that its fighters had conducted 14 mortar and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks in Beit Hanoun over the previous 24 hours targeting Israeli forces in Beit Hanoun.[2] A Hamas fighter separately conducted a sniper attack targeting an Israeli soldier in Beit Hanoun.[3] The National Resistance Brigades lastly mortared Israeli forces in eastern Jabalia.[4]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on April 17.[5] The 401st and Nahal brigades (162nd Division) are operating near Wadi Gaza to kill Palestinian fighters and destroy military infrastructure. The IDF Air Force struck a Palestinian fighter squad that was using an armed drone in the central Gaza Strip.[6] The 215th Artillery Brigade and IDF Air Force cooperated to destroy several rocket launchers aimed at Israel.[7]

The IDF Air Force struck over 40 targets in the Gaza Strip on April 17, including explosively rigged buildings, observation posts, and underground military infrastructure.[8]

Palestinian sources claimed on April 17 that Israeli forces are operating in eastern Deir al Balah.[9] Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed separate RPG and anti-tank guided missile attacks targeting Israeli forces in the area.[10]

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—said that eight aid trucks entered the Gaza Strip from Ashdod Port in southern Israel on April 17.[11] This instance marks the first time that humanitarian aid has arrived via ship to Israel during the Israel-Hamas war.[12] The Israeli war cabinet approved the opening of the port on April 5.[13] The IDF said that trucks carry aid unloaded from the Ashdod Port into the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom crossing[14]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh is meeting with senior Turkish officials. Haniyeh met with the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Qatar on April 16.[15] Haniyeh will also meet Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara in the coming days.[16]

Palestinian fighters fired a single rocket barrage from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on April 17.[17] The Popular Resistance Committees, which is a Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, targeted an IDF base in Zikim.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 16.[18]  Three Palestinian militias—PIJ, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and Jundullah—claimed separate attacks targeting Israeli forces around Tubas on April 16.[19] PIJ also claimed that it detonated an IED targeting an IDF bulldozer.[20] Jundallah has claimed two previous attacks in Tubas since the Israel-Hamas war began.[21] 

 Israeli forces detained six wanted Palestinians during overnight operations in the West Bank on April 17.[22] Israeli police separately detained a Palestinian man in Jerusalem on suspicion of planning to conduct a stabbing attack.[23]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on April 17.[24] One of these attacks was a complex drone and anti-tank guided missile attack that injured 18 Israelis, including 14 IDF soldiers, in Arab al Aramsha along the Israel-Lebanon border.[25] The drone that Hezbollah used bears visual similarities to an Iranian-made Adabil-2.[26] Hezbollah claimed that it targeted an IDF reconnaissance company headquarters in Arab al Aramsha.[27] The IDF reported that it conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah air defense sites near Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, in retaliation for the Hezbollah drone strike in Arab al Aramsha.[28]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

A small demonstration occurred outside the Jordanian embassy in Tehran on April 16, protesting the Jordanian support in intercepting the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[29]  Demonstrators chanted anti-US and anti-Israeli phrases and held posters condemning Jordanian cooperation with the United States and Israel.[30] The Jordanian foreign minister said on April 14 that Jordan intercepted the projectiles because it assessed that the Iranian drones and missiles posed a genuine threat to Jordanian national security.[31] IRGC-affiliated media previously threatened Jordan if it further supported Israel.[32]

CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance have adopted a more confrontational strategy vis-a-vis Jordan in recent months.[33] The Axis of Resistance has indicated its interest in expanding its militia networks into Jordan, which would facilitate the transfer of materiel to the West Bank as well as create possible opportunities to disrupt Israeli overland trade through kingdom.[34] Iranian and Iranian-backed actors have repeatedly signaled their interest in generating these effects in recent weeks.[35] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah furthermore criticized Jordanian leaders for supporting the US and Israeli interception of the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[36]

Senior Iranian political and military officials reiterated on April 17 their threats that Iran would respond “severely” if Israel retaliates for the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[37] IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, who is primarily responsible for Iranian drone and missile operations, told reporters that Iran would strike Israel again if it responds to the April 13 Iranian attack.[38] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi similarly stated that Iran would confront Israel “fiercely and severely” if Israel conducts even the “smallest attack” on Iranian territory.[39] Artesh Commander Maj. Gen. Abdol Rahim Mousavi lastly emphasized that the Iranian armed forces are in a constant state of readiness.[40]

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 17 that Iran ordered IRGC personnel to evacuate military sites across Syria in anticipation of possible Israeli strikes.[41] This report follows several local Syrian reports claiming that IRGC leadership issued evacuation orders to Iranian-backed militias in Deir ez Zor Province.[42] WSJ reported that Iran also advised Lebanese Hezbollah forces in Syria to take ”precautionary measures” ahead of potential Israeli targeting. Unspecified Syrian security officials told WSJ that Hezbollah accordingly reduced its senior officer presence in Syria and transferred personnel away from military sites. The officials also claimed that Hezbollah recently expanded its force presence along the Israel-Syria border to collect intelligence ahead of possible Israeli strikes.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah published a statement criticizing Saudi Arabia on April 17 amid rising tensions between the Axis of Resistance and the kingdom.[43] Kataib Hezbollah accused Saudi Arabia of supporting the US agenda in the Middle East. This statement comes as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for providing Israel land access to the Persian Gulf.[44] It also comes as Saudi Arabia supported the United States and Israel in intercepting the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel on April 17.[45]

An adviser to the Iraqi prime minister, Subhan al Mullah Jiyad, claimed on April 17 that the US-Iraqi Higher Military Commission has “set a schedule” for the withdrawal of the US-led international coalition from Iraq.[46] Jiyad did not provide details about the timeline for a withdrawal. The Higher Military Commission, which is comprised of US and Iraqi military officials, began talks about the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq in late January 2024.[47] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia and political figures have repeatedly called on Sudani to set a timeline for removing US and international coalition forces from Iraq.[48] Sudani traveled to Washington, DC, on April 15, in part to discuss with US officials ending the US-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq and transitioning to a “comprehensive” bilateral relationship with the United States.[49]

US CENTOM reported that it destroyed two drones in Houthi-controlled Yemen on April 16.[50] Houthi-controlled media claimed on April 16 that the United States and United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting unspecified sites in Bajil District, Hudaydah Governorate.[51]

 

Iran Update, April 16, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Washington Post reported on April 15 that 17 Iranian officials visited a Russian air defense system factory in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in March 2023.[1] The factory produces S-400 air defense missiles and mobile launchers, among other military equipment.[2] The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned the company that owns the factory — NPP Start — in June 2022 for supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[3] Unspecified intelligence officials told the Washington Post that Russia is “advancing” an agreement with Iran to supply Iran with Su-35 fighter jets.[4] Iran has long sought, but not yet received, Su-35s in return for supplying Russia with drones. US and Middle Eastern intelligence officials assessed that delayed Iranian payments to Russia may be hindering Iran’s acquisition of the fighter jets.[5] Russia previously provided Iran with at least two Yak-130 combat trainer aircraft in September 2023, which Iranian media framed as a “necessary prelude” for the acquisition of Su-35s.[6]

Senior Iranian officials emphasized that Iran would strike Israel again “faster and stronger” if Israel retaliated to Iran's April 13 missile and drone attack. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani stated that Iran would respond against Israel within a “few seconds” of an Israeli attack.[7] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi emphasized in separate phone calls to several foreign leaders, including his Qatari and Russian counterparts, that Iran would respond “more fiercely, widely and painfully” if Israel retaliates against Iran.[8] The spokesperson of Iran’s Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee claimed that Iran is “ready to use weapons that [it] has not used before” during an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah-controlled media on April 16.[9]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: The Washington Post reported that 17 Iranian officials visited a Russian air defense system factory in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in March 2023.
  • Senior Iranian officials emphasized that Iran would strike Israel again "faster and stronger" if Israel retaliates to Iran's April 13 missile and drone attack.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian sources reported that Israeli forces are operating around Beit Hanoun.
  • Political Negotiations: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that Hamas rejected the most recent ceasefire agreement because it thought the April 13 Iranian attack on Israel would lead to a regional conflict.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel, including a one-way drone attack targeting an Iron Dome battery.
  • Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani continued his official visit to Washington, DC.
  • Yemen: Houthi President Mahdi al Mashaat congratulated Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi for the April 13 Iranian attack targeting Israel during a phone call.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian sources reported on April 16 that Israeli forces are operating around Beit Hanoun. Several local Palestinian sources reported that Israeli armored vehicles entered Beit Hanoun and areas east of Jabalia. The sources reported that Israeli forces ordered civilians in Beit Hanoun and areas east of Jabalia to leave.[10] One report noted that Israeli forces are conducting an unspecified military operation in the area.[11] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, mortared Israeli forces in eastern Jabalia on April 15.[12]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have not issued official evacuation orders for the area as of the time of writing. CTP-ISW assessed on March 25 that a small number of Palestinian fighters have likely infiltrated Beit Hanoun.[13] The ability of Palestinian militias to continue to operate in the northern Gaza Strip is consistent with the infiltration of fighters into the area and Hamas’ efforts to reassert its governing authority following the drawdown of Israeli forces.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued operations near Nuseirat in the central Gaza Strip on April 16.[14] Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters and destroyed military infrastructure. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired rockets targeting an Israeli command and control node in southwestern Gaza City on April 15.[15] The Israeli defense minister said in February 2024 that the IDF has not defeated all four Hamas battalions in the central Gaza Strip and that it intends to dismantle the two remaining battalions.[16] CTP-ISW previously observed that Palestinian militias, including Hamas, have likely used a rear area in the central Gaza Strip to conduct attacks since mid-December that have targeted Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.[17] Palestinian militias have also likely been able to infiltrate from the central strip into previously cleared areas of southern Gaza City. The IDF has conducted multiple raids in southern Gaza City since it decreased its force presence in the northern Gaza Strip in early 2024.[18]

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—said that 126 aid trucks entered the northern Gaza Strip on April 16.[19] Israeli media reported that the delivery was part of IDF-COGAT efforts to increase aid deliveries into the Gaza Strip and especially into the northern Gaza Strip.[20] The initiatives include opening two bakeries and working on the Bani Suheil water pipeline, according to Israeli media.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that Hamas rejected the most recent ceasefire agreement because it thought the April 13 Iranian attack on Israel would lead to a regional conflict.[21] Two attendees of a meeting between Blinken and American Jewish leaders told Axios about the substance of Blinken’s comments at the meeting. Hamas rejected the US-proposed ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal on April 13 hours before the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[22] Hamas has since demanded new concessions from Israel in its counteroffer, according to one Israeli official.[23] The official said that Hamas sought to release fewer Israeli hostages in addition to asking for a higher ratio of hostage-for-prisoners and for Israel to release more Palestinian prisoners held under a life sentence.

Palestinian fighters fired two rockets from the northern Gaza Strip into southern Israel on April 16.[24] An Israeli military correspondent reported that both rockets struck open areas, causing no casualties or damage.[25]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least three locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 15. The IDF reported on April 16 that Israeli forces detained 23 wanted Palestinians during overnight operations in the West Bank.[26] Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fighters detonated an IED targeting Israeli forces in al Askar refugee camp. The militia separately targeted Israeli forces advancing into Nablus with unspecified munitions.[27] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades shot at Israeli forces operating in Jenin.[28]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah launched one-way attack drones targeting an Iron Dome battery near Beit Hilal.[29] Hezbollah has only claimed four attacks targeting Israeli Iron Dome batteries during the Israel-Hamas war.[30] LH previously claimed a drone attack targeting an Israeli Iron Dome battery on April 13 hours before the Iranian attack against Israel.[31] The IDF confirmed that two one-way attack drones entered Israeli airspace and exploded near Beit Hilal.[32] Israeli Army Radio reported that the drone attack injured three people and caused significant damage to unspecified ”property.”[33]

Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on April 16, including the one-way drone attack targeting the Iron Dome battery.[34]

The IDF killed two Hezbollah commanders in southern Lebanon on April 16.[35] The IDF Air Force killed the commander of the Radwan Unit’s rocket and missile unit in Hezbollah’s Western Sector, Mohammed Hossein Metzafa Shouri.[36] The IDF added that Shouri oversaw the planning and execution of “many” rocket and missile attacks from southern Lebanon into Israeli territory. The IDF also killed a commander from Hezbollah’s “Coastal Sector,” Esmail Yousef Baz.[37] Baz held a rank equivalent to a brigadier general and served as a “senior” Hezbollah military official. Baz was responsible for directing rocket and anti-tank guided missile attacks into northern Israel.[38] Hezbollah acknowledged Baz’s death.[39]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian spoke with several of his foreign minister counterparts and representatives from various international organizations in separate phone calls on April 15 and 16.[40] Abdollahian spoke separately with the foreign ministers of China, Oman, Indonesia, and Malaysia, among others. Abdollahian held additional separate phone calls with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Secretary General and the Organization of Islamic States Secretary General on April 16.[41] Abdollahian claimed in his separate calls with the Indonesian foreign minister and Omani foreign minister that Israel is responsible for tension and instability in the region.[42] The foreign ministers of Malaysia, Austria, and the United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres urged restraint from all parties involved.[43]

An anti-regime outlet posted a video of the Iranian military transporting drones, tanks, and other assorted military equipment in Tehran on April 16.[44] This is likely in preparation for the annual Artesh Day parade, which is held on April 18.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani continued his official visit to Washington, DC on April 16. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin expressed support for transitioning to an “enduring bilateral security relationship” with Iraq during a meeting with Sudani on April 15.[45] Sudani has emphasized during 2024 that he seeks to end the US-led international coalition’s presence in Iraq and transition to a “comprehensive” bilateral relationship with the United States.[46] Sudani also claimed that Iraqi Security Forces are “at a high level of readiness” and are prepared to ensure security and stability in Iraq.[47] Iraqi security forces still face significant deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics that would impede their ability to eliminate ISIS and other domestic threats alone.[48] Austin also stated that Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet Mohammad al Abbasi requested “the pricing and availability” of US counter-drone systems on April 13.[49] Militias in the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces—a security service that exists outside of the Defense Ministry—have repeatedly launched drones targeting US troops in Iraq. Sudani separately met with a delegation from the US defense company General Dynamics on April 16 to discuss developing Iraqi tanks and other armor.[50] General Dynamics Land Systems builds US M1 Abrams tanks, and Iraq operates Abrams tanks.

Sudani also held separate meetings with US Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo and US Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas on April 16.[51] Sudani and Adeyemo discussed “rehabilitating” Iraqi banks to meet international standards.[52] The United States has worked with Iraq in recent years to “improve the compliance procedures of Iraqi banks” to align Iraqi banks with international standards and “prevent terrorists, criminals, and corrupt and other illicit actors from accessing both the Iraqi and international financial systems.”[53] The US Treasury Department identified the Iraqi al Huda Bank as a “conduit for terrorist financing” and imposed sanctions on the bank’s owner in late January 2024.[54]

Houthi President Mahdi al Mashaat congratulated Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi for the April 13 Iranian attack targeting Israel during a phone call on April 16.[55] Mashaat reaffirmed Yemen’s support for the Iranian attack. The Houthis also took part in the Iranian attack on April 13 by firing missiles and drones from Yemen targeting Israel.[56] Mashaat expressed an interest in “expanding and strengthening relations” with Iran in “various fields.”[57] Raisi praised Houthi attacks against Israel and international shipping in the Red Sea. Raisi said that these Houthi attacks demonstrate Yemen’s “resistance” and support for Palestinians.[58] 

Houthi-controlled media claimed on April 16 that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting unspecified sites in Bajil District, Hudaydah Governorate, western Yemen.[59] The United States and the United Kingdom have not confirmed any airstrikes in Yemen at this time of writing.

 

Iran Update, April 15, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Israeli officials have emphasized the need to respond to the Iranian drone and missile attack but have not specified how or when they will do so.[1] An unnamed US official told Axios that Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in a phone call on April 15 that Israel has “no choice” but to respond to the Iranian attack.[2] Gallant stated that Israel will not allow ballistic missiles to be launched against its territory without a response. An unnamed Israeli official told NBC News that Israel’s response may be “imminent” following an Israeli war cabinet meeting on April 15. The official added that any Israeli response will be coordinated with the United States.[3]

Western and Israeli officials have maintained that the Iranian drone and missile attack into Israel on April 13 was meant to impose a severe cost on Israel—rather than the attack being symbolic and meant to fail.[4] US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby stated on April 15 that Iran sought to cause “extensive damage inside Israel” but failed due to US, Israeli, and partner efforts to intercept the Iranian projectiles.[5] Kirby’s remarks are consistent with other unnamed senior Biden administration officials telling Western media that Iran intended for the attack to cause “significant damage” and be “highly destructive.”[6] Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi similarly emphasized that Iran intended to harm the “strategic capabilities” of Israel but was unsuccessful during a statement at IDF Nevatim airbase on April 15.[7]

These statements from Western and Israeli officials are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the Iranian drone and missile attack was meant to penetrate Israeli air defenses and enable missile impacts inside Israel, thus causing greater damage than the attack actually did. The attack was designed to succeed—not to fail. The strike package was modeled on those that Russia has used repeatedly against Ukraine to great effect.[8]

Three unnamed US officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 14 that roughly 50 percent of the ballistic missiles that Iran fired at Israel either failed to launch or crashed before reaching their target.[9] US officials stated that Iran launched between 115 and 130 ballistic missiles at Israel in its attack.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Israeli officials have emphasized the need to respond to the Iranian drone and missile attack but have not specified how or when they will do so.
  • Western and Israeli officials have maintained that the Iranian drone and missile attack into Israel was meant to impose a severe cost on Israel.
  • Three unnamed US officials stated that roughly 50 percent of the ballistic missiles that Iran fired at Israel either failed to launch or crashed before reaching their target.
  • Gaza Strip: Hamas demanded several new concessions from Israel in its counteroffer to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement.
  • West Bank: Israeli settlers conducted a shooting attack and killed two Palestinians in Aqraba, which is near Nablus.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks around the Israel-Lebanon border.
  • Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani traveled to Washington, DC, to discuss bilateral US-Iraqi relations.
  • Yemen: US CENTCOM stated that the Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile toward the Gulf of Aden but did not damage any vessels.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF Nahal Brigade continued to conduct clearing operations at the seam of the northern and central Gaza Strip on April 15 to secure Israeli-built highway Route 749 and other nearby Israeli military sites.[10] The IDF has dubbed this zone the Netzarim corridor. The Nahal Brigade killed 15 Palestinian fighters around the corridor over the past day.[11]

The IDF activated two reserve brigades on April 14 for combat operations in the Gaza Strip.[12] An Israeli Army Radio journalist reported on April 15 that the IDF 2nd Carmeli Brigade and 679th Armored Brigade will deploy to secure the Netzarim corridor and the temporary US-built pier in the central Gaza Strip.[13] The two brigades will replace elements of the 162nd Division in the Gaza Strip, enabling the division to conduct raids in other parts of the Gaza Strip.[14]

Israeli forces continued to conduct raids around Nuseirat in the central Gaza Strip on April 15.[15] Elements of the IDF 162nd Division, including the Nahal and 401st brigades, are operating in the area to kill Palestinian fighters and destroy military infrastructure.[16] The IDF Nahal Brigade destroyed buildings and military infrastructure used by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the central Gaza Strip. The brigade also directed airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters and seized weapons. PIJ mortared an IDF headquarters near the University of Palestine, north of Wadi Gaza, on April 14.[17]

Three Palestinian militias targeted Israeli forces in eastern Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on April 15. Israeli forces continue to operate there, along the Israel-Gaza Strip border, to clear a one-kilometer buffer zone. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, reported that its fighters mortared Israeli armor east of Jabalia cemetery.[18] PIJ and the Palestinian Mujahedeen movement posted videos of their fighters targeting Israeli forces with heavy mounted machine guns in eastern Jabalia on April 15.[19] CTP-ISW cannot verify when the groups recorded the footage.

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson reiterated on April 15 that Palestinians cannot return to the northern Gaza Strip, calling the area “a dangerous combat zone.”[20] The IDF asked Gazans to remain in humanitarian zones and shelters in the southern Gaza Strip.[21] The statement marks the spokesperson’s second such appeal in two days, indicating that migration to the north remains a problem for the IDF.[22]Hamas has made the return of Gazans to the north a consistent demand in the ceasefire negotiations.[23]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant held a meeting on April 15 to identify "necessary civilian operations" to accomplish before an IDF clearing operation into Rafah. The minister focused on the need to evacuate civilians from Rafah and increase food and medical supply transfers into the Gaza Strip.[24] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on April 8 that he had set a date for the clearing operation into Rafah.[25]

Hamas demanded several new concessions from Israel in its counteroffer to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement, according to one Israeli official.[26] Hamas rejected the US-proposed ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal on April 13 hours before the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[27] The Israeli source claimed that Hamas sought to release only 20 Israeli hostages for a six-week ceasefire—half of the hostages reportedly proposed by the United States.[28] Hamas also reportedly asked for a higher ratio of hostage-for-prisoners and for more life-sentenced Palestinian prisoners to be released.[29] A recent Western report indicated that the US-proposal had a ratio of one Israel hostage for 17.5 Palestinian prisoners [30] White House spokesperson John Kirby said on April 15 that the United States believes that its proposal is still possible and that he is unaware of another proposal.”[31]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 15.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Nablus on April 14 and 15.[32] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces there.[33]

Israeli settlers conducted a shooting attack and killed two Palestinians in Aqraba, which is near Nablus, on April 15, according to Israeli media.[34] The IDF said that the attack followed a violent confrontation between a Jewish shepherd and Palestinian in the area.[35] The IDF said that Israeli forces responded to the scene and tried to diffuse the conflict after the shooting.[36] The IDF and Israeli police are investigating the incident.[37] Israeli media has reported an uptick in settler attacks in the West Bank following the murder of an Israeli boy near the Malachi Hashalom settlement on April 12.[38]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks around the Israel-Lebanon border since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 14.[39] The IDF said that an explosion injured four IDF soldiers in the “border area” of northern Israel on April 15.[40] Hezbollah said that it detonated “explosive devices” targeting IDF members in Tal Ismail, Lebanon, as they crossed the border into Lebanon.[41]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with US President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Washington, D.C., on April 15 to discuss bilateral US–Iraqi relations.[42] Sudani stated during his meeting with Biden that he aimed to discuss a “360-degree strategic partnership” and transition from a “military security-based relationship to a comprehensive economic, political, environmental, educational, and security partnership according to the Strategic Framework Agreement”.[43] CTP–ISW has previously assessed that Sudani is attempting to retain some US force presence in Iraq, but this policy places Sudani at odds with Iranian-backed groups which demand a full US withdrawal from Iraq.[44]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—threatened on April 12 to renew its attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq if there is a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq that permits US forces to remain.[45]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah congratulated Iran for its recent drone and missile attack on Israel and framed the attack as a success for penetrating Israeli air defense systems.[46] Western media reported that four out of the 100+ ballistic missiles launched by Iran penetrated Israeli air defenses and hit an IDF airbase in southern Israel.[47] Israeli media reported that the airbase suffered minimal damage.[48] Kataib Hezbollah also said that “the shame would haunt the rulers of Jordan” for supporting the US and Israeli effort to intercept Iranian projectiles.[49]

The IDF announced the interception of two drones approaching Israel. The IDF Navy intercepted a drone approaching near Eilat from the Red Sea on April 14.[50] The IDF separately reported on April 15 that it intercepted a drone approaching Israeli territory “from the east.”[51] Neither Iran nor an Iranian-backed group have claimed either attack at the time of this writing.

US CENTCOM stated that the Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile toward the Gulf of Aden on April 13 but did not damage any vessels.[52] US CENTCOM destroyed four Houthi drones in Taiz Governorate on April 14 following the Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile attack.[53]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian held phone calls with several of his foreign counterparts on April 14 and 15. Abdollahian spoke with the foreign ministers of Egypt, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom, among others. Abdollahian claimed that the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel was “legitimate self-defense” under Article 51 on the UN charter.[54] Abdollahian reiterated that, if Israel responds, the next Iranian attack would be “immediate, stronger, and more extensive.“[55] The foreign ministers of Egypt, Germany, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom separately emphasized the need for regional de-escalation in their phone calls with Abdollahian.

The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) resumed enforcing mandatory veiling throughout Tehran on April 13. LEC Tehran Provincial Unit Commander Brig. Gen. Abbas Ali Mohammadian announced that his forces would begin penalizing unveiled women on April 13.[56] Iranian social media users have correspondingly reported a sharp uptick in morality and veiling enforcement throughout Tehran City since then.[57] This enforcement involves arrests, fines, and verbal warnings.[58] Some users have reported similar enforcement activity in other cities, such as Karaj, Mashhad, and Yazd.[59] The Iranian regime reduced the number of morality patrols following the killing of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, although it did not entirely stop policing unveiled women in the months following her death.[60] Iranian social media users additionally noted an increased security presence in some Tehran universities in recent days, with some female dormitories reportedly requiring facial recognition technology for entry.[61] The full resumption of enforcing modesty standards in Tehran follows Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s call for mandatory veiling on April 3.[62]

Resumed veiling enforcement could exacerbate already existing anti-regime sentiments in Iran, especially amid deteriorating economic conditions and the ongoing escalation with Israel. One reformist-affiliated Iranian outlet wrote that the LEC risked submerging the country into a “state of crisis” following the recent Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel and compared the increased security presence in Tehran to an “invasion.”[63]

The Iranian rial separately reached a record low of 670,500 to one US dollar on April 12.[64]

Iran Update, April 14, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

For additional CTP-ISW analysis of the April 13 Iranian Strike Targeting Israel, please see Iran’s Attempt to Hit Israel with a Russian-Style Strike Package Failed...for Now by Brian Carter and Frederick W. Kagan

Senior Iranian military and political officials praised the alleged success of the April 13 Iranian attack against Israel and simultaneously warned the United States that Iran would target US bases in the region if the US supported an Israeli response.[1] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri warned that, if the United States supports any Israeli response to its attack, Iran will target US bases in the region.[2] Bagheri further specified that Iran intended to target the IDF Air Force Nevatim airbase in the Negev desert and the IDF intelligence center in Mt. Hermon during the attack against Israel. Iranian missiles caused limited damage to the Nevatim airbase, and the base remains operational.[3] There are no reports of any damage to the intelligence center in northern Israel. The IRGC issued a warning to the United States not to get involved in a response to the Iranian operation.[4] Artesh Commander Maj. Gen Abdol Rahim Mousavi stated that, if the United States uses any of its regional bases to support Israel, then Iran will consider the US bases legitimate targets and retaliate accordingly.[5] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stated that, if Israel responds to the Iranian operation, Iran will retaliate with greater severity than its April 13 attack.[6] Raisi emphasized that Israel’s supporters, presumably meaning the United States, should ”appreciate” the ”responsible and propionate” nature of the Iranian April 13 operation.

A senior Iranian military official asserted on April 14 that Iran has adopted a new policy to target Israel directly from Iranian territory due to the “success” of the Iranian attack on Israel.[7] IRGC Commander Maj. Gen Hossein Salami stated that Iran has adopted a new “equation” for confronting Israel following the “success” of the attack, which Iran dubbed the “True Promise” operation.[8] Salami warned that, should Israel attack Iran or Iranian targets abroad, Iran will retaliate by launching attacks targeting Israel directly from Iranian territory.[9] This would represent a significant shift in Iranian policy, where historically Iran has relied on proxy and partners to launch attacks targeting Israel rather than conducting the attacks itself.

Israel and its partners are discussing possible responses to the Iranian attack on Israel. Israeli President Isaac Herzog said that the Iranian attack was “like a declaration of war” but emphasized that Israelis “are not war seekers.”[10] Israeli War Cabinet member Benny Gantz stated that Israel would respond to the attack at a time of its choosing.[11] Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Israel Katz stated, “We said that, if Iran attacks Israel, Israel will attack Iran – that is still valid.”[12] US President Joe Biden told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the night of April 13 in a phone call that the United States will not participate in an offensive response to Iran’s attack.[13] Leaders from the Group of 7 nations (G7) convened on April 14 to coordinate a “diplomatic response” to Iran’s attack, according to the White House.[14] An unspecified Biden administration official said that the G7 leaders discussed the possibility of recognizing the IRGC as a terrorist organization, which the United States did in 2019.[15]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Senior Iranian military and political officials praised the alleged success of the April 13 Iranian attack against Israel and simultaneously warned the United States that Iran would target US bases in the region if the US supported an Israeli response.
  • A senior Iranian military official asserted that Iran has adopted a new policy to target Israel directly from Iranian territory due to the “success” of the Iranian attack on Israel.
  • Israel and its partners are discussing possible responses to the Iranian attack on Israel.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to clearing operations in Nuseirat along Wadi Gaza.
  • Political Negotiations: Hamas rejected a US-proposed ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal.
  • West Bank: A Palestinian militia claimed three shooting attacks in and around the West Bank in retaliation for recent settler violence.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel during and after the Iranian attack on Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces continued to clearing operations in Nuseirat along Wadi Gaza on April 14. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 401st Brigade combat engineers built two bridges for Israeli tanks to cross Wadi Gaza, a natural separation between the north and south of the Gaza Strip.[16] Elements of the IDF 162nd Division, including the Nahal and 401st brigades, are operating in the area to kill Palestinian fighters and destroy military infrastructure.[17][18] Israeli forces destroyed rocket launch sites in the central Gaza Strip that several Palestinian militias used .[19] Palestinian fighters had prepared to launch the rockets into Israel. Israeli forces have killed dozens of Palestinian fighters in close-range engagements over the past several days of operations in the Nuseirat area.[20]

Palestinian fighters claimed a single attack targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on April 14. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, reported that its fighters mortared Israeli forces north of Nuseirat.[21]

Hamas rejected a US-proposed ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal on April 13.[22] The proposal would have reportedly established a six-week ceasefire in exchange for the release of 40 Israeli hostages held by Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip.[23] Mediators presented Hamas with the US proposal on April 7.[24] Hamas reiterated in its rejection that the group would only accept a ceasefire proposal that includes a permanent ceasefire, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the entire Gaza Strip, the return of the displaced Palestinians, an increase in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, and the start of reconstruction efforts.[25] [26] The Israeli Prime Minister's Office confirmed that Hamas rejected the ceasefire proposal on April 14 and said that the proposal ”included the most significant flexibility on Israel's part” since the beginning of negotiations.[27]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson reiterated on April 14 that Palestinians cannot return to the northern Gaza Strip, calling the area “a war zone.”.[28] The spokesperson specified that Palestinian civilians should not try to migrate to the northern Gaza Strip on the Salah al Din or al Rashid roads despite ”rumors” the IDF is allowing civilians to return.[29] Local Palestinian sources posted footage of crowds of Palestinians civilians walking to the northern Gaza Strip on al Rashid Road on April 14 as a munition exploded on near the road.[30] Israeli military correspondents previously hypothesized that the recent IDF withdrawal from the southern Gaza Strip would enable displaced Palestinians in Rafah to migrate to parts of Khan Younis and the central Gaza Strip.[31] [32]

Several Palestinian political factions, including Hamas, issued supportive statements of Iran’s April 13 attack on Israel. The groups called the Iranian attack a “natural” and “justified” response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike that targeted Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials in Damascus.[33] The Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestinian, a secular leftist Palestinian group fighting alongside Hamas in the war, called the Iranian attack an “important turning point“ in the war.[34]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 14.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed three shooting attacks on April 13 in and around the West Bank in retaliation for recent settler violence. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades targeted an Israeli military checkpoint, an Israeli settlement near Tulkarm, and an Israeli town on the border with the West Bank..[35] An Israeli Army Radio West Bank correspondent posted a flyer signed by 11 West Bank Rabbis in response to the death of a 14-year-old boy who was murdered near the Malachi HaShalom settlement on April 12.[36] The flyer called on Israelis to strengthen and grow settlements across the West Bank in response to the boy’s death. Palestinian media claimed that Israeli settlers have targeted Palestinians in Auja, Huwwara, Jalazoun refugee camp, Kafr Shuba, and Nabe Ghazzal since CTP-ISW’s last data cut off on April 13.[37] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify these reports.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel during and after the Iranian attack on Israel on April 13.[38]


Iran Update, April 13, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps 

Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Ashka Jhaveri, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 7:00 pm ET

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force launched a large-scale drone and missile attack from Iranian territory that targeted Israel from Iranian territory on April 13.[1] This marks the first time Iran has targeted Israel directly from Iranian territory.[2] Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson Brig. Gen. Daniel Hagari confirmed that Iran launched drones and then missiles from Iranian territory toward Israel.[3] The IRGC announced the start of operation “True Promise” at approximately 15:30 EST on April 13.[4] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council approved the attack and the IRGC Aerospace Force conducted the attack under the supervision of the Armed Forces General Staff. The IRGC launched hundreds of drones toward Israel, including Shahed-136 one-way attack drones.[5] The attack included at least three attack waves over the course of several hours.[6] Israeli media reported that the IRGC launched its operation from Kermanshah city, Kermanshah Province, and Dokuh, Hormozgan Province, in western Iran.[7]

The United States, United Kingdom, Israel, and Jordan began intercepting drones and missiles outside of Israeli airspace between 1700 and 1800 ET, according to Israeli media and several unspecified sources speaking to Israeli media.[8] IDF spokesperson Hagari said in a press briefing that Iran launched over 200 drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.[9] Flight radar reported that the airspace over Iran, Israel, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon is closed.[10] The Iranian Permanent Mission to the United Nations posted on X (Twitter) that the operation was launched in response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike targeting IRGC officials in Damascus. The Iranian Permanent Mission wrote that the Iranian “True Promise” operation “can be deemed concluded” at 1800 ET.[11]

Members of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” appear to have conducted attacks targeting Israel simultaneously with Iran’s first wave of attacks. Lebanese Hezbollah claimed it fired “dozens” of Katyusha rockets targeting an Israeli missile and artillery base in the Golan Heights at 1800 ET.[12] The Houthis posted two promotional videos about destroying Israel during Iran’s wave of drone attacks, but has not claimed any attack at the time of writing.[13] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq (True Promise Corps) congratulated the Islamic Resistance in Iraq on April 13 for participating in the attack targeting Israel.[14] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has not claimed an attack at the time of writing. The Iranian-backed Badr Organization posted a graphic celebrating Iran’s attack on Israel stating that “we are among the criminals taking revenge” suggesting that the militia may have supported the attack on Israel in an unspecified capacity.[15]

The Israeli war cabinet convened on April 13 in Tel Aviv and remains in session.[16] Israel immediately took certain preventative measures after the first wave of drones were launched. Israel closed its airspace.[17] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) evacuated several bases, deployed aircraft, and raised air defense readiness.[18] The IDF instructed residents along its northern border in the Golan Heights, Eilat, Dimona, and Nevatim (Negev region) to remain close to shelters.[19]

Iran warned Israel’s partners, particularly the United States and Jordan, not to intervene in Iran’s attack against Israel. Supreme National Security Council-affiliated media warned the United States against intervening in Iran’s attack, claiming that Iran has prepared ballistic missile platforms to target “several US bases in the region.”[20] The Iranian Permanent Mission to the UN similarly warned the United States to “stay away” from the conflict between Iran and Israel.[21] The United States and the United Kingdom have intercepted over 100 drones outside of Israeli airspace at the time of this writing.[22] IRGC-affiliated media separately warned Jordan that it will be Iran’s “next target” if it participates in an Israeli response to Iran’s attack.[23] Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani warned that Iran will give a “decisive response” to any country that allows Israel to use its airspace or territory to conduct a counterattack against Iran.[24] Israeli media reported that Jordanian aircraft shot down Iranian drones headed toward Israel over northern and central Jordan.[25]

The composition of the ongoing Iranian attack on Israel is similar to the composition of Russian strikes have repeatedly targeted Ukraine. These Russian strikes have attempted to determine the optimal package to penetrate Western air and missile defenses. Russia has experimented with combinations of ballistic and cruise missiles alongside Iranian drones in Ukraine.[26] Iran’s use of drones and missiles shows how Iran is learning from the Russians to develop increasingly dangerous and effective strike packages against Israel. Iran has also used the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea to refine Iranian drone tactics by testing US Navy air defenses.[27] The ongoing Iranian attacks provide Iran opportunities to evaluate the effectiveness of different strike packages to understand how they can evade and overwhelm US air and maritime defenses more effectively.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy seized a Portuguese-flagged, Israeli-linked commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz on April 13, likely as part of its campaign to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel.[28] IRGC-controlled media published a video of IRGC Navy forces repelling from a helicopter onto the MSC Aries.[29] The Zodiac Maritime, a shipping company owned by Israeli billionaire Eyal Ofer, owns the MSC Aries and chartered the vessel to the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC).[30] The MSC confirmed that the MSC Aries, which was en route from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to India, was “boarded by Iranian authorities” and “diverted from her itinerary towards Iran.”[31] IRGC-controlled media emphasized that the seizure of the MSC Aries “has nothing to do with Iran’s retaliatory measure” against Israel for the April 1 Israeli airstrike that killed seven IRGC officials in Damascus.[32]

The IRGC Navy’s seizure of the MSC Aries comes amid increased Iranian threats to the UAE. IRGC Navy Commander Rear Adm. Ali Reza Tangsiri recently claimed that Israel’s presence in the UAE threatens Iran and reiterated the long-standing Iranian threat to close the Strait of Hormuz during an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah-controlled media on April 9.[33] Israel has increasingly relied on an overland trade route that connects Haifa to Dubai via Jordan and Saudi Arabia to compensate for reduced trade activity at the Port of Eilat due to the Houthis’ anti-shipping campaign.[34] Tehran and its regional allies have threatened to disrupt the Israeli ground connection to the Persian Gulf. Iranian state media and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the UAE for allowing Israel to conduct trade through its territory.[35] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have specifically called for the dismantlement of Israel’s “land bridge” through Jordan.[36] The IRGC Navy may have specifically targeted the Aries MSC to increase pressure on the UAE to sever economic ties with Israel.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Iran launched a large-scale drone and missile attack from Iranian territory that targeted Israel from Iranian territory.
  • The IRGC Navy seized a Portuguese-flagged, Israeli-linked commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, likely as part of its campaign to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters in Beit Hanoun.
  • West Bank: The IDF announced that it found the body of the missing 14-year-old Israeli boy in the West Bank near Malachi HaShalom. Israeli media is widely reporting that Israeli settlers committed acts of violence in at least eight Palestinian towns in the northern West Bank after the IDF found the missing boy’s body.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 12 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters in Beit Hanoun on April 13. The IDF Northern Brigade (Gaza Division) located the Palestinian fighters using a drone.[37] The IDF Northern Brigade most recently conducted a raid in Shujaiya neighborhood of Gaza City, south of Beit Hanoun.[38] CTP-ISW assessed on March 25 that a small number of Palestinian fighters have likely infiltrated Beit Hanoun.[39] The IDF reported that Israeli forces killed a Hamas company commander for the Beit Hanoun area during clashes with Hamas fighters in the area on April 4.[40] Palestinian militias continued ability to operate in the northern Gaza Strip is consistent with the assessed infiltration of fighters into the area and Hamas’ intentions to reassert its governing authority following Israeli withdrawals.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations outside Nuseirat along Wadi Gaza on April 13. Elements of the IDF 162nd Division, including the Nahal and 401st brigades, are operating in the area to kill Palestinian fighters and destroy military infrastructure.[41] Israeli forces destroyed a Hamas weapons storage facility and confiscated military equipment belonging to the group during clearing operations.[42] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on April 12 shows flattened terrain in Zahra, north of Nuseirat, indicating that Israeli bulldozers and/or heavy vehicles are operating in the area.

Several Palestinian militias claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces near Nuseirat on April 13. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, reported that its fighters conducted five attacks north of Nuseirat during the past two days, which included firing a rocket-propelled grenade at an IDF tank.[43] The Popular Resistance Committees, which is a Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters conducted separate mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces and a military position north of Nuseirat, respectively.[44]

The IDF Air Force struck over 30 targets in the Gaza Strip on April 13, including anti-tank equipment.[45]

PIJ and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) conducted a combined rocket attack from the Gaza Strip targeting Sderot in southern Israel on April 12.[46] The IDF said that it intercepted three rockets.[47] Israeli artillery targeted the launch site of the attack in the Gaza Strip. The IDF Air Force struck three rocket launchers in the Gaza Strip that contained about 20 rockets ready to be launched into central Israel.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The IDF announced on April 13 that it found the body of the missing 14-year-old Israeli boy in the West Bank near Malachi HaShalom.[48] The IDF reported that unspecified persons killed the boy with a blade and that the investigation is ongoing.[49] The IDF initially began searching for the boy with Israeli settlers on April 12 near the Israeli settlement of Malachi HaShalom.[50] Israeli and Palestinian media reported violence occurred in al Mughayir, a Palestinian town west of Malachi HaShalom, during the search on April 12. The IDF reported that there were “violent disturbances” in al Mughayir but that the Israeli forces entered the town and removed the Israeli settlers from the area.[51] Palestinian Authority-affiliated media confirmed that at least one Palestinian civilian died during the violence.[52] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF is preparing for widespread riots and “disturbances” across the West Bank in response to the boy’s death[53][54]

Israeli media is widely reporting that Israeli settlers committed acts of violence on April 13 in at least eight Palestinian towns in the northern West Bank after the IDF found the missing boy’s body. The IDF reported that participants in clashes between Israelis and Palestinians in several areas of the West Bank threw stones and fired weapons.[55] Israeli Army Radio reported that Israeli settlers rioted and committed acts of violence in al Mughayir, Dumas, Abu Falah, Beit Furik, and Kosra.[56] The Jerusalem Post cited unspecified Israeli, Arab, and US media who reported that Israeli settlers also targeted Deir Dibwan, Sinjil, and Beitin.[57] Israeli media and local reports reported that Israeli settlers set fire to cars and Palestinian homes.[58] There were also reports of casualties during the violence. The Palestinian Red Crescent reported that three Palestinians were wounded in al Mughayr.[59] Israeli media reported that Israeli settlers fired small arms, killing a Palestinian in al Mughayir.[60] Israeli Army Radio reported that Israeli settlers shot and injured three Palestinians.[61]

Senior Israeli cabinet officials appeared to call on Israeli settlers to return home in an attempt to restore order. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called on Israeli citizens to allow Israeli forces to operate “unhindered.”[62] Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant added that “revenge” will make it difficult for Israeli forces to pursue the boy’s killers.[63] Gallant and Israeli War Cabinet Minister Benny Gantz urged the Israeli settlers not to take the law “into [their] own hands.”[64] The IDF reported later on April 13 that clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians had ended.[65]

Palestinian militias called for a general mobilization of fighters and Palestinian civilians in response to settler violence that occurred in the West Bank on April 12 and 13. Hamas called on Palestinian militias and civilians in the West Bank to take up arms and escalate “resistance activity” against Israeli forces and settlers.[66] Hamas also called on the Palestinian Authority to exercise its authority to protect Palestinians in the West Bank.[67] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade announced a general mobilization of all of its fighters in Tulkarm to retaliate against the settler violence at al Mughayir.[68] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine posted a statement calling for the formation of a “popular protection committee” in all Palestinian towns in the West Bank to “confront” settler “crimes” and to “thwart their malicious goals.”[69]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 12 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 11.[70] Hezbollah fired one-way attack drones targeting an Iron Dome site near Kfar Blum.[71] The IDF confirmed that a drone fell in the Kfar Blum area.[72] Hezbollah claimed that the Israelis are using the site as an alternative to one at Kfar Blum after a Hezbollah attack targeting the Iron Dome batteries there in January 2024.[73] CTP-ISW cannot corroborate the claim.

Iran Update, April 12, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps 

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Islamic Resistance in Iraqan umbrella organization of Iranian-backed Iraqi militiasthreatened on April 12 to renew its attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq.[1] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq rejected any bilateral agreement between the United States and Iraq that permits US forces to remain in Iraq. The group threatened to “torment [the United States] with fire” if US forces are not removed from Iraq.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani will meet with US President Joe Biden in Washington, DC, on April 15 to discuss the trajectory of US-Iraqi relations under the Strategic Framework Agreement.[2] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s threat follows Sudani’s article in Foreign Affairs on April 11 in which he articulated his intent to expand US and Iraqi cooperation beyond security and military affairs to include economic, agricultural, industrial, technological, and energy cooperation.[3] Sudani’s articulated policy is currently at odds with the demands set by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which include the full withdrawal of US forces.

CTP-ISW previously warned that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may regard Sudani’s visit to Washington as a decisive moment and could decide to resume attacks targeting US forces if the visit does not result in tangible steps toward removing US forces from Iraq.[4] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has paused attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria since February 2024, when the United States killed a senior Kataib Hezbollah commander in Baghdad.[5] The pause in attacks coincided with the start of negotiations between Washington and Baghdad over the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq.[6] Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais Khazali suggested on April 10 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could resume attacking US forces if Sudani’s upcoming visit to Washington, DC fails to force the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[7]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—an umbrella organization of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias— threatened to renew its attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF killed multiple Hamas personnel affiliated with Hamas’ governance structures and military organizations in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • The IDF continued an operation on the outskirts of Nuseirat along Wadi Gaza.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces killed senior Hamas commander Muhammad Omar Daraghmeh in Tubas on April 12.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iran: US CENTCOM Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla continued to meet with Israeli officials in Israel to discuss preparations for a possible Iranian attack targeting Israel.
  • Yemen: US CENTCOM intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile over the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed multiple Hamas personnel affiliated with Hamas’ governance structures and military organizations on April 11 in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike that killed the head of Hamas’ internal security in Jabalia, Radwan Muhammad Abdallah Radwan.[8] Palestinian media reported that Radwan was the director of a police station and that he coordinated aid distribution.[9] The IDF said that Radwan was also a member of Hamas’ military wing and directed other Palestinian fighters to take over humanitarian aid trucks in the area.[10] The IDF also killed another senior official in Hamas’ internal security operations in Jabalia and another fighter in an unspecified Hamas battalion in Jabalia.[11]

Hamas remains determined to reconstitute itself militarily and reassert its authority in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has made attempts to coopt and undermine possible alternatives to its rule, facilitate trade, and rehabilitate its local police in the northern Gaza Strip.[12] The IDF is conducting operations in the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt Hamas' attempts to reconstitute its governing authority.[13] Israel has previously targeted members of Hamas’ police and internal security apparatus. The Civil Police and the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry’s Internal Security Forces in Gaza both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing.[14]

The IDF continued an operation on the outskirts of Nuseirat along Wadi Gaza on April 12. Elements of the IDF 162nd Division, including the Nahal and 401st Brigades, killed Palestinian fighters and destroyed military infrastructure.[15] Israeli forces raided a school in Zahra, north of Nuseirat. The IDF discovered weapons and a residence at this location. The IDF reported that Hamas fighters were staying at the residence.[16] The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade supported ground operations in the central Gaza Strip.[17]

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed that its fighters detonated a minefield and used an explosively formed penetrator to target Israeli armor in a complex attack at a military position north of Nuseirat.[18] Palestinian militias, including PIJ and Hamas, claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zahra in mid-March 2024.[19] The militias may have infiltrated into Zahra and other areas of southern Gaza City from areas of the central Gaza Strip that the IDF has not yet cleared. The militias also likely reactivated dormant cells after the Israelis decreased the number of IDF troops in the northern Strip in late December.

The IDF Air Force struck more than 60 targets in the Gaza Strip on April 12, including underground military infrastructure.[20]

A humanitarian aid convoy entered the northern Gaza Strip on April 12 through a new crossing.[21] The convoy underwent security checks at the Kerem Shalom crossing before entering the Gaza Strip. The aid delivery was coordinated by the IDF and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—“as part of efforts to enhance the humanitarian aid corridors to the Gaza Strip in general, and to the north in particular.”[22] The IDF said on April 11 that Israel approved the construction of another border crossing into the northern Gaza Strip as part of Israeli efforts to boost aid.[23] 

The American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA) charity resumed aid operations in the Gaza Strip on April 11.[24] ANERA temporarily paused operations following the death of an ANERA staff member and the Israeli strike that killed seven World Central Kitchen (WCK) aid workers on April 1.[25] ANERA said that Israeli authorities informed them during a meeting that “certain measures would be taken to protect humanitarian aid workers in the Gaza Strip.”[26] Israeli military officials met with several international aid organizations on April 10 to discuss the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.[27]

The United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated three entities on April 12 affiliated with Hamas’ offensive cyber and drone operations.[28] The European Union simultaneously imposed sanctions targeting Hamas.[29] These designations are part of broader US efforts to disrupt Hamas’ ability to conduct future attacks.

OFAC sanctioned the following individuals:

  • Hamas’ military wing spokesperson Hudhayfa Samir Abdallah al Kahlut (al Kahlut) also known as “Abu Ubaida”
  • William Abu Shanab (Abu Shanab)
  • Baraa Hasan Farhat (Farhat)
  • Khalil Muhammad Azzam (Azzam)

A bipartisan group of US House of Representatives members is introducing legislation to sanction the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) for their role in the October 7 attacks.[30] The PRC is a Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war. The group has claimed multiple attacks targeting Israeli forces and Israel during IDF ground operations.[31] Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA) stated that the militia has “flown under the radar and avoided real consequences for their horrific crimes.”[32] The legislation also requires the US Department of State to issue a report on whether to designate the PRC and the West Bank-based Lion’s Den group as terrorist organizations.[33]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 12.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in two locations in the northern West Bank on April 12.[34]  The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired “light weapons” and detonated improvised explosive devices in two separate attacks targeting Israeli forces around Tubas and Qalqilya.[35] Israeli forces detained five wanted individuals in overnight operations across the West Bank.[36]

Israeli forces killed senior Hamas commander Muhammad Omar Daraghmeh in Tubas on April 12.[37] The IDF reported that Daraghmeh shot at Israeli forces who returned fire and killed him. The IDF said that Daraghmeh was a “central Hamas operative” and “promoted” militia activity in the region.[38] Israeli forces killed Daraghmeh’s predecessor “about a month and a half ago,” according to Israeli Army Radio.[39] Hamas confirmed Daraghmeh’s death.[40] Palestinian Authority-affiliated media reported that Israeli forces killed another Palestinian fighter during fighting in al Faraa refugee camp during the raid.[41]

The IDF announced on April 12 that it launched a search and rescue operation for a 14-year-old boy near the Malachi Shalom settlement.[42] Israeli media reported that the IDF air, ground, and special operations forces launched a search and rescue operation with Israeli settlers from Malachi Shalom to find the boy who went missing while herding sheep.[43] The settlers volunteered to assist the IDF. The exact cause of the boy’s disappearance is still unknown.[44]

Israeli and Palestinian media reported violence occurred in al Mughayir, west of Malachi Shalom. Local footage confirms these reports.[45] The IDF confirmed that there were “violent disturbances” in al Mughayir but that the IDF entered the town and removed the Israeli citizens from the town.[46] Israeli and Palestinian media also reported Israeli and Palestinian casualties.[47] Palestinian Authority-affiliated media confirmed that at least one Palestinian civilian died during the violence.[48] The details of these events are unclear. CTP-ISW will provide additional details as information becomes available.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 11.[49]

Hezbollah fired approximately 40 rockets targeting Israeli “artillery positions” in al Zaoura in the Golan Heights on April 12.[50] The IDF said that it intercepted some rockets and that the rest of the rockets fell in open areas.[51]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla continued to meet with Israeli officials in Israel on April 12 to discuss preparations for a possible Iranian attack targeting Israel.[52] Kurilla met with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi to discuss US and Israeli preparations ahead of a potential Iranian attack against Israel.[53] Kurilla also met with other senior Israeli military officials, including IDF spokesperson Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, on April 11.[54] Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened that they will retaliate against Israel in response to the Israeli airstrike that killed several senior IRGC officers in Damascus on April 1.[55]

Kurilla’s visit to Israel coincides with heightened US military readiness and warnings of an “imminent” Iranian attack targeting Israel. US media and US government officials said on April 12 that the United States is moving additional assets into the region, including air defenses to protect US forces in Iraq and Syria, in preparation for the “viable threat” of an Iranian attack on Israel.[56] The Wall Street Journal reported that the additional assets include two US Navy destroyers.[57] Unspecified US officials also warned that the US and Israel are expecting a “major Iranian attack” using “more than 100 drones and dozens of missiles” on “southern or northern Israel” as early as April 12 or 13.[58] US officials similarly told Western media on April 10 and 11 that an Iranian drone and missile attack targeting Israel was "imminent.”[59]

The present nature of the information space makes it difficult to forecast when precisely Iran might launch a retaliatory strike targeting Israel, if Iran attacks Israel at all. Western estimations of when Iran will conduct an attack have varied and could be subject to change. The likelihood that Iran is spreading disinformation surrounding its strike increases the difficulty of forecasting the timing of the retaliation.[60]

President Ebrahim Raisi and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari discussed recent tensions between Iran and Pakistan during a phone call on April 11.[61] Raisi is scheduled to travel to Pakistan on April 22.[62] He warned that “hegemonic world powers”—a standard Iranian reference to the United States and the West—are attempting to create divisions between Tehran and Islamabad. He also stressed the need for Muslims to reject Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS. Raisi also called for information sharing between Pakistan and Iran to “overcome security challenges.”[63] A series of attacks in southeastern Iran since December 2023 by Salafi-jihadi groups operating along the Iran-Pakistan border has strained relations between Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan designated the Zainabiyoun Brigade–an Iran-backed Pakistani Shia militia operating in Syria–as a terrorist organization on April 11.[64] Iran and Pakistan also exchanged missile and drone strikes in January 2024 after Iran targeted anti-regime militants inside Pakistan.[65]

US CENTCOM intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile over the Red Sea on April 11.[66] CENTCOM said that the missile was launched from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen and did not cause any damage to US, coalition, or commercial ships.

 


Iran Update, April 11, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Alexandra Braverman, Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iran appears to be exploiting the uncertainty surrounding its reported “imminent” attack against Israel to stoke psychological terror in Israel. Western media reported on April 10 that Iran could launch drone and missile strikes into Israel imminently in retaliation for the IDF recently killing several senior IRGC officers in Damascus.[1] Iranian state media posted on X (Twitter) later on April 10 that the Iranian defense minister announced the closure of the airspace around Tehran for a military exercise.[2] Iranian regime-affiliated channels then began circulating posts suggesting that an Iranian attack into Israel would soon occur.[3] The coincidence of these posts led to extensive public speculation that Iran would launch an attack into Israel while the airspace around Tehran was closed. Iranian state media shortly thereafter retracted the claims of Iranian airspace being closed and denied that the Iranian defense minister made any related announcement.[4] The publication and retraction of these reports is bizarre, especially given that the Iranian defense minister should have no role in the maintenance of Iranian airspace. Iranian military and political officials have boasted in recent days that the impending nature of their attack is itself damaging to Israel, suggesting that the media reports may have been part of a sophisticated information operation.[5] Stoking terror in Israel is consistent with CTP-ISW’s previous observation that Iranian leaders want the Israel-Hamas war to catalyze migration away from Israel and thereby erode the long-term viability of the Jewish state.[6]

The present nature of the information space makes it difficult to forecast when precisely Iran might launch a retaliatory strike into Israel if at all. Western estimations of when Iran will conduct an attack have varied and could be subject to change. The likelihood that Iran is spreading disinformation surrounding its strike exacerbates the issue further.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant clarified on April 10 that Israel’s war aim in the Gaza Strip is to prevent Hamas from conducting another October 7-style attack into Israel again.[7] Gallant said that preventing another October 7-style attack is what Israeli leaders mean when saying that they seek to destroy Hamas as a military organization. Gallant added that the IDF has already destroyed four of Hamas’ five brigades and that Israeli forces are currently contending with “hotspots” of militia activity across the Gaza Strip.[8] The remaining brigade that Israeli leaders say that they have not yet destroyed is in Rafah.

Israeli operations have likely degraded Hamas in the Gaza Strip severely, rendering Hamas unable to restore its military wing to pre-October 7 levels in the short term. Gallant described Hamas’ military force as comparable to an “organized commando division” prior to the war. Israel has since then destroyed a large quantity of Hamas’ military infrastructure and weapons as well as killed thousands of fighters in the Gaza Strip thus far. Hamas fighters are currently operating as small squad- and platoon-sized cells instead of the well-organized structure they had prior to the war. Hamas will thus require extensive resources and time to rebuild their military force.

Hamas remains determined to reconstitute itself militarily and reassert its authority in the Gaza Strip, however. Hamas is already trying to coopt and undermine possible alternatives to its rule, which is evident by the reported Hamas attack targeting a head of a local clan in March 2024.[9] Hamas is also attempting to facilitate trade and rehabilitate local police in the northern Gaza Strip, which are parts of Hamas’ larger effort to restore control over the civilian population.[10] Gallant acknowledged that Israel must empower a local alternative to Hamas in a post-war scenario.[11]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Iran appears to be exploiting the uncertainty surrounding its reported “imminent” attack against Israel to stoke psychological terror in Israel.
  • Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant clarified that Israel’s war aim in the Gaza Strip is to prevent Hamas from conducting another October 7-style attack into Israel again.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Tulkarm in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani wrote an article for Foreign Affairs reiterating his intention to end the US-led international coalition’s presence in Iraq and transition to a “comprehensive” bilateral relationship with the United States.
  • Yemen: US CENTCOM confirmed that it intercepted three Houthi drones over the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on April 11 that it had conducted a raid in Shujaiya in the northern Gaza Strip in recent days.[12] The IDF Northern Brigade (Gaza Division) has conducted “targeted activities” in the area recently, including killing Palestinian fighters and destroying military infrastructure, such as a Hamas training base

Palestinian militias conducted several attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on April 11. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, mortared Israeli vehicles south of Gaza City.[13] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) separately said that it conducted a sniper attack targeting an Israeli soldier in al Taqa, east of Gaza City.[14]

The IDF announced on April 11 that it conducted an operation targeting Hamas outside Nuseirat in the central Gaza Strip. The IDF Nahal Brigade and 401st Brigade led the operation around Nuseirat.[15] The IDF Air Force coordinated with the 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division) and directed airstrikes targeting dozens of Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure before Israeli ground forces entered the area.[16] The Nahal Brigade identified a fighter emerging from a tunnel, and the IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting the fighter as they approached Israeli forces.[17] The IDF Navy separately conducted several strikes targeting Palestinian fighters along the central Gaza Strip coast.[18]

The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC) conducted a combined mortar attack targeting Israeli forces north of Nuseirat refugee camp on April 11.[19] PFLP-GC is a Palestinian faction based primarily in Syria.[20] The faction receives support from Iran and has cooperated with other elements of the Axis of Resistance.[21] This event marks the second known instance of the PFLP-GC attacking the IDF in the Gaza Strip since the Israel-Hamas war began.[22]

The IDF and Shin Bet killed a Hamas fighter who was responsible for financing Hamas military activities in Rafah, on April 11.[23] The IDF said that the fighter transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars to Hamas in December 2023 for its operations in Rafah.[24]

Israeli media reported on April 11 that an IDF Southern Command colonel approved the airstrike that killed three sons of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in the northern Gaza Strip on April 10.[25] Israeli media reported that senior Israeli officials, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, were not aware of the strike before it occurred.[26] Israeli media reported that the IDF targeted Haniyeh’s sons over their involvement in holding Israeli hostages.[27] The reports are consistent with the IDF reporting on April 10 that Haniyeh’s sons were Hamas fighters.[28] Unspecified Israeli officials told Israeli media that IDF leaders believed that Israel is not close to a ceasefire deal with Hamas and that the strike would not affect hostage negotiations.[29]

The IDF said on April 11 that Israel is increasing the delivery of aid into the Gaza Strip, particularly to the northern part.[30] Israeli Defense Minister Gallant said that these efforts are part of the next Israeli phase of humanitarian efforts and include opening new crossings into the Gaza Strip, boosting aid deliveries from Jordan, establishing a joint command to coordinate military operations and aid efforts, and other projects, such as the establishment of a temporary floating pier.[31] IDF spokesperson Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari said that Israel approved the construction of another border crossing into the northern Gaza Strip and the opening of the Port of Ashdod to enable more aid flow.[32] Hagari's comments are consistent with an Israeli Army Radio report on April 10 that Israel would construct a new crossing instead of opening the Erez crossing.[33] Hagari also said that the IDF is establishing field hospitals and other kinds of infrastructure as well as providing food, water, and shelter in the central Gaza Stirp.[34] The IDF said on March 13 that it plans to move civilians from Rafah to “humanitarian enclaves” in the central Gaza Strip before any Israeli clearing operation into Rafah.[35] Israel expects the number of trucks entering the Gaza Strip to increase gradually from 350 to 500 per day.[36] The UN Security Council said in a statement on April 11 that it acknowledged the Israeli efforts to facilitate more aid into the Gaza Strip “but stressed that more should be done to bring the required relief given the scale of needs in Gaza.”[37]

Israeli military officials met with several international aid organizations on April 10 to discuss the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.[38] The IDF Southern Command Commander Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman and Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—Maj. Gen. Ghassan Alyan met with representatives from UN agencies, the Red Cross, and USAID, among others.[39] Israeli officials presented their upcoming plans for increasing the pace of aid transfers into the strip. Israeli Army Radio noted that the meeting followed the Israeli strike that killed seven World Central Kitchen (WCK) aid workers on April 1.[40] Some aid organizations have suspended operations in the Gaza Strip following the WCK attack, citing concerns of a lack of protection for civilians.[41] The IDF spokesperson said on April 11 that the IDF is implementing lessons learned from WCK attack.[42]

Unspecified Palestinian fighters conducted an indirect fire attack from the central Gaza Strip into Israel on April 11.[43] Israeli Army Radio reported that four munitions fell short inside the Gaza Strip. No Palestinian militia has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Tulkarm in the West Bank on April 11.[44] The IDF reported on April 11 that Israeli forces arrested six wanted individuals across the West Bank.[45] The IDF seized small arms during these operations. Israeli forces separately arrested an individual in Hebron on suspicion of them planning to conduct a stabbing attack.[46]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 10.[47]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani wrote an article for Foreign Affairs on April 11 reiterating his intention to end the US-led international coalition’s presence in Iraq and transition to a “comprehensive” bilateral relationship with the United States.[48] Sudani likely published the article as part of his preparations for his official visit to Washington, DC, on April 15. Sudani said that US and Iraqi military officials agreed to end the US-led international coalition’s presence in Iraq “in a gradual and orderly manner on an agreed timeline,” although he did not provide details on this timeline.[49] Sudani argued that the US-Iraqi relationship should extend beyond military and security cooperation to include economic, energy, and technological cooperation.[50] US and Iraqi officials began talks about the status of the US-led international coalition in late January 2024.[51] The latest round of talks occurred on April 8 under the chairmanship of US CENTCOM Commander Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla and Iraqi Armed Forces General Staff Chief Gen. Abdel Emir Rashid Yarallah.[52]

US CENTCOM confirmed that it intercepted three Houthi drones over the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea on April 10. The Houthis claimed on April 10 that they conducted several attacks targeting commercial and military vessels in the Gulf of Aden.[53]

US CENTCOM preemptively struck eight Houthi drones in Houthi-controlled Yemen on April 10.[54] CENTCOM assessed that the drones presented an imminent danger to commercial and military vessels in the region. Houthi-affiliated media separately claimed that the United States conducted airstrikes near Hudaydah on April 10.[55]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla traveled to Israel on April 11 to coordinate preparations for a possible Iranian and/or Iranian-backed attack into Israel. Kurilla met with senior Israeli military officials, including IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari.[56] Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened that they will retaliate for Israel killing several senior IRGC officers in Damascus on April 1.[57]

Iran Update, April 10, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, Ashka Jhaveri, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Bloomberg reported on April 10 that Iran or its proxies may conduct missile or drone strikes targeting military and government facilities in Israel in the coming days in response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike that killed seven IRGC officials in Damascus.[1] Sources familiar with US and Israeli intelligence told Bloomberg that Iran or its proxies might use high-precision missiles in the strikes. One of the sources said that it is “a matter of when, not if” Iran will respond to the April 1 airstrike. Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz warned on April 10 that Israel would attack Iran if “Iran attacks [Israel] from its own territory.”[2] IRGC-affiliated media dismissed Katz’s warning, claiming that Israel seeks to deter Iran from responding to the April 1 airstrike and warning that Iran must respond.[3]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—will not conduct attacks targeting US forces in Iraq as part of Iran’s response to the April 1 airstrike, according to two “knowledgeable sources” who spoke to a UK-based Saudi outlet on April 10.[4] A “Shia source” told the outlet that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders have had “intensive contacts” with Iranian officials since April 1 and that the two sides have agreed to “continue the calm” in Iraq.[5] Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chief of Staff and senior Kataib Hezbollah official Abdul Aziz (Abu Fadak) al Mohammadawi visited Tehran for Iran's annual, anti-Israel holiday, Quds Day, on April 5.[6] Iranian officials and media previously attributed the April 1 Israeli airstrike to the United States, claiming that the United States gave Israel the “green light” to conduct the strike.[7] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has not claimed an attack targeting US forces in Iraq since early February 2024.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant implicitly warned Iran on April 10 against launching an attack on Israel in response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike that killed seven IRGC officials in Damascus.[8] Gallant said that Israel knows how to respond with “decisive offensive action” targeting any actor in the Middle East that attacks Israel.[9] Gallant’s comments are consistent with warnings from other Israeli officials who have emphasized Israel’s preparation for an Iranian attack and a strong Israeli response to an Iranian attack.[10] Unnamed US, Israeli, and other unspecified Western officials told the Washington Post on April 4 that they expected Iran to retaliate with drones or missile attacks against Israeli targets that would be ”calibrated to avoid an even bigger response from Israel.”[11]

Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali hinted on April 10 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could resume attacking US forces if Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s upcoming visit to Washington, DC, fails to facilitate the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[12] Sudani will travel to Washington on April 15, in part to discuss the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq with US officials.[13] Khazali said that the “success” of Sudani’s upcoming visit to Washington, DC, will depend on whether his visit facilitates the removal of “all foreign forces” from Iraq.[14] Khazali warned that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would force US forces to leave Iraq “if diplomatic efforts fail,” which could be an implicit threat to use military force to expel US forces.[15] Khazali may also be referring to political efforts to expel US forces.[16] Iranian-backed political actors have attempted in recent months to pass a law calling for the removal of US forces from Iraq and requiring Sudani to detail how his administration would end the US military presence in Iraq.[17]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and political actors have been conducting a political and military campaign in recent months to try to expel the United States from Iraq.[18] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted over 190 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and February 2024. These militias suspended their attacks targeting US forces in February 2024 following a one-way drone attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan.[19] The pause in attacks also coincided with the start of negotiations between Washington and Baghdad about the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq.[20] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders have warned since the negotiations began that “[their] patience will not last long.”[21] The militias may regard Sudani’s visit to Washington as a decisive moment and could decide to resume conducting attacks targeting US forces if the visit does not result in tangible steps toward removing US forces from Iraq, such as the creation of a timetable for their withdrawal.

Iran and its Axis of Resistance have been engaged in a coordinated campaign to economically isolate Israel by encouraging Muslim nations during the Israel-Hamas war to sever economic relations with Israel. Many senior Iranian leaders have repeatedly urged Muslim nations during the Israel-Hamas war to cut off political and economic relations with Israel.[22] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called it “treason” for any Muslim country to aid Israel and urged all Muslim nations to cut off economic relations with Israel “at least temporarily” during his speech for Eid al Fitr speech on April 10.[23]

Some Muslim countries have heeded this call, including Turkey. Turkey announced on April 9 that it would immediately restrict the export of 54 key products to Israel in response to Israel’s reported denial of Turkish aid efforts and the Israeli refusal to implement the UNSC ceasefire resolution from March 24.[24] President Ebrahim Raisi stated that Muslim countries cutting off economic relations with Israel is the “most effective deterrent power” during a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on April 10.[25] President Erdogan stated that Israel is more isolated today than ever before.[26] Malaysia banned Israeli-owned and –linked shipping from its ports in December 2023 in “response to Israel’s actions...against the Palestinian people.” The Houthi supreme leader “praised” Malaysia’s position, calling the economic pressure on Israel one way to support the Palestinian cause.[27]

Iran and its Axis of Resistance have also implicitly and explicitly threatened the UAE and Jordan for cooperating with Israel. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei claimed during his April 10 Eid al Fitr speech that Israel “enters [Islamic] countries” for ulterior motives rather than for the benefit of the host country.[28] Senior Iranian military leaders and its regional allies have recently criticized the UAE for allowing Israel to conduct trade in its territory.[29] IRGC Navy Commander Rear Adm. Ali Reza Tangsiri claimed on April 9 that Israel is present in the UAE under the pretext of “economic work” but actually engages in security and military activities there that threaten Iran.[30] Tangsiri issued this statement in an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah-controlled media, likely to pressure the UAE to sever ties with Israel.[31] These statements may also refer to the overland trade route Israel is using to offset its losses caused by the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Israel’s overland ground trade routes have taken on new importance after trade decreased at the Port of Eilat.[32] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias also threatened to “cut” Israel’s “land bridge” through Jordan.[33] These militias would probably use missile and drone attacks to generate this effect, given their lack of political influence in Jordan.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Bloomberg reported that Iran or its proxies may conduct missile or drone strikes targeting military and government facilities in Israel in the coming days in response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike that killed seven IRGC officials in Damascus.
  • Iran and its Axis of Resistance have been engaged in a coordinated campaign to economically isolate Israel by encouraging Muslim nations to sever economic relations with Israel throughout the Israel-Hamas War.
  • Iraq: Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali hinted that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias could resume attacking US forces if Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s upcoming visit to Washington, DC, fails to facilitate the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike that killed three sons of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Political Negotiations: Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh said that Israel would not get more concessions in the negotiations from Hamas after an IDF strike in the Gaza Strip killed three of his children.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Tulkarm in the West Bank during Israeli operations there.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least two attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Syria: The IDF said that it struck a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) site that was operated by Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Syria.
  • Yemen: US CENTCOM reported that it intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile in the Gulf of Aden. CENTCOM assessed that the Houthi attack was likely targeting the US-flagged and owned commercial vessel the MV Yorktown.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias conducted several indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on April 10. Hamas and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement conducted a joint mortar attack targeting Israeli forces in southwest Gaza City.[34] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas that has expressed close ties with Iran. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force struck a launch site from which Palestinian fighters had targeted Israeli forces in Shujaiya with indirect fire. Hamas claimed a mortar attack targeting Israeli forces in Shujaiya on April 9.[35]

The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement claimed that it fired a man-portable air defense system targeting an Israeli fighter jet in western Gaza City.[36]

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike on April 10 that killed three sons of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in the northern Gaza Strip.[37] The IDF reported that Haniyeh’s sons were Hamas fighters en route from al Shati camp to conduct an attack in the central Gaza Strip when Israel killed them.[38] The IDF said that one of the sons was a squad leader and the other two sons were fighters in Hamas’ military wing. The presence of Hamas fighters in al Shati camp is consistent with the infiltration of Palestinian fighters into areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces have conducted several clearing operations. It is notable that Haniyeh‘s sons—three Hamas fighters—were using al Shati camp as a rear base to conduct attacks further south, given that Israeli forces re-cleared areas of al Shati in early February 2024.

Several regional leaders, including Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, called Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh to offer their condolences following the Israeli airstrike that targeted three of Haniyeh’s sons.[39]

The IDF Nahal Brigade continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on April 10.[40] The Nahal Brigade killed a squad of Palestinian fighters in close quarters combat.[41] The Nahal Brigade is operating around the border of the central and northern strip to secure the Israeli highway and bases nearby.[42] The IDF reported on April 10 that the Nahal Brigade is conducting targeted operations and raids near the Israeli highway, which the IDF has dubbed the “Netzarim corridor.” Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in the area and destroyed military infrastructure, including tunnel shafts. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted a mortar attack targeting an IDF command site near the Netzarim corridor.[43]

The IDF Air Force conducted several airstrikes targeting Palestinian military infrastructure in the Gaza Strip on April 10.[44] The IDF destroyed military sites, launch sites, and tunnel shafts.[45] The IDF Air Force also targeted a Palestinian fighter squad that threatened Israeli forces.[46]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh said on April 10 that Israel would not get more concessions in the negotiations from Hamas after an IDF strike in the Gaza Strip killed three of his children.[47] Haniyeh also stated that Israeli leaders “are delusional if they think that by killing my sons we will change our positions.”[48] Hamas said on April 8 that the latest ceasefire proposal does not meet its demands but that it is still reviewing the proposal.[49]

Senior US officials continued to discuss a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. US President Joe Biden expressed support for an immediate six-to-eight-week ceasefire in the Gaza Strip during an interview published on April 9 but recorded last week.[50] Biden also called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's actions in Gaza Strip “a mistake” in reference to the IDF airstrike that mistakenly killed seven aid workers from the World Central Kitchen on April 1.[51] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on April 9 that negotiators are waiting on Hamas to make a decision and that “the world is watching to see what [Hamas] will do.”[52]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on April 10 that Israel would not open the Erez crossing with the northern Gaza Strip for aid transports.[53] The Israeli War Cabinet approved on April 5 the imminent reopening of the crossing, which has been closed since the beginning of the war.[54] The correspondent said that Israel is concerned that protesters could block the crossing and prevent the shipment of aid into the Strip, as they have at other crossings.[55] Israel will instead establish a new border crossing in a “less central location” in the northern Gaza Strip to facilitate the transfer of aid.[56]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 10.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Tulkarm in the West Bank during Israeli operations there on April 9.[57]

Israeli forces detained nine wanted individuals across the West Bank during overnight operations on April 10.[58] Israeli forces detained three wanted individuals and confiscated small arms in Qalandiya near Ramallah and detained six other individuals in Tulkarm.[59] Israeli forces also seized weapons and money near Hebron.[60]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least two attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 9.[61]

The IDF said that it struck a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) site that was operated by Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Syria on April 9.[62] An Israeli journalist reported that the IDF has claimed two prior strikes targeting Hezbollah in southern Syria on February 3 and March 12.[63] Israeli media reported in 2020 that the SAA’s 1st Corps, which is responsible for areas of southern Syria near the Golan Heights, is closely affiliated with Hezbollah.[64] The IDF did not specify whether it used artillery or aircraft to target the SAA position.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it launched two drones targeting an oil terminal in Haifa, Israel on April 10.[65] CTP-ISW cannot verify this attack claim. Israeli officials and media have not commented on the attack at the time of this writing.

Six unnamed Iranian officials and diplomats told Reuters on April 10 that Iran has provided the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) with Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over the past few months.[66] An unspecified senior Sudanese army source told Reuters that the Iranian UAVs have helped the SAF “turn the tide of the war” by halting the progress of the Rapid Support Force (RSF) and regaining territorial control in areas surrounding the capital. A Netherlands-based independent Sudanese media outlet stated that the drones have been “decisive” in tactical engagements, allowing the SAF to track, isolate and destroy RSF fighters in the capital.[67] Western media previously reported in January 2024 that Iran had supplied the SAF with Mohajer-6 multirole drones.[68] An unspecified regional source close to Iran’s political elites told Reuters that Iran’s Qeshm Fars Air has transported Mohajer and Ababil drones to Sudan several times since the end of 2023 .[69] The Mohajer-6 has a range of 200-2,000 km and uses Almas guided anti-tank missiles and Ghaem guided glide bombs.[70] The Ababil drones have a range of 120-480 km and use Almas guided anti-tank missiles and Ghaem guided glided bombs.[71] Reuters did not specify which type of Ababil drones Iran supplied to Sudan. Iran has reportedly supplied drones to Sudan since at least 2019.[72]

The Washington Post reported on April 10 that Iran is rapidly accumulating enriched uranium at its Fordow enrichment facility outside of Qom.[73] The Washington Post reported that unspecified inspectors have witnessed increased activity at the Fordow facility after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. The report also said that the Fordow facility is producing highly enriched uranium at a faster rate than ever before, even though Iran recently sought to dilute some of its highly enriched uranium.[74] Iran previously claimed that the near-weapons grade uranium discovered at the Fordow enrichment facility in January 2023 was due to an unintended fluctuation in enrichment levels.[75] The IAEA assessed that the information Iran provided to the IAEA was “not inconsistent” with Iran’s explanation that the near-weapons grade uranium was caused by an unintended fluctuation in enrichment levels.

US CENTCOM reported on April 9 that it intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile in the Gulf of Aden. CENTCOM assessed that the Houthi attack was likely targeting the US-flagged and owned commercial vessel the MV Yorktown.[76] The Houthis claimed on April 10 that they conducted two attacks targeting US-flagged vessels, including the Yorktown and an unspecified US warship.[77] The Houthis also claimed two attacks targeting two “Israeli” commercial vessels named the MSC Gina and the MSC Darwin.[78] CENTCOM reported on April 9 that there were no injuries or damage to commercial or military vessels.[79] UK Maritime Trade Operations reported that there were no security alerts from April 9 and 10.[80] 

Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States conducted airstrikes near Hudaydah on April 10.[81] 

Iran Update, April 9, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl

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IRGC Navy Commander Rear Adm. Ali Reza Tangsiri implicitly threatened the United Arab Emirates (UAE) during an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah-controlled media on April 9, likely to pressure the UAE to sever ties with Israel.[1] Tangsiri issued a series of threatening messages, all of which appear aimed at the UAE, during the interview. Tangsiri reiterated the long-standing Iranian threat to close the Strait of Hormuz and furthermore suggested that Israel is cooperating with the UAE against Iran. Tangsiri claimed that Israel is present in the UAE under the pretext of “economic work” but actually engages in security and military activities there that threaten Iran.[2] Tangsiri’s decision to conduct the interview with an Arabic-language outlet further suggests that he intended to message to an Arabic-speaking audience.

Tangsiri’s comments are part of a larger Iranian effort to impose an unofficial blockade on Israel. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has urged regional states to cut trade ties with Israel and institute a blockade in response to the Israel-Hamas war. The Houthis have conducted over 40 attacks targeting commercial vessels in the Red Sea since November 2023, as part of this Iranian-led call effort, causing maritime traffic through the Red Sea to decline by approximately 50 percent since January 2024.[3] Israel has increasingly relied on overland trade with the Gulf States in recent months to compensate for reduced trade activity at the Port of Eilat due to the Houthis’ anti-shipping campaign.[4] Tehran and its regional allies have focused in more recent weeks on disrupting the Israeli ground connection to the Arabian Peninsula. Iranian state media and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias recently criticized the UAE for allowing Israel to conduct trade through its territory.[5] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have, moreover, called for the dismantlement of Israel’s “land bridge” through Jordan, as CTP-ISW previously noted.[6]

Tangsiri separately endorsed the strategy of “strategic patience” in response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike that killed seven IRGC officials in Damascus. “Strategic patience” is a long-standing Iranian regime policy that involves not immediately conducting a major response to Israeli attacks. Tangsiri claimed that Iran will “strike [Israel] hard at the right time,” but emphasized that Iran will not act “emotionally” or “hastily.”[7] Tangsiri added that “it is not the case that [Iran] will not give a response.”[8] Numerous senior Iranian military officials, including Armed Forces General Staff Chief Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri and Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, have similarly stated in recent days that Iran will respond to the April 1 airstrike “at the right time.”[9]

US, Israeli, and Iranian officials told the New York Times that Iran is operating a smuggling network through Jordan to arm Palestinian fighters in the West Bank.[10] The Iranian officials described this effort as meant to ”foment unrest against Israel.” They added that Tehran is not trying to arm any particular Palestinian militias and is using Bedouin smuggling networks in Jordan and Iranian-backed militias in Syria to facilitate the transfer of materiel into the West Bank. US and Israeli officials said that the Iranian-backed networks are specifically involved in moving small arms, anti-tank missiles, and rocket-propelled grenades. Iran’s smuggling network in Jordan could enable already motivated militias in the West Bank to attacks on Israeli targets.

The Iranian effort to build its capabilities and networks in the West Bank is part of a larger effort to encircle Israel militarily. IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami presented in August 2022 the clearest articulation yet from an Iranian official on how they plan to destroy Israel, and he placed special emphasis on growing anti-Israel militancy around the West Bank[11] Afshon Ostovar, a well-know analyst on Iran, suggested to the New York Times that Iran may be focusing on arming the West Bank because it anticipates having more limited access to militias in the Gaza Strip in the future.[12] Tehran has sought to develop the capabilities and infrastructure of its militia network in the West Bank in recent years, but the Israel-Hamas war has highlighted the shortcomings of its networks there.[13]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: IRGC Navy Commander Rear Adm. Ali Reza Tangsiri implicitly threatened the United Arab Emirates (UAE) during an interview with Lebanese Hezbollah-controlled media, likely to pressure the UAE to sever ties with Israel.
  • Tangsiri separately endorsed the strategy of “strategic patience” in response to the April 1 Israeli airstrike that killed seven IRGC officials in Damascus.
  • West Bank: US, Israeli, and Iranian officials told the New York Times that Iran is operating a smuggling network through Jordan to arm Palestinian fighters in the West Bank.
  • The Iranian effort to build its capabilities and networks in the West Bank is part of a larger effort to encircle Israel militarily.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias conducted several indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Central Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force killed the Maghazi mayor, whom Israel says was a member in Hamas’ military wing in the central Gaza Strip.
  • Political Negotiations: Hamas said on April 8 that the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal does not meet its demands.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Syria: The IDF and local Syrian sources reported that unspecified Iranian-backed militants launched a rocket from Syria targeting the Yonatan region of the Golan Heights.
  • Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted five attacks into Israel using “appropriate weapons” over the previous 72 hours.
  • Iran: Jaish al Adl—a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia group—conducted an attack killing at least five Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers in Sib and Soran county, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.
  • Yemen: US CENTCOM reported that it targeted Houthi air defense systems in Houthi-controlled Yemen. CENTCOM separately intercepted a Houthi drone over the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias conducted several indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on April 9. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed that it mortared an Israeli command site southwest of Gaza City.[14] Hamas separately claimed that it mortared Israeli forces near Shujaiya neighborhood in eastern Gaza City as well as an Israeli command site near where the IDF is constructing a highway in southern Gaza City.[15]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on April 9. The Nahal Brigade killed and directed an airstrike targeting several Palestinian fighters.[16] The Nahal Brigade is operating around the border of the central and northern strip to secure the Israeli highway and bases nearby.

The IDF Air Force conducted several airstrikes targeting Palestinian military infrastructure in the Gaza Strip on April 9.[17] The IDF destroyed the site from which PIJ launched rockets into southern Israel on April 8.[18] The IDF separately conducted an airstrike in Khan Younis, killing a Palestinian fighter, who was involved in the October 7 attack.[19]

The IDF Air Force killed the Maghazi mayor, whom Israel says was a member in Hamas’ military wing in the central Gaza Strip on April 8.[20] The IDF said that the mayor, Hatem Saleh al Ghamri, was part of Hamas’ Emergency Committees, which is responsible for maintaining public order and civil control.[21] Ghamri was also reportedly a fighter in Hamas’ Maghazi Battalion.[22] CNN reported that Hamas condemned the strike and said that Ghamri was the mayor of the Maghazi refugee camp.[23] The IDF previously killed five members of Hamas’ Emergency Committees in Rafah in March 2024.[24]

Israeli media close to the IDF reported on April 9 that the Israeli forces withdrawn from Khan Younis will prepare for fighting in other areas and carry out large, unspecified humanitarian operations.[25] The IDF withdrew most of its forces from the Gaza Strip on April 7, including the IDF 98th Division, which had been operating around Khan Younis for four months.[26] The report noted that Israeli forces are preparing for fighting in Rafah, among other unspecified places.[27]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on April 8 that Israel has not yet set a date for a clearing operation into Rafah, according to an unidentified source with direct knowledge.[28] Gallant’s comments follow Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saying that Israel has set a date for the offensive.[29] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that Israel has not informed the United States on the date of the operation.[30]

Hamas said on April 8 that the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal does not meet its demands.[31] The group is currently reviewing the proposal and will soon inform international mediators of its response. The Wall Street Journal, citing officials' part of the negotiations, reported that Israel and Hamas still disagree over key aspects of a deal, including the return of displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip, the identities of Palestinian prisoners set to be released under the deal, and the future of Israeli military operations in the strip.[32] The officials noted that Hamas has demanded the free movement of displaced Palestinians to the north, while Israel has rejected the unconditional return of Palestinians there. Unspecified Egyptian officials reported that Israel wants to inspect Palestinians moving from the south to the north to stop potential Hamas fighters from returning alongside civilians.[33] CTP-ISW previously reported how Hamas could use the return of civilians to the north to bring its own fighters back to the area amid Hamas attempts to reassert its authority there.[34]

Israel reported that it has increased the amount of aid moving into the Gaza Strip.[35] The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—announced that Israel has expanded the scope of aid and doubled the daily number of civilian trucks that can move through the Kerem Shalom crossing.[36] COGAT claimed that UN aid agencies are not using the full capacity of the Kerem Shalom route.[37] Israel said 468 trucks entered the Gaza Strip on April 9, which is the highest rate since the war began.[38] The United Nations reports much lower numbers, noting that many trucks are only half full because of Israeli inspection rules.[39] US State Departments spokesperson Matthew Miller said on April 8 that the high number of trucks entering the Gaza Strip “represents a significant improvement, but it is important not just that we see the daily number continue to grow, but that it be sustained over time.”[40]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 9.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 8.[41] Israeli forces detained nine wanted Palestinians, including one Hamas member, in the West Bank during the operations there.[42] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices in two separate attacks targeting Israeli forces around Nablus and Tulkarm.[43] Israeli forces separately engaged Palestinian fighters in Jayyus, east of Qalqilya.[44]

A PIJ cell in Jenin claimed a shooting attack on April 9 targeting Gan Ner, which is in northern Israel near the border with the West Bank.[45]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 8.[46] Hezbollah fighters launched a one-way attack drone targeting an Israeli counter-drone electronic jamming device south of Kiryat Shmona.[47]

The IDF and local Syrian sources reported that unspecified Iranian-backed militants launched a rocket from Syria targeting the Yonatan region of the Golan Heights on April 8.[48] Israeli forces targeted the launch site in Daraa Province with artillery fire.[49] The IDF also said that it conducted strikes on Syrian Arab Army infrastructure in Mahaja region, Daraa Province, in a separate attack.[50]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed on April 8 that it conducted five attacks into Israel using “appropriate weapons” over the previous 72 hours.[51] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed that its targets included the Ashkelon oil terminal and the Hatzerim airbase near Beer Sheva, among other unspecified ”vital targets.” CTP-ISW cannot verify these attacks. Western analysts reported that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq used Paveh cruise missiles in most of the attacks, according to footage that the group published.[52] The IDF intercepted a drone that entered Israeli airspace from the east and was headed toward Eilat on April 8.[53]

US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski met with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al Araji ahead of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s visit to Washington, DC, on April 15.[54] Romanowski stated that the United States and Iraq are moving toward a “bilateral security agreement.” Iraqi officials previously stated that Sudani’s visit to Washington will focus on the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq and the “transition to a comprehensive partnership."[55] Washington and Baghdad began talks to evaluate the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq in late January 2024.[56] US and Iraqi officials held the latest round of Higher Military Commission talks on April 8.[57]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned that the “coming days will be difficult days for Israel” during a joint press conference with his Syrian counterpart, Faisal Mekdad, on

 April 8.[58] Abdollahian reiterated that the United States should be held responsible for the Israeli airstrike that killed several senior IRGC officers in Syria on April 1. Abdollahian emphasized that Syria is at the ”frontline” of the Axis of Resistance. Abdollahian’s comments follow several senior Iranian military officials suggesting that they will carefully calibrate Iran’s response.[59]

US CENTCOM reported that it targeted Houthi air defense systems in Houthi-controlled Yemen on April 8. CENTCOM separately intercepted a Houthi drone over the Red Sea on April 8.[60]

CENTCOM reported that the Houthis have launched five anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the UK-owned, Italian-operated commercial vessel MV Hope Island.[61]

Jaish al Adl—a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia group—conducted an attack on April 9 killing at least five Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers in Sib and Soran county, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[62] Jaish al Adl claimed that it “completely destroyed” three LEC vehicles during the attack.[63] There has been a significant uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023. Jaish al Adl most recently conducted a series of unprecedently complex and sophisticated attacks targeting Iranian security forces in Sistan and Baluchistan on April 4.[64] The uptick in Jaish al Adl attacks, and the complexity of the April 4 attack, illustrate the increasingly precarious state of Iranian internal security, especially in Sistan and Baluchistan province.


Iran Update, April 8, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, Christian Engfer, Tor Lansing, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Senior Iranian military officials have continued to suggest that they will carefully calibrate Iran’s response to Israel’s killing of senior IRGC commanders in Syria. This careful approach aims to avoid a direct war with Israel. Iranian Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff Major General Mohammad Bagheri said on April 6 that Iran will strike Israel “at the right time” during a commemoration ceremony for the IRGC officers killed in the likely Israeli airstrike on April 1[1] The Military Affairs Adviser to the Iranian Supreme Leader Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi separately said during a similar commemoration ceremony on April 7 that Iran “must wait for the right time” to deliver its response.[2] Several senior Iranian clerics close to the Office of the Supreme Leader endorsed “strategic patience”—a long-standing regime policy that involves not immediately conducting a major response to Israeli attacks—in their weekly sermons on April 5.[3] Such comments support CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran seeks to avoid a direct military confrontation against the United States and Israel. Strategic patience does not exclude an eventual Iranian retaliation, however.[4]

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on April 8 warned that Iran will retaliate for the April 1 Israeli airstrike, illustrating the possibility of an eventual response to the attack.[5] Nasrallah’s made these comments during a Hezbollah ceremony for IRGC commander Mohammed Reza Zahedi in Beirut. Nasrallah said that Iran has a ”natural right” to retaliate against the airstrike because it represented ”an attack on Iranian territory.”[6] Nasrallah added that the United States and Israel recognize that an Iranian response to the attack is ”inevitably coming.”[7] Zahedi spearheaded Iranian engagement with Hezbollah and most recently commanded the IRGC Quds Force unit responsible for overseeing operations in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories.[8] Zahedi was the only non-Lebanese member of Hezbollah’s Shura Council, which is led by Nasrallah and serves as the groups’ central decision-making authority.[9]

Arabic-language media outlet Jadeh Iran reported on April 7 and 8 that Iran has conditioned its potential response to the April 1 Israeli strike on a ceasefire in Gaza. Arabic-language outlet Jadeh Iran reported on April 7 and 8 that Iran informed the United States that it would not retaliate against Israel for the April 1 strike if the United States could secure a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Hamas, citing “an anonymous Arab diplomatic source.[10] Jadeh Iran is an outlet founded by an al Jazeera journalist. An Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry official told Kuwait-based newspaper Al Jarida on April 8 that the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry told the United States that Iran would not respond to the April 1 Israeli airstrike if there was ”a ceasefire in Gaza.”[11] The US State Department spokesperson denied these reports on April 8.[12] The Jadeh Iran reporting coincides with claims from Western media and Israeli officials that Israel and Hamas negotiators had made ”significant progress” in negotiations or reached a “critical point“ during on going negotiations in Cairo.[13]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian is engaging in political coordination with Iranian partners and Oman following the April 1 Israeli airstrike that targeted Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials in Damascus. Abdollahian traveled to Muscat, Oman, on April 7 to meet with his Omani counterpart, Sayyid Badr al Busaidi, and chief Houthi negotiator and senior official Mohammad Abdul Salam.[14] An “anonymous Arab diplomatic source” telling Arabic-language outlet Jadeh Iran on April 7 that Iran would refrain from retaliating against Israel for the April 1 airstrike if Israel and Hamas reach a ceasefire.[15] It is not clear whether the diplomatic source told Jadeh Iran about this Iranian position before or after Abdollahian’s meeting with Busaidi. Oman has historically served as an intermediary and messenger between Iran and the United States, including by facilitating nuclear negotiations between the two countries. Oman also serves as an intermediary between the Gulf States and the United States and the Houthis. Abdollahian separately thanked the Houthis for supporting Iran following the April 1 airstrike and claimed that Israel used “American-made aircraft and missiles” in the airstrike during his meeting with Abdul Salam.[16]

Abdollahian also traveled to Damascus, Syria, on April 8 and met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad and Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal Mekdad.[17] Abdollahian claimed that the United States is directly responsible for Israel’s “crimes and actions” and that Iran’s response to the April 1 airstrike will be “decisive” during his meeting with Assad.[18] Assad called for strengthening the Axis of Resistance “as much as possible” in response to the Israeli airstrike.[19] Abdollahian visited a Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry employee who was injured in the airstrike and inaugurated a new Iranian consular building in Damascus with Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal Mekdad.[20]

Israel and Hamas are considering a new US-proposed ceasefire and hostage exchange deal. The deal would reportedly establish a six-week ceasefire in exchange for the release of 40 Israeli hostages held by Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip.[21] Israel would release at least 700 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the hostages.[22] Hamas must submit a list of 40 living hostages to mediators, which has reportedly been a sticking point in negotiations, including the most recent talks on April 7.[23] The new proposal reportedly calls for Israel to make additional concessions on the return of displaced Palestinian civilians to the northern Gaza Strip by allowing Palestinians to return to the northern Gaza Strip at a more rapid pace than the Israelis had previously proposed.[24] Israel submitted a ceasefire proposal on April 2 that reportedly allowed for the gradual return of 60,000 displaced Palestinians to unspecified zones of the northern Gaza Strip at a rate of 2,000 per day.[25] Hamas rejected the April 2 proposal.[26]

Israeli officials and mediating countries have acknowledged the potential for a ceasefire deal, while anonymous Hamas sources have expressed skepticism about a ceasefire deal.[27] Hamas said on April 7 that its negotiating delegation arrived in Cairo for talks with mediators but that it would adhere to its previous demands regarding a permanent ceasefire and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.[28] An anonymous Hamas official said on April 8 that there was ”no progress” on April 7.[29] White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby confirmed on April 8 that Hamas has received the proposal and will be waiting for Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar’s response over the next several days.[30] The Israeli security cabinet is scheduled to discuss the proposal on April 9.[31] The Israeli foreign minister said on April 8 that negotiations had ”reached a critical point” for the first time since the previous ceasefire deal in November 2023.[32] Egyptian and Qatari sources have also issued optimistic statements on the status of negotiations.[33]

An Israeli source told an Israel Army Radio correspondent that the IDF hopes Hamas will agree to the ceasefire so that Palestinian civilians sheltering in Rafah can migrate north before an Israeli clearing operation into Rafah at the end of the six-week ceasefire.[34] Unspecified Israeli sources claimed that the IDF withdrawal from the southern Gaza Strip will enable displaced Palestinians in Rafah to migrate to parts of Khan Younis and the central Gaza Strip.[35] Israel and aid organizations have not yet constructed encampments in the southern and central Gaza Strip to which Gazans could migrate, however. Western media and local sources published images of destruction in Khan Younis after the IDF withdrawal.[36]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Palestinian militias resumed launching rockets from Khan Younis shortly after the IDF’s withdrawal on April 7.[37] Several Israeli brigades were involved in clearing operations in Khan Younis throughout February and March, likely reducing the ability of Palestinian fighters to launch rockets from the southern Gaza Strip. The Israeli military correspondent said that Palestinian militias launched six rockets into Israel from Khan Younis on April 7 and 8, compared to the five rockets that the groups launched from Khan Younis in all of February and March.[38] The IDF said that Palestinian fighters fired three rockets on April 7 that fell in empty areas of Israel from Khan Younis.[39] The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes on the rocket launch sites and additional militia infrastructure near the site.[40]

IDF Southern Command has directed airstrikes targeting Hamas rocket launch sites in the al Mawasi humanitarian area west of Khan Younis City over the past several days.[41] The IDF said that it ensured civilians evacuated from the area before conducting the airstrikes.

Key Takeaways: 

  • Iran: Senior Iranian military officials have continued to suggest that they will carefully calibrate Iran’s response to Israel’s killing of senior IRGC commanders in Syria. This careful approach aims to avoid a direct war with Israel. This approach does not exclude an eventual Iranian retaliation, however.
  • Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on April 8 warned that Iran will retaliate for the April 1 Israeli airstrike, illustrating the possibility of an eventual response to the attack.
  • Arabic-language media outlet Jadeh Iran reported on April 7 and 8 that Iran has conditioned its potential response to the April 1 Israeli strike on a ceasefire in Gaza.
  • Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian is engaging in political coordination with Iranian partners and Oman following the April 1 Israeli airstrike that targeted Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials in Damascus.
  • Ceasefire Negotiations: Israel and Hamas are considering a new US-proposed ceasefire and hostage exchange deal. Israeli officials and mediating countries have acknowledged the potential for a ceasefire deal, while anonymous Hamas sources have expressed skepticism about a ceasefire deal.
  • Gaza Strip: An Israeli source told an Israel Army Radio correspondent that the IDF hopes Hamas will agree to the ceasefire so that Palestinian civilians sheltering in Rafah can migrate north before an Israeli clearing operation into Rafah at the end of the six-week ceasefire.
  • An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Palestinian militias resumed launching rockets from Khan Younis shortly after the IDF’s withdrawal on April 7.
  • Several Israeli brigades were involved in clearing operations in Khan Younis throughout February and March, likely reducing the ability of Palestinian fighters to launch rockets from the southern Gaza Strip.
  • Lebanon: The IDF Air Force killed a senior official and commander in Hezbollah’s Radwan unit and two other Hezbollah fighters in an airstrike in southern Lebanon on April 8.
  • Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted three drone attacks targeting Israeli military bases since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 7. Israeli officials and media have not commented on the claimed attacks at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW cannot verify the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s attack claims.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian sources reported that Israeli forces are still present in the Central Gaza Strip and in southern Gaza City on April 8. The IDF withdrew all its forces in the southern Gaza Strip on April 7, but the IDF Nahal Brigade remains at the seam of the northern and central Gaza Strip to secure Israeli-built highway Route 749 and other Israeli military sites in the area, which the IDF has dubbed the Netzarim corridor.[42] The Nahal Brigade’s presence on the road also prevents Palestinian civilians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip from the south. Palestinian sources claimed that Israeli bulldozers operated in eastern Deir al Balah and Maghazi camps area as part of the IDF’s effort to establish a buffer zone between the Gaza Strip and Israel.[43] Local sources also reported Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces near al Kuwait Roundabout in southern Gaza City and near Juhor ad Dik, southeast of Gaza City.[44] Palestinian reports of Israeli activity in the northern and central Gaza Strip are consistent with the Nahal Brigade’s limited operations in the central Gaza Strip and the IDF’s transition to a model focused on targeted raids throughout the entire Gaza Strip.

Hamas was the only Palestinian militia to claim an attack targeting Israeli forces operating in the Gaza Strip on April 8. Hamas said that its fighters mortared the IDF Nahal Brigade headquarters along the “Netzarim Axis,” referring the Israeli-built highway Route 749, which bisects the northern and southern Gaza Strip.[45] The low number of attack claims is likely due to the IDF withdrawal from the southern Gaza Strip and a lack of target availability. Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters targeted Israeli forces in Sheikh Ijlin, southern Gaza City on April 7.[46]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on April 8 that “there is a date” for an IDF clearing operation into Rafah to dismantle the remaining Hamas battalions there.[47] The IDF chief of staff similarly said on April 7 as the IDF withdrew most of its forces from the Gaza Strip that ”the war in Gaza continues, and we are far from stopping.“[48] Israeli officials and media sources framed the April 7 withdrawals as part of the IDF’s preparations for conducting a clearing operation into Rafah.[49] Far-right politician and National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir said on April 8—in reference to the IDF‘s withdrawal from the southern Gaza Strip—that if Netanyahu decided to ”end the war without an extensive attack on Rafah—he will not have a mandate to continue serving as Prime Minister.[50]

Palestinian fighters fired at least two rocket barrages from the Gaza Strip targeting southern Israel on April 8.[51] The al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, targeted an Israeli military site near the northern Gaza Strip with a combined rocket barrage.[52] Israeli Army Radio reported unspecified Palestinian fighters fired one rocket targeting a town that hosts an Israeli military base in southern Israel.[53]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least five locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 7.[54] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices targeting Israeli forces during Israeli operations in Tulkarm and the Balata refugee camp in Nablus.[55] PIJ fighters also fired small arms targeting Israeli civilians across the West Bank-Israel border in the Meirav settlement.[56]

Israeli forces detained 11 wanted individuals across the West Bank during overnight raids on April 8.[57]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 7.[58]

The IDF Air Force killed a senior official and commander in Hezbollah’s Radwan unit and two other Hezbollah fighters in an airstrike in southern Lebanon on April 8.[59] The IDF said that the commander, Ali Ahmed Hussein, was a “veteran and senior official” for the group and held a rank equivalent to a brigade commander.[60] The IDF added that Hussein was responsible for planning and executing attacks targeting Israeli forces in Ramim in northern Israel.[61] Hezbollah acknowledged Hussein’s death on April 8.[62]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Jordanian Army killed two drug smugglers along the Jordanian-Syrian border on April 8.[63] Saudi media reported that Jordanian officials said that Lebanese Hezbollah and other unspecified Iran-backed militias are responsible for the increase in drug and weapons smuggling from Syria into Jordan.[64]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted three drone attacks targeting Israeli military bases since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 7.[65] The group claimed that it targeted the “Western Yarden” base in the Golan Heights, the “Elifalet” base near Safed north of the Sea of Galilee, and the “Southern Yohantan” base in the southern Golan Heights.[66] Israeli officials and media have not commented on the claimed attacks at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW cannot verify the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s attack claims.

US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to discuss Sudani’s upcoming visit to Washington, DC, on April 15.[67] Iraqi officials previously stated that Sudani’s visit to Washington will focus on the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq and the “transition to a comprehensive partnership between Iraq and the United States.”[68] Washington and Baghdad began talks to evaluate the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq in late January 2024. [69]

Iranian security forces arrested a “main member” of the Baloch militant group Ansar al Furqan in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on April 6.[70] The Sistan and Baluchistan Province police chief said that the Ansar al Furqan militant previously participated in attacks targeting Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) headquarters in Iran.[71] A group of "terrorists” separately killed two police officers in Zahedan on April 6.[72] These incidents are part of a rise in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran and reflect the increasingly precarious state of the Iranian internal security environment. The Baloch Salafi-jihadi militant group Jaish al Adl most recently conducted unprecedentedly complex and sophisticated attacks targeting Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran on April 4, killing at least 11 Iranian security personnel.[73]

Iranian police claimed that they arrested three Islamic State operatives in Karaj, Tehran on April 6.[74] Iranian state media claimed that trio was planning to conduct a suicide bombing at the end of Ramadan.[75]

Afghan media reported that the three individuals are members of the anti-Taliban opposition group the Afghanistan National Resistance Front (NRF) and previously fought against the Taliban in eastern Afghanistan.[76] The NRF does not target civilians and does not use suicide bombings as part of its operations against the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Pro-Taliban social media users used Iran’s arrest to advance an information operation that claims that the National Resistance Front and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) cooperate to conduct terror attacks.[77] The NRF wants to restore the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan while ISKP is a Salafi-jihadist group that wants to implement Sharia law in central and south Asia as part of a global caliphate. The two groups’ worldviews and ideologies are diametrically opposed to each other.

Iran Update, April 7, 2024

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Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

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Israel withdrew most of its forces from the Gaza Strip on April 7. Israeli officials and media sources have framed the withdrawals as part of their preparations for conducting a clearing operation into Rafah. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant announced on April 7 that Israeli “forces came out” of the Gaza Strip “and are preparing for future missions” into Rafah.[1] Israeli military correspondents similarly interpreted the withdrawal as part of an IDF effort to reconstitute ahead of advancing into Rafah.[2] Israeli media close to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) clarified that the IDF 98th Division withdrew from the southern Gaza Strip on April 7.[3] Israeli brigades and units operating under the command of the 98th Division were previously the only Israeli forces remaining in the southern Gaza Strip. Palestinian sources posted images of areas in which the 98th Division recently operated, suggesting that Israeli forces had withdrawn from those areas.[4]

Hamas and other Palestinian militias will likely try to exploit the Israeli withdrawal to reconstitute militarily and reassert Hamas' governing authority around Khan Younis. Israeli officials and media sources have framed the withdrawals as part of their transition toward a raid-based model around Khan Younis—similar to what the IDF has done in the northern Gaza Strip since December 2023.[5] Israeli military correspondents asserted that the IDF has destroyed Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade and will accordingly transition to conducting raids to target the remaining militia forces and infrastructure there.[6] Hamas conducted a multi-stage attack that killed four Israeli soldiers in Khan Younis on April 6, however, demonstrating that Hamas retains some combat effectiveness there.[7] CTP-ISW has reported extensively on how Hamas and other Palestinian militias have exploited the withdrawal of Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip to infiltrate and rebuild their networks there.[8] The IDF has redeployed to several areas in the northern Gaza Strip in recent months to re-clear those areas of Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure.[9] Hamas and the other Palestinian militias will likely see an opportunity to pursue similar effects around Khan Younis following the Israeli withdrawal there.

Unspecified Israeli sources claimed that the IDF withdrawal from the southern Gaza Strip will enable displaced Palestinians in Rafah to migrate to parts of Khan Younis and the central Gaza Strip.[10] The migration of Palestinians from Rafah to other parts of the Gaza Strip would facilitate an Israeli clearing operation into Rafah, according to Israeli military correspondents.[11] Israel and aid organizations have not yet constructed encampments in the southern and central Gaza Strip to which Gazans could migrate. Israeli media indicated that the construction of such encampments was part of the IDF humanitarian plan.[12]

The withdrawal of the IDF 98th Division means that the Nahal Brigade is the only remaining Israeli unit in the Gaza Strip.[13] The Nahal Brigade operates around the border of the central and northern Strip to secure Israeli-built highway Route 749, which bisects the northern and southern Gaza Strip and three nearby forward operating bases for future raids and operations in the Gaza Strip.[14] The role of the Nahal Brigade in securing the divide between the central and northern Gaza Strip is consistent with the IDF’s full transition to a raid-based model. Israeli military correspondents have reported that the IDF uses the road to quickly launch raids into the Gaza Strip, such as the al Shifa Hospital operation that the IDF chief of staff called a “great achievement” for leading to the capture and death of many senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters on March 30.[15]

Key Takeaways:

  • Gaza Strip: Israel withdrew most of its forces from the Gaza Strip. Israeli officials and media sources have framed the withdrawals as part of their preparations for conducting a clearing operation into Rafah. Hamas and other Palestinian militias will likely try to exploit the Israeli withdrawal to reconstitute militarily and reassert Hamas governing authority around Khan Younis.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed that it conducted a drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat, Israel.
  • Yemen: The Houthis claimed that they conducted five drone and missile attacks targeting civilian and military vessels over the previous 72 hours.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 89th Commando Forces (98th Division) cleared al Amal neighborhood, western Khan Younis, before withdrawing on April 7. The 89th Commando forces located over 100 militia sites during operations in al Amal.[16] Israeli forces detonated and destroyed a 900-meter tunnel equipped with living rooms and weapons stores.[17] The IDF conducted raids to seize weapons and kill Palestinian fighters, including a Hamas squad commander.[18]

Palestinian fighters conducted two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 7. PIJ targeted towns in southern Israel with a five-rocket barrage shortly after all Israeli forces withdrew from the southern Gaza Strip.[19] An Israeli military correspondent said that the Iron Dome intercepted all the rockets.[20] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement separately targeted the IDF Gaza Division headquarters in Reim, southern Israel.[21]

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine mortared Israeli armor near the Israel-Gaza Strip border northeast of Qarara on April 7.[22] Palestinian militias did not claim additional attacks targeting Israeli forces on April 7, likely due to the IDF withdrawal from the southern Gaza Strip and a lack of target availability.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 6.[23]

A Palestinian fighter fired upon an Israeli bus and wounded two individuals, including an IDF soldier, near Nabi Elias on April 7.[24]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 6.[25]

The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah air defense systems in Baalbek, Lebanon, after Hezbollah intercepted an IDF drone over southern Lebanon on April 6.[26]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted a drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat, Israel, on April 6.[27] Israel media reported on April 7 that “hostile aircraft intrusion sirens” went off in Eilat.[28] The IDF later announced that these sirens were a “false alarm.”[29]

The Houthis claimed on April 7 that they conducted five drone and missile attacks targeting civilian and military vessels over the previous 72 hours.[30] The Houthis claimed that they conducted anti-ship missile attacks targeting a Marshall Islands-flagged “British ship” in the Red Sea and two Panamanian-flagged “Israeli ships” in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.[31]

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that international coalition forces intercepted a missile and that a second missile fell into the water near a vessel approximately 60 nautical miles southwest of Hudaydah, Yemen, on April 6.[32] US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that a coalition vessel engaged and destroyed an anti-ship missile on April 6.[33] UKMTO separately reported that a missile impacted the water near a vessel approximately 59 nautical miles southwest of Aden, Yemen, on April 6.[34]

The Houthis also claimed that they conducted two drone attacks targeting unspecified US “military frigates” in the Red Sea.[35] CENTCOM announced that it intercepted a Houthi drone over the Red Sea on April 6.[36]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) destroyed a mobile, surface-to-air missile in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on April 6.[37]


Iran Update, April 6, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on April 6 and 7, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, April 8, 2024.

Key Takeaways:

  • Central Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters have claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces near Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip in recent days.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Hamas claimed to conduct a multi-stage attack targeting Israeli forces in eastern Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: A senior US official said that US President Joe Biden sent letters to the Egyptian president and Qatari emir, asking them to pressure Hamas to agree to a six-week ceasefire agreement.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least five locations in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed two drone attacks targeting an unspecified military facility in the Golan Heights and an oil refinery in Haifa, Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian fighters have claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces near Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip in recent days.[1] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed on April 6 that its forces returned from the front lines east of Deir al Balah and reported attacking an Israeli tank with an explosively formed penetrator.[2] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah, separately mortared Israeli forces near Deir al Balah.[3] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on April 5 shows flattened terrain southeast of Deir al Balah, indicating that Israeli bulldozers and/or bulldozers are operating in the area.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis on April 6.[4] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Givati Brigade (162nd Division) destroyed a weapons depot and found over 40 improvised explosive devices and other explosives in al Amal.[5] Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in close combat and destroyed a four-man Palestinian squad in one attack.[6]

Hamas claimed that it conducted three attacks targeting Israeli forces in al Amal after Hamas fighters returned from the front lines.[7] Hamas fighters fired anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), tandem-charge anti-tank rockets, and detonated a mine targeting Israeli forces.

Hamas claimed to conduct a multi-stage attack targeting Israeli forces in eastern Khan Younis on April 6.[8] Hamas fighters targeted three IDF tanks with anti-tank RPGs in al Zana. Hamas fighters then claimed that they prevented an Israeli quick reaction force from responding to the situation by detonating a minefield that they set prior to the attack. Hamas later claimed that its fighters targeted Israeli forces that responded to the attack.[9] The IDF has not commented on the attack at the time of this writing.

The IDF Air Force killed a senior official in Hamas’ internal security apparatus in Khan Younis, who was also responsible for managing some militia activity.[10] The IDF said that the figure was the deputy head of internal security and responsible for significant attacks against Israel targets. Hamas controls several internal security forces, including the Civil Police.[11]

The IDF reported on April 6 that Israeli forces rescued the body of a hostage during an overnight operation in Khan Younis.[12] The Israeli Army Radio reported that that PIJ killed the hostage, named Elad Katzir, in January 2024.[13] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division), with support from Shin Bet and Military Intelligence, returned the body to Israel. Israeli authorities say that Palestinian militias still hold around 133 hostages and that 99 of them are believed to still be alive.[14]

A CNN team in Israel reported on April 6 hearing gunfire and explosions near the Erez crossing connecting Israel with the northern Gaza Strip.[15] These reports come immediately after Israel decided to reopen the crossing, which has been closed since the war began, to facilitate humanitarian aid.[16] The IDF moved the CNN team to another unspecified location after hearing the gunfire and explosions. The Israeli War Cabinet approved on April 5 the reopening of its Erez crossing, which has been closed since the beginning of the war.[17]

A senior US official said that US President Joe Biden sent letters to the Egyptian president and Qatari emir on April 4, asking them to pressure Hamas to agree to a six-week ceasefire agreement.[18] Biden ”urged them to secure commitments from Hamas to agree to and abide by a deal," the US official said. Israeli media reported that a senior Hamas delegation led by Ismail Haniyeh is expected to travel to Cairo on April 7 for further negotiations.[19] Senior Hamas sources said that the group still insists on a full ceasefire before they release any hostages.[20]

US, Israeli, and Egyptian officials told the Wall Street Journal that the Biden administration is pressing Israel to allow a limited number of displaced Palestinians to return to the northern Gaza Strip as part of the current round of ceasefire talks.[21] Unspecified Arab mediators stated that     Israel is open to permitting 2,000 people per day—mainly women and children—to return to the northern Gaza Strip. Israel would reportedly allow a maximum of 60,000 Palestinians to return to the northern Gaza Strip as part of the deal, representing an Israeli concession.[22] Israel sent an “updated” ceasefire proposal to the mediators and Hamas on April 2, which Hamas later rejected.[23]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 6.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least five locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 5.[24]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on April 6.[25]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two drone attacks targeting an unspecified military facility in the Golan Heights and an oil refinery in Haifa on April 5.[26] 



Click here to read the full report with maps

Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Tor Lansing, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Some clerics close to the Office of the Supreme Leader suggested that Tehran will calibrate its response to Israel killing senior IRGC commanders in Syria in order to avoid a direct war with Israel.1] Several Friday prayer leaders endorsed ”strategic patience”—a long-standing regime policy that involves not conducting a full response to Israeli attacks immediately—in their weekly sermon on April 5.[2] The Office of the Supreme Leader issues guidance to Friday prayer leaders for the content of their sermons, which suggests that their promotions of strategic patience are part of a broader messaging effort from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[3] Khamenei previously ordered his military commanders to exercise strategic patience following an Israeli airstrike that killed senior IRGC Quds Force officer Brig. Gen. Razi Mousavi in Syria in December 2023, according to The New York Times.[4] The public endorsements of a calibrated retaliation on April 5 are consistent with recent Western reporting.[5] Two unspecified Iranian officials told Reuters on April 4 that the immediate Iranian response would be “limited and aimed at deterrence.”[6] Such reports support CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran seeks to avoid a direct military confrontation against the United States and Israel.[7]

Tehran is also signaling that it wants to avoid involving the United States in its retaliation against Israel. An official in Raisi’s Presidential office claimed that Iran has warned the United States to “step aside, so you don’t get hit,” suggesting that Iran seeks to retaliate against Israeli targets.[8] Western media has similarly suggested that Iran will target Israel directly, moreover. An unnamed US, Israeli, and other unspecified Western officials told the Washington Post that they expected Iran to retaliate with drones or missile attacks on Israeli targets that would be ”calibrated to avoid an even bigger response from Israel.”[9] CBS separately reported that US intelligence indicates that Iran’s response will include ”a swarm of Shahed loitering drones and cruise missiles,” likely before the end of Ramadan on April 10.[10] Israel has reportedly evacuated several of its diplomatic facilities around the region in anticipation of a possible Iranian retaliation, although the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry has denied such reports.[11]

Kataib Seyyed al Shuhada (KSS) Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai threatened on April 5 to increase attacks targeting Israel if the IDF conducts a clearing operation into Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.[12] Walai’s statement suggests that KSS may be at least one of the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that has conducted attacks into Israel in recent weeks. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has conducted regular attacks into Israel since pausing its near-daily attacks on US forces in February 2024. Walai also called for Arab and Islamic countries to sever all diplomatic ties with Israel and stop all normalization efforts.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Iranian officials have signaled that they want to avoid involving the United States in their retaliation against Israel for killing senior IRGC commanders in Syria.
  • Iraq: An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leader threatened to increase attacks into Israel if the IDF conducted a clearing operation into Rafah.
  • Gaza Strip: Israeli leaders approved a series of measures to increase the volume of humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Yemen: US CENTCOM conducted a preemptive strike targeting a Houthi-operated, anti-ship missile in Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations around Khan Younis on April 5.[13] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 7th Brigade (36th Division), which has been operating in eastern Khan Younis, directed artillery to destroy a house that Palestinian fighters had rigged to explode.[14] The IDF Air Force similarly destroyed over 30 explosively rigged buildings across the Gaza Strip in support of Israeli infantry operations.[15] These reports are consistent with the fact that Hamas and other Palestinian militias have claimed house-borne IED attacks throughout the war.[16] The IDF Givati Brigade located grenades and IEDs while re-clearing al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis.[17]

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) reported that it mortared Israeli forces in central Khan Younis.[18] The group claimed that the attack supported the al Qassem Brigades, which is Hamas’ military wing, in some unspecified fashion. PIJ has been aligned with Hamas throughout the war.

Israel approved on April 5 a series of measures to increase the humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip. The Israeli War Cabinet approved the reopening of its Erez crossing with the northern Gaza Strip, which has been closed since the beginning of the war.[19] The Israeli War Cabinet separately approved the use of the Port of Ashdod in Israel to facilitate the movement of aid into the Gaza Strip. Israeli officials told CNN that the crossing and port would open on April 7.[20]

Israel released on April 5 its internal inquiry into the IDF strikes that killed seven World Central Kitchen aid workers in the central Gaza Strip.[21] The investigation found that the strike on three vehicles was conducted in “serious violation” of its rules and operating procedures. Israel dismissed several officers who bore responsibility for the attack. The World Central Kitchen called on April 4 for the creation of an independent commission to investigate the killings of its staff.[22] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated he is reviewing the report and that the United States will discuss its conclusions “in the days to come.”[23]

Axios reported on April 5, citing unspecified sources, that the US, Israeli, and Egyptian intelligence chiefs and Qatari prime minister will meet in Cairo in the coming days in an effort to secure the release of Hamas-held hostages in the Gaza Strip.[24] The meeting follows US President Joe Biden urging Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a phone call on April 4 "to empower his negotiators to conclude a deal without delay to bring the hostages home." Israel and Hamas have been negotiating a proposal that includes a six-week ceasefire and the release of 40 hostages in return for approximately 700 Palestinian prisoners. A senior Hamas official said on April 4 that the latest round of negotiations in Cairo did not yield progress.[25] CNN reported on April 5, citing an unspecified diplomatic official, that Hamas believes “that Israeli proposal includes nothing new, so they see no need to change their proposal.”[26] The Israeli proposal did not accept Hamas's demands for the unrestricted return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip and the withdrawal of Israeli forces.[27]

The Israeli Justice Ministry is investigating a cyberattack claimed by the group, “Anonymous for Justice,” that breached its servers.[28] The group claimed on April 4 that it had taken over 300 gigabytes of data and that it would continue attacking Israel until the war ends.[29]

Palestinian fighters have conducted at least three indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 4.[30] PIJ fired rockets targeting Ashkelon, Sderot, and Nir Aam in southern Israel on April 4, meaning that Palestinian militias conducted six total that day.[31]

The IDF reported on April 5 that its 215th Artillery Brigade attacked the launch sites from which Palestinian fighters launched rockets into southern Israel [32] The IDF Air Force also struck targets in the area, including rocket launchers and a tunnel shaft. Palestinian militias have launched most of their indirect fire attacks into Israel from the northern and central Gaza Strip since January 2024. [33]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on April 4.[35] The IDF said that it conducted raids in six locations and detained thirteen wanted Palestinians across the West Bank.[36] The IDF reported that Palestinian fighters threw an IED at Israeli forces in Tulkarm.[37] PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades engaged Israeli forces in the Nour Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm.[38] Israeli forces also encountered armed Palestinian fighters in Fahma, southwest of Jenin, where the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed an attack.[39] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also claimed an attack in Kafr Rai, which neighbors Fahma.[40]

Unspecified actors shot from Jordan at an IDF vehicle near the Israel-Jordan border on April 5.[41] The IDF said that the suspects did not cross the border fence and that there were no Israeli casualties.

PIJ military spokesperson for the West Bank Abu Ahmed published a statement to celebrate Quds Day on April 5.[42] Ahmed said that PIJ fighters in the West Bank are “preparing” for an unspecified event and that Israeli forces are not expecting “what awaits” them.[43] Ahmed also affirmed PIJ’s support for the Axis of Resistance leadership in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.[44]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 4.[45]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

US CENTCOM conducted a preemptive strike targeting an anti-ship missile in Houthi-controlled Yemen on April 4.[46] CENTCOM reported that the missile presented an imminent threat to US Navy, coalition, and merchant ships in the region.

Senior Iranian and Axis of Resistance leaders gave speeches for their annual, anti-Israel Quds Day celebration on April 5.[47] Quds Day is an Iranian-established celebration that occurs on the last Friday of Ramadan.[48] Senior Iranian military and political leaders repeated their standard anti-Israel rhetoric and boasted that Israel has failed to achieve its objectives in the Israel-Hamas war.[49] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al Mohammadawi visited Tehran for the holiday commemorations.[50] Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General separately gave a televised speech for the holiday and affirmed that Iran will retaliate against Israel for killing senior IRGC officers in Syria on April 1.[51]

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi will reportedly meet with Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif in Islamabad in the near future, likely to discuss the recent Jaish al Adl attack in Iran.[52] A Jaish al Adl—a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia—conducted unprecedentedly complex and sophisticated attacks targeting Iranian security forces in multiple locations in southeastern Iran on April 4.[53] At least 11 Iranian security personnel and 18 Jaish al Adl militants died during the attacks, which lasted over 13 hours.[54] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the attacks risked straining the Iranian relationship with Pakistan, which Iran has long accused of harboring Jaish al Adl militants.[55]

The Iranian rial depreciated to a record low of 640,000 to one US dollar on April 4.[56]

 


Iran Update, April 4, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps 

Iran Update, April 4, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, Rachel Friedman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate with one another to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia, conducted unprecedentedly complex and sophisticated attacks targeting Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran on April 4.[1] Jaish al Adl conducted coordinated and simultaneous attacks targeting at least two Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) headquarters, a police station, and a naval facility in Chabahar and Rask in Iran’s Sistan and Balochistan Province.[2] Jaish al Adl claimed that it conducted attacks targeting six locations total across Sistan and Balochistan Province, although CTP-ISW cannot verify every attack.[3] At least 11 Iranian security personnel and 18 Jaish al Adl militants died during the attacks, which began around midnight on April 4 and lasted over 13 hours.[4]

IRGC-affiliated media reported that Jaish al Adl militants opened fire at the IRGC headquarters in Rask from the top of a nearby hospital, while other militants assaulted the headquarters with explosives.[5] Iranian military officials and state media also reported that the militants wore suicide vests, which could have been the explosives used in the attack.[6] Iranian state media claimed that the Jaish al Adl militants failed to breach the headquarters.[7] Jaish al Adl contrastingly claimed that it captured munitions warehouses within the IRGC headquarters and published videos showing Jaish al Adl fighters seizing unspecified military equipment at the warehouse.[8]

Jaish al Adl separately announced that it targeted Police Station 11 in Chabahar because the former police chief raped a young Baloch girl at this station in September 2022.[9] This incident fueled public outrage and large-scale protests in the nearby city of Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, in late September 2022. Iranian security forces violently suppressed the protests in Zahedan in an event that became known as “Bloody Friday.”[10] Jaish al Adl vowed in early October 2022 that it would retaliate against the Iranian regime for killing protesters and “enter the field with all its power.”[11] Jaish al Adl referencing the rape of the young Baloch girl in Chabahar is likely part of an effort to cultivate support among the local population.

Jaish al Adl separately cited Iranian cooperation with China, India, and Russia as a reason for its April 4 attacks.[12] The group specified that it seeks to disrupt the development of the Makran coast, a coastal strip that extends between southeastern Iran and southwestern Pakistan. Other Baloch militant groups, such as the Baloch Liberation Army, have previously targeted Chinese development projects in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province.[13]

The Jaish al Adl attacks demonstrate the group’s growing organization and ability to use relatively advanced tactics inside Iranian territory. Jaish al Adl claimed that it coordinated 168 fighters from two different battalions and an “intelligence and security unit” to conduct the attack.[14] Those same two Jaish al Adl battalions previously cooperated to raid an Iranian police station in Rask in December 2023.[15] One of the Jaish al Adl battalions involved in the April 4 attack separately organized a rare, battalion-sized training exercise in October 2022.[16] Most Jaish al Adl attacks involve targeted killings, IED attacks, and raids targeting Iranian security forces’ outposts.[17] A Jaish al Adl attack targeting a Zahedan police station in July 2023, for instance, used only four fighters equipped with suicide vests.[18]

The Jaish al Adl attacks risk straining the Iranian relationship with Pakistan, which Iran accuses of harboring Jaish al Adl militants.[19] Tehran has frequently called on the Pakistani government to crack down on Jaish al Adl and to secure its border with Iran.[20] The IRGC previously conducted drone and missile strikes targeting two Jaish al Adl “headquarters” in southwestern Pakistan in January 2024 in retaliation for an earlier Jaish al Adl attack on a police station.[21] The Pakistani armed forces responded to the IRGC strikes by conducting their own cross-border attacks targeting anti-Pakistan Baloch separatists in southeastern Iran.[22] Iranian and Pakistani officials quickly sought to deescalate tensions following the exchange of strikes, but the fundamental tension points remain.[23] The Pakistani Foreign Affairs Ministry condemned the April 4 Jaish al Adl attacks, possibly to try to preemptively address the risk of rising tensions with Iran.[24]

The Jaish al Adl attacks highlight the increasingly precarious state of the Iranian internal security environment. There has been a significant uptick in anti-regime militancy and terrorist activity throughout Iran in recent years. Jaish al Adl has conducted several significant attacks in this period, possibly because it has exploited the Bloody Friday incident to drive recruitment and support for itself.[25] The Afghanistan branch of the Islamic State, known as Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), has similarly conducted several major attacks inside Iran, including two attacks on a holy shrine in Shiraz in October 2022 and August 2023 and another attack on a funeral ceremony for Qassem Soleimani in January 2024.[26] These security challenges compound with the fact that there have been several major, anti-regime protest waves in Iran in recent years, imposing increased strain on the Iranian internal security apparatus, as it tries to violently impose social control.

Two unspecified Iranian officials told Reuters that Iran will respond seriously to Israel killing IRGC Quds Force Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi in Syria but that the retaliation would also be “limited and aimed at deterrence.”[27] The officials also indicated that Iran would continue trying to avoid a direct confrontation with Israel and the United States whilst continuing to support Iranian-backed attacks across the Middle East.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) military spokesperson “Abu Hamza” expressed support on April 4 for the anti-Israel protest movement in Jordan.[28] Thousands of Jordanians have demonstrated in front of the Israeli embassy in Amman since March 24 to demand that the Jordanian government cut diplomatic ties with Israel, withdraw from the 1994 peace treaty, and cut off the trade route between the Persian Gulf and Israel that cuts through Jordanian territory.[29] Abu Hamza said that PIJ is following the protest movement closely and that the Jordanians’ voice ”is beginning to spread.”[30] The leaders of PIJ and Hamas previously praised the Jordanian protest movement on March 29.[31]

The Palestinian militias’ support for the Jordanian protests comes as Iran and its so-called ”Axis of Resistance” have similarly expressed a desire to disrupt the ”land bridge” connecting Israel to the Persian Gulf.[32] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance may be shifting to a more confrontational strategy vis-a-vis Jordan as part of their effort to expand their capabilities and networks in the West Bank.[33]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia, conducted unprecedentedly complex and sophisticated attacks targeting Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.
  • Jordan: PIJ military spokesperson “Abu Hamza” expressed support on April 4 for the anti-Israel protest movement in Jordan.
  • Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations throughout the Gaza Strip. Hamas rejected the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal.
  • West Bank: The Shin Bet announced that it had detained and indicted eleven individuals, who had planned attacks against high-value targets in Israel.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed two drone attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets.
  • Yemen: A senior US military official stated that the Houthis may be running low on their stockpiles of drones and anti-ship ballistic missiles due to persistent US airstrikes.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 7643rd Gefen Brigade (Gaza Division) and Netzah Yehuda Battalion (900th Kfir Brigade, 99th Reserve Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in Beit Hanoun on April 4.[34] The IDF reported that Israeli forces killed a Hamas company commander for the Beit Hanoun area during clashes with Hamas fighters. CTP-ISW assessed on March 25 that a small number of Palestinian fighters have likely infiltrated Beit Hanoun.[35]

Palestinian militias have continued to conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces in Gaza City since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 3. Hamas mortared Israeli forces in Tuffah in eastern Gaza City on April 3.[36] PIJ and the National Resistance Brigades conducted a combined mortar attack on April 4 targeting Israeli forces west of Gaza City in Sheikh Ijlin.[37] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, also fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) at an Israeli bulldozer west of Gaza City on April 4.[38]  

Israeli forces continued to engage Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on April 4. The IDF Nahal Brigade identified a group of nearby Palestinian fighters and directed an airstrike killing the fighters.[39] Hamas fighters fired an RPG at an Israeli Merkava tank east of Deir al Balah.[40]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on April 4. The 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) killed Palestinian fighters and seized weapons in al Amal.[41] PIJ fighters mortared Israeli forces near al Amal Hospital and al Arishya neighborhood.[42] The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in eastern Khan Younis.[43] PIJ targeted Israeli forces operating in a building in an unspecified area of Khan Younis with an anti-bunker bomb.[44] PIJ also targeted an Israeli tank in the same location with a mine.[45]

The IDF said on April 4 that its independent investigative body completed an inquiry into the IDF strikes that mistakenly killed seven World Central Kitchen aid workers in the central Gaza Strip.[46] The General Staff Fact-Finding Assessment Mechanism, which is ”an independent military body responsible for investigating unusual incidents amid the war,“ investigated the incident "thoroughly" and briefed the IDF chief of staff on its findings. The report will be released to the public in the coming days after the key stakeholders, including the World Central Kitchen and embassy personnel, review the findings. Israeli Army Radio reported on April 3 that the IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) was responsible for directing the airstrikes that killed the aid workers.[47]

US President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a call to discuss the Gaza Strip on April 4.[48] Biden called for an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip ”to stabilize and improve the humanitarian situation and protect innocent civilians.” Biden said that the Israeli strikes on humanitarian workers and the overall humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip are ”unacceptable.” Biden added that US policy on the Gaza Strip depends on Israel’s immediate actions to ”implement a series of specific, concrete, and measurable steps to address civilian harm, humanitarian suffering, and the safety of aid workers,” but that the United States will ”strongly support” Israel in the face of ”public Iranian threats against Israel.”

NBC reported new details of a virtual meeting between senior US and Israeli officials to discuss a possible Israeli clearing operation into Rafah. US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken met virtually with Israeli National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi and Israeli Minster for Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer on April 1.[49] Several unspecified US officials familiar with the meeting said that the plan that Israel presented to move 1.4 million civilians from Rafah to tents north of the city “did not include plans for addressing sanitation needs or an assessment of how much food or water would be required or where it would come from.”[50] The sources also reported that Israel has only considered sourcing “a fraction of the hundreds of thousands” of temporary shelters that will be needed under the plan.[51] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu purchased 40,000 tents to house displaced Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in preparation for Israel’s clearing operation into Rafah, according to Israeli media on March 28.[52]

Hamas rejected Israel’s latest ceasefire proposal on April 3. Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan said on April 4 that Hamas had resubmitted its March 14 ceasefire proposal to Egyptian and Qatari mediators in response to Israel’s most recent proposal.[53] Hamdan stated that Hamas was “sticking to [its] position” but also claimed that the group had shown great “flexibility” in negotiations.[54] Hamas’ March 14 proposal includes implementing a ceasefire, calls for Israel to release Palestinian prisoners, an increase in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, a return of displaced Palestinians, and a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.[55] Israel sent an “updated” ceasefire proposal to the mediators and Hamas on April 2.[56] Israel’s updated proposal reportedly allowed for the gradual return of 60,000 displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip, representing a softening of Israel’s previous position.[57]

Palestinian militias conducted five indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on April 3.[58] This is the highest number of attacks launched from the Gaza Strip since February 8 and may be in anticipation of Iran’s annual, anti-Israel holiday, Quds Day, on April 5.[59] Israeli air defenses intercepted two rockets fired by PIJ from the Gaza Strip over Netivot on April 4.[60] Palestinian militias have not targeted Netivot since January 16.[61] PIJ also fired mortars and rockets at three towns in southern Israel.[62] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), a secular leftist Palestinian group fighting alongside Hamas in the war, fired a rocket salvo at Kissufim.[63]

The IDF Air Force struck a PIJ launch site on April 3, shortly after fighters conducted indirect fire attacks into Israel.[64] The Israeli strikes destroyed several rocket launchers and militia infrastructure.[65]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least nine locations since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 3.[66]

The Shin Bet announced on April 4 that it had detained and indicted eleven individuals, who had planned attacks against high-value targets in Israel.[67] The cell included seven Arab Israelis and four Palestinians from the West Bank, who plotted attacks against targets, including the Israeli national security minister, Ben Gurion Airport, and an unspecified government complex in Jerusalem.[68] Four of the individuals in the cell were from Jenin and Tulkarm in the West Bank, where Israeli forces have repeatedly conducted operations targeting Palestinian fighters.[69] The individuals planned to rent land in Rahat, Israel, or in the West Bank to use for military training and weapons manufacturing.[70] At least one member of the cell was in contact with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which offered funding for attacks in Israel.[71] It is unclear when and where Shin Bet detained these individuals.

The indictments come amid several Palestinian attacks targeting Israeli civilians in recent months.[72] Palestinian militias have repeatedly praised these attacks and called for further attacks on Israeli civilians.[73]

Israeli forces detained three individuals on April 4 who had plotted attacks in Jerusalem.[74] The individuals are from east Jerusalem and planned small arms and IED attacks targeting a sports stadium and an unspecified police station. Israeli police and the Shin Bet said that the suspects were ISIS supporters but did not specify further on the nature of the relationship.[75] Israeli media reported that an ISIS affiliate had provided training to two of the suspects.[76]

 

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 3.[77]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed two drone attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 3. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting the IDF Ramat David airbase in northern Israel.[78] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed a drone attack targeting Ashdod, north of the Gaza Strip.[79] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify these claims.

US CENTCOM reported that it intercepted an anti-ship ballistic missile and two drones launched by the Houthis from Yemen toward the USS Gravely on April 3.[80] US CENTCOM separately reported that it destroyed a Houthi mobile surface-to-air missile system on April 3.[81]

US AFCENT Commander Lt. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich said on April 3 that the Houthis may be running low on their stockpiles of drones and anti-ship ballistic missiles due to persistent US airstrikes degrading Houthi munitions stockpiles.[82] Grynkewich further stated that US airstrikes have reduced the pace of Houthi operations but did not provide further details.

The IDF has taken several defensive measures, including expanding electronic warfare GPS-spoofing, canceling IDF soldier’s weekend leave, and ”strengthening” air defenses, on April 4 in anticipation of a possible Iranian attack on Israel in the coming days.[83] Israeli media reported that the Israeli security establishment is worried about an Iranian missile attack on Israel.[84] The Israeli defense minister held a "multi-front situational assessment" with top military and security officials on April 4.[85] The IDF spokesperson reassured Israeli citizens that there has been no change to the threat level in Israel, that the IDF is well prepared to defend against an attack, and that ”there is no need to buy generators, store food, and withdraw money from ATMs."[86]

The IRGC Navy held a naval parade in the northern Persian Gulf on April 4 as part of Iran’s annual, anti-Israel holiday, Quds Day. Iranian state media framed the parade as meant to show solidarity with the Palestinian people and demonstrate the naval capacity of the Axis of Resistance.[87] IRGC Navy Commander Rear Adm. Ali Reza Tangsiri suggested that other members of the Axis of Resistance participated in the parade, although not where and in what capacity.[88] Tangsiri reiterated the regime's intent for this year’s Quds Day on April 5 to be more widely celebrated globally than in previous years.[89]

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Adm. Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with the Russian National Security Council secretary and Chinese public security minister during the 19th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, on April 4.[90] The Russian secretary and Chinese minister expressed condolences to Iran for the IRGC officials killed in an Israeli airstrike in Syria on April 1. Ahmadian thanked his Russian counterpart, Nikolai Patrushev, for Russia’s support for a UNSC meeting on the strike. Ahmadian and Patrushev discussed Russo-Iranian efforts to combat terrorism and increase bilateral economic cooperation, including the construction of the North-South transit corridor.[91] Chinese Public Safety Minister Wang Ziaohong emphasized the need to strengthen bilateral coordination.

The United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated one entity and 13 associated vessels for facilitating commodity shipments on behalf of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) and the Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry (MODAFL).[92] These designations are part of broader US efforts to counter illegal Iranian military revenue generation and ability to finance its regional proxy and partner groups.

OFAC sanctioned the following entities:

  • UAE-based Oceanlink Maritime DMCC

OFAC sanctioned the following OceanLink Maritime DMCC-associated vessels:

  • Comoros-flagged Anthea
  • Comoros-flagged Boreas
  • Comoros-flagged Cape Gas
  • Comoros-flagged Glaucus
  • Comoros-flagged Oceanus Gas
  • Comoros-flagged Hebe
  • Comoros-flagged Hectate
  • Antigua and Barbuda-flagged Calypso Gas
  • Antigua and Barbuda-flagged Meraki
  • Belize-flagged Elsa
  • Belize-flagged Baxter
  • Panama-flagged Demeter
  • Cook Islands-flagged Ourea

OFAC updated the sanctions to account for the name change of the following vessel:

  • Saint Light, also known as Stellar Oracle, previously listed as Young Yong

Iran Update, April 3, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Amin Soltani, Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have signaled their desire to disrupt the “land bridge” connecting Israel to the Persian Gulf. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary General Akram al Kaabi criticized the “land bridge,” which passes through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, in a speech on April 3.[1] Kataib Hezbollah military spokesperson Hussein Moanes similarly declared on April 1 that the group is prepared to arm Iranian-backed militants in Jordan and “cut off” land routes that reach Israel.[2]

The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ desire to disrupt the “land bridge” is likely part of a larger Axis of Resistance effort to economically isolate Israel. These threats come as Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have repeatedly called for Muslim countries to institute a blockade on Israel.[3] Iranian state media similarly has criticized countries that have allowed Israel to conduct trade through their territory.[4] Iranian state media has further argued that the “land bridge” renders Houthi attacks targeting Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea “ineffective.”[5] Israel has increasingly relied on the Israeli-UAE overland trade route to compensate for reduced trade activity at the Port of Eilat due to the Houthis’ anti-shipping campaign.[6] The Houthis have conducted over 40 attacks targeting commercial vessels in the Red Sea since November 2023.[7] Vessel traffic through the Red Sea has declined by approximately 50 percent since January 2024 due to Houthi attacks.[8]

Kaabi separately discussed the West Bank, Israeli settlers, and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba operations in his April 3 speech. Kaabi claimed that Israel is “confused” by the “emerging Palestinian resistance” in Jerusalem and Bethlehem.[9] Kaabi also claimed that Israeli settlers are “returning to their countries of origin” because they feel unsafe in Israel.[10] This claim is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iranian leaders seek to stoke economic, political, and security turmoil in Israel to facilitate Israeli citizens’ emigration [11] Kaabi lastly claimed that Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba will “expand” its attacks if the IDF continues operating in the Gaza Strip and reiterated the militia’s commitment to removing US forces from Iraq.[12]

Social media users have alleged that Lebanese Hezbollah’s representative to Iraq, Mohammad Hossein al Kawtharani, traveled to Najaf, Iraq, possibly to coordinate the Axis of Resistance’s response to Israel killing IRGC Brig Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi on April 1.[13] CTP-ISW cannot verify these rumors at this time. Iran and Hezbollah have long relied on Kawtharani to manage and unify the often-fractious Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, especially since the United States killed Qassem Soleimani in 2020. A UK-based, Middle East-focused outlet previously reported in January 2024 that Kawtharani had traveled to Baghdad to “coordinate an escalation in operations” against US forces in Iraq.[14] Kawtharani’s January 2024 visit to Baghdad marked his first trip to Iraq in two years.[15] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Kawtharani in August 2013 for promoting Lebanese Hezbollah’s interests in Iraq, including providing “training, funding, political, and logistical support to Iraqi sectarian armed groups.”[16] The US State Department announced in April 2020 that Kawtharani “facilitates the actions of groups operating outside the control of the Government of Iraq that have violently suppressed protests, attacked foreign diplomatic missions, and engaged in widespread organized criminal activity.”[17]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq: Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have signaled their desire to disrupt the “land bridge” connecting Israel to the Persian Gulf.
  • Social media users have alleged that Lebanese Hezbollah’s representative to Iraq, Mohammad Hossein al Kawtharani, traveled to Najaf, Iraq, possibly to coordinate the Axis of Resistance’s response to Israel killing IRGC Brig Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi on April 1
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias continued to conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces around Gaza City.
  • Central Gaza Strip: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters around Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip in recent days, suggesting that Israeli forces are advancing into the area.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and northern Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: The Qatari prime minister said that the main point of dispute in Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations is over the return of displaced people to different parts of the Gaza Strip.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces conducted raids in the West Bank and engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Syria: The Russian Defense Ministry announced that Russian forces have deployed to a new observation post along Syria-Golan Heights border.
  • Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech emphasizing Syria’s role in Iran’s Axis of Resistance.
  • Iran: Iranian leaders are continuing to hold Israel and the United States responsible for the April 1 airstrike targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials in Syria and vowing to exact revenge.
  • Yemen: US Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking said that the United States is trying to negotiate a diplomatic solution to stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias continued to conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces around Gaza City on April 3. Hamas fired mortars targeting Israeli forces in Tuffah, northeast of Gaza City.[18] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, separately conducted a combined mortar attack targeting Israeli forces south of Gaza City.[19]

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters around Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip in recent days, suggesting that Israeli forces are advancing into the area.[20] Hamas fired a thermobaric rocket targeting Israeli forces east of Deir al Balah on April 3.[21]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and northern Khan Younis on April 3. The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) and IDF Givati Brigade are operating in al Amal neighborhood, western Khan Younis. Israeli forces detained and killed Palestinian fighters.[22] The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) located unspecified weapons in Khan Younis.[23] Israeli engineering forces and the IDF Air Force destroyed weapons depots and militia infrastructure in the area.[24] The IDF reported on April 3 that its 7th Brigade has been operating in Qarara in northern Khan Younis.[25] Israeli forces located and destroyed a rocket launcher in an olive grove and engaged Palestinian fighters in the area.

Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on April 3. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired anti-tank shells targeting Israeli forces in al Amal neighborhood.[26] The group also mortared Israeli forces in an unspecified area in western Khan Younis.[27]

Axios reported new details of a virtual meeting between senior US and Israeli officials to discuss a possible Israeli clearing operation into Rafah.[28] US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken met virtually with Israeli National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi and Israeli Minster for Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer on April 1.[29] Unspecified sources with direct knowledge of the meeting said that the Israeli delegation presented a plan to evacuate over one million people from Rafah over at least four weeks.[30] The US side responded saying that the timeline was an unrealistic estimate and that the current humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip did not create confidence in Israel’s ability to conduct an orderly evacuation. Israel rejected a US claim that an evacuation ought to take four months. The sources said that the US message to the Israelis was that the IDF needs to operate more slowly and with lower intensity than it did in Gaza City and in Khan Younis.

The Qatari prime minister said on April 3 that the main point of dispute in Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations is over the return of displaced people to different parts of the Gaza Strip.[31] Hamas has made the return of all displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip a major point in its negotiation demands, along with a comprehensive permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, and adequate humanitarian relief.[32] Al Jazeera reported on April 1 that the Israeli negotiators in Cairo amended their stance on the return of displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip to a gradual return of 60,000 people into the northern Gaza Strip.[33] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office reported on April 2 that Israel has created an “updated” ceasefire proposal for Hamas to review.[34]

Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) was responsible for mistakenly directing the airstrike that killed seven aid workers from the World Central Kitchen (WCK) in the Gaza Strip on April 1.[35] The report noted that the Nahal Brigade has killed over two dozen Hamas fighters in the same area over the past few weeks. It also said that Hamas often tries to take control of humanitarian aid convoys. Unspecified senior IDF officials reportedly warned IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi in recent days that their coordination mechanism with international aid organizations in the Gaza Strip was not functioning properly. The IDF inaugurated a joint command between the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—and the IDF Southern Command on April 3 to improve the coordination between Israeli military headquarters and the management of humanitarian aid.[36] US President Joe Biden said following the attack that the Israeli government “has not done enough to protect aid workers.”[37]

PIJ launched rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Kissufim in southern Israel on March 3.[38]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have conducted raids in the West Bank and engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 2.[39] The IDF conducted a “divisional operation” in al Faraa camp, south of Tubas.[40] Hamas, PIJ, and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed separate shooting attacks targeting Israeli forces there.[41] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also targeted Israeli forces with unspecified IEDs.[42]

Palestinian media cited local sources claiming that Palestinian fighters targeted the Qalandia checkpoint north of Jerusalem with an IED.[43]

A 26-year-old Arab Israeli conducted separate car ramming and stabbing attacks in central Israel on April 3.[44] The individual targeted four Israeli police officers at a temporary checkpoint in Kochav Yair, which borders the West Bank.[45] He then drove south to the Eliyahu crossing, where he attempted to stab security guards stationed there.[46] Israeli security forces at the Eliyahu crossing shot and killed him. Israeli police identified the attacker as a resident of Tira in central Israel.[47]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 2.[48]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed on April 2 to have conducted a drone attack targeting Haifa Airport in Israel.[49] Israeli officials and media have not confirmed the attack at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW cannot verify the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claim.

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech on April 3 emphasizing Syria’s role in Iran’s Axis of Resistance.[50] Nasrallah’s comments follow an Israeli airstrike in Syria that killed a senior Iranian military commander and some of his top subordinates on April 1.[51] The speech was for a “Quds Platform” event, which included speeches from Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah, and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary General Akram al Kaabi.[52] Nasrallah singled out Syria in the speech and said that Syria has not “modified or changed its position” despite the “daily aggression” that it faces.[53] Israel has been conducting an air campaign to disrupt the Iranian transfer of military material to its proxies and partners in Lebanon and Syria throughout the current war. Nasrallah added that Syria is the “incubator and supporter of all resistance movements” in the region. Nasrallah also praised militia operations in the Gaza Strip, Iraq, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Yemen.[54]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

US Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking said that the United States is trying to negotiate a diplomatic solution to stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[55] Lenderking said that the Biden administration would considerbut not guaranteerevoking the Houthi’s terrorist designation if the Houthis stopped attacks into the Red Sea.[56] He also said that the Houthis could demonstrate a “show of good faith” and “intent to deescalate” by releasing the crew of the Galaxy Leader, which the Houthis hijacked in November 2023.[57]

Iranian leaders are continuing to hold Israel and the United States responsible for the April 1 airstrike targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials in Syria and vowing to exact revenge. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called Israel’s airstrike in Syria “desperate” and claimed that it is not enough to save Israel from failure in the Israel-Hamas war. Khamenei made these remarks during a pre-scheduled meeting for Ramadan.[58] IRGC spokesperson Brig. Gen. Ramazan Sharif announced that the funeral ceremony for the IRGC officials killed in Damascus will take place simultaneously with the World Quds Day march in Tehran on April 5.[59] Quds Day is an annual anti-Israel holiday established by Iran that occurs on the last Friday of Ramadan.[60] Sharif further stated that the killing of IRGC officers increases the IRGC’s and Iranian people’s motivation to confront Israel. Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi stated that the Israeli airstrike would not go unanswered.[61]

UK-based Amwaj media, citing an unspecified political source in Iran, outlined three potential Iranian responses to the April 1 Israeli airstrike targeting IRGC officials in Syria.[62] The source stated that Iran will not likely target Israel directly but may target an Israeli diplomatic target abroad. Iranian officials and state media similarly suggested on April 2 that Iran may attack Israeli diplomatic facilities in response.[63] The source alternatively said that Iran may respond in a way that is unclear to others but clear to Iran and Israel. This approach could include targeting a Mossad center, such as those the regime alleges are in Azerbaijan and Iraqi Kurdistan.[64] The source lastly said that Iran may avoid a quick response for the time being.

The Russian Defense Ministry announced on April 3 that Russian forces have deployed to a new observation post along Syria-Golan Heights border.[65] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that the purpose of the observation post is to “maintain order and peace in Syria” and that the post was established in mutual agreement with the Syrian regime. Russian forces have previously bolstered their position in southern Syria during the Israel-Hamas War, reportedly to “monitor the ceasefire” between Israel and Syria.[66] Russian forces most recently established a joint observation post with the Syrian Arab Army on the border with the Golan Heights on March 13.[67]

The Iranian rial depreciated to a record low of 634,000 rials to the US dollar on April 3.[68] A member of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce claimed that the recent rial exchange rate fluctuations were a “temporary” response to the Israeli airstrike targeting IRGC officers in Syria on April 1. The value of the rial was 32,000 rials to one US dollar when the United States and Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015.[69]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian attended the 19th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) security council secretaries meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, on April 2 and 3.[70] This event marked Ahmadian’s first time attending an SCO meeting since becoming SNSC secretary in May 2023 and since Iran became a full member state in July 2023.[71] The meeting participants discussed items related to the SCO’s stated mission as a collective security organization, including combating terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, and confidence-building-and-security-measures.[72] Ahmadian also held separate bilateral meetings with his SCO counterparts on the sidelines of the wider meeting to discuss the implementation of bilateral economic, defense, and security cooperation agreements.[73] CTP-ISW previously assessed in July 2023 that Iran likely seeks to use its membership in the SCO to circumvent sanctions through non-US dollar financial transactions with other SCO countries, accelerate the construction of various regional transit corridors which will confer new sources of revenue, and reap military benefits from participating in the SCO’s combined counterterrorism and naval exercises.[74]

The Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry arrested two alleged members of the Afghan branch of the Islamic State—named Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—in Qom on April 2.[75] Iranian state media reported that the two suspected ISKP members were attempting to conduct an unspecified attack on the Fatima Masumeh Shrine in Qom, which is considered the second holiest site in Iran for Shias.[76] These arrests follow an uptick in Salafji-jihadi activity across several Iranian provinces in recent months and years.[77] Two ISKP members detonated suicide vests during a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of the United States killing Qassem Soleimani, killing at least 84 civilians and wounding dozens of others, on January 3.[78] ISKP similarly conducted two attacks on the Shah Cheragh Shrine in Shiraz, Fars Province, in August 2023 and October 2022.[79]

Iran Update, April 2, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

A prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia threatened to create and arm a new Iranian proxy in Jordan, which may reflect a greater, more confrontational, shift in the Iranian strategy vis-a-vis Jordan. Kataib Hezbollah military spokesperson Hussein Moanes, also known as Abu Ali al Askari, said on April 1 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed militias, has prepared to “equip” 12,000 “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with a significant supply of weapons.[1] The mention of an Islamic resistance network in Jordan is a notable inflection, as Iranian and Iranian-backed actors have not previously mentioned the existence of such an entity. Moanes said that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq seeks to equip Jordanian fighters, so that Iraq and Jordan can jointly attack Israel to ”defend” the Palestinian cause. Kataib Hezbollah released the statement in response to an Israeli airstrike in Damascus on April 1, which killed seven Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) members.[2] Moanes’ statement is likely aspirational given the current strength of the Jordanian armed forces and the operational costs and time required to create a pro-Iran network in Jordan.

Kataib Hezbollah’s choice to publicize its desire to set up a large armed militia indicates a growing Iranian interest in using Jordan in its anti-Israel campaign, however. Jordan offers a direct front from which Iranian-backed fighters could more easily conduct and direct attacks into Israel. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq already utilizes Jordanian airspace for its drone attacks into Israel.[3] An active and well-armed Iranian-backed militia based out of Jordan would dramatically advance Iran’s military encirclement of Israel.

An expanding Axis of Resistance network in Jordan would also facilitate Iranian efforts in the West Bank. Jordanian territory also offers multiple ground routes through which Iran could move military materiel into the West Bank. Tehran has sought to develop the capabilities and infrastructure of its militia network in the West Bank in recent years, but the Israel-Hamas war has highlighted the shortcomings of the networks there.[4] Palestinian militias in the West Bank remain relatively disorganized and still use rudimentary capabilities to attack Israel and Israeli forces compared to the militias in the Gaza Strip. Iranian leaders could conclude that they need to invest further in building their networks into Jordan to develop their militia infrastructure in the West Bank more effectively.

Moanes’ separately declared that Kataib Hezbollah would “cut off” land routes that “reach” Israel.[5] Kataib Hezbollah may be referring to the transportation line connecting ports in the Persian Gulf to Israel via Saudi Arabia and Jordan.[6] A likely Iranian-backed militia drone exploded on the Jordan-Israel border near Eilat on April 2, near where trucks carrying Israeli goods from the Gulf States enter Israel via Jordan.[7] CTP-ISW is unable to confirm the drone's target. However, the location is notable because Israel has increasingly relied on this land route to compensate for reduced trade activity through Eilat due to the Houthi’s anti-shipping campaign.[8] The Houthi movement has emphasized that its drone and missile campaign seeks to create a blockade that will destroy the Israeli economy and analogized ongoing Houthi operations to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which Egypt seized Israeli shipping near the Bab al Mandeb.[9] Kataib Hezbollah attacks targeting this land route would support the Houthis’ efforts.

Recent domestic unrest and large sustained demonstrations in Jordan against the Jordanian government’s Israel policy may be driving Iran and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq to approach Jordanian infiltration differently and more overtly. Thousands of Jordanians have demonstrated in front of the Israeli embassy in Amman since March 24.[10] The protestors have called for the Jordanian government to cut diplomatic ties with Israel, withdraw from the 1994 peace treaty, and cut off the trade route between the Persian Gulf and Israel that cuts through Jordanian territory.[11] Protestors have repeatedly clashed with Jordanian security services, and the government has accused groups of stirring up ”strife.”[12] Protestors have also expressed support for Hamas and called for armed resistance against Israel.[13]  Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s leaders have praised the Jordanian protest movement as an important part of resistance against Israel.[14] The Jordanian state’s strong security apparatus, high degree of domestic control, and close relationship with the US military are significant obstacles for Kataib Hezbollah or other Iranian-backed actors if they choose to develop a network in Jordan.

The Iranian regime may target US forces or Israeli diplomatic facilities in retaliation for the April 1 Israeli airstrike in Damascus that killed seven Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials.[15] Israel struck a building directly adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus, killing senior IRGC commanders Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi and Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hadi Haj Rahimi.[16] The commanders were discussing the Israel-Hamas war with Palestinian militia leaders, including PIJ leaders, at the time of the Israeli airstrike.[17] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned on April 2 following the attack that Israel will “be punished by the hands of our brave men.”[18] The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which is the Iranian regime’s highest defense and foreign policy body, separately held an emergency meeting on April 1 to discuss the airstrike.[19] Iranian state media reported that the SNSC “adopted appropriate decisions” regarding the airstrike.[20] The SNSC’s members are senior Iranian political and security figures, including the president, parliament speaker, judiciary chief, and the commanding officers responsible for the Armed Forces General Staff, IRGC, Artesh, and Law Enforcement Command.[21]

Iranian officials and media are accusing the United States of enabling the Israeli airstrike, possibly to set conditions to target US forces in the Middle East. Political advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and former SNSC Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani claimed on April 2 that the United States “holds direct responsibility” for the Israeli airstrike “and its consequences.”[22] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled media separately claimed on April 2 that the United States gave Israel the “green light” to conduct the airstrike and that Israel “would not dare” conduct such a strike without US “permission.”[23] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian attributed the Israeli airstrike to the United States and announced that the regime sent an “important message” to the US government following the airstrike via the Swiss ambassador to Iran.[24] Iran has historically held the United States accountable for Israeli military activity against Iran and its proxies. Iranian-backed militants conducted a drone attack in northeastern Syria that killed an American in March 2023 following Israeli airstrikes on Iranian-backed targets in Syria, for example.[25]

Some Iranian officials and media have suggested that Iran may attack Israeli diplomatic facilities in response to the Israeli airstrike. An Iranian parliamentarian called for “openly and directly” targeting the Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan in a post on X (Twitter) on April 1.[26] The Iranian regime has historically accused Baku of allowing Israel to use Azerbaijani territory to launch operations against Iran. Armed Forces General Staff-controlled media separately argued that Israeli embassies are “exposed to retaliatory operations.”[27] Iranian regime institutions and media have emphasized that the April 1 Israeli airstrike “crossed a red line” by targeting “diplomatic persons and places” and may therefore regard a retaliatory strike on an Israeli embassy or diplomatic facility as a proportional and reasonable response.[28]

The IDF conducted a drone strike on April 1 in the central Gaza Strip that killed seven aid workers from the World Central Kitchen (WCK).[29] WCK reported that its workers were traveling in a “deconflicted“ zone in two armored cars branded with the WCK logo and a third soft skin vehicle.[30] The convoy was traveling on the al Rashid coastal road, which Israel has designated as a humanitarian corridor.[31] Unspecified Israeli defense sources told Israeli media that Israel targeted the convoy because of “suspicion” that a Palestinian fighter was traveling with the convoy.[32] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged that the IDF “unintentionally targeted” the aid workers.[33] The United States, United Kingdom, and Australia have called on Israel to investigate the attack.[34] The IDF said that the Fact Finding and Assessment Mechanism, a military body tasked with investigating accusations, will investigate the incident.[35]

The IDF said in the aftermath of the World Central Kitchen strike that it will establish a joint command between the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—and the IDF Southern Command to improve the coordination between Israeli military headquarters and the management of humanitarian aid.[36] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant instructed Israeli forces to "maintain an open and transparent line of communication" with international organizations.[37]

The Israeli drone strike has disrupted other aid operations in the Gaza Strip. The WCK has paused its activities “in the region.”[38] Emirati government sources told Axios on March 2 that the UAE has suspended its participation in the maritime aid corridor to the Gaza Strip. This decision will remain in effect until Israel provides assurances the safety of aid workers and completes an investigation into the drone strike, according to the Emirati officials.[39] The UAE plays a significant role in coordinating with the Israeli government for humanitarian efforts via the maritime corridor.[40] The UAE also provided significant funding for the maritime corridor.[41]

Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev claimed that the United States would resort to “blackmailing” the Iraqi government to maintain its presence in Iraq. Kutrashev’s comments are likely part of the Russian effort to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq.[42] Kutrashev made this comment during an interview with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq-controlled outlet al Ahad on April 1. Kutrashev claimed that the presence of foreign forces in Iraq negatively affects Iraqi and regional security and stability. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have made similar statements, calling the US presence in Iraq “destabilizing.”[43] Kutrashev further claimed that the Iraqi Army is “strong and capable” enough to “fill the void of foreign forces.”[44] This claim ignores the fact that the Iraqi Security Forces, of which the Iraqi Army is apart, faces deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, logistics, and planning that decrease the ISF’s ability to confront some internal threats, such as ISIS, alone.[45] Kutrashev has met with at least six Iraqi officials, including senior security leaders, since January 2024.[46] CTP-ISW previously assessed in February 2024 that Russia may be setting conditions to try to supplant the United States as Iraq’s security partner in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence there.[47]

Key Takeaways:

  • Jordan: A prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia threatened to create and arm a new Iranian proxy militia in Jordan, which may reflect a greater, more confrontational, shift in the Iranian strategy vis-a-vis Jordan.
  • Recent domestic unrest and large sustained demonstrations against Jordan’s Israel policy may be causing Iran and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq to approach Jordanian infiltration differently and more overtly.
  • Iran: The Iranian regime may target US forces or Israeli diplomatic facilities in retaliation for the Israeli airstrike in Damascus that killed seven IRGC officials.
  • Central Gaza Strip: The IDF conducted a drone strike in the central Gaza Strip that killed seven aid workers from the World Central Kitchen.
  • Iraq: Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev claimed that the United States would resort to “blackmailing” the Iraqi government to maintain its presence in Iraq. Kutrashev’s comments are likely part of the Russian effort to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces conducted raids in the West Bank and engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah threatened that it would retaliate in an unspecified manner against Israel in retaliation for the Israeli airstrike in Damascus that killed seven IRGC officials.
  • Syria: An unspecified Iranian-backed militia conducted a drone attack targeting US forces stationed at al Tanf Garrison in Homs Province, Syria. This attack marks the first Iranian-backed militia attack targeting US forces in the Middle East since February 4.
  • Yemen: US CENTCOM reported that it destroyed a Houthi unmanned surface vessel that posed a threat to US ships and merchant vessels in the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias continued attacks targeting Israeli forces near Gaza City on April 2. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, said that its fighters fired small arms targeting an Israeli soldier in a house near al Shifa Hospital after returning “from the battle lines.”[48] The IDF withdrew from al Shifa Hospital on April 1 after concluding a two-week long operation in the area.[49] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters mortared Israeli forces in an unspecified area southwest of Gaza City.[50]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in western and northern Khan Younis on April 2. The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) directed an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters and weapons depots in Qarara, northern Khan Younis.[51] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) killed Palestinian fighters and confiscated weapons during ”raids“ in al Amal neighborhood, western Khan Younis.[52] The IDF Egoz Unit detained ”dozens” of Palestinian fighters near Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis.[53] Israeli forces also conducted searches near the Nasser Hospital and al Amal Hospital to ”ensure Hamas has not established infrastructure there again.”[54]

 The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office reported on April 2 that Israel has created an “updated” ceasefire proposal for Hamas to review.[55] The office confirmed that an Israeli delegation will return from Cairo on April 2 as it concluded an “additional intensive round of negotiations.”

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 2.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces conducted raids in the West Bank and engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations on April 2.[56] Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters engaged Israeli forces with small arms during an Israeli ”counterterrorism” raid in Qalandia refugee camp to detain and question unspecified "suspects.“[57] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade Nablus Battalion said that it targeted Israeli special operations forces with small arms and improvised explosive devices in Balata refugee camp. The Israeli forces were conducting a raid in Balata.[58] Israeli forces detained a total of 22 wanted people during raids in the West Bank.[59] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades separately targeted two Israeli checkpoints and an Israeli settlement near Tulkarm where Israeli forces are permanently stationed.[60]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 1.[61] Hezbollah that reportedly fired at least 30 rockets targeting Israeli civilians in Gesher HaZiv, near Nahariya.[62]

Hezbollah condemned the Israeli airstrike in Syria on April 1 that killed a senior Iranian military commander and some of his top subordinates.[63] Hezbollah said that the commander, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, ”developed and advanced the work of the resistance in Lebanon."[64] Zahedi most recently commanded the IRGC Quds Force unit responsible for overseeing operations in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories.[65] Hezbollah threatened that it would retaliate in an unspecified manner against Israel for conducting the strike.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Israeli air defenses shot down several projectiles that likely Iranian-backed militias fired from Syria on April 1. An Israeli military correspondent said that Israel shot down a cruise missile approaching the Golan Heights from Syria.[66] No group has taken responsibility for the attack at the time of writing. Syrian sources reported that the IDF conducted an airstrike in Daraa, southern Syria, in response to the attack.[67] Axios also reported on April 2 that Israeli air defenses shot down several drones fired from Syria targeting Israel on April 1.[68]

US CENTCOM reported that it destroyed a Houthi unmanned surface vessel on April 1 that posed a threat to US ships and merchant vessels in the Red Sea.[69] CENTCOM did not provide details on the location of the attack.

The Houthis likely demanded on April 1 that a commercial vessel near Hudaydah reveal its position by turning on its automatic identification system (AIS). The UK Maritime Trade Operations reported that an unspecified entity claiming to be the “Yemeni Navy” threatened a commercial vessel to turn on its AIS.[70] The commercial vessel reported hearing “suspected gunshots” after it declined to reveal its location.[71] The Houthi naval arm often refers to itself as the “Yemeni Navy,” but the Houthis are not the internationally recognized Yemeni government and do not control the Yemeni navy.

An unspecified Iranian-backed militia conducted a drone attack targeting US forces stationed at al Tanf Garrison in Homs Province, Syria, on April 1.[72] Unspecified US Defense Department officials confirmed that US forces shot down a one-way attack drone targeting al Tanf.[73] US defense officials did not provide the time of the attack, nor did they confirm whether the attack occurred before or after the Israeli airstrike that killed Zahedi. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iranian-backed militias that has claimed over 190 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began, has not claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing. This attack marks the first Iranian-backed militia attack targeting US forces in the Middle East since February 4.

Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq Secretary General Mohammad al Tamimi repeated calls to remove US forces from Iraq during an interview with Russian state-controlled media on April 2.[74] Tamimi claimed that the US government “only understands the language of force.” Tamimi said during an interview with US media on March 27 that Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq would resume attacks targeting US forces if the United States does not leave Iraq.[75] Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq has reported ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al Haq and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba.[76]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting the Tel Nof Airbase in central Israel on April 2.[77] Israeli officials and media have not confirmed the attack at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW cannot verify the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claim.


Iran Update, April 1, 2024

click here to read the full report with maps

Nicholas Carl, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Israel killed one of Iran’s senior-most military commanders in Syria in an airstrike on April 1.[1] Israel struck a building directly adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus, killing Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi and some of his top subordinates.[2] Zahedi was a highly influential and well-connected individual within the Iranian security establishment, having held several key positions throughout his career.[3] Zahedi most recently commanded the IRGC Quds Force unit responsible for overseeing operations in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories.[4] Zahedi almost certainly therefore played a prominent role in managing how Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” have escalated against the United States and Israel since the Israel-Hamas war began. Zahedi beforehand commanded the IRGC’s ground and air services and served as the operations deputy at the IRGC’s joint staff.[5] He was also part of an extraordinarily influential and tightly knit circle of senior IRGC officers who met one another during the Iran-Iraq War and have periodically come together in the intervening decades to interfere in Iranian domestic politics.[6] Other members of this informal fraternity include Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who the United States killed in January 2020, and his successor and current Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani.

Israel targeted Zahedi as part of an air campaign that it has conducted to disrupt the Iranian transfer of military materiel to its proxies and partners in Lebanon and Syria.[7] Israel has conducted several strikes targeting Iranian and Iranian-backed positions in Syria in recent months to this end, including killing IRGC Brig. Gen. Razi Mousavi outside Damascus in December 2023.[8] Mousavi was one of Zahedi’s subordinates and responsible for moving military assets and equipment through Syria. Zahedi is now the senior-most Iranian officer that Israel has killed in its air campaign.

Iran and its Axis of Resistance may attack US and/or Israeli targets in the coming weeks in retaliation for the killing of Zahedi. The Iranian regime has vowed publicly to avenge Zahedi and is creating a domestic expectation that it will take some dramatic action.[9] Iranian state media celebrated Zahedi’s prominence in the Axis of Resistance, publishing photos of him standing next to Qassem Soleimani and Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.[10] Iranian state media also emphasized that the April 1 Israeli airstrike hit a building that was part of the Iranian embassy and argued that the airstrike thus constitutes an attack on Iranian territory.[11] Iranian and Iranian-backed forces could time part of their retaliation around Quds Day, which is the annual anti-Israel holiday that Iran and its Axis of Resistance promote, on April 5.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a two-week long operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on April 1. Israeli forces returned to re-clear the area on March 18 after receiving intelligence that Palestinian militias were using the hospital compound as a command-and-control center.[12] Israeli forces killed a total of over 200 Palestinian fighters, some of whom had barricaded themselves inside the hospital.[13] The IDF also detained over 500 Palestinian fighters from near the hospital and seized intelligence documents and weapons.[14] The IDF said on April 1 that it “completed” the mission and that Israeli forces left the hospital area.[15] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on April 1 that “the terrorist base in Shifa has been eliminated.”[16] The IDF confirmed that Israeli forces will continue to operate in the northern Gaza Strip and "wherever terrorism rears its head."[17] Palestinian militias, including Hamas, confirmed that the IDF withdrew from al Shifa Hospital on April 1.[18]

The IDF captured several senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad commanders in al Shifa, suggesting that the Palestinian militias were using the hospital compound as a command-and control node. The IDF raid sought to disrupt this node. Hamas and other Palestinian militias condemned the IDF for destroying buildings near the hospital complex during the operation.[19] Palestinian fighters had reoccupied the hospital between November 2023—when Israeli forces initially cleared it—and March 2024. The hospital treated patients during this period, meaning that Palestinian militias reoccupied positions at the hospital while the hospital was operating.[20] Palestinian fighters also conducted at least 85 attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around al Shifa Hospital over a two-week period. Many of the 85 attacks were indirect mortar and rocket-propelled grenades aimed at areas near the complex, including its front gate.[21] Three Palestinian militias continued to target Israeli forces at the hospital before the IDF concluded operations there on the morning of April 1.[22] Palestinian fighters also targeted Israeli forces from inside the hospital wards.[23]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran in the Region: An Israeli airstrike targeted a building directly adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus, killing senior IRGC Quds Force commander Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi and some of his top subordinates.
  • Israel targeted Zahedi as part of an air campaign that it has conducted to disrupt the Iranian transfer of military materiel to its proxies and partners in Lebanon and Syria.
  • Iran and its Axis of Resistance may attack US and/or Israeli targets in the coming weeks in retaliation for the killing of Zahedi.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a two-week long operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on April 1. The IDF captured several senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad commanders in al Shifa, suggesting that the Palestinian militias were using the hospital compound as a command-and control node.
  • Palestinian fighters had reoccupied the hospital between November 2023—when Israeli forces initially cleared it—and March 2024. The hospital treated patients during this period, meaning that Palestinian militias reoccupied positions at the hospital while the hospital was operating.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Hamas said that its fighters conducted a complex multi-stage ambush targeting an Israeli armored personnel carrier, seven dismounted infantrymen, and a quick reaction force.
  • Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted a drone attack that damaged an IDF naval base in Eilat, southern Israel, on March 31.
  • Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah on March 30 in Tehran.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Hamas reported that its fighters mortared an Israeli command-and-control center west of Tal al Hawa in southwestern Gaza City on March 31.[24] Hamas has claimed almost daily attacks targeting Israeli forces in Tal al Hawa since March 24.[25]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on April 1. The Nahal Brigade directed an airstrike targeting a Hamas military structure filled with explosives and a Palestinian militia observation post in the central Gaza Strip.[26]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on April 1. The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) and Givati Brigade (162nd Division) are operating in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis.[27] The brigades engaged Palestinian fighters and raided militia infrastructure.[28] The forces also detained Palestinian fighters and seized weapons, including explosives.[29] The IDF Air Force struck two vehicles filled with Palestinian fighters approaching Israeli ground forces in Khan Younis.[30]

Two Palestinian militias claimed that they ambushed Israeli forces in central Khan Younis City on April 1. Hamas said that its fighters conducted a complex multi-stage ambush targeting an Israeli armored personnel carrier, seven dismounted infantrymen, and a quick reaction force. The Hamas fighters first engaged the APC and dismounts before using unspecified “heavy weapons” targeting the quick reaction force.[31] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, claimed separately that it ambushed Israeli forces in central Khan Younis City.[32] Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that the attacks killed and wounded Israeli forces, but the IDF has not acknowledged casualties from the attacks at the time of writing.

Al Jazeera reported on April 1 that the Israeli negotiating delegation in Cairo amended its stance on the return of displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip.[33] Israeli negotiators proposed a gradual, month-long return of 60,000 people into the northern Gaza Strip at a rate of 2,000 people per day.[34] The 60,000 returned Gazans would be housed in tents and not return to their homes.[35] Israel stipulated that fighting aged men are prevented from returning to the northern Gaza Strip.[36] Hamas has made the return of all displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip a major point in its hostage negotiation demands, along with a comprehensive permanent ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip, and adequate humanitarian relief.[37] The new Israeli stance reportedly did not lead to a breakthrough in negotiations, but an unspecified Israeli official told Israeli media on April 1 that negotiators are making ”some progress” in Cairo.[38]

Senior US and Israeli officials held a secure video conference to discuss the Biden administration’s “alternative proposals” to a possible Israeli clearing operation into Rafah on April 1.[39] US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Israeli National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi and Israeli Minster for Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer chaired the meeting.[40] Hanegbi and Dermer were originally expected to visit Washington in person on March 25, but Tel Aviv rescheduled the meeting.[41] The joint statement released by the White House said that the meeting on Rafah was constructive and that both parties want to see Hamas defeated in Rafah. Israeli and US officials will hold follow up discussions ”as early as next week.”[42]

Hamas’ internal security said on March 31 that Hamas detained ten security officers from the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the Gaza Strip.[43] Hamas claimed that the PA sent security forces to the Gaza Strip to protect aid trucks and that the PA’s intelligence chief supervised the operation.[44] The group added that the individuals had ”coordinated [their] operations entirely with [Israel].”[45] An unspecified PA official denied Hamas’ claims.[46] Hamas killed the leader of a local clan in the Gaza Strip on March 13 for stealing humanitarian aid and collaborating with Israel.[47] CTP-ISW has observed no evidence that the individuals Hamas detained are associated with the PA.

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on April 1.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in Tulkarm in the West Bank on March 31.[48] The al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades fired small arms at Israeli forces and detonated IEDs targeting these forces during an Israeli operation in the area.[49]

A Palestinian attacker wounded three Israeli civilians in a stabbing attack in Gan Yavne, east of Ashdod, on March 31. Israeli forces killed the attacker. Israeli media reported that the attacker is from the town of Dura near Hebron and was in Israel without a permit.[50] Hamas and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement praised the attack.[51] Israeli security forces searched the home of the attacker in Dura overnight on March 31 and the IDF said that it will question suspects in the area.[52]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 31.[53]

The head of Israel’s National Emergency Management Authority said on April 1 that Israel has stockpiled fuel, food, and medical supplies in recent months in preparation for a wider conflict with Hezbollah.[54] Brigadier General Yoram Laredo said that Israel has invested over $500 million to boost these stockpiles to prepare for an ”all-out war” with Hezbollah. An official in an Israeli government-owned electricity company said that a conflict with Hezbollah would cause major disruptions to Israel’s supply of natural gas and electricity.[55]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted a drone attack that damaged an IDF naval base in Eilat on March 31.[56] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari acknowledged the strike and stated that the drone "was made in Iran” and that the attack was "directed by Iran.”[57] An Israeli journalist and western analyst posted videos that showed the drone impacting a hanger next to an Israeli warship.[58] Israeli media reported that three attacks have penetrated IDF air defenses around Eilat since October 7: an Islamic Resistance in Iraq drone attack on November 9, 2023, a Houthi cruise missile attack on March 17, 2024, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq attack on March 31.[59] Hagari stated separately that the IDF was investigating how the March 31 drone was able to penetrate IDF air defenses.[60] 

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah on March 30 in Tehran.[61] Abdollahian praised the unity of the Palestinian resistance groups and said that the arrival of Palestinian militia leaders in Tehran ahead of Quds Day—an annual anti-Israel holiday on April 5—sends an “important message” to the region and the world about the Axis of Resistance.[62] Haniyeh and Nakhalah both arrived in Tehran on March 26 and have since met with other senior Iranian officials, including the supreme leader.[63] The simultaneous visits of both Haniyeh and Nakhalah are noteworthy, as Iranian leaders have repeatedly emphasized the need for greater cohesion among Palestinian militias fighting Israel.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi called on unspecified “Muslim countries” to work together to support Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during a phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on March 31.[64] Raisi also condemned purported Israeli violations of international law and called for greater economic cooperation between Iran and Turkey. Iranian officials and media have repeatedly pressured Muslim countries, particularly Turkey and Azerbaijan, to sever economic and political ties with Israel since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.[65] ICTP-ISW has previously assessed that the Iranian regime is exploiting the Israel-Hamas war to try to politically isolate Israel in the Middle East.[66]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that it destroyed two Houthi drones on March 30. CENTCOM destroyed one drone over the Red Sea and a second in Houthi-controlled Yemen.[67]

Houthi-affiliated media also claimed that the US conducted airstrikes against an unspecified target near Hudaydah on April 1.[68]  

Iran Update, March 31, 2024

click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Peter Mills and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on March 30 and 31, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, April 1, 2024

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City.
  • Central Gaza Strip: The IDF said that its Air Force conducted a drone strike targeting a PIJ command-and-control center in the al Aqsa Hospital complex in Deir al Balah.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: Egyptian state media reported, citing an unspecified security source, that Israel and Hamas have resumed ceasefire negotiations.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least seven locations in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it launched a drone targeting an unspecified target in Eilabun, Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to conduct clearing operations in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 31.[1] These operations hit their two-week mark, as Israeli forces returned to re-clear the area on March 18. Israeli forces killed Palestinian fighters, who had barricaded themselves inside the hospital. The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) is operating in the maternity complex, where it has engaged Palestinian fighters and located weapons.[2] The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade and IDF Air Force struck several buildings in the vicinity of al Shifa Hospital that Palestinian fighters recently used to fire anti-tank munitions and small arms targeting Israeli forces.[3] Four Palestinian militias launched mortars and rockets targeting Israeli forces near al Shifa Hospital on March 31.[4] Hamas fighters separately targeted an Israeli soldier with sniper fire near al Shifa Hospital.[5]

Hamas reported that its fighters fired an anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade targeting Israeli armor west of Tal al Hawa in southwestern Gaza City.[6]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162 Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 31.[7] Israeli forces directed an airstrike targeting a Palestinian fighter squad that emerged from a tunnel shaft in the area.[8] Israeli snipers separately destroyed a Palestinian fighter squad moving toward Israeli infantry.

The IDF said on March 31 that its Air Force conducted a drone strike targeting a PIJ command-and-control center in the al Aqsa Hospital complex in Deir al Balah.[9] PIJ fighters were present at the center, according to the IDF.[10] A spokesperson for the hospital said that the drone strike killed at least two people and wounded over a dozen.[11] The IDF said that the hospital is still functioning and that the drone strike hit the area precisely to reduce harm to civilians.[12] The al Aqsa Hosptial is the last functioning hospital in Deir al Balah.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on March 31.[13] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) and Givati Brigade (162nd Division) are operating in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis.[14] A Palestinian journalist reported that Israeli forces advanced to southwestern Deir al Balah and toward the Khan Younis port.[15] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) reported that its fighters engaged Israeli special operations forces with small arms south of Deir al Balah.[16]

Egyptian state media reported on March 31, citing an unspecified security source, that Israel and Hamas have resumed ceasefire negotiations.[17] Hamas rejected the most recent US proposal for a ceasefire on March 26, after which several people familiar with negotiations noted that the talks had reached another stalemate.[18] Hamas’ representative to Lebanon said during an interview on March 31 that Israel is not interested in reaching a deal.[19]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that senior Hamas operatives described Hamas as “collapsing from within” during questioning.[20] Gallant made the comment at the IDF 98th Division headquarters on March 31. Israeli forces have detained hundreds of Palestinian fighters in recent weeks who have helped the IDF kill those who were involved in the October 7 attack.

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 31.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least seven locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 30.[21]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 30.[22]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it launched a drone targeting an unspecified target in Eilabun, Israel, on March 30.[23] The IDF Air Force intercepted a drone entering Israel from Syria on March 30.[24] This drone was presumably the same one that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq launched.

Iran Update, March 30, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force struck Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and northern Khan Younis.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 11 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified Israeli military facility in the Golan Heights.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force struck Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip on March 30. The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division), which has been targeting Palestinian militia assets and positions in the northern Gaza Strip, directed the airstrikes, which targeting Palestinian fighters around a military building in an unspecified area of the northern Gaza Strip.[1]

Israeli forces continued operating in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 30. The IDF 162nd Division located militia infrastructure and unspecified weapons near the hospital.[2] Israeli forces also engaged Palestinian fighters in the area.[3] The IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said on March 29 that the al Shifa Hospital operation ”achieved its goal” but that Israeli forces would continue to operate there.[4] Halevi called the operation a ”great achievement” for leading to the capture and death of many senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters during his visit to the al Shifa Hospital area.[5] The IDF separately announced that Israeli forces killed two senior Hamas officials in al Shifa Hospital, who were responsible for organizing attacks targeting Israel from the West Bank.[6] Both senior officials were released in a hostage-for-prisoner exchange in 2011.[7]

Palestinian militias have continued attacks targeting Israeli forces around al Shifa Hospital. Hamas targeted Israeli forces with mortars, anti-personnel explosive charges, and rocket-propelled grenades on March 29.[8] PIJ mortared an Israeli command-and-control node on March 30.[9]

The IDF Nahal Brigade continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 30. The brigade directed an airstrike on a Palestinian militia squad transporting weapons from a military building.[10] The airstrike caused several secondary explosions, indicating that the building contained ammunition storage.[11] PIJ mortared an Israeli artillery and command-and-control position in the eastern central governorate on March 29.[12]

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian militias in southern Gaza City on March 30. Israeli forces engaged PIJ in Mughraqa, south of Israeli-built highway Route 749.[13] Palestinian media reported clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters in Mughraqa and Zahra on March 30.[14]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and northern Khan Younis on March 30. The IDF 98th Division targeted Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure in al Qarara, northern Khan Younis.[15] The IDF Givati Brigade separately destroyed a Palestinian militia squad that attempted to target Israeli forces with an explosive device in al Amal, western Khan Younis.[16]

Several Palestinian militias targeted Israeli forces in Khan Younis on March 30. Hamas detonated an explosively formed penetrator targeting an Israeli tank in central Khan Younis.[17] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, claimed that it ambushed Israeli forces in central Khan Younis.[18] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, targeted Israeli forces operating near Nasser Hospital and central Khan Younis with multiple attack waves.[19] Other Palestinian fighters mortared Israeli forces in Qarara, northern Khan Younis.[20]

US and Israeli officials may discuss a possible Israeli clearing operation into Rafah in a high-level meeting in Washington, DC, as soon as April 1, according to unspecified US officials.[21] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved plans for a clearing operation into Rafah on March 15.[22] Axios reported on March 27 that Netanyahu is expected to send Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi to Washington for the high-level meeting with US officials.[23]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant discussed establishing a multinational Arab coalition to improve law and order in the Gaza Strip and escort humanitarian aid convoys during his recent visit to Washington, DC, according to unspecified Israeli officials.[24] Israeli officials reportedly believe that a multinational force could help establish a viable alternative to Hamas rule. The proposal includes an Arab force remaining in the Gaza Strip for a “limited transition period.” The forces would be responsible for securing the temporary US pier and distributing aid to civilians. Israeli officials have already met with prospective countries to discuss the multinational force. An unspecified Arab official from one of the countries reportedly involved in the plan said that Gallant misunderstood the Arab position and that the countries are not ready to send troops into the Gaza Strip to secure aid now but that they might consider it in a post-war scenario.[25] The Arab countries' involvement is conditional on steps toward a two-state solution following the war. Hamas published a statement on March 30 on behalf of several Palestinian factions rejecting the Israeli proposal to send Arab forces to manage the Gaza Strip.[26]

The United States has warned Israel that a “total breakdown of law and order” is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the strip.[27] The absence of a local security force contributes to this issue.[28] Hamas has already sought to reconstitute militarily and rebuild its governing authority in the northern Gaza Strip after the Israeli drawdown in the strip that began in December 2023, as CTP-ISW has previously reported.[29]

The second delivery of humanitarian aid via the maritime corridor left Cyprus for the Gaza Strip on March 30.[30] World Central Kitchen (WCK) organized the delivery, which includes “hundreds of tons of food.”

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 30. The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting a launch area in the Gaza Strip following a rocket attack targeting Kissufim on March 29.[31] PIJ published footage of its fighters' firing rockets from the northern Gaza Strip targeting Sderot after the group claimed a rocket attack on March 25.[32] Palestinian militias have launched most of their indirect fire attacks into Israel from the northern and central Gaza Strip since January 2024.[33]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 29.[34] The Popular Resistance Committees reported that its fighters fired small arms targeting Homesh, north of Nablus.[35]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 11 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 29.[36]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified Israeli military facility in the Golan Heights on March 29.[37] Israeli officials have not commented on the attack at the time of this writing. CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim.

Iran Update, March 29, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri met with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on March 29. Bagheri praised Hamas’ October 7 attack and reemphasized the Iranian regime’s commitment to supporting the Palestinian cause, describing the latter as one of Tehran’s “main objectives.” Bagheri separately claimed that Israel would have already “collapsed” without support from the United States.[1] Haniyeh separately met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian on March 26, President Ebrahim Raisi on March 27, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on March 28.[2]

The meeting between Bagheri and Haniyeh is particularly noteworthy considering Bagheri’s role within the regime. Bagheri holds the most senior military role in Iran and is responsible for military policy and strategic guidance to the Iranian armed forces. CTP-ISW assessed on March 28 that several senior Axis of Resistance officials have traveled to Tehran in recent weeks likely in part to coordinate their reaction to a possible, major Israeli operation into southern Lebanon.[3]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri met with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued operating in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias claimed 11 attacks targeting Israeli forces in al Amal and al Qarara after several weeks of only a few claimed attacks around Khan Younis.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces detained a PIJ fighter in the Nour Shams refugee camp near Tulkarm.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF Air Force killed the deputy commander of Hezbollah’s missile and rocket unit in an airstrike in al Bazouriyeh in southern Lebanon.
  • Iraq: Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member Yasser Iskandar suggested that Iraq should acquire Russian military aircraft instead of US aircraft.
  • Syria: Israel was likely responsible for a series of airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed positions in Aleppo Province, Syria.
  • Yemen: US Central Command intercepted four Houthi drones that were “aimed at a coalition vessel and a US warship” in the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
  • Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces continued operating in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 29.[4] The IDF 162nd Division located militia infrastructure and unspecified weapons near the hospital.[5] Israeli forces also engaged Palestinian fighters in the area.[6]

Palestinian fighters continued their usual rate of attacks targeting Israeli forces in southern Gaza City. Palestinian fighters have conducted over 80 attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around al Shifa Hospital since Israeli forces returned to the area on March 18. Hamas fighters targeted an Israeli tank with an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) in Tal al Hawa, south of al Shifa Hospital, on March 29.[7] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared Israeli forces operating near al Shifa Hospital in separate and combined attacks on March 29.[8] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, also claimed that its fighters targeted Israeli armor with rocket-propelled grenades near al Shifa Hospital on March 28.[9]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 29. Israeli aircraft struck a cell of Palestinian fighters near the Nahal Brigade.[10] The Nahal Brigade separately destroyed rockets aimed at Israel.[11]  

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in al Amal and al Qarara neighborhoods of Khan Younis on March 29. The IDF 98th Division targeted Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure in al Qarara, northern Khan Younis, on March 29.[12] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade killed a Palestinian fighter in a house during a raid and located military equipment in al Amal.[13] The IDF 7th Brigade destroyed militia infrastructure, located weapons, including grenades and explosives, and targeted a cell of Palestinian fighters with tank fire in al Amal. The Givati Brigade separately destroyed a weapons warehouse in al Amal. The IDF launched a second clearing operation in al Amal on March [14][15]

Palestinian militias claimed 11 attacks targeting Israeli forces in al Amal and al Qarara since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on March 28 after several weeks of only a few claimed attacks around Khan Younis.[16] Palestinian militia attack claims in the southern Gaza Strip outnumbered attacks in the northern Gaza Strip on March 29 for the first time since March 14. Several Palestinian militias prefaced their attack claims on March 29 by reporting that their fighters returned from the front lines to give accounts of clashes.[17] This preface suggests that Palestinian fighters may have been regularly targeting Israeli forces in Khan Younis over the past weeks but were unable to communicate attacks to their media arms and/or higher headquarters. CTP-ISW has previously reported on a similar phenomenon with Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces operating in Khan Younis have consistently reported clashes with Palestinian fighters in al Amal over the past week, despite the low level of Palestinian claims, further suggesting that the Palestinian attack claims in Khan Younis are delayed and that the militias retain some degree of combat effectiveness around Khan Younis.[18]

Palestinian militias claimed a series of high-impact attacks in Khan Younis on March 29. Hamas fighters fired a thermobaric rocket at Israeli forces inside a multi-story building near Nasser Hospital, leading to a large explosion captured on video.[19] The IDF and Israeli media indicated that an Egoz special operations forces (SOF) soldier died and that 16 other Israeli soldiers were injured—some seriously—by the Hamas attack.[20] PIJ said that its fighters ambushed six Israeli SOF members in the Qarara area on March 29, claiming to kill and wound the entire squad.[21] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, separately claimed that its fighters detonated an improvised explosive device targeting an Israeli personnel carrier in Qarara.[22]

US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Charles Brown Jr. said on March 28 that Israel has committed to help protect US troops who are traveling to the eastern Mediterranean Sea to build and operate a temporary pier meant to transport humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.[23] Brown added that the United States has its own ”capability and capacity to protect” its forces. The US Department of Defense (DOD) confirmed that ”there will be no US boots on the ground” when it announced the project on March 8.[24] US service members could be in range of some Palestinian weapons systems even if stationed offshore, however. A DOD spokesperson confirmed on March 26 that six US ships are “on their way” to the eastern Mediterranean Sea as part of the effort to construct a temporary pier.[25]

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)a department within the Israeli Defense Ministrysaid that nine aid trucks entered the northern Gaza Strip on March 29.[26] The trucks entered through the Gate 96 crossing, which Israel reportedly opened in early March 2024.[27] COGAT said that 47 aid trucks have entered Gate 96 since early March.[28]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu purchased 40,000 tents to house displaced Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in preparation for Israel’s clearing operation into Rafah, according to Israeli media.[29] These reports did not specify where the 40,000 tents will be erected in the Gaza Strip beyond “clear places.“[30] Netanyahu approved plans for a clearing operation into Rafah on March 15.[31]

PIJ and the DLFP fired a rocket barrage from the Gaza Strip targeting a southern Israeli town on March 29.[32]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 28.[33]

Israeli forces detained a PIJ fighter in the Nour Shams refugee camp near Tulkarm on March 29. The IDF said that the fighter planned small arms attacks against Israeli forces and prepared explosive devices to be used to target the IDF and Israeli civilians.[34]

Israeli forces detained five other wanted individuals and confiscated weapons in operations across the West Bank on March 29.[35]

Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa formed a new cabinet on March 28 amid calls for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to reform itself.[36] PA President Mahmoud Abbas appointed Mohammad Mustafa as prime minister on March 14.[37] US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said that the presence of ministers in the cabinet who were born in the Gaza Strip demonstrates that the cabinet intends to be “fully representative of the Palestinian people.”[38] The United States has pushed for the PA to contribute to rebuilding the Gaza Strip after the Israel-Hamas war. An unspecified US government official told Reuters in December 2023 that aides to US President Joe Biden have urged Israeli leaders to drop their opposition to the PA so that it can take a leading role in the post-war Gaza Strip.[39]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

  • Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
  • Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
  • Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 28.[40]

The IDF Air Force killed the deputy commander of Hezbollah’s missile and rocket unit in an airstrike in al Bazouriyeh in southern Lebanon on March 29.[41] The IDF said that Ali Abdel Hassam Naim was a “senior expert” and a “leader in the field of rockets.”[42] The IDF added that Naim specialized in “heavy rockets” and had planned rocket attacks into Israel.[43] Hezbollah acknowledged Naim’s death on March 29.[44] Israeli Defense Minister Gallant said that the IDF will increase attacks targeting Hezbollah following the airstrike.[45] Gallant said that Israel is becoming “offensive rather than defensive” and said that Israel will strike “any place” where Hezbollah is present.

IDF Northern Command Commander Maj. Gen. Ori Gordin met with local Israeli government authorities on March 29 to discuss the IDF’s readiness in northern Israel.[46] Gordin said that the IDF will continue to strike Hezbollah and that the recent IDF Northern Command training exercises will increase readiness in the region.[47]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member Yasser Iskandar suggested that Iraq should acquire Russian military aircraft instead of US aircraft during an interview with Iraqi state media on March 29.[48] Iskandar claimed that the Iraqi Air Force spends 200 million dollars annually to maintain its F-16 fighter jets and that the cost of maintaining Russian aircraft would be “much less.”[49] Iskandar stated that Western sanctions on Moscow makes it difficult for Iraq to pay for Russian aircraft but that Iraq is open to developing “air power and air defense” capabilities with “many friends and allies.”[50] Iskandar previously claimed in early March 2024 that the United States has prevented Iraq from developing its air defense capabilities.[51]

Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev has similarly advertised the affordability of Russian military equipment in recent years. Kutrashev claimed that “the main things our Iraqi friends do not like are the price and maintenance costs of American weapons, which are four times more expensive than Russian weapons,” during an interview with Russian state media in December 2022.[52] Kutrashev further claimed that “the Iraqis like Russian and Soviet weapons” but that the West is trying to "hinder the expansion of military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Baghdad.”[53]

CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to try to supplant the United States in anticipation of the United States reducing its military presence there.[54] Kutrashev has met with at least six Iraqi officials, including senior security leaders, since January 2024.[55] Kutrashev has served as Russia’s ambassador to Iraq since April 2021 and has also worked in the Russian embassy in Syria.[56]

The Iraqi electricity minister and the head of the National Iranian Gas Company extended Iran and Iraq’s gas export contract by five years on March 27.[57] The contract stipulates that Iran will export up to 50 million cubic meters of natural gas to Iraq per day.[58] Iraq started importing Iranian natural gas in 2017 to fuel power plants near Baghdad and Basra and has since then relied on Iranian natural gas and electricity exports to produce approximately a quarter of its electricity.[59]

Israel was likely responsible for a series of airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed positions in Aleppo Province, Syria, on March 28. Syrian media claimed that the strikes targeted air defense facilities in Safira and a Lebanese Hezbollah weapons warehouse in Jabreen, which is near the Aleppo International Airport.[60] Reuters reported that strikes killed 33 Syrians and five Hezbollah fighters, including one local field commander, citing unspecified security sources, marking the highest death toll of such a strike in Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began.[61] The Syrian Defense Ministry confirmed the airstrikes and claimed that they resulted in civilian casualties, although CTP-ISW cannot corroborate this assertion.[62]

These airstrikes are part of an Israeli air campaign to disrupt the transfer of Iranian military materiel to its proxies and partners in the Levant, especially Hezbollah. Israel has conducted at least seven other strikes targeting Iranian- and Hezbollah-affiliated targets in Syria in March 2024, which marks a notable increase from an average of 1.6 Israeli strikes per month between December 2023 and February 2024.[63] The IDF said in February 2024 that it had conducted a series of airstrikes in Syria since the start of the Israel-Hamas war to interdict Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah via Syria.[64] Israel has previously targeted Safira—a location linked to missile and chemical weapons development —in May 2023 and 2020 respectively.[65]

The Iranian regime held a funeral ceremony for killed IRGC Quds Force and Basij Member Behrouz Vahedi in Karaj, Alborz Province, on March 29. Vahedi died in a likely Israeli airstrike in Deir Ez Zor Province, Syria, on March 25.[66] Israeli and Syrian media claimed that the strikes caused around 30 casualties, including among members of the IRGC Quds Force, Lebanese Hezbollah, and unspecified Iranian-backed militia commanders in eastern Syria.[67] IRGC Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to Alborz Province attended the funeral procession.[68]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) intercepted four Houthi drones that were “aimed at a coalition vessel and a US warship” in the Red Sea on March 28.[69]

The Iranian Embassy in Moscow hosted on March 28 a discussion on the anti-Israel Quds Day holiday that the Iranian regime promotes annually.[70] The Iranian regime uses Quds Day, which is on April 5 this year, to broadcast the strength and unity of its Axis of Resistance.[71] Iranian state media reported that Russian Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov attended the event.[72] Afghan, Algerian, Azerbaijani, Bangladeshi, Iraqi, Lebanese, Palestinian, Sudanese, and Syrian diplomats also attended.[73] The event—and the regime’s promotion of the Quds holiday in recent days—is consistent with CTP-ISW's longstanding assessment that Iran is trying to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to try to isolate Israel internationally.[74]


Iran Update, March 28, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET 

A series of senior Axis of Resistance officials have met with senior Iranian officials—including the supreme leader—in March, likely to coordinate and prepare plans for their reaction to a wider Israeli operation into southern Lebanon. Iran and the Axis of Resistance use periodic meetings between senior officials to coordinate responses to new developments in the region. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani spent much of October 2023 in Beirut for meetings with Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to help coordinate “a possible broader confrontation with Israel,” for example.[1] The Syrian defense minister, Kataib Hezbollah secretary general, Palestinian Islamic Jihad secretary general, and Hamas Political Bureau chairman each met with senior Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in Tehran between March 17 and 28.[2]

This string of meetings comes after IRGC Quds Force Commander Ghaani visited Beirut in February 2024 to discuss the possibility of an Israeli offensive against Hezbollah with Nasrallah. One Iranian source told Reuters that during the meeting Nasrallah told Ghaani that Hezbollah did not want Iran to become involved in a Hezbollah-Israel war.[3] Iran could use the remainder of its proxy network—including actors based in Syria, Iraq, and in the West Bank—against Israel in a Hezbollah-Israel war to support Hezbollah and increase the threat to Israel. PIJ Secretary General Ziyad Nakhalah highlighted the importance of the West Bank in his meeting with Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in Tehran on March 28, noting that “the resistance is not only in Gaza, but [also] in the West Bank.”[4] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Iran is seeking to promote major terror attacks by smuggling “high-quality” weapons into the West Bank.[5]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran in the Region: A series of senior Axis of Resistance officials have met with senior Iranian officials—including the supreme leader—in March, likely to coordinate and prepare plans for their reaction to a wider Israeli operation into southern Lebanon.
  • The Syrian defense minister, Kataib Hezbollah secretary general, Palestinian Islamic Jihad secretary general, and Hamas Political Bureau chairman each met with senior Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in Tehran between March 17 and 28.
  • This string of meetings comes after IRGC Quds Force Commander Ghaani visited Beirut in February 2024 to discuss the possibility of an Israeli offensive against Hezbollah with Nasrallah.
  • Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued operating in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 28. Israeli special operations forces (SOF) killed senior Hamas commander Raad Thabet there on March 28.
  • West Bank: An armed Palestinian fired small arms targeting Israeli civilian vehicles near al Auja in the Jordan Valley on March 28, wounding three Israeli civilians.
  • Lebanon: The IDF concluded a week-long training exercise on March 27 aimed at increasing IDF Northern Command readiness in northern Israel.
  • Iraq: The Iraqi Foreign Minister said that the recent Islamic State attack in Moscow shows that ISIS is “resurging and stronger than ever” on March 28. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein’s comments are notable given their contrast with the statements of Iranian-backed Iraqi officials, who have claimed that ISIS is no longer a threat to Iraq.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces continued operating in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 28. Israeli forces have killed about 200 Palestinian fighters around the hospital complex since the start of operations there on March 18.[6] Palestinian fighters continued to fire at Israeli forces from inside al Shifa hospital, including from the emergency room.[7]

Israeli special operations forces (SOF) killed senior Hamas commander Raad Thabet at al Shifa Hospital on March 28.[8] Thabet was responsible for Hamas’ "supply and personnel unit,” according to the IDF. The IDF spokesperson said Israel considered Thabet among the top 10 senior-most Hamas military commanders in the Gaza Strip.[9] Israeli forces killed Thabet and two other Hamas fighters as they entered the hospital area.[10]

Most of the Palestinian militia attacks on March 28 targeted Israeli forces in and around al Shifa Hospital.[11] Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces with mortar fire and rocket-propelled grenades.[12] Palestinian militias have conducted over 75 attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around the hospital since Israeli forces returned to the area on March 18. This high rate of attack indicates that Palestinian militia elements in the area remain combat effective, despite continued Israeli clearing efforts in Gaza City. At least six Palestinian militias have participated in the recent attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around al Shifa Hospital.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 28. Israeli aircraft conducted a strike targeting a cell of Palestinian fighters approaching the Nahal Brigade in the central Gaza Strip.[13] The IDF said that it destroyed a 2.5-kilometer-long tunnel used by Hamas to connect the northern and southern Gaza Strip on March 28.[14] Israeli forces used over 30 tons of explosives to destroy the tunnel.

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in al Amal neighborhood, western Khan Younis on March 28. The IDF launched a second clearing operation in al Amal on March 24.[15] The IDF 98th Division has killed dozens of Palestinian fighters in al Amal during this operation.[16] The IDF Egoz SOF unit detained dozens of Palestinians in al Amal.[17] The Givati Brigade engaged two Palestinian fighters approaching Israeli forces in al Amal. Israeli forces seized hundreds of weapons in al Amal, including grenades, explosively-formed penetrators, small arms.[18]

Hamas engaged Israeli forces during IDF clearing operations in northern Khan Younis on March 28. Hamas fighters detonated explosives that Israeli forces had planted to destroy a building in Qarara. It is not clear how Hamas detonated the explosives. Hamas claimed that the house explosion killed and wounded Israeli forces, but the IDF has not acknowledged casualties from the attack at the time of writing. This attack bears similarity to a Hamas attack in January 2024 that killed 21 Israeli soldiers after the soldiers rigged a building to detonate in the central Gaza Strip. Hamas fighters also separately targeted Israeli armor operating in Qarara with rocket-propelled grenades.[19]

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry, said that 205 aid trucks entered the Gaza Strip on March 28.[20] COGAT said that 19 private sector “food” aid trucks reached the northern Gaza Strip without incident.

The US Defense Department is considering funding a private peacekeeping force in the Gaza Strip, according to Politico.[21] The options under consideration will not include the deployment of US servicemembers to the Gaza Strip but could consist of a multinational force or a Palestinian peacekeeping team. Biden administration officials said these talks are part of planning for the "day after” in the Gaza Strip with Israeli officials and other partners. One of Israel’s stated war objectives is the destruction of Hamas’ governance apparatus in the Gaza Strip and the IDF has warned that all members of “the Hamas apparatus,” including Hamas police officers, are legitimate targets.[22]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 27.[23]

An armed Palestinian fired small arms targeting Israeli civilian vehicles near al Auja in the Jordan Valley on March 28, wounding three Israeli civilians.[24] Israeli media reported that the armed man was a security officer for the Palestinian Authority. The armed Palestinian is originally from Jenin.[25] Palestinian channels posted photos of the shooter and identified him as Mohammed Saadia.[26] IDF Central Command Commander Yehuda Fox and other IDF personnel held an ”assessment” of the attack. Fox reported that the IDF is still searching for the attacker at the time of writing.[27]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 11 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 27.[28]

The IDF concluded a week-long training exercise on March 27 aimed at increasing IDF Northern Command readiness in northern Israel.[29] The IDF held briefings with Northern Command division, brigade, and battalion commanders to discuss ”operational and strategic plans” for a conflict in northern Israel.[30] IDF Northern Command Commander Major General Ori Gordin said that the IDF will continue to take an ”offensive approach” against Hezbollah and that the IDF is ”determined” to change the security situation in the north so that residents may return to the area.[31]

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike in Ras Naqoura in southern Lebanon on March 27, killing two Amal Movement fighters.[32]
The Amal Movement released statements mourning the fighters on the same day.[33]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Israel likely conducted a series of airstrikes targeting Iran-backed militia and Lebanese Hezbollah positions near Sayyida Zainab, Syria on March 28.[34] Syrian, Israeli, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported that the IDF air force struck several buildings near Sayyida Zainab, southeast of Damascus, Syria.[35] Syrian and Israeli media noted that Iran-backed militias and Lebanese Hezbollah were using the targeted buildings.[36] Israeli media reported that the strikes possibly killed an unspecified IRGC member.[37] Iranian-backed militia groups and the IRGC maintain a headquarters in Sayyida Zainab and use it to facilitate Iranian efforts throughout Syria.[38]

Israel has conducted at least six other strikes targeting Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated targets inside Syria in March 2024, a notable increase from an average of 1.6 strikes per month between December 2023 and February 2024.[39] The IDF said in February 2024 that it had conducted a series of airstrikes in Syria since the start of the Israel-Hamas war to interdict Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah via Syria.[40]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the implementation of gas, electricity, and water supply agreements with senior Turkmen officials in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan on March 28, possibly to preempt electricity and water shortages in the summer that could fuel internal unrest.[41] Abdollahian called for the implementation of these and other trade and transit agreements during separate meetings with the Turkmen president, foreign affairs minister, and the Turkmenistan People’s Council chairman. Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan previously signed a gas swap agreement in November 2021.[42] Senior Iranian officials called for the expeditious implementation of these agreements during their meetings with senior Turkmen officials in May and June 2023.[43] These agreements would allow Iran to use some of the gas it imports from Turkmenistan to supply electricity and heating to its northern provinces. Iranians previously protested power outages in Tehran, Fars, and Mazandaran Provinces in July 2021.[44] The Raisi administration has similarly expressed concern that water shortages could precipitate unrest inside Iran and sought to increase water cooperation with Turkmenistan to address these concerns in May 2023.[45]

The Iraqi Foreign Minister said that the recent Islamic State attack in Moscow shows that ISIS is “resurging and stronger than ever” on March 28.[46] Iranian-backed Iraqi officials have claimed repeatedly that ISIS in Iraq is defeated to publicly justify their efforts to expel US forces from Iraq. The Iranian-backed head of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) claimed on March 3, for example, that ISIS is no longer a threat due to the PMF’s capabilities.[47] Iraqi Prime Minister Shia al Sudani, who is supported by Iranian-backed groups in Iraq, claimed on February 7 and 25 that the international coalition is no longer necessary because ISIS has been defeated.[48] Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein’s comments are notable given their contrast with the statements of Iranian-backed Iraqi officials. Hussein is a Kurdish official and member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which Iranian-backed militias undermined during government formation in 2021 and 2022.[49]

CTP-ISW continues to assess that the United States and its partners in Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS and that a US withdrawal from Syria would very likely cause a rapid ISIS resurgence there within 12 to 24 months.[50] A resurgent ISIS could then threaten Iraq. Iraqi security forces still face significant deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics that will impede their ability to defeat ISIS alone.[51]

Hussein separately questioned the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s claimed attacks on Israel on March 28 by stating that he did not know if the attacks were true or for internal propaganda purposes.[52] The IDF has not acknowledged any of the claimed Islamic Resistance in Iraq attacks targeting Israel. Hussein emphasized that only the commander-in-chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces—the Iraqi prime minister—could legitimately authorize the use of weapons inside Iraq. Hussein further said that the only entity with the legal power to declare war in Iraq is the Iraqi Council of Representatives.

US CENTCOM reported that it intercepted four Houthi drones in the Red on March 27 that were “aimed at a US warship.”[53]

Iran Update, March 27, 2024

Click here to read the full report

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued operating in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. Palestinian militias have conducted nearly 70 attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around the hospital since Israeli forces returned to the area on March 18.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces discovered a “significant” tunnel network in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis.
  • Unspecified US and Israeli officials told Axios that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is planning to send two top officials to Washington to discuss a possible Israeli clearing operation into Rafah.
  • Political Negotiations: Three unspecified people familiar with the Israel-Hamas negotiations told CNN that ceasefire talks have reached another stalemate but are continuing.
  • West Bank: The IDF said that it conducted a “counterterrorism” operation around Jenin, highlighting the enduring militia network that exists there.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike in southern Lebanon, killing at least seven fighters associated with the military wing of a Lebanese Islamist political party Jamaa al Islamiyya.
  • Iraq: Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq Secretary General Mohammad al Tamimi threatened to resume attacks targeting US forces if they do not leave Iraq.
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks targeting Israeli military infrastructure.
  • Yemen: Senior IRGC Quds Force officer Brig. Gen. Abdol Reza Shahlai directed the initial Houthi attacks targeting vessels around the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea in October 2023, according to Bloomberg, further underscoring the Iranian role in these attacks.
  • Iran: Senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leaders continued their visit to Tehran.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces continued operating in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 27.[1] Israeli forces killed dozens of Palestinian fighters and located unspecified military infrastructure and weapons in the hospital area.[2] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF surrounded three buildings in the hospital compound, where approximately 30 senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) personnel are located.[3] The IDF published footage on March 26 of its forces questioning a PIJ fighter, who said that Hamas and PIJ personnel are “scattered in the buildings” at al Shifa Hospital.[4] The IDF published an infographic of three Hamas and PIJ officials detained at the hospital, including a leader in Hamas’ Security and Protection Department.[5]

Most of the Palestinian militia attacks on March 27 targeted Israeli forces in and around al Shifa Hospital.[6] Palestinian militias have conducted nearly 70 attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around the hospital since Israeli forces returned to the area on March 18. This high rate of attack indicates that Palestinian militias retain a significant degree of combat effectiveness in the area, despite continued Israeli clearing efforts around Gaza City. At least six Palestinian militias have participated in the recent attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around al Shifa Hospital.

A Palestinian journalist reported on March 27 that Israeli forces advanced into parts of Zaytoun neighborhood in southwestern Gaza City.[7] The IDF concluded a two-week-long re-clearing of Zaytoun on March 3.[8] The return of Israeli forces to the neighborhood suggests that Palestinian militias continue to operate there similar to how these militias still have a presence in other portions of the northern Gaza Strip.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 27.[9] A Palestinian journalist reported that Israeli forces advanced into unspecified areas east of Bureij.[10] Hamas claimed that its fighters mortared Israeli forces in the area.[11]

The IDF reported on March 27 that Israeli forces discovered a “significant” tunnel network in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis.[12] The IDF said that it used intelligence from questioning detained Palestinian fighters to find three tunnel shafts. The IDF has been conducting a second round of clearing operations in al Amal neighborhood, western Khan Younis, since March 24.[13]

The IDF continued clearing operations in Qarara in northern Khan Younis on March 27.[14]

The IDF published on March 27 footage of an airstrike targeting a Palestinian fighter, who was surveilling Israeli forces in Hamad neighborhood, northern Khan Younis.[15] The IDF said that the fighter was passing information on Israeli troop locations to other Palestinian fighters over a phone.

Unspecified US and Israeli officials told Axios that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is planning to send two top officials to Washington to discuss a possible Israeli clearing operation into Rafah.[16] The Israeli officials are expected to arrive as early as next week. Netanyahu canceled a planned visit of two top Israeli security officials to Washington, DC, on March 25 in response to the United States’ abstention from the UN Security Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire. Netanyahu said in a statement on March 27 that his reasoning for canceling the Israeli visit was “a message to Hamas: Don’t bet on this pressure, it’s not going to work.”[17] The White House said on March 27 that the Israeli Prime Minister's Office had agreed to reschedule the meeting.[18] Axios reported that Netanyahu is expected to send the Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant discussed a possible Israeli clearing operation into Rafah in a meeting with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on March 26.[19] Gallant arrived in Washington, DC, on March 25 to meet with top US diplomatic and military officials. An unnamed senior US Department of Defense official stated that Austin presented to Gallant the broad outlines of the Biden administration’s ”alternative approach” to an Israeli operation into Rafah.[20] This approach included Israel targeting Hamas leadership, creating a plan to evacuate civilians, increasing humanitarian aid into the area, and securing the Gazan-Egyptian border.[21] The official also stated that the Israelis were receptive to these outlines. Gallant told reporters after the meeting that Israel needs “to destroy Hamas as a military and governing organization in Gaza.”[22] He also said that they discussed the issue of aid distribution in the Gaza Strip and noted that Hamas is “sabotag[ing] the delivery of aid.”[23] Unspecified US officials said the two discussed the United States selling F-15 and F-35 fighter jets and Apache helicopter gunships to Israel.[24]

Three unspecified people familiar with the Israel-Hamas negotiations told CNN that ceasefire talks have reached another stalemate but are continuing.[25] An unnamed senior Israeli official familiar with the negotiations in Doha told Israeli media said that Hamas’ response to the latest hostage deal offer was “ridiculous” and that Hamas’ leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, “does not want to move forward with a deal at the moment.”[26] Lebanese media cited unnamed Egyptian sources, who have been in contact with IDF officials, saying that, following the failure of the latest round of negotiations, Israel is unwilling to make any further concessions to Hamas and is preparing for a clearing operation into Rafah after Eid al Fitr or in early May at the latest.[27]

Hamas published on March 27 a video statement of its military commander Mohammad Deif calling for popular marches toward Israel and the Palestinian Territories.[28] Deif stated: “Begin marching now, not tomorrow, toward Palestine, and do not let restrictions, borders, or regulations deprive you of the honor of participating in the liberation of al Aqsa Mosque.”

Israeli media reported on March 27, citing an unspecified Israeli official, that 25 aid trucks reached the northern Gaza Strip without incident.[29] The trucks entered the Gaza Strip through Gate 96, which Israel reportedly opened in early March 2024.[30]

PIJ conducted an indirect fire attack from the Gaza Strip targeting Kissufim in southern Israel on March 27.[31] The IDF acknowledged that the rocket fell in an open area.[32] The IDF Air Force struck the area from which the Palestinian fighters launched the rockets and killed those responsible.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least nine locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 26.[33]

The IDF said that it conducted a “counterterrorism” operation around Jenin on March 27, highlighting the enduring militia network that exists there.[34] The IDF conducted a drone strike during the operation, killing two Palestinian fighters.[35] Israeli forces killed a third Palestinian fighter, who threw IEDs targeting Israeli forces.[36] The IDF also said that it detained two Palestinians, who were driving a vehicle carrying “ready-to-use explosives.”[37] CTP-ISW previously assessed that PIJ and possibly other Palestinian militias have a cell in Jenin for targeting Israeli civilians outside the West Bank.[38]

An Israeli Army Radio journalist reported on March 27 that the IDF will turn the Netzah Yehuda Battalion into a maneuver infantry battalion.[39] The Netzah Yehuda Battalion is an ultra-Orthodox military unit that operates primarily in the West Bank.[40] The journalist said that the battalion will train to conduct maneuver in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.[41] Israeli media reported that some soldiers from the Netzah Yehuda Battalion began operating in the Gaza Strip in January 2024.[42] The Israeli government must present legislation aimed at increasing recruitment among the religious community by the end of March, but it has disagreed over drafting ultra-Orthodox Israelis.[43]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 26.[44] Hezbollah fired approximately 30 rockets targeting IDF forces in Kiryat Shmona in northern Israel, killing one Israeli civilian and damaging buildings.[45]

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike in southern Lebanon on March 27, killing at least seven fighters associated with the military wing of a Lebanese Islamist political party Jamaa al Islamiyya .[46] The IDF and Israeli media reported that the fighters had plotted to infiltrate Shebaa Farms.[47]

Senior Hezbollah official Nawaf al Mousawi said that Hezbollah has increased the rate at which it can stockpile new weapons during an interview with Hezbollah-affiliated media on March 26.[48] Mousawi, who serves as the head of Hezbollah’s Borders and Natural Resources Department, said that the group is now capable of receiving as many weapons in a month as it previously received in six months.[49] Mousawi added that Hezbollah has created new storage facilities and has acquired more accurate missiles for ”naval, ground, and aerial use.” Israel has conducted an air campaign into Syria in recent months to disrupt Iranian efforts to transfer military materiel to Hezbollah. Mousawi also said that Israel is facing logistical challenges and would not be able to strike Lebanon or the Gaza Strip if not for US weapons shipments.[50]

The IDF approved a new training program to increase the Air Force’s readiness around northern Israel.[51] The IDF said that the Air Force has conducted military training exercises over recent weeks.[52] The exercises include "massive, long-range strikes, flights deep in enemy territory, decision-making in war conditions. . . and surprise exercises will be held for the various units."[53] The IDF said that the training will not interrupt the Air Forces’ operations in the Gaza Strip or other areas.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq claimed on March 26 that unidentified actors conducted a drone attack targeting US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site in eastern Syria.[54] The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights similarly reported that US forces intercepted a drone in the area on March 26.[55] CTP-ISW cannot verify whether any attack occurred, however.

Iran and its Axis of Resistance remains committed to expelling the United States from the Middle East—by force is necessary—regardless of whether the reported attack on March 26 occurred. CTP-ISW has previously warned that the current lull in Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks does not indicate a change in the long-term Iranian and Iranian-backed effort to force the United States from the region.[56] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias retain the capability to resume attacks targeting US forces at any time and for any reason of their choosing.

Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq Secretary General Mohammad al Tamimi threatened during a Newsweek interview published on March 27 to resume attacks targeting US forces if they do not leave Iraq.[57]Tamimi threatened that Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq will target and kill US service members “if an agreement is not achieved” between Baghdad and Washington. Tamimi was referring to ongoing discussions between the United States and Iraq to transition to a bilateral security partnership.[58]  Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq has reported ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al Haq and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba.[59] Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq also proclaims to adhere to Velayat-e Faqih, which is a core tenet of Iranian governance that enshrines the position of a senior cleric at the head of the regime.[60]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks targeting Israeli military infrastructure on March 26.[61] The group claimed to target the Sapir military facility on the Sea of Galilee, northern Israel, with one-way attack drones and Ovda Airbase in Eilat, southern Israel, with unspecified munitions. CTP-ISW has previously observed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has transitioned to conducting regular attacks targeting Israel in March 2024 rather than US forces in Iraq and Syria.[62] The group has not claimed any attacks targeting US forces since February 4.[63]

US Department of Defense Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh confirmed that the United States was not responsible for a series of airstrikes on March 25 that targeted Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and IRGC-affiliated positions in eastern Syria.[64] CTP-ISW previously noted that Israel was likely responsible for the strike.[65]

Senior IRGC Quds Force officer Brig. Gen. Abdol Reza Shahlai directed the initial Houthi attacks targeting vessels around the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea in October 2023, according to Bloomberg, further underscoring the Iranian role in these attacks.[66] Bloomberg cited informed sources. Shahlai’s involvement reflects the prominent role that Iran has had in directing and supporting the Houthi attack campaign targeting commercial and military vessels off the coast of Yemen. CTP-ISW has previously noted the Iranian role in providing targeting intelligence to the Houthis.[67]

Shahlai is the seniormost IRGC Quds Force responsible for the Yemen portfolio but also has an extensive background coordinating other clandestine Iranian activities globally.[68] Shahlai has helped arm and fund Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and supported their attacks targeting US and coalition forces in Iraq. Shahlai planned, for instance, an attack that killed five US services members and wounded three others in Karbala in 2007.[69] He also directed and funded the attempted assassination of the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States in Washington, DC, in 2011.[70] The United States attempted to kill Shahlai the same evening as the US airstrike that killed IRGC Quds Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.[71] The US Treasury Department designated Shahlai as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2011.[72]

Senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leaders continued their visit to Tehran on March 27. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh and PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah separately traveled to Tehran on March 26.[73] Haniyeh met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian on March 26.[74] Haniyeh also presented a report on “current events and prospects” in the Gaza Strip during a meeting with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi on March 27.[75] The Hamas readout of Haniyeh and Raisi’s meeting noted that the two officials discussed the "conditions” facing Palestinians in Jerusalem and the West Bank.[76] Haniyeh’s visit to Tehran marks his second trip to Iran since the Israel-Hamas war began.[77]

Iranian media has notably published no reports about meetings between Nakhalah and Iranian officials. Nakhalah has almost certainly engaged Iranian officials since arriving in Tehran or will do so before he leaves. The lack of relevant media coverage is bizarre, especially given the opportunity for the Iranian regime to broadcast publicly its support for the Palestinian militias by having state media cover Nakhalah’s visit. The media silence could indicate that Nakhalah is holding meetings with officials that the Iranian regime does not wish to publicize.

IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brig. Gen. Mohammad Pak Pour visited IRGC Ground Forces units in southeastern Iran on March 27.[78] It is unclear which units Pak Pour visited, although the IRGC Ground Forces has at least four brigades in the southeastern region.[79] Pak Pour’s visit comes amid an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023. Jaish al Adl—a Balochi, Salafi-jihadi group operating around the Iran-Pakistan border—has conducted at least five attacks targeting Iranian security personnel since December 2023.[80] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State separately conducted a terrorist attack in Kerman Province in early January 2024, killing over 90 individuals.[81]

Iran Update, March 26, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Alexandra Braverman, Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials have traveled to Iran likely to coordinate their ongoing efforts against Israel in the Gaza Strip and across the Middle East. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh and PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah both arrived in Tehran on March 26.[1] Haniyeh met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian to discuss the war. Nakhalah spoke at a religious rally at Azadi Stadium in Tehran and will likely meet with senior Iranian officials thereafter.[2] The simultaneous visits of both Haniyeh and Nakhalah are noteworthy, as Iranian leaders have repeatedly emphasized the need for greater cohesion among Palestinian militias fighting Israel. Their visits are also noteworthy given that Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” will celebrate Quds Day—an annual anti-Israel holiday—on April 5 and will almost certainly use the occasion to broadcast the strength and unity of the Axis of Resistance.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei emphasized the importance of using information operations, especially in the context of the Israel-Hamas war, on March 26. Khamenei asserted that influencing the information space and using it against adversaries can be just as effective as military strength during a meeting with Iranian poets in Tehran.[3] Khamenei further stated that all “war is a media war” and that whichever actor has greater media influence will achieve their goals. Khamenei especially praised Palestinian militias’ media efforts in shaping public attitudes and narratives in the Muslim world during his meeting with Haniyeh.[4] Khamenei boasted that Palestinian militias’ media outlets have outperformed the Israeli media throughout the Israel-Hamas war. This emphasis on achieving informational effects to win wars is not entirely new; Khamenei has long stressed the need for Iran to fight a “soft war” against its adversaries. This soft war concept involves the use of information operations and psychological warfare to influence public perceptions.[5] Khamenei’s recent statements are, nevertheless, significant, as they are consistent CTP-ISW's assessment that the Iranian regime is trying to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to try to isolate Israel in the Middle East.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Senior Hamas and PIJ officials have traveled to Iran likely to coordinate their ongoing efforts against Israel in the Gaza Strip and across the Middle East.
  • Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei emphasized the importance of using information operations, especially in the context of the Israel-Hamas war.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias continued to defend against Israeli clearing operations around Beit Hanoun, northeastern Gaza Strip.
  • Palestinian militias have launched most of their indirect fire attacks into Israel from the northern and central Gaza Strip since January 2024.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued clearing operations in western and northern Khan Younis.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank.
  • Northern Israel and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah fired unspecified weapons targeting the IDF Mount Meron air traffic control base in northern Israel. The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure in Zboud, Bekaa Valley.
  • Iraq: Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister Fuad Hussein said that the United States and Iraq will remain partners in the fight against ISIS,
  • Syria: Israel was likely responsible for a series of airstrikes targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and IRGC-affiliated positions in eastern Syria.
  • Yemen: The Houthis claimed that they conducted five drone and missile attacks targeting civilian and military vessels in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea over the previous 72 hours.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias continued to defend against Israeli clearing operations around Beit Hanoun, northeastern Gaza Strip, on March 26. CTP-ISW previously assessed on March 25 that a small number of Palestinian fighters have likely infiltrated Beit Hanoun.[6] Hamas then published on March 26 footage of its fighters firing an anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) targeting Israeli armor in Beit Hanoun.[7] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, claimed that its fighters around Beit Hanoun intercepted an Israeli reconnaissance drone and mortared Israeli forces east of the area.[8] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades may have targeted IDF units involved in establishing the buffer zone between Israel and the Gaza Strip. The IDF has moved its forces to a buffer zone along the Israeli border as part of its third phase of military operations in the Gaza Strip.[9]

Hamas mortared Israeli forces advancing on the outskirts of Tuffah neighborhood, eastern Gaza City.[10] Tuffah is south of Beit Hanoun. 

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 26. Two IDF brigades as well as Israeli special operations forces engaged several Palestinian fighters in the hospital area.[11] Palestinian militias similarly attacked Israeli forces in the vicinity of al Shifa Hospital.[12] The IDF published footage of its forces questioning a PIJ fighter, who said he had been staying at al Shifa Hospital for three months.[13] Israeli forces initially expanded clearing operations to al Shifa Hospital in November 2023, targeting a sophisticated Hamas tunnel network underneath the hospital.[14] The IDF withdrew from the hospital area on November 24 but resumed clearing operations there on March 18.[15]

A Palestinian journalist reported that the IDF is moving northwestward from al Shifa Hospital toward al Shati refugee camp.[16] Hamas published footage on March 25 of its fighters firing RPGs targeting Israeli forces northwest of al Shifa Hospital.[17] The IDF concluded a two-week re-clearing of al Shati camp on February 15.[18]

Hamas claimed two attacks targeting Israeli forces in Tal al Hawa neighborhood, southwestern Gaza City, on March 26.[19] A Palestinian journalist reported that Israeli forces were operating in Zahra neighborhood, which is southwest of Tal al Hawa.[20]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in western and northern Khan Younis on March 26.[21] The IDF have been conducting a second round of clearing operations in al Amal neighborhood, western Khan Younis, since March 24.[22] Israeli forces are also operating in Qarara, northern Khan Younis.[23] Israeli forces located IEDs, grenades, unspecified vests, and ammunition during the operations. Several Palestinian militias engaged Israeli forces in western and northern Khan Younis on March 26.[24]

An unspecified informed source told Reuters on March 26 that ceasefire negotiations have continued between Israel and Hamas and that senior Mossad officials remain in Qatar for related discussions.[25] The source noted that a small team of Israeli personnel are returning to Israel for consultations. The report follows speculation that Israel withdrew its delegation from Qatar.[26]

Palestinian militias have launched most of their indirect fire attacks into Israel from the northern and central Gaza Strip since January 2024. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on March 26 a summary of indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip.[27] The correspondent noted a general decrease in the number of attacks since January, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's tracking of indirect fire. Palestinian militias launched nearly half of all attacks from the northern Gaza Strip in January and nearly half of all attacks from the central Gaza Strip in March 2024.[28] The correspondent hypothesized why there have not been attacks from the southern Gaza Strip, highlighting the intense fighting in Khan Younis and the continued rocket capabilities of Hamas in the south, where Israeli forces have not concentrated their operations.[29] Palestinian militias continued ability to launch attacks from the northern Gaza Strip is consistent with the infiltration of fighters into the area and Hamas’ intentions to reassert itself following Israeli withdrawals. Israeli forces have not expanded clearing operations to the entirety of the central Gaza Strip, where Hamas maintains four local battalions.[30]

Palestinian fighters have conducted at least two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 25.[31] PIJ launched rockets targeting Ashkelon. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, mortared an Israeli military site in southern Israel.

The IDF said that Palestinian fighters launched rockets targeting Ashdod from a civilian area of Deir al Balah on March 25.[32] The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting the launch areas in Deir al Balah in response to the attack. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.[33]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 25.[34] Israeli forces detained two wanted individuals in Jenin.[35] PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that they conducted separate IED and small arms attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in Jenin.[36] Israeli forces conducted a ”brigade operation” and located and destroyed unspecified explosives in Balata refugee camp in Nablus.[37] The IDF reported that an Israeli soldier shot a Palestinian fighter, who attempted to take the soldier’s weapon in Balata.[38] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and Mujahideen Brigades conducted multiple IED and small arms attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in Balata.[39]

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in Hebron reported on March 26 that its fighters fired small arms targeting an Israeli settlement north of Hebron.[40] The militia reported that its forces were able to leave the Karmei Tzur settlement following the attack. The IDF reported that the Palestinian militia fighters shot at the settlement from Beit Ummar. Israeli forces conducted an operation in Beit Ummar after the attack and found small arms and ammunition.[41]

PIJ’s Jenin battalion reported on March 25 that its fighters fired small arms targeting Meirav, which is an Israeli town near the border of the West Bank.[42] Israeli media reported on March 24 that unidentified Palestinian fighters shot at Meirav from the adjacent Palestinian village of Jalbun.[43]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 12 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 25.[44] Hezbollah fired unspecified weapons targeting the IDF Mount Meron air traffic control base, which has radar, surveillance, communication, and jamming facilities.[45] The IDF reported that the attack caused no damage to the base or injuries to Israeli personnel stationed there.[46] Hezbollah separately fired 50 rockets targeting an Israeli barracks in Yarden.[47] The IDF said that it intercepted several of the rockets and that the remaining rockets landed in open areas.[48] Hezbollah also fired unspecified weapons targeting Avivim, causing a fire in the area.[49]

The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure in Zboud, Bekaa Valley, on March 26 following the Hezbollah attack targeting Mount Meron.[50] This strike represents the northernmost Israeli attack into Lebanon since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.[51] The Bekaa Valley contains significant Hezbollah military infrastructure, including training centers, weapons storage sites, and ballistic missile production facilities.[52]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister Fuad Hussein said on March 26 that the United States and Iraq will remain partners in the fight against ISIS.[53] Hussein made the remark during a joint press conference with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Hussein and Blinken said that the United States and Iraq are preparing for an upcoming Higher Coordinating Committee meeting. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced on January 25 that the US-Iraq Higher Military Commission (HMC), which is comprised of US and Iraqi federal government officials, will soon hold “working group meetings” to evaluate the status of the US-led Global Coalition’s mission to defeat ISIS. The HMC is part of the United States and Iraq’s transition to a bilateral security partnership as described under the 2021 US-Iraqi Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue.[54] Hussein’s meeting with Blinken precedes Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s meeting with US President Joe Biden on April 15.[55]

Israel was likely responsible for a series of airstrikes on March 25 targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and IRGC-affiliated positions in eastern Syria.[56] Israeli and Syrian media claimed the strikes resulted in around 30 casualties, including IRGC Quds Force, Lebanese Hezbollah, and unspecified Iranian-backed militia commanders in eastern Syria.[57] There are several unverified Syrian reports claiming that the Israeli attacks injured or killed Hajj Askar, who is the IRGC commander in eastern Syria.[58] The IRGC announced that Israeli strikes killed an IRGC Quds Force and Basij member in eastern Syria.[59]

Israeli media reported that Israel targeted IRGC Quds Force special operation units in eastern Syria in response to recent Iranian attempts to smuggle advanced weapons into the West Bank.[60] The Israeli media cited an unspecified Israeli defense official.[61] Shin Bet announced on March 25 that the IDF seized a “significant amount of advanced arms from Iran” that the IRGC Quds Force had helped smuggle into the West Bank to support Palestinian militia attacks targeting Israel.[62] The Israeli strike in Syria follows several other Israeli strikes on facilities affiliated with Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” in Syria in recent weeks.[63] The IDF has previously acknowledged that it conducted a series of airstrikes in Syria to interdict Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah through Syria after the Israel-Hamas war began.[64]

The Houthis claimed on March 26 that they conducted five drone and missile attacks targeting civilian and military vessels in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea over the previous 72 hours.[65] The Houthis said that they targeted separate commercial vessels flagged by Malta, Panama, Singapore, and the United States. Maersk denied the attack on the US-flagged vessel.[66] The Houthis also claimed that they attacked two unspecified US surface combatants in the Red Sea.[67]

The Houthis claimed that they conducted a missile attack targeting Eilat in southern Israel.[68]

The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated six entities, one individual, and two commercial tankers for facilitating commodity shipments and financial transactions for the IRGC Quds Force, the Houthis, and [69] This is the sixth round of sanctions targeting the Iran-based Said al Jamal network since December 2023. This is a network of front companies and vessels headed by Iran-based, IRGC-backed Houthi financier Said al Jamal.[70] The US Treasury Department previously sanctioned Said al Jamal in June 2021.[71] The sanctions target entities and an individual across five countries. OFAC sanctioned the following commercial vessels:

  • The registered owner of the Panama-flagged Dawn II
  • The Palau-flagged Abyss

OFAC sanctioned the following entities:

  • Liberia-based Hassaleh International Company
  • India-based KNH Shipping Private Limited
  • India-based Melody Shipmanagement Pvt Ltd
  • Kuwait-based Orchidia Regional for General Trading and Contracting Company
  • Kuwait-based Mass Com Group General Trading and Contracting Company WLL
  • Vietnam-based Quoc Viet Marine Transport JSC

OFAC sanctioned the following individual:

  • Lebanon-based Syrian money exchanger Tawfiq Muhammad Said al Law

Iran Update, March 25, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Amin Soltani, Ashka Jhaveri, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Shin Bet announced on March 25 that the IDF seized a “significant amount of advanced arms from Iran” that Iran had smuggled into the West Bank to support Palestinian militia attacks targeting Israel.[1] The captured arms included 83 small arms, five anti-tank mines, four grenade launchers, 15 RPGs, and 25 kilograms of plastic explosives.[2] Shin Bet also said that a Fatah official based in Lebanon and affiliated with Lebanese Hezbollah and the IRGC assisted the Iranian effort to smuggle arms into the West Bank, but Shin Bet did not provide further details.[3] Shin Bet added that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force organized the effort to smuggle Iranian weapons into the West Bank, which is consistent with previous Western reporting.[4] The Wall Street Journal reported in October 2023 that Iran is smuggling weapons from Syria through Jordan into the West Bank, citing multiple Jordanian security officials.[5] Other unspecified regional officials told the Journal in October 2023 that the ”vast majority” of weapons going through Jordan ”appear[ed] destined for the West Bank.”[6]

Key Takeaways:

  • West Bank: Shin Bet announced that the IDF seized a “significant amount of advanced arms from Iran” that Iran had smuggled into the West Bank to support Palestinian militia attacks targeting Israel.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: A small number of Palestinian fighters have likely infiltrated Beit Hanoun in the northeastern Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF continued a second round of clearing operations in al Amal neighborhood, western Khan Younis.
  • Political Developments: The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution calling for “an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan respected by all parties” in the Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Syria: Israel likely conducted an airstrike targeting an Iranian-backed militia- and Syrian Arab Army (SAA)-controlled military site near Damascus, Syria.
  • Iran: The Iranian regime is continuing to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to try to politically isolate Israel in the Middle East. IRGC-affiliated media published images of Iranian protesters in Tehran on March 24 who were calling on Turkey to stop food and oil exports to Israel.
  • Yemen: The Houthi movement threatened to attack oil installations in Saudi Arabia if Saudi Arabia allowed the United States to use Saudi airspace to strike the Houthis, which is probably a Houthi attempt to pressure Saudi Arabia into discouraging US airstrikes targeting Houthi military assets in Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

A small number of Palestinian fighters have likely infiltrated Beit Hanoun in the northeastern Gaza Strip. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, reported that its fighters conducted three attacks targeting Israeli forces between March 22 and 24.[7] Hamas fighters targeted Israeli armor with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) northeast of Beit Hanoun on March 24.[8] There are at least seven Palestinian militias, including Hamas, contesting Israeli operations in other areas of the northern Gaza Strip. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) acknowledged on March 24 that its forces are operating near Beit Hanoun, noting that the IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike on a target in Beit Hanoun that “posed a threat to the forces operating in the area.”[9] Israeli forces have conducted multi-week operations in other areas of the northern Gaza Strip to reclear those areas of Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure.

Israeli forces continued operations in and around al Shifa Hospital, Gaza City, on March 25. An IDF spokesperson said that the Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in the hospital.[10] Hagari said that Israeli forces have killed 170 Palestinian fighters during engagements in and around the hospital.[11] Israeli forces found ammunition and weapons stored in several rooms in al Shifa hospital.[12] The IDF also said that Israeli forces have detained 500 fighters affiliated with either Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).[13] Hagari called the al Shifa Hospital operation “one of the most successful operations since the start of the war,” citing the hundreds of Palestinian fighters detained.[14]

Palestinian militias concentrated their attacks targeting Israeli forces on March 25 at al Shifa Hospital. Palestinian fighters conducted at least nine attacks targeting Israeli forces in the area.[15] Hamas claimed that its fighters fired a rocket-propelled grenade and completely ”burned“ an Israeli tank close to the hospital.[16] The IDF said that Hamas continued to mortar Israeli forces at al Shifa Hospital.[17]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central and northern Gaza Strip on March 25. The Nahal Brigade killed a Palestinian fighter who was emerging from a tunnel shaft to target Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip.[18] The Nahal Brigade is also operating at al Shifa Hospital.[19]

The IDF continued a second round of clearing operations in al Amal neighborhood, western Khan Younis, on March 25. The IDF previously operated in al Amal in February and early March 2024 before shifting ground operations to northern Khan Younis.[20] The IDF 98th Division isolated al Amal on March 24 and 25 before conducting raids on militia infrastructure there.[21] Israeli forces killed over 20 Palestinian fighters and seized military equipment during the operation.[22] Israeli forces questioned dozens of Palestinian suspects in al Amal.[23] The Palestinian Red Cresent reported that Israeli forces ordered doctors and patients to evacuate al Amal hospital on March 24.[24] Palestinian militias did not claim attacks on Israeli forces operating in Khan Younis on March 25.

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that the IDF's re-clearing in al Amal is similar to the Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip since early 2024.[25] These operations are all consistent with the IDF’s ”third phase” of operations in the Gaza Strip, which involves ending major combat operations, releasing reservists, transitioning to “targeted raids,” and establishing a security buffer zone within the Gaza Strip.[26] The IDF announced the ”third phase” in early 2024.[27]

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution on March 25 calling for “an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan respected by all parties” in the Gaza Strip.[28] The US abstained from the vote.[29] US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby told reporters on March 25 that the US decision to abstain on the UNSC resolution “does not represent a shift in our policy.”[30] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu canceled a March 25 visit of two top Israeli security officials to Washington, DC, in response to the United States’ abstention.[31] US President Joe Biden requested that the Israeli delegation meet with US officials to discuss Israeli plans for a ground operation in Rafah.[32]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant arrived in Washington, D.C., on March 25 to meet with top US military and diplomatic officials despite the US decision to abstain.[33] Israeli War Cabinet Minister Benny Gantz and Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz both signaled the UNSC resolution would not impact Israel’s operations in the Gaza Strip.[34]

Hamas praised the UNSC resolution and affirmed its ”readiness to engage in an immediate prisoner exchange process.”[35] Hamas also called for the UNSC to ”pressure” Israel to adhere to the ceasefire resolution.

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry, said that 203 humanitarian aid trucks entered the Gaza Strip over the past 24 hours.[36] COGAT reported that 22 of the 203 trucks entered the northern Gaza Strip.[37] Unspecified people looted some of the trucks, according to Israeli media.[38]

Palestinian militias have conducted three indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on March 24.[39] Hamas fired eight rockets targeting Ashdod.[40] This attack is the first rocket salvo targeting Ashdod since mid-January 2024.[41] Israel intercepted two of the rockets and six more landed in open areas.[42] PIJ and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a secular leftist Palestinian group fighting alongside Hamas in the war, conducted a combined rocket attack targeting Beeri, southern Israel on March 24.[43] PIJ also fired rockets targeting Sderot on March 25.[44]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least nine locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 24.[45] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed at least four attacks targeting the IDF in Nablus Governorate.[46] The group also separately claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in Jenin, Tulkarm, Hebron and near Jerusalem.[47] Israeli forces arrested seven wanted Palestinians across the West Bank on March 25.[48]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 24.[49]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Israel likely conducted an airstrike on March 24 targeting an Iranian-backed militia- and Syrian Arab Army (SAA)-controlled military site near Damascus, Syria.[50] Israel has likely conducted three other airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed militia, SAA, and Lebanese Hezbollah facilities in Syria in March 2023.[51] The IDF previously said in February 2024 that it had conducted a series of airstrikes in Syria since the start of the Israel-Hamas war to interdict Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah through Syria.[52]

IRGC Deputy Coordinator Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi reiterated recent regime rhetoric that Israel must be prepared for greater Palestinian attacks against it.[53] Naghdi threatened Israel on March 25, stating that Israel has “prepared the ground for an incident” worse than the October 7 attack and exposed itself to this risk by intensifying its attacks on Palestinians. Naghdi also warned in the same statement that “the people of the region” may soon “hang American soldiers from electric poles in the streets of Baghdad and Manama.” This inflammatory rhetoric is typical for Naghdi and likely does not indicate any shift in Iranian policy or strategic calculus. Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Mohammad Javad Haj Ali Akbari similarly said during Friday prayers on March 22 that Israel must be prepared for a “second, third, and fourth” October 7-style attack.[54] The Iranian supreme leader appoints Friday prayer leaders, but these clerics are not critical to regime decision-making.[55]

The Iranian regime is continuing to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to try to politically isolate Israel in the Middle East. IRGC-affiliated media published images of Iranian protesters in Tehran on March 24 who were calling on Turkey to stop food and oil exports to Israel. The protesters were demonstrating against Israel’s ongoing operations in al Shifa Hospital.[56] Iranian state media published a separate report in November 2023 highlighting student protesters in front of the Turkish Embassy in Tehran who were demonstrating against Turkey’s economic ties with Israel.[57] Iranian officials and media have repeatedly pressured Muslim countries, particularly Turkey and Azerbaijan, to sever economic and political ties with Israel since the Israel-Hamas war began.[58] Azerbaijan supplies approximately 40 percent of Israel’s oil, much of which passes through Turkey on its way to Israel.[59]

The Iranian rial depreciated to a record low of 613,500 rials to one US dollar on March 24.[60] The value of the rial was 32,000 rials to one US dollar when Iran and the United States signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015.[61] The rial has depreciated since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and has lost more than half of its value since the start of the Mahsa Amini protest movement in September 2022.[62]

The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) arrested a Jaish al Adl militant on Qeshm Island, Hormozgan Province, Iran, on March 25.[63] Jaish al Adl is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group that operates along the Iranian border with Pakistan. The arrest of a Jaish al Adl member on Qeshm Island is notable given that Jaish al Adl militants typically operate in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan Province that borders Pakistan. The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) arrested two men in Hormorzgan Province in late February 2024 who it accused of being part of Sipah Sahaba, which is a prominent Sunni militant organization that originated in Pakistan.[64] The LEC arrested one of the Sipah Sahaba members on Qeshm Island and the other in Bandar Abbas.[65]

Unspecified “armed men” shot and killed an Iranian border guard near Mirjaveh, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, Iran, on March 25.[66] Iranian state media reported that the “armed men” entered Iran from Pakistan.[67] This incident is part of an uptick in militancy and insecurity in southeastern Iran since December 2023. Jaish al Adl has conducted at least five attacks targeting Iranian security personnel since December 2023.[68] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State separately conducted a terrorist attack in Kerman Province in early January 2024, killing over 90 individuals.[69]

Iran displayed its Shahed 149 or “Gaza” drone during the March 4 to 6 Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference.[70] Iran unveiled the drone in May 2021. Iran claims that the drone has a range of 2,000 kilometers and can carry up to 13 precision-guided munitions. The Wall Street Journal reported on March 23 that the display marked the first time Iran has showcased the drone outside Iran since the IRGC Aerospace Force unveiled it in May 2021. The Wall Street Journal reported that Qatari and Sudanese officials expressed interest in Iranian weapons systems, including small arms, during their visit to the exhibition. Iran has reportedly supplied drones to Sudan since at least 2019.[71] Iranian officials also recently expressed interest in increasing defense exports to Qatar.[72] Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani said on March 13 that Iran seeks to develop greater defense cooperation with Armenia, Qatar, Russia, and Turkey.[73] Iran uses its defense exports to expand its military influence abroad and to generate revenue for the Iranian economy.

 

The Houthi movement threatened to attack oil installations in Saudi Arabia if Saudi Arabia allowed the United States to use Saudi airspace to strike the Houthis, which is probably a Houthi attempt to pressure Saudi Arabia into discouraging US airstrikes targeting Houthi military assets in Yemen.[74] Key Houthi powerbroker and Supreme Political Council member Mohammed Ali al Houthi said on March 24 that the Houthis would target oil installations in Saudi Arabia if the country allowed the United States to use Saudi airspace to strike the Houthis.[75] Mohammad Ali al Houthi added that the ongoing negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis are a “de-escalation, not a truce,” and that Saudi Arabia must take more serious steps towards a truce.[76]

Iran Update, March 24, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

CORRECTION: CTP-ISW inaccurately reported on March 23 that the IDF had concluded its operation at al Shifa Hospital. This operation is still ongoing, and the IDF did not report on March 23 that the operation had al Shifa had ended.

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) engaged Palestinian militias north of Gaza City, including in Beit Hanoun.
  • Israeli forces continued operations near al Shifa Hospital, Gaza City, on March 24. CTP-ISW inaccurately reported on March 23 that the IDF had concluded its operation at al Shifa Hospital. This operation is still ongoing, and the IDF did not report on March 23 that the operation had al Shifa had ended.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF launched a second clearing operation in al Amal, western Khan Younis, on March 24.
  • Lebanon: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a Hezbollah “weapons workshop” in Baalbek, the Bekaa Valley, on March 23 following a Hezbollah attack targeting an Israeli air defense site in northern Israel.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least nine locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 23.
  • Yemen: The Houthis launched five anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Panamanian-flagged, Chinese-owned, and Chinese-operated oil tanker Huang Pu in the Red Sea on March 23.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) engaged Palestinian militias north of Gaza City. Local Palestinian sources reported that Israeli armor entered eastern Beit Hanoun on March 23.[1] The IDF acknowledged on March 24 that its forces are operating in Beit Hanoun, saying that the IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike on a target in Beit Hanoun that “posed a threat to the forces operating in the area.”[2] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, targeted Israeli armor with a rocket-propelled grenade east of Beit Hanoun on March 23.[3] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, reported its fighters detonated an improvised explosive device targeting Israeli armor in al Shati Camp, northern Gaza City on March 23.[4]

Israeli forces continued operations near al Shifa Hospital, Gaza City, on March 24.[5] The IDF said that it confirmed 480 of the 800 detainees it detained at al Shifa Hospital are linked to Palestinian Islamic Jihad or Hamas.[6] The IDF 401st Brigade (162nd Division) and Israeli special operations forces seized weapons, destroyed militia infrastructure, and engaged Palestinian fighters in the al Shifa Hospital area over the past 24 hours.[7] Palestinian militias conducted at least nine attacks targeting Israeli armor and infantry near al Shifa Hospital.[8] Hamas targeted three Israeli tanks with explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and rocket-propelled grenades south of al Shifa Hospital on March 23.[9]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central and northern Gaza Strip on March 24. The Nahal Brigade raided a drone manufacturing site belonging to the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), a Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, in the central Gaza Strip and killed Palestinian fighters guarding the site.[10] The DFLP targeted Israeli armor south of Deir al Balah with rocket-propelled grenades.[11]

The IDF launched a second clearing operation in al Amal, western Khan Younis, on March 24. The IDF previously operated in al Amal in February and early March 2024 before shifting ground operations to northern Khan Younis.[12] The IDF said that the IDF and Shin Bet redeployed to al Amal based on intelligence that Palestinian militias were using civilian infrastructure there for military purposes.[13] The IDF said that the clearing operations will continue to dismantle militia infrastructure and target remaining Palestinian fighters.[14] The IDF Air Force conducted approximately 40 airstrikes on militia targets to assist the IDF 89th Commando Brigade, Givati Brigade, and the 7th Brigade’s maneuver into al Amal.[15] Local Palestinian sources reported that the IDF isolated al Nasser Hospital and al Amal Hospital in northern al Amal on the early morning of March 24.[16] The IDF issued a statement that called on Hamas to ”stop using hospitals and other civilian facilities as a shield.”[17] Palestinian Islamic Jihad said that its fighters targeted Israeli armor with rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank guided missiles, and small arms in the al Amal area on March 24.[18]

The IDF 7th Brigade and Kfir Brigade continued clearing operations in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, on March 24.[19] The brigades killed Palestinian fighters near the Israel-Gaza Strip border and targeted a meeting site for Hamas fighters in Qarara.[20] Israeli forces seized weapons caches and an IDF helicopter struck a tunnel shaft in Qarara.[21] Palestinian militias did not claim attacks targeting Israeli forces in Qarara on March 24.

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 24.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least nine locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 23.[22]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 23.[23]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a Hezbollah “weapons workshop” in Baalbek, the Bekaa Valley, on March 23 following a Hezbollah attack targeting an Israeli air defense site in northern Israel.[24] This is the fourth time that the IDF has conducted airstrikes in the Bekaa Valley since October 7.[25] The Bekaa Valley is an area that contains significant Hezbollah military infrastructure including training centers, weapons storage sites, and ballistic missile production facilities.[26] Hezbollah claimed that it launched more than 60 rockets targeting IDF headquarters and training grounds in the Golan Heights after the IDF airstrike in Baalbek.[27] Israeli media separately reported that a likely IDF airstrike killed an unspecified Syrian individual in Souairi in the Bekaa Valley on March 24.[28]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting the Israeli Defense Ministry on March 23.[29] Israeli officials have not commented on the claimed attack at the time of writing. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also vowed to “escalate” its attacks during the month of Ramadan, which began on March 10 and ends on April 9.[30]

The Houthis launched five anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Panamanian-flagged, Chinese-owned, and Chinese-operated oil tanker Huang Pu in the Red Sea on March 23.[31] The attack caused a fire on the Huang Pu, which the crew quickly extinguished. The Houthis targeted the Huang Pu despite earlier Houthi claims that the group would provide safe passage to Chinese and Russian ships transiting the Red Sea.[32] The Houthis mistakenly launched an anti-ship ballistic missile targeting a tanker south of Yemen carrying Russian oil in early January 2024.[33]

US forces engaged six Houthi drones over the southern Red Sea on March 23.[34] Five of the drones crashed into the Red Sea while the sixth drone flew back into Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen. CENTCOM assessed that the drones presented an imminent threat to US, coalition, and commercial vessels in the Red Sea.[35]


Iran Update, March 23, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Key Takeaways:

  • Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a weeklong operation in and around al Shifa Hospital on March 23.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters during a raid targeting an unspecified “wanted individual” in Tulkarm in the West Bank on March 22.
  • Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 22.
  • Yemen: CENTCOM reported that the Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles into the Red Sea but added that the Houthi attacks did not damage any military or commercial vessels.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a weeklong operation in and around al Shifa Hospital on March 23.[1] The 401st Brigade (162nd Division) and Israeli special operations forces cleared areas surrounding al Shifa Hospital and arrested fighters who had returned to the hospital.[2] The 401st Brigade raided nearby buildings and seized weapons.[3] The IDF also established an evacuation route for civilians to leave the hospital compound.[4] Israeli forces killed approximately 170 fighters and detained approximately 800 suspects during the operation, which began on March 18.[5]

Palestinian fighters continued to attack Israeli forces that were conducting clearing operations around al Shifa Hospital on March 23.[6]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 23.[7] The IDF reported that the Nahal Brigade engaged in “intense fighting” in unspecified areas of the central Gaza Strip and killed 15 Palestinian fighters. The Nahal Brigade also directed an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters barricaded in a building.

The 7th Brigade (36th Division) continued clearing operations in Qarara, Khan Younis Governorate, on March 23.[8] The IDF Air Force struck two Palestinian fighters moving toward their forces and targeted a "military building" that belonged to a Hamas fighter in Qarara.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters during a raid targeting an unspecified “wanted individual” in Tulkarm in the West Bank on March 22.[9] Palestinian media separately reported that unspecified Palestinian militia fighters fired small arms targeting an IDF checkpoint near Jenin on March 23.[10]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 22.[11]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US CENTCOM conducted preemptive strikes targeting four Houthi drones and three underground storage facilities in Houthi-controlled Yemen on March 22.[12]

CENTCOM reported separately that the Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles into the Red Sea but added that the Houthi attacks did not damage any military or commercial vessels.[13]

Iran Update, March 22, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Peter Mills, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, Elizabeth Volynsky-Lauzon, Rachel Friedman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

 The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 22.[1] The IDF 401st and Nahal Brigades (162nd Division) and Israeli special operations forces have killed approximately 150 Palestinian fighters in the hospital area since the operation began on March 18.[2] Palestinian militias focused their attacks in the Gaza Strip on March 22 on Israeli forces al Shifa Hospital.[3] A Palestinian journalist reported that Israeli forces ”intensified” operations in Gaza City east of al Shifa Hospital.[4] Hamas' infiltration into the al Shifa Hospital area after Israel’s initial clearing operation highlights Hamas’ efforts and determination to reestablish itself in the northern Gaza Strip.[5]

Palestinian fighters may be retreating from certain areas of the Gaza Strip during Israeli clearing operations there before reentering those areas after the Israelis depart. Israeli forces are not permanently securing the areas that they clear, which allows Palestinian fighters to return after the IDF leaves. The current clearing operation in and around al Shifa Hospital is the third clearing operation in southern or western Gaza City. Israeli forces have launched new clearing operations in several neighborhoods surrounding al Shifa Hospital three times—including the ongoing operation—since  January. Israeli forces re-cleared al Shati Camp—to the immediate north of al Shifa Hospital—and Rimal neighborhood—where al Shifa Hospital is located—in early February and Zaytoun neighborhood, southeast of Rimal, in late February.[6] Palestinian militias may have temporarily retreated from these areas during the Israeli operations there, as demonstrated by the large number of fighters that Israeli forces have detained during the newest Israeli clearing operation in Rimal focused on al Shifa Hospital, which began on March 18.

Palestinian militias may be maintaining at least one VBIED cell near Tubas. Hamas fighters detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) targeting an IDF bulldozer in Tubas during an Israeli raid on March 21.[7] Palestinian fighters have deployed at least three VBIEDs targeting Israeli forces in the northern West Bank in 2024, including two VBIEDs in Tubas since March 7.[8] CTP-ISW previously noted on March 7 that the two VBIED attacks on and prior to March 7 suggested the existence of a VBIED cell in the northern West Bank.[9] It is unclear how sophisticated or well-manufactured these VBIEDs are. VBIEDs require significant logistical infrastructure, including dedicated workshops to reassemble cars after technicians take apart the vehicles and pack them with explosives.[10] VBIEDs also require bombmaking facilities, an area to stash the VBIED prior to its deployment, and a security detachment for the workshop and bombmaking facilities. The Palestinian militias in Tubas may be collaborating to assemble and deploy these VBIEDs, given the level of resources and expertise required.

A Hamas sniper wounded seven Israelis near an Israeli settlement in the West Bank on March 22 in a multi-stage ambush.[11] The sniper fired multiple rounds at an Israeli bus near Dolev before engaging the IDF quick reaction force that responded to the attack.[12] The sniper fired at the IDF quick reaction force from a series of pre-prepared firing positions for several hours before an IDF helicopter killed him.[13] The al Aqsa Martyrs‘ Brigades, Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine all praised the sniper attack.[14]

The pause in Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks does not indicate a change in the long-term Iranian and Iranian-backed proxy objective to expel the United States from the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq–an umbrella group of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias–has not conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq or Syria for 47 days.[15] IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani ordered the Islamic Resistance in Iraq to pause attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria following the January 28 attack that killed three US service members in northeast Jordan.[16] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias retain the capability to resume attacks targeting US forces at any time for any reason of their choosing. CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla said during a Senate Armed Service Committee Hearing on March 7 that Iran has continued to send arms and funding to its Iraqi militias during the pause in attacks.[17] Iran and its so-called ”Axis of Resistance“ in Iraq have not deviated from their objective to remove US forces from Iraq. Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi met with unspecified leaders in Iran‘s ”Axis of Resistance” in Tehran on March 20 and said that the current pause in attacks on US forces does not mark the end of efforts to expel US forces from Iraq.[18]

Key Takeaways:

  1. Gaza Strip: The IDF continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. Palestinian fighters may be retreating from certain areas of the Gaza Strip during Israeli clearing operations there before reentering those areas after the Israelis depart.
  2. West Bank: Palestinian militias may be maintaining at least one VBIED cell near Tubas.
  3. Iraq: The pause in Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks does not indicate a change in the long-term Iranian and Iranian-backed proxy objective to expel the United States from the Middle East.
  4. Yemen: US CENTCOM and the French Navy intercepted multiple Houthi ballistic missiles and a Houthi naval attack drone in the Red Sea in several separate incidents.
  5. Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war in separate phone calls with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh and PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 22.[19] The IDF reported that unspecified Palestinian fighters launched mortars targeting Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip and Israeli forces responded with artillery fire.[20]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, on March 22. The IDF Air Force struck tunnel shafts and two structures in Qarara that Palestinian fighters had rigged to explode.[21] 

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli War Cabinet in Tel Aviv on March 22.[22] Blinken discussed efforts to reach a six-week ceasefire to secure hostages and enable a surge in humanitarian aid. Blinken also briefed the Israeli War Cabinet about efforts he made during his visits to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Cairo, Egypt, to “achieve lasting peace.” Netanyahu said at the end of his meeting with Blinken that there is “no way to defeat Hamas without entering Rafah” and that Israel will “do it alone” if it must.[23] 

Two unspecified US officials told CNN on March 21 that Blinken told Qatar that Hamas must agree to a ceasefire deal or risk getting kicked out of Doha.[24] Several senior Hamas members, including Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, are based in Doha. CNN noted that Blinken made the comment on March 5 at a time when negotiations between Hamas and Israel had stalled. The officials said that Qatar understood the message and “received it without major pushback.”

The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office confirmed that CIA Director Bill Burns will travel to Doha on March 22 to join ceasefire negotiations.[25] The talks also include Israeli and Egyptian intelligence chiefs and the Qatari prime minister. Israel and Hamas began a new round of negotiations on March 18.[26]

Several Arab and Israeli sources told the Wall Street Journal on March 22 that Israel is developing a plan to distribute aid in the Gaza Strip that “could eventually create a Palestinian-led governing authority” to contest Hamas.[27] The Israeli plan involves distributing the aid via Palestinian leaders and businessmen without links to Hamas who would be recruited by Israel. An Israeli official noted that Hamas’ “vehement opposition” could make the plan unfeasible. Some of this ”vehement opposition” may include Hamas-ordered assassinations targeting Gazan notables. Hamas reportedly killed the head of a large local clan on March 13. Palestinian civilians accused the clan of cooperating with Israel.[28] The Israeli official noted that Hamas can reassert itself due to the governance vacuum that exists in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has already sought to reconstitute militarily and rebuild its governing authority in the northern Gaza Strip after the Israeli drawdown in the Strip that began in December 2023.

Israeli officials are currently debating the issue of humanitarian aid distribution in the Gaza Strip. Israeli media reported on March 8 that Israeli officials have discussed arming civilians in the Gaza Strip to provide security for aid convoys.[29] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has proposed involving Fatah in the distribution. Netanyahu has shut down proposals for aid distribution involving the Palestinian Authority.[30] Israeli officials have also not yet identified an actor or organization that could lead Gaza in the future, though some Israeli officials have proposed working with local clans.[31] Hamas reportedly killed the head of a local clan in Gaza City on March 13 amid local accusations that the clan was cooperating with Israel.[32] The heads of Palestinian tribes, clans, and families in the Gaza Strip affirmed on March 19 that they are not an alternative to any Palestinian political solution. They added that they denounced Israel, calling Israel an occupier.[33]

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 22. The IDF reported on March 22 that it intercepted a rocket that Palestinian fighters launched on March 21 from the central Gaza Strip into southern Israel.[34] The Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed the March 21 attack.[35] The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting military infrastructure in the Strip in response to the attack. [36]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least six locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 21.[37] The al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, Hamas, and PIJ separately claimed that they detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces operating in Tubas on March 21 and 22 (see topline for analysis of a VBIED detonation in Tubas during the raid).[38] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also engaged Israeli forces in Qalqilya and near Nablus.[39] The group threw an IED targeting a civilian bus near Bethlehem and fired small arms at an Israeli settlement near Jenin.[40]  

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 21.[41]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US CENTCOM and the French Navy intercepted multiple Houthi ballistic missiles and a Houthi naval attack drone in the Red Sea on March 21 in several separate incidents.[42] US CENTCOM intercepted a Houthi naval attack drone in the Red Sea on March 21.[43] CENTCOM also reported that coalition forces intercepted two Houthi ballistic missiles in the Red Sea. A French frigate also intercepted three additional Houthi ballistic missiles over the southern Red Sea.[44]

Houthi-controlled media claimed on March 22 that the United States conducted airstrikes targeting Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory.[45] The outlet said that the strikes targeted al Kadan, Hudaydah Governorate, western Yemen.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war in separate phone calls with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh and PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah on March 21 and 22, respectively. [46] This marks Abdollahian and Haniyeh’s fifth phone call since October 7.[47] Abdollahian last met with Nakhalah in February 2024 during a meeting with leaders of various Palestinian factions in Beirut.[48] 

Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Mohammad Javad Haj Ali Akbari said during Friday prayers on March 22 that Israel must be prepared for a “second, third, and fourth” October 7-style attack.[49] Akbari stated that Muslim countries must prepare for a ”different” Quds Day this year by creating a ”political earthquake” for Israel and its supporters. Quds Day is an anti-Israel holiday started by Iran and will occur on the last Friday of Ramadan, April 5, 2024.[50]

Akbari’s statement reflects the thinking of Iranian leaders on how to defeat Israel. IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami said in 2022 that Palestinian militias needed to focus on successive offensive ground operations into Israel instead of defensive, static wars using their rocket systems.[51] Iran’s leaders theorize that these ground operations will result in mass Israeli emigration and the collapse of the Israeli state. Hamas Political Bureau member Ghazi Hamed seemingly echoed these sentiments in a television interview on November 1, when he said that Hamas would repeat the October 7 attacks “a second, a third, [and] a fourth” time.[52]


Iran Update, March 21, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other Palestinian militias cooperating against Israel have likely established at least one cell in Jenin to target Israeli civilian areas outside of the West Bank. Israeli forces killed a Palestinian man from Jenin carrying a weapon and “ready-to-use explosive device” in Zeita, along the West Bank-Israel barrier, on March 11.[1] The IDF said that the man was en route to conduct a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv.[2] A PIJ commander in Jenin organized the attack.[3] PIJ probably received assistance from other Palestinian militias, given PIJ’s role in the Hornets’ Nest operations room and Jenin’s importance as a hub for militia activity. The Hornets’ Nest is a combined operations room that is based in Jenin and led by PIJ, Hamas, and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade.[4] The IDF conducted a “brigade operation” in Jenin on March 13 following the attempted March 11 attack and arrested seven “wanted persons” and captured three improvised explosive devices.[5] The IDF Air Force killed the Palestinian commanders responsible for planning the March 11 attack in a March 20 airstrike that killed several fighters the IDF said were ”attempting to insert a hazard into the heart of Israel.”[6]

The March 20 airstrike likely failed to destroy the Palestinian militia cell responsible for the manufacture, planning, and execution of the attempted March 11 attack. Suicide attacks require a significant logistical tail to manufacture and deploy suicide bombers.[7] These logistical assets include bombmaking facilities, safehouses, and an area in which to mentally prepare the would-be suicide bomber.[8] A single airstrike eliminating leaders of this cell will not cause the cell’s more important assets, such as bombmakers or recruiters, to cease operations. The airstrike may, however, cause a temporary pause or slowdown in operations as the cell reorganizes itself.

Palestinian militias in the West Bank almost certainly maintain additional cells focused on attacking Israel proper. Israeli border police detained a Palestinian man in Jericho on March 21 that Israeli police alleged planned to conduct a suicide bombing attack against an unspecified target.[9] The logistical tail required to manufacture and deploy suicide bombers indicates that this Jericho attack and other unclaimed attempted attacks are not isolated events or attacks by independent individuals.

Palestinian militia presence in Jenin and other West Bank cities along the barrier wall—such as Tulkarm—offer geographic advantages for Palestinian militias that the groups could use to launch attacks into Israel proper. Jenin is only 5km south of the West Bank-Israel barrier, and Tulkarm is immediately adjacent to the Israeli town of Bat Hafer. The IDF “brigade operation” in Tulkarm on March 21 is notable in this context (see West Bank for more on this operation).[10] The IDF’s ability to disrupt militia attacks into Israel proper and eliminate would-be suicide bombers does demonstrate the difficulties faced by Palestinian militias in conducting these attacks, however. Israeli media reported on March 19 that the IDF had established a unit of engineering and intelligence personnel to locate “offensive tunnels” in the West Bank.[11] The report added that the IDF established the unit after residents in Bat Hafer reported hearing “digging noises” under their homes.[12] Both Jenin and Tulkarm have been hotspots of militia activity before and during the current war.[13] The IDF discovered a tunnel under Jenin refugee camp in July 2023 that Palestinian militias were using to transport weapons and hide fighters.[14] The development of tunnels that could cross under the West Bank-Israel barrier points to the threat posed by militias operating near the barrier wall.

Israeli forces continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 21. Israeli special operations forces and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 401st Brigade (162nd Division) killed approximately 50 Palestinian fighters and located ammunition depots near the hospital over the last 24 hours.[15] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari stated on March 21 that Palestinian fighters remain barricaded in the al Shifa Hospital emergency room and that the Israeli forces are focused on evacuating civilians from the area before clearing the full hospital.[16] The IDF said on March 20 that its forces evacuated 3,700 Gazans to the southern Gaza Strip through a checkpoint near the hospital, detaining 300 of the 3,700 evacuees as suspected fighters.[17] Local Palestinian sources said Israeli forces had evacuated all of Rimal neighborhood, where al Shifa hospital is located.[18] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said on March 20 that the IDF would continue operations at al Shifa Hospital ”for a few more days.”[19]

Halevi said that Hamas returned to al Shifa hospital and turned it into a command-and-control center as part of Hamas’ efforts to rebuild its governance in the northern Gaza Strip.[20] Local sources also reported Israeli forces raided local government buildings in Rimal neighborhood.[21] Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip aim to destroy both Hamas’ military capabilities and government infrastructure.[22]

Israeli forces detained several high-level Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters at al Shifa Hospital. The IDF spokesperson said on March 21 that Israeli forces detained 600 people, including 358 PIJ and Hamas fighters, since the raid began.[23] The IDF said "very significant" senior Hamas commanders are among those captured but that the IDF would not disclose their identities due to ongoing questioning.[24] Israel said that included among the detainees were Hamas officials responsible for facilitating attacks in the West Bank.[25] The IDF said many PIJ fighters surrendered to Israeli forces as the IDF entered al Shifa hospital.[26] Israeli forces detained PIJ’s Shujaiya Battalion commander, the deputy commander of PIJ's Northern Gaza Brigade, and the PIJ northern Gaza tunnel commander in al Shifa Hospital.[27] Israeli forces also detained two PIJ fighters responsible for intelligence and military communications.[28] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said during his visit to the hospital on March 20 that the raid at al Shifa Hospital is targeting senior Palestinian militia leaders.[29] Halevi added that the IDF operations are causing “severe damage to Hamas, dismantling Hamas, killing the military leadership, [and damaging] the civilian [Hamas] leadership.”[30]

Four Palestinian militias conducted at least 11 attacks targeting Israeli ground forces near al Shifa Hospital on March 21.[31] The four Palestinian militias reported that their fighters engaged Israeli forces near al Shifa Hospital with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. Three militias also mortared Israeli forces at the hospital.[32]

Key Takeaways:

  • West Bank: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other Palestinian militias cooperating against Israel have likely established at least one cell in Jenin to target Israeli civilian areas outside of the West Bank.
  • A March 20 IDF airstrike targeting PIJ fighters coordinating a suicide attack cell in Jenin likely failed to destroy this cell, which was responsible for the manufacture, planning, and execution of an attempted March 11 suicide attack.
  • Palestinian militias in the West Bank almost certainly maintain additional cells focused on attacking Israel proper.
  • Palestinian militia presence in Jenin and other West Bank cities along the barrier wall—such as Tulkarm—offer geographic advantages for Palestinian militias that the groups could use to launch attacks into Israel proper.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 21. Israeli forces detained several high-level Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters at al Shifa Hospital.
  • Iraq: Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Ala al Walai described Israeli maritime ports and airports as “legitimate targets” on March 21.
  • Iran: The US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three procurement networks across four different countries on March 20 for supporting Iran’s ballistic missile, nuclear, and defense programs.

Iran Update, March 20, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi said during a meeting with unspecified leaders in Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” in Tehran on March 20 that the current pause in attacks on US forces does not mark the end of efforts to expel US forces from Iraq. [1] Hamidawi said that he and the unspecified leaders discussed challenges and the timing of “resistance” activity.[2]  He argued that “the politicized and the weak” must be prevented from interfering in this effort.[3] Hamidawi was likely referring to Iraqi Sunni political parties that Iranian-affiliated Iraqi Shia parties have accused of blocking attempts to remove US forces from Iraq.[4]

Israeli forces continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 20. Israeli special operations forces and the Israel Defense Forces 401st Brigade (162nd Division) killed approximately 90 Palestinian fighters and located weapons in the hospital area on March 20.[5] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF has apprehended about 350 suspected Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters in the hospital since the operation began.[6] Israeli forces detained PIJ Political Bureau member Khaled al Batsh during the operation.[7] The IDF noted that several Hamas battalion commanders were at the hospital but added that Gaza City Brigade Commander Izz al Din al Haddad was not present and is still at-large. Haddad is responsible for some of Hamas’ reconstitution efforts.[8]

The Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF assessed that Hamas may have tried in recent months to rebuild the underground tunnel system under al Shifa Hospital.[9] The report clarified that Hamas could not hide weapons in the rebuilt tunnels and its fighters were unable to use the tunnels to exfiltrate from the hospital area. Israeli forces initially expanded clearing operations to al Shifa Hospital in November 2023.[10] An Israeli think tank analyst told the RAND Corporation in 2016 that during previous operations the IDF found that the Gaza Strip’s sandy soil means that tunnels are difficult to rebuild.[11] Hamas and PIJ’s decision to use al Shifa to launch and direct operations after Israel’s initial clearing operations illustrates that Hamas will resume operations in areas without an Israeli presence, however.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq: Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi said during a meeting with unspecified leaders in Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” in Tehran that the current pause in attacks on US forces does not mark the end of efforts to expel US forces from Iraq.
  • Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct an operation in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City.
  • Negotiations: Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon Osama Hamdan said on March 20 that Israel responded negatively to Hamas’ ceasefire proposal.
  • West Bank: The IDF Air Force killed four Palestinian fighters, including two low-level PIJ leaders, in a drone strike in the Jenin refugee camp.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF said that it has degraded Hezbollah’s ability to transfer weapons since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.
  • Yemen: The Houthi supreme leader said on March 15 that the Houthis intend to target international shipping transiting the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope. This statement is likely aspirational given the current maximum range of Houthi weapon systems, which is roughly 2,200km.
  • Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged the Iranian government’s shortcomings in “controlling inflation” and economic production during his Nowruz speech.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division) directed an airstrike targeting six Palestinian fighters in Jabalia on March 20.[12] Israeli forces previously struck Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) infrastructure in Jabalia on March 6 after Palestinian fighters launched rockets into Israel from Jabalia.[13]

Palestinian militias continued attempts to disrupt Israeli ground operations in Gaza City on March 20. Several militias reported that their fighters engaged Israeli forces near al Shifa Hospital with small arms.[14] Hamas published footage of its fighters targeting Israeli armor south of al Shifa Hospital with RPGs.[15] Palestinian sources reported engagements between Palestinian fighters and Israeli forces west of al Shifa Hospital.[16]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, on March 20. The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) killed two Palestinian fighters in the area and attacked military infrastructure.[17] Hamas fighters targeted Israeli infantrymen breaching a tunnel in Qarara by rigging the tunnel entrance to explode.[18] PIJ fighters also mortared Israeli forces in Qarara.[19] Israeli forces have been operating in  Qarara since March 3.[20]

The IDF Air Force killed five senior members of Hamas’ Emergency Committees in Rafah.[21] Israeli media reported that the Emergency Committees are Hamas organizations that are responsible for maintaining public order and civil control.[22] The IDF reported that the five members killed in this strike helped Hamas maintain Hamas control on the ground.[23] They worked to preserve Hamas’ organizational structure in humanitarian areas and were responsible for all Hamas activities including contact with Hamas fighters. The IDF killed the chair of the committees in Rafah last week.[24]

The White House requested that an Israeli delegation visit Washington next week to discuss alternatives to an Israeli ground operation in Rafah.[25] Two unspecified US officials told Axios on March 20 that one alternative is to delay a military operation in Rafah and instead focus on stabilizing the humanitarian situation in the northern Gaza Strip.[26] Another alternative is to focus first on securing the Egyptian side of the Egypt-Gaza Strip border as part of a combined US-Egyptian-Israeli plan. Israel confirmed that it will send a delegation to Washington.[27] The New York Times reported on March 19 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that an Israeli ground operation into Rafah is necessary because there is “no way” to destroy Hamas’ local battalions without one.[28]

The Associated Press reported on March 20 the new Palestinian prime minister would appoint a “non-partisan, technocratic government” supported by the international community and the Palestinian people. The Associated Press cited a mission statement written by incoming Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa.[29] Mustafa added that the Palestinian Authority (PA) aims to hold presidential and parliamentary elections. He did not give a timetable and added that the timetable would depend on “realities on the ground” in Gaza, the West Bank, and east Jerusalem. PA President Mahmoud Abbas appointed Mustafa as the new prime minister on March 14.[30]

Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon Osama Hamdan said on March 20 that Israel responded negatively to Hamas’ ceasefire proposal.[31] Hamas submitted a ceasefire proposal and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange to international mediators on March 14.[32] The proposal includes a ceasefire, calls for Israel to release Palestinian prisoners, an increase in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, a return of displaced Palestinians, and a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Strip.

Israeli media reported on March 14 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant disagreed over the issue of humanitarian aid distribution in the Gaza Strip.[33] Gallant said that Fatah must be involved in distribution while Netanyahu said he is “not ready to hear about the PA.”[34] Israeli media reported on March 15 that Gallant said that the best option Israel has for the future leader in the Gaza Strip will be local Palestinians who are affiliated with the PA.[35]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh said on March 20 that Israeli attacks targeting police officers in the Gaza Strip are harming Israel's ability to achieve a ceasefire.[36] Hamas controls several internal security forces, including the Civil Police.[37]

Israel detected Palestinian indirect fire targeting Sderot, southern Israel, on March 19.[38] No Palestinian militia has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing. Israeli forces responded to the attack by conducting an airstrike targeting a Hamas tunnel shaft near the fire‘s point of origin.[39]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 19.[40]  Hamas reported on March 20 that its fighters conducted additional small arms attacks targeting Israeli forces and settlements in unspecified areas of the West Bank during an unspecified time frame.[41] Hamas called for Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem to escalate against Israel.[42]

The IDF Air Force killed four Palestinian fighters, including two low-level PIJ leaders, in a drone strike in the Jenin refugee camp on March 20.[43]  The IDF said that one of the PIJ fighters was a senior PIJ member who killed an Israeli civilian in a small arms attack targeting an Israeli settlement in May 2023. The strike also killed a local PIJ commander in Jenin.[44] The IDF said that the two other unspecified fighters killed in the strike directed an attempted suicide vest attack into Israel on March 11. The two fighters also directed an attack in which Palestinian fighters detonated an improvised explosive device targeting Israeli forces in Homesh, near Jerusalem, on March 8.[45] Palestinians in Jenin held a funeral service for the fighters on March 20.[46]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 19.[47]

The IDF said on March 20 that it has degraded Hezbollah’s ability to transfer weapons since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.[48] The IDF added that it has targeted Hezbollah’s weapons production facilities since the beginning of the war. The IDF noted that these facilities are in civilian areas in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and in Lebanese cities.

An Israeli airstrike killed an Amal Movement leader in al Ghandouriya in southern Lebanon on March 20.[49] The Amal Movement released a statement mourning the official on the same day.[50]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport near Tel Aviv, Israel, on March 19.[51] Israel has not commented on the attack at the time of writing. Ben Gurion Airport did not report any significant flight delays on March 19, suggesting that the drone attack either did not pose a threat to the airport or did not occur.[52] The Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General said on March 20 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias must continue their support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[53] Kataib Hezbollah is part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which began a ”second phase of operations” in March 2024 that is defined by drone and missile attacks targeting Israeli airports and seaports. The Israeli government does not acknowledge many of these attacks claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and some of these attacks likely did not occur.

A French military helicopter operating in the Red Sea under European-led Operation Aspides intercepted a Houthi drone over the Red Sea on March 20.[54] European Council coalition members have shot down eight drones and ”repelled“ three other drones since they launched Operation Aspides on February 19.[55] Aspides is the European defensive naval coalition operating in the Red Sea.[56]  The French military said that the drone was “threatening civilian maritime traffic.”[57]  The European coalition said that its vessels have ”closely protected” 35 merchant vessels in Red Sea.[58]

The Houthi supreme leader said on March 15 that the Houthis intend to target international shipping transiting the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope.[59] This statement is likely aspirational given the current maximum range of Houthi weapon systems, which is roughly 2,200km.[60] Houthi military spokesperson Yahye Saree said that the expanded operation would target all Israel-associated commercial vessels traveling around the Cape of Good Hope.[61] The Houthi’s maximum weapon range is 2,200km, which encompasses only some parts of the shipping routes toward the Cape of Good Hope and Indian Ocean, suggesting that the supreme leader's statement is largely aspirational.[62] Vessel traffic through the Red Sea has declined by approximately 50% since January 2024 due to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[63] The Cape of Good Hope has seen a 74% increase in traffic compared to 2023 after Houthi attacks forced ships to re-route from the Red Sea and Suez Canal.[64] The Houthis have not conducted an attack outside the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since the announcement on March 15. Iran did target a vessel 200km off the Indian coast in the Indian Ocean on December 23.[65]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei acknowledged the Iranian government’s shortcomings in “controlling inflation” and economic production during his Nowruz speech on March 20.[66] Khamenei announced “controlling inflation and” economic production as Iran’s new year’s slogan at the beginning of the last Persian calendar year in March 2023.[67] Khamenei stated on March 20, 2024 that the state of inflation and economic production in Iran is “relatively far from what we wanted.”[68] Khamenei said in a separate Nowruz message on March 20, 2024 that Iranians should not expect the regime to address “big issues” such as inflation and production growth “within a year.”[69] Khamenei also described the economy as Iran’s “main weakness” and announced a new slogan, “a leap in [economic] production with [the] people’s participation,” for the upcoming Persian calendar year.[70]

Iran’s inflation rate is approximately 44 percent, according to Iranian media.[71] The actual inflation rate is likely higher given Iranian officials and media’s tendency to fabricate economic statistics, however. Western and diaspora media recently reported that many Iranians refrained this year from buying goods that they normally would for Nowruz, such as new clothes and sweets, due to high prices.[72]

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Iran is likely concerned that Armenia’s deteriorating relations with Russia and outreach to the West could increase NATO’s presence along its northern border. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi discussed the security situation in the Caucasus with Russian President Vladimir Putin in a phone call on March 19.[1] Raisi told Putin that Iran is “ready to maintain stability” and protect Iran’s strategic interests in the Caucasus.[2] Iran’s interests in the Caucasus include keeping overland trade routes open, preventing Israel from using Azerbaijan’s territory to operate against Iran, and preempting the spread of separatist sentiments among Iran’s Azeri minority.[3] Russian readouts of Raisi and Putin’s phone call notably did not mention that the pair discussed the Caucasus.[4]

Iranian leaders previously expressed concern that the United States and NATO would exploit the Russian focus on Ukraine to increase Western influence in the Caucasus. Iranian Supreme Leader Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, for example, warned Russia in July 2023 to not “neglect” the Caucasus because “ill-intending parties…would attack the interests of Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”[5] Velayati also claimed that Turkey aspires to create a “pan-Turkic” belt stretching from Istanbul to Xinjiang that would “surround Iran from the north and Russia from the south” and “spread NATO’s influence in the region.”[6]

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government has pursued closer ties with NATO and Western countries in recent months. The Armenian and French defense ministers signed an arms contract in late February 2024.[7] Armenia’s foreign minister discussed normalizing ties with Turkey during a meeting with Turkey’s foreign minister in Antalya, Turkey, on March 1.[8] Pashinyan separately stated that Armenia seeks to “continue and develop the existing political dialogue and expand our partnership with [NATO] and some of its members” during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in Yerevan on March 19.[9]

Raisi and Putin’s phone call on March 19 comes amid a deterioration in Russo-Armenian relations after Russia failed to support Armenia during Azerbaijan’s two-day offensive targeting Nagorno Karabakh in September 2023. Azerbaijan seized Nagorno Karabakh—an enclave in Azerbaijan previously home to a large Armenian population—during a two-day military offensive in September 2023.[10] Armenia began seeking external security assistance from parties other than Russia—Armenia's traditional security partner—after the offensive, claiming that Russia had failed to help Armenia defend Nagorno Karabakh against Azerbaijan.[11] Armenia’s relations with Russia have further worsened in recent weeks. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced in late February 2024 that Armenia “froze” its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[12] The CSTO is a Russian-led security organization that, like NATO, requires member states to come to one another’s assistance if a member state is attacked.[13] Pashinyan later stated that the CSTO “creates a threat” to Armenia’s “security and territorial integrity.”[14] Pashinyan also called on Russia to remove its border guards from Armenia’s international airport in Yerevan in early March 2024.[15]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued its raid at al Shifa Hospital on March 19.[16] The IDF reported on March 18 that it had intelligence that senior Hamas officials were using the area to conduct and direct attacks in the Gaza Strip.[17]  The IDF 162nd Division and Shin Bet led the raid targeting al Shifa Hospital and killed over 50 Palestinian fighters and detained 300 suspects during the operation.[18] The IDF detained Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas rocketry and intelligence personnel. Israeli forces also seized ammunition near the hospital.  Palestinian militias, including Hamas, targeted Israeli forces operating at al Shifa Hospital at least six times.[19]

Hamas' infiltration into the al Shifa Hospital area after Israel’s initial clearing operation highlights Hamas’ efforts to reestablish itself in the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas fighters conducted at least four attacks targeting Israeli forces in the al Shifa area on March 18 and 19, indicating Hamas retains some fighting forces near the hospital.[20] The large number of suspects that Israeli forces detained at al Shifa hospital also indicates the success of Hamas and its allies in rebuilding their fighting strength in the north.[21] Israeli forces initially expanded clearing operations to al Shifa Hospital in November 2023, targeting a Hamas tunnel network underneath the hospital.[22] Israeli forces began to decrease their presence in the northern Gaza Strip in December 2023, citing the degradation of Hamas forces in the area.[23] Hamas has sought to reconstitute militarily and rebuild its governing authority in the northern Gaza Strip after the Israeli drawdown. Israeli Army Radio reported in January 2024 that the Israeli military establishment assesses that Hamas is trying to restore its control over the civilian population in the northern Gaza Strip partly by rehabilitating local, Hamas-controlled police there.[24]

Key Takeaways:

  • The Caucasus: Iran is likely concerned that Armenia’s deteriorating relations with Russia and outreach to the West could increase NATO’s presence along its northern border. Iranian leaders previously expressed concern that the United States and NATO would exploit Russia’s focus on its invasion of Ukraine to increase their influence in the Caucasus.
  • Iranian Supreme Leader Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, for example, warned Russia in July 2023 to not “neglect” the Caucasus because “ill-intending parties…would attack the interests of Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
  • Velayati also claimed that Turkey aspires to create a “pan-Turkic” belt that would “surround Iran from the north” and “spread NATO’s influence in the region.”
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued its raid at al Shifa Hospital on March 19. Hamas' infiltration into the al Shifa Hospital area after Israel’s initial clearing operation highlights Hamas’ efforts to reestablish itself in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: IDF Egoz and Maglan special operations forces concluded clearing operations in Hamad, northern Khan Younis, on March 19.
  • West Bank: Israeli media said on March 19 that the IDF has established a unit of engineers and intelligence personnel to locate “offensive” tunnels in the West Bank. The unit has not discovered any offensive tunnels in the West Bank at the time of this writing, according to Israeli media.
  • Lebanese Hezbollah in Syria: Israel likely conducted multiple airstrikes targeting Hezbollah facilities in southern Syria.
  • Lebanese Hezbollah in the Region: Senior Hezbollah official Wafiq Safa traveled to the UAE on March 19 to negotiate the release of Lebanese detainees suspected of having ties to Hezbollah, according to Lebanese media.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

See topline text for additional details on the al Shifa Hospital raid.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 19.[25] Nahal Brigade forces killed several Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip.[26] The IDF Nahal Brigade has been operating in the area between the northern and central Gaza Strip for two weeks.[27] The IDF has been constructing a highway in this area, which the IDF has dubbed the “Netzarim corridor.”[28] Palestinian militias continued to target Israeli forces in the Netzarim area with rocket and mortar fire.[29] Palestinian groups also fired rockets at Israeli armor and infantry in the eastern Central Governorate.[30]

The IDF Egoz and Maglan special operations forces (SOF) concluded clearing operations in Hamad, northern Khan Younis, on March 19.[31] Hamas-affiliated media said that Israeli forces departed Hamad on March 19.[32] Israeli forces expanded clearing operations into Hamad on March 3.[33] Israeli SOF raided a building used by a Hamas battalion deputy commander and killed over 100 Palestinian fighters during the two-week operation in Hamad.[34]

The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) continued clearing operations in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, on March 19.[35] The 7th Brigade targeted Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure in Qarara on March 19, including a building that Palestinian fighters used to fire anti-tank guided missiles at Israeli forces on March 17.[36]

Israeli forces are continuing to target Hamas police officers in the Gaza Strip. The IDF has warned that all members of “the Hamas apparatus,” including Hamas police officers, are legitimate targets.[37] Hamas controls several internal security forces, including the Civil Police.[38] The Israeli Air Force killed the Hamas police director in the Nuseirat camp, Mahmoud al Bayoumi, on March 19.[39] An airstrike targeted his police vehicle.[40]  An Israeli airstrike also killed a Hamas police lieutenant colonel in Jabalia on March 19.[41] Hamas-affiliated media said that the police officer facilitated aid deliveries to Jabalia Camp.[42]  Hamas police officers, as well as Gazan clans and political factions, have provided escorts for aid convoys through the Gaza Strip.[43] Israel has sought to organize alternative security escorts for the shipments, including by using international private security contractors.[44]  Israeli forces killed Faiq al Mabhouh, who is a senior official in the Hamas-run Interior Ministry, during their operation in al Shifa Hospital on March 18.[45]

Mossad Director David Barnea, who is the lead Israeli official responsible for ceasefire and hostage negotiations, departed Qatar after one day of indirect ceasefire talks in Qatar, according to the Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesperson.[46] Lower-level negotiating teams remain in Qatar.[47]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 19.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters at least nine times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 18.[48] An al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighter fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Gush Etzion, south of Bethlehem.[49] The fighter injured two Israeli Shin Bet officers before Israeli security forces killed him.[50] Israeli media reported that the fighter was from Jenin.[51]

Israeli media said on March 19 that the IDF has established a unit of engineers and intelligence personnel to locate “offensive” tunnels in the West Bank.[52] The IDF reportedly established the unit after residents in Bat Hefer, which is across the Israel-West Bank border from Tulkarm, heard digging noises near their homes. The unit has not discovered any offensive tunnels in the West Bank at the time of writing, according to Israeli media. An unspecified security official said that the unit is aware that “terrorist organizations [in the West Bank] are trying to mimic some of the combat methods in Gaza” and that these organizations use underground facilities for weapons storage.[53] The unit has located approximately five shafts in the Jenin refugee camp and Nour Shams refugee camp, but Israeli media said that the shafts did not lead to tunnels without elaborating further upon the nature of the shafts.[54] The IDF discovered one tunnel dozens of meters long in Jenin refugee camp in July 2023 that connected an apartment to a mosque, however.[55]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 18.[56]

The IDF established a specialized brigade on March 19 to defend two areas in northern Israel from attacks from Syria and Lebanon.[57] The IDF created the new Mountain Brigade to “defend the Mount Dov and Mount Hermon sectors.” The brigade will replace the Hermon Brigade, which presumably operated in the same area. The IDF did not explain whether the Hermon Brigade would relocate or merge with the Mountain Brigade. The new Mountain Brigade will specialize in combat in mountainous terrain and will begin operating in the next several weeks.

Senior Hezbollah official Wafiq Safa traveled to the UAE on March 19 to negotiate the release of Lebanese detainees suspected of having ties to Hezbollah, according to Lebanese media.[58] The UAE has previously detained dozens of Lebanese nationals over suspected ties to Hezbollah.[59] Safa is the head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit.[60] This unit is responsible for coordination with Lebanese state entities, including political parties, Lebanese armed forces elements, and other state institutions. The unit is also responsible for bribing Lebanese officials to secure their assistance in covering up and enabling Hezbollah’s criminal activity.[61] The United States sanctioned Safa in July 2019 for serving as the head of Hezbollah’s security apparatus and using Lebanese ports and border crossings to smuggle weapons and transfer funds for Hezbollah.[62] Safa is also the Hezbollah official responsible for engaging the international community and Lebanon’s security forces, according to the US Treasury Department.[63]

Israel likely conducted multiple airstrikes targeting Lebanese Hezbollah facilities in southern Syria on March 18. The Syrian Defense Ministry said on March 19 that Syrian air defense systems intercepted at least one Israeli missile and that several other missiles struck unspecified military targets in the Damascus countryside.[64] Unspecified Syrian sources told Reuters that the strikes targeted Hezbollah ammunition depots near Yabroud in the Qalamoun Mountains north of Damascus.[65] An unspecified Western intelligence source said that the airstrike on March 18 also targeted “Hezbollah infrastructure” in Qutayfah, which is also north of Damascus.[66] Unspecified Syrian sources and ”regional intelligence” claimed that Israel has increased its rate of strikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Syria.[67] Yabroud and Qutayfah are located on main roads used by Iran and Iranian-affiliated militias to transport weapons and personnel through southern Syria and into Lebanon.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad and Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal Mekdad in Damascus on March 19.[68] Grossi and Mekdad discussed “the factors that hinder cooperation” between the IAEA and Syria.[69] Emirati media previously reported that Grossi would likely discuss the suspected nuclear reactor in eastern Syria that Israel destroyed in an airstrike in 2007.[70] The Syrian regime has denied that the site Israel struck in 2007 was a secret nuclear facility.[71] The IAEA concluded in 2011 that the site was “very likely” a nuclear reactor. Grossi said on March 19 that he visited Syria to “reignite high-level dialogue between the IAEA and Syria.”[72]

IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri warned that Iran would retaliate if “foreigners” seize Iranian oil tankers anywhere in the world during a speech for the anniversary of the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry on March 18.[73]  Tangsiri is probably implicitly warning the United States. Iran has previously seized US commercial vessels in response to US seizures of Iranian vessels.[74] These US seizures aim to enforce sanctions on Iran.

Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji discussed bilateral cooperation and the oil market in a telephone call with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak on March 19.[75] The ministers discussed the development of unspecified oil and gas field projects. Iran previously signed memoranda of understanding (MoU) with Russian oil companies to develop oil and gas fields, invest in the energy sector, and construct liquefied natural gas plants.[76] The two sides have not moved forward with these MoUs by converting them into contracts.

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri reached an agreement to secure gubernatorial positions for their respective political parties.[77] Maliki will nominate State of Law Coalition member Wadah al Tamimi as governor of Diyala Province and Ameri will nominate Fatah Alliance member Abbas al Zamili as governor of Qadisiyyah Province.[78] Zamili served as a member of the Qadisiyyah provincial council and as the head of the Badr Organization’s Shura Council in Qadisiyyah between 2016 and 2017.[79]

The Houthis claimed a missile attack targeting the Marshall Islands–flagged, Greek-operated MADO tanker in an unspecified area of the Red Sea.[80] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations has not confirmed this attack on the MADO at the time of writing. The UKMTO previously reported two attacks on the MADO on March 15 and March 16, respectively.[81]

The Houthis claimed a missile attack targeting Eilat, southern Israel, on March 19. The IDF said on March 18 that a “suspicious aerial target” crossed into Israeli territory from the Red Sea and fell into an open area north of Eilat.[82]

US CENTCOM conducted multiple preemptive strikes targeting Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen on March 18.[83] CENTCOM said that it destroyed seven anti-ship missiles, three Houthi attack drones, and three weapons storage containers. Houthi-affiliated media previously reported on March 18 that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted 10 airstrikes targeting two Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.[84]

Iran Update, March 18, 2024

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Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, Anne McGill, Talia Tayoun, Kelly Campa, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Israeli forces conducted a "high-precision operation" at al Shifa Hospital on March 18 based on intelligence that Hamas was using it for militant activity.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that they had intelligence that senior Hamas officials were using the area to conduct and direct attacks in the Gaza Strip.[2] Israeli ground forces advanced to the hospital with bulldozers and tanks and detained more than 200 Palestinians.[3] Palestinian militias, including Hamas, engaged Israeli forces around al Shifa Hospital during the operation.[4]

Israeli forces killed Faiq al Mabhouh, who is a senior official in the Hamas-run Interior Ministry, during the operation.[5] The IDF said that Mabhouh was the head of Hamas’ “Operations Directorate of the Internal Security Service,” while Hamas said that he was the “director of central operations of the Palestinian Police in Gaza.”[6] The Civil Police and the Interior Ministry‘s Internal Security Forces both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing.[7] The IDF has warned that all members of “the Hamas apparatus,” including Hamas police officers, are legitimate targets during IDF operations in the Gaza Strip.[8] Mabhouh’s brother, Mahmoud Mabhouh, was a prominent figure in Hamas’ military wing, and Israel likely killed him in 2010.[9]

Hamas infiltration into the al Shifa Hospital area after Israel’s initial clearing operation highlights Hamas’ efforts to reestablish itself in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces initially expanded clearing operations to al Shifa Hospital in November 2023, targeting a Hamas tunnel network underneath the hospital.[10] Hamas has sought to reconstitute militarily and rebuild its governing authority in the northern Gaza Strip since Israeli forces reduced their presence there in December 2023. Israeli Army Radio reported in January 2024 that the Israeli military establishment believes that Hamas is trying to restore its control over the civilian population in the northern Gaza Strip partly by rehabilitating local police there.[11]

Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas traveled to Tehran on March 16 to discuss military cooperation with senior Iranian officials. Abbas met with Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Brig. Gen. Ali Akbar Ahmadian, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri from March 17 to 18.[12]

Abbas may have discussed Iran transferring air defense systems to Syria during his meetings. Abbas discussed recent Israeli airstrikes in Syria and how to counter them, among other issues. Iranian leaders have sought in recent years to build an integrated air defense network in Syria that could repel Israeli airstrikes and thereby help Iran entrench itself militarily in Syria.[13] The meetings with Ashtiani and Bagheri are particularly noteworthy in this context. Ashtiani, as defense minister, is primarily responsible for managing arms procurement and sales as well as the Iranian defense industrial base. Bagheri has previously pursued expanding air defense cooperation with Syria.

Key Takeaways:

  • Gaza Strip: Israeli forces conducted a "high-precision operation" at al Shifa Hospital based on intelligence that Hamas was using it for militant activity.
  • Syria: Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas traveled to Tehran to discuss military cooperation with senior Iranian officials.
  • West Bank: Israeli police have conducted training exercises in recent weeks to prepare for possible Palestinian militia attacks into Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a one-way drone attack targeting an unspecified Israeli airbase in the Golan Heights.
  • Yemen: Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted 10 airstrikes targeting two Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen.

Iran Update, March 17, 2024

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Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) conducted clearing operations in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 17.
  • West Bank: The IDF arrested seven wanted individuals across the West Bank on March 17. The IDF also confiscated materials needed for manufacturing improvised explosive devices during an operation in Hebron.
  • Northern Israel: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 16.
  • The Red Sea: The Houthis likely fired at least one unspecified missile targeting the Marshall Islands-flagged LPG tanker MADO in the Gulf of Aden on March 16. This incident marks the second time the Houthis have targeted this vessel in two days.
  • Syria: The Israeli Air Force likely conducted air strikes targeting a Hezbollah ammunitions depot and other Syrian army positions along the Damascus-Homs highway on March 17.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.|

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 162nd Division and combat engineers demolished a 2.5-kilometer-long tunnel in the northern Gaza Strip during the week of March 10.[1] The IDF called the tunnel the “longest underground route” in the northern Gaza Strip that it has discovered during the war. The tunnel network allowed Hamas units to move between the northern and southern Gaza Strip.[2]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) conducted clearing operations in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 17.[3] The Nahal Brigade killed 18 Palestinian fighters operating near IDF positions using airstrikes, tank fire, and sniper fire.[4] The IDF Nahal Brigade has been operating in the area between the northern and central Gaza Strip for two weeks.[5] The IDF has been constructing a highway in this area, which the IDF has dubbed the “Netzarim corridor.”[6] This corridor divides the northern and southern parts of the Gaza Strip. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, mortared Israeli forces at the ”Netzarim site” near the Israeli-built road.[7] Palestinian militias also claimed rocket and small arms attacks near the corridor.[8] Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, mortared Israeli positions in the eastern part of the Gaza Strip‘s Central governorate in three separate attacks.[9]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on March 17. The IDF said that the IDF Givati Brigade (162nd Division) is still conducting clearing operations in Hamad.[10] The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) fought Palestinian fighters and seized weapons in Khan Younis.[11] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also engaged Israeli forces operating in Khan Younis.[12]

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) mortared Israeli forces at Nahal Oz, which is close to the Israel-Gaza Strip border, on March 17.[13] The PFLP is a secular, leftist Palestinian group fighting alongside Hamas in the war.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 16.[14]

The IDF arrested seven wanted individuals across the West Bank on March 17.[15] The IDF confiscated materials needed for manufacturing improvised explosive devices during an operation in Hebron.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 16.[16] The IDF reported that it shot down a “suspicious aerial target” over Acre on March 16.[17] The IDF often uses this language to refer to suspected drones

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that US forces destroyed five naval attack drones and one aerial drone in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on March 16.[18] CENTCOM assessed that these weapons presented an “imminent threat” to commercial vessels and US Navy ships in the Red Sea.[19] Houthi-controlled and pro-Axis of Resistance media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted airstrikes in al Durayhimi, Hudaydah governorate and in al Taiziyah, Taiz governorate, on March 16.[20]

CENTCOM also reported that the Houthis launched two drones toward the Red Sea on March 16.[21] CENTCOM intercepted one of the drones. CENTCOM assessed that the second drone likely crashed into the Red Sea.[22] Neither drone caused any casualties aboard or damage to nearby vessels.

The Houthis likely fired at least one unspecified missile targeting the Marshall Islands-flagged tanker MADO in the Gulf of Aden on March 16.[23] UK Maritime Trade Operations reported that an unspecified actor fired at least one missile targeting the MADO. This incident marks the second time the Houthis have targeted this vessel in two days. The UKMTO previously reported that an explosion occurred near the MADO in the Red Sea approximately 65 nautical miles west of Hudaydah on March 15.[24]

The Israeli Air Force likely conducted air strikes targeting a Hezbollah ammunitions depot and other Syrian army positions along the Damascus-Homs highway on March 17.[25] The Syrian Defense Ministry said that the strikes targeted several sites in southern Syria, damaging property and injuring one Syrian soldier.[26] Israeli Army Radio reported that the strikes targeted Syrian army positions and Hezbollah ammunition depots.[27] A Syria-focused analyst noted that the area has a large Hezbollah presence.[28] CTP-ISW has previously reported that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) may have previously used this highway as a weapons transportation route.[29] The airstrikes caused significant secondary explosions, potentially confirming that the strike targeted an ammunitions

Iran Update, March 16, 2024

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Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) conducted clearing operations in the northern and central Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved plans for a military operation into Rafah.
  • Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least six locations in the West Bank.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) conducted clearing operations in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 16.[1] The IDF Nahal Brigade has been operating at the intersection of the northern and central Gaza Strip for two weeks.[2] Israeli forces are launching raids from the ”Netzarim corridor” targeting Palestinian fighters. The “Netzarim corridor“ is where the IDF has been constructing a highway to support operations in the Gaza Strip.[3] Israeli forces have destroyed Hamas military infrastructure in the area including weapons depots and rocket launchers.

The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division) received intelligence about Palestinian fighters hiding inside a Hamas-affiliated building and directed an airstrike that targeted the fighters.[4] The IDF also killed a Hamas commander of a sniper unit.[5]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on March 16. Israeli infantrymen coordinated with the IDF Air Force to destroy a Hamas weapons depot.[6] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 15 shows flattened terrain north of Hamad in northern Khan Younis, indicating that Israeli tanks or bulldozers operated in the area. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, detonated an unspecified explosive device targeting Israeli forces in Hamad.[7]

Fatah criticized Hamas for opposing PA President Mahmoud Abbas’ appointment of a new prime minister.[8] Hamas stated on March 15 that Abbas’ decision is an “individual decision” that is “devoid of substance,” noting that Palestinians have lost confidence in the PA’s policies.[9] Fatah officials argued that Hamas is responsible for the war in the Gaza Strip and unilaterally conducted the October 7 attack.[10]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved plans on March 15 for a military operation into Rafah.[11] The Prime Minister’s Office did not provide additional details. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters that the Biden administration has not seen the plan and the Biden administration does not know how Israel plans to protect civilians in Rafah.[12] The IDF said on March 13 that it plans to move civilians from Rafah to “humanitarian enclaves” in the central Gaza Strip before any Israeli offensive into Rafah.[13] There are approximately 1.4 million displaced Palestinian civilians currently in Rafah.

Israeli security officials told the Israeli security cabinet that the Israeli airstrike in the central Gaza Strip on March 11 likely killed Hamas military wing deputy commander Marwan Issa.[14] Israeli media reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Issa’s death is an “is an important and significant achievement for Israel.”[15] Israeli journalists described Issa as the third most senior official in Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[16] Issa worked closely with Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar and Hamas military wing commander Mohammad Deif to plan the October 7 attack.[17]

Palestinian fighters have conducted at least two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 15. PIJ fired rockets targeting Sderot in southern Israel on March 15.[18] Israeli air defenses intercepted one of the rockets and a second rocket landed outside the city.[19] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fired rockets into southern Israel on March 16.[20] Israeli Army Radio reported red alerts in Nahal Oz on March 16.[21]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in at least six locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 15.[22] An imam from a local mosque fired small arms at an Israeli settlement in Hebron on March 16.[23] Israeli forces later engaged and killed him.[24]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 15.[25]

Iran Update, March 15, 2024

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Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, Anne McGill, and Brian Carter 

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Unspecified Iranian officials said that Iran could “intensify its proxy war” against Israel if Israel attacks Lebanese Hezbollah, which is consistent with Iran's decades-old use of its proxies.[2] Seven Iranian, Lebanese, and regional sources told Reuters on March 14 that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani met with Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut in February 2024 to discuss the possibility of an Israeli offensive against Hezbollah.[3] Three of the sources told Reuters that an Israeli offensive against Hezbollah “could pressure Iran to react more forcefully" by intensifying “its proxy war” against Israel.[4] Iran has avoided directly fighting Israel and the United States in the current war, instead using its proxies across the region to fight on Iran’s behalf. Iran has long used its regional proxies to pursue Iranian strategic objectives throughout the region. This strategy decreases the risk that Iran will face direct retaliation from its adversaries by obfuscating Iran’s role in escalation. Iranian media reported in October 2023 that Iran formed a “joint operations room” to coordinate operations and attacks against Israel and the United States with its proxies in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.[5] Iranian media claimed that Hezbollah would use Syrian ground forces--as part of the joint operations room--to invade Israel in the event of an Israeli attack on Hezbollah. Hezbollah is closely affiliated with the Syrian Arab Army’s 1st Corps.[6]

The Iranian officials may also have been messaging Iran’s opposition to a direct confrontation with Israel to try to appease the Iranian public. An Iranian source told Reuters that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei seeks to avoid a direct war with Israel.[7] Some Iranians criticize the regime for funding Iran’s proxies and focusing on external affairs while failing to improve citizens’ lives and the economy.[8] Many of the sociocultural, economic, and political frustrations that ignited the Mahsa Amini movement that began in September 2022 remain prevalent among the Iranian population, moreover.[9]

Key Takeaways:

  • Lebanon: Unspecified Iranian officials said that Iran could “intensify its proxy war” against Israel if Israel attacks Lebanese Hezbollah, which is consistent with Iran's decades-old use of its proxies.
  • Iran has long used its regional proxies to pursue Iranian strategic objectives throughout the region. This strategy decreases the risk that Iran will face direct retaliation from its adversaries by obfuscating Iran’s role in escalation.
  • Iranian media reported in October 2023 that Iran formed a “joint operations room” to coordinate operations and attacks against Israel and the United States with its proxies in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
  • Iranian media claimed that Hezbollah would use Syrian ground forces—as part of the joint operations room—to invade Israel in the event of an Israeli attack on Hezbollah. Hezbollah is closely affiliated with the Syrian Arab Army’s 1st Corps.
  • The Telegraph reported that five Iranian-controlled, US-sanctioned container ships are using European ports to disguise weapons shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in Zahra, south of Gaza City.
  • Negotiations: Hamas submitted a ceasefire proposal and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange to international mediators.
  • Yemen: Houthi fighters conducted at least three attacks targeting civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
  • Syria: Israel likely conducted a drone strike targeting a truck transporting weapons for Iranian-backed militias near Albu Kamal, Syria.
  • Iran: The G7 countries warned Iran that it should not transfer missiles to Russia.
  • West Bank: Tens of thousands of Palestinian worshippers gathered peacefully at the al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem for Ramadan prayers, despite repeated Hamas calls to “defend” the mosque.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in Zahra, south of Gaza City, on March 15. Three Palestinian militias, including Hamas, targeted Israeli forces in Zahra using rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), thermobaric rockets, and indirect rocket fire.[10] The militias may have infiltrated into Zahra and other areas of southern Gaza City from areas of the central Gaza Strip that the Israel Defense Force (IDF) has not yet cleared. The militias also likely reactivated dormant cells after the Israelis decreased the number of IDF troops in the northern Strip.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162 Division) killed ten Palestinian fighters in an unspecified area in the central Gaza Strip on March 15.[11] Israeli forces are currently operating at the intersection of the northern and central Strip near Wadi Gaza.[12]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on March 15. Israeli forces directed an airstrike targeting a Palestinian militia squad that was loading explosives into a vehicle in Khan Younis.[13] Hamas fighters fired RPGs targeting Israeli forces in Hamad neighborhood.[14] Hamas fighters returned from the frontlines in Hamad and said that they had conducted a complex attack by detonating an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) and firing a thermobaric rocket targeting an Israeli armored vehicle.[15]

Hamas submitted a ceasefire proposal and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange to international mediators on March 14.[17] The proposal is Hamas’ response to the US, Qatari, and Egyptian proposal that Hamas has been deliberating over for weeks.[18] Hamas’ statement said that the proposal includes a ceasefire, calls for Israel to release Palestinian prisoners, an increase in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, a return of displaced Palestinians, and a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Strip.[19] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office said that Hamas continues to make “unrealistic demands.”[20] A senior Israeli official noted that Hamas’ proposal included the number of Palestinian prisoners that Hamas demands Israel release as part of the deal.[21] The number of Palestinian prisoners Hamas is demanding has been a point of contention during ceasefire negotiations. Hamas reportedly expressed readiness to reduce the number of Palestinian prisoners whom Israel would release.[22] CNN reported that Israel is sending a delegation to Doha for further talks.[23]

The first delivery of humanitarian aid via the maritime corridor arrived in the northern Gaza Strip on March 15.[24] The first humanitarian aid ship left Cyprus on March 12. The UAE and Cyprus funded the project, and World Central Kitchen (WCK) organized the delivery.[25] The IDF confirmed on March 15 that its forces are on land and at sea to secure the delivery area.[26] The ship contained 115 tons of food and water. WCK transferred the food and water into 12 trucks that then distributed the aid in the northern Gaza Strip.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said the best option Israel has for the future leader in the Gaza Strip will be local Palestinians who are affiliated with the Palestinian Authority (PA).[27] Israeli media reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hopes to allow local clans unaffiliated with Hamas or the PA to rule the Gaza Strip after the war ends.[28] Hamas reportedly killed the head of a local clan in Gaza City on March 13. Palestinian civilians accused the clan of cooperating with Israel.[29] The attack demonstrates that Hamas intends to reassert its authority in the Gaza Strip and suppress political opposition.

Hamas criticized PA President Mahmoud Abbas’ appointment of a new prime minister.[30] Abbas appointed current Palestinian Investment Fund Chairman Mohammad Mustafa as the new PA prime minister on March 14.[31] Abbas tasked him with forming a new government that will seek to rebuild the Gaza Strip after the war. Hamas stated on March 15 that Abbas’ decision is an “individual decision” that is “devoid of substance,” noting that Palestinians have lost confidence in the PA’s policies.[32]

Hamas announced on March 15 that it established a “government” with Palestinian armed groups, including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), in response to Mustafa’s appointment.[33] Hamas warned that ”political exclusivity will grow,” and that ”division will deepen” without a national consensus on a government.

PIJ fighters fired rockets targeting unspecified Israeli towns surrounding the Gaza Strip on March 14.[34] The IDF Air Force and artillery forces targeted Palestinian military infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip on March 15 in response to rocket launches into southern Israel on March 14.[35]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least three times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 14.[36] The IDF said on March 15 that it has conducted over 60 ”brigade operations” in the West Bank since the Israel-Hamas war began.[37] The IDF also said that more than half of Palestinians that Israel has detained in the West Bank are associated with Hamas.[38]

Tens of thousands of Palestinian worshippers gathered peacefully at the al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem for Ramadan prayers on March 15, despite repeated Hamas calls to “defend” the mosque.[39] Israeli police reported that there were no confrontations during the prayers.[40] Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh called in February for marches on al Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan.[41] Ramadan began on March 10. Hamas released several statements in March that called for Palestinians to escalate attacks against Israeli forces in the West Bank.[42]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 13 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 14.[43]

The Telegraph reported on March 14 that five Iranian-controlled, US-sanctioned container ships are using European ports to disguise weapons shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah.[44] The Telegraph reported that the Iranian ships transport weapons from Bandar Abbas, Iran, to Latakia, Syria. Unspecified sources told The Telegraph that some of these ships continue to Belgium, Italy, and Spain to obfuscate the nature of the shipments. One of the sources said that Iran has relied on shipping weapons to Hezbollah by sea following Israeli attacks on Iranian land shipments from Iraq to Syria.[45] Israel has conducted an air campaign in Syria in recent months meant to disrupt Iran’s efforts to transfer weapons and military systems to Hezbollah and other Iranian partners in the Levant.[46] Hezbollah members have claimed previously that the group controls surveillance at the port and that the port is ”ours, [Hezbollah’s].”[47]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Israel likely conducted a drone strike on March 15 targeting a truck transporting weapons for Iranian-backed militias near Albu Kamal, Syria.[48] A local Syrian outlet reported that the militia fighters were transporting Iranian missile parts to Lebanese Hezbollah.[49] The IDF previously said in February 2024 that it had conducted a series of airstrikes targeting more than 50 Hezbollah and Hezbollah-affiliated targets in Syria since the start of the Israel-Hamas war to interdict Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah through Syria.[50]

Iranian state media said on March 14 that Iran and the United States conducted secret indirect nuclear negotiations in Oman in January 2024, thus confirming earlier Western reports.[51] The Financial Times reported that the talks were primarily focused on convincing Tehran to pressure the Houthis to halt attacks on maritime traffic in the Red Sea but included discussions over Iran’s nuclear program.[52] Iranian state media denied that the negotiations addressed the Houthi attacks but confirmed that the two sides held nuclear negotiations, citing an unspecified “informed” Iranian source.[53]

The G7 countries warned Iran on March 15 that it should not transfer missiles to Russia.[54] The G7 countries threatened “new and significant measures against Iran,” including new sanctions, if Iran transfers missiles to Russia. Western media reported that the G7 is considering banning Iran’s national air carrier, Iran Air, from conducting flights to Europe.[55] American and European officials told Western media on March 15 that they have no evidence confirming that Iran has supplied missiles to Russia.[56] Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia in early January.[57]

Iranian Ambassador to Qatar Ali Saleh Abadi discussed security cooperation with Qatari Interior Minister and Internal Security Force (Lekhwiya) Commander Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad al Thani in Doha on March 14.[58] Abadi previously served as the governor of Iran’s Central Bank between October 2021 and December 2022 and has served as Iran’s ambassador to Qatar since August 2023.[59] Abadi’s appointment coincided with the transfer of $6 billion worth of frozen Iranian assets to Qatari banks as part of a prisoner swap agreement with the United States.[60] The Lekhwiya is a Qatari security service responsible for counterterrorism, riot control, the maintenance of security and public order, and the protection of Qatar’s borders and coasts.[61] Thani previously took military training courses on combating terrorism and riot control between 2015 and 2018.[62]

Houthi fighters have conducted at least three attacks targeting civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on March 14.[63] US CENTCOM reported that the Houthis conducted two anti-ship ballistic missile attacks from Houthi-controlled Yemen, targeting unspecified targets in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.[64] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree claimed on March 15 that Houthi fighters had targeted the Panama-flagged, Vietnamese-owned Pacific 01 merchant vessel in the Red Sea.[65] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations separately reported an explosion occurred alongside a vessel on March 15 approximately 65 nautical miles west of Hudaydah in the Red Sea.[66] The vessel did not suffer any damage.[67] Saree also claimed that the Houthis launched one-way attack drones targeting a US warship in the Red Sea.[68]

US CENTCOM reported on March 14 that it conducted preemptive strikes targeting nine anti-ship missiles and two drones in Houthi-controlled Yemen.[69] CENTCOM determined that the munitions presented an “imminent threat to merchant vessels and US Navy ships in the region.” 

The United States and the United Kingdom expressed their support to boost the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism’s (UNVIM) capacity to inspect shipments to Houthi-controlled ports during a UNSC meeting on March 14.[70] US Alternative Representative for Special Political Affairs, Ambassador Robert Wood, stated that UNVIM is critical to identifying violations of the Houthi arms embargo and preventing weapon shipments to the Houthis.[71] UNVIM operates under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 2216 to monitor commercial and bilateral aid shipments bound for Yemeni ports in the Red Sea and inspect the cargo for banned items, including weapons.[72] UNSC Resolution 2216 demanded an immediate ceasefire in Yemen in 2015 and imposed sanctions, a travel ban, and an arms embargo on Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi.[73] Iran continues to supply advanced conventional weapons and ”other lethal aid” to the Houthis in support of the group’s attack campaign in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, according to US officials.[74]

 


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Ashka Jhaveri, Peter Mills, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Elizabeth Volynsky-Lauzon, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Hamas reportedly killed the head of a local clan in Gaza City on March 13 likely as part of Hamas’ effort to reassert its authority in the northern Gaza Strip.[1] Hamas targeted the head and other members of the armed Dughmush clan amid local accusations that the clan stole humanitarian aid and cooperated with Israel.[2] The clan responded to the killing by vowing to retaliate and declaring Hamas members and positions as “legitimate target[s].”[3] Hamas denied reports that its forces killed the clan members.[4]

Hamas has sought to reconstitute militarily and rebuild its governing authority in the northern Gaza Strip since Israeli forces reduced their presence there in December 2023. CTP-ISW has reported extensively on how Hamas fighters have infiltrated areas in the northern strip that Israeli forces previously cleared. Israeli Army Radio reported in January 2024 that the Israeli military establishment believes that Hamas is trying to restore its control over the civilian population in the northern Gaza Strip partly by rehabilitating local police there.[5] The Civil Police and the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry‘s Internal Security Forces both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing.[6] The killing of the members of the Dughmush clan further demonstrates that Hamas fighters remain present in at least some areas of the northern strip.

Hamas may be targeting political opposition as part of its effort to consolidate its power in the northern Gaza Strip. An Israeli academic reported that Hamas killed the Dughmush members after they expressed readiness to be part of a new administration in the Gaza Strip.[7] Tension between Hamas and the Dughmush clan is not unprecedented, as they have periodically clashed since Hamas took power in the Gaza Strip in 2007. The clan reportedly has affiliations with Salafi-jihadi groups as well as organized crime and arms trading in the Gaza Strip. Hamas reportedly warned Palestinians against cooperating with Israel earlier this week and that Hamas would treat those who did with “an iron fist.”[8] Hamas has a long history of violently suppressing political opposition in the Gaza Strip.[9]

Hamas’ killing of the Dughmush clan members risks further eroding the security situation there as humanitarian aid enters the northern Gaza Strip. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on March 13 that “criminal gangs” and “ordinary civilians” are resorting to looting humanitarian aid.[10] He warned that lawlessness, insecurity, and desperation remain hurdles to delivering aid to Gazans. Intercommunal violence within the Gaza Strip between Hamas and clans, such as the Dughmush, could further threaten the secure delivery of aid into the area. These challenges could become particularly acute if Hamas and its rivals compete with one another to control the flow of aid in the strip. Israel is currently deciding whether to open a crossing directly into the northern Gaza Strip based on as assessment of how securely the convoys can reach civilians.[11]

Key Takeaways:

 

  • Northern Gaza Strip: Hamas reportedly killed the head of a local clan in Gaza City likely as part of Hamas’ effort to reassert its authority in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in several sectors of Khan Younis.
  • Political Developments: Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas appointed the current chairman of the Palestinian Investment Fund, Mohammad Mustafa, as the new PA prime minister. Abbas tasked him with forming a new government that will seek to rebuild the Gaza Strip after the war.
  • Yemen: The Houthi movement launched an anti-ship ballistic missile targeting an unspecified vessel in the Red Sea. US CENTCOM reported that US forces destroyed four drones and a surface-to-air missile in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.
  • Iraq: Head of the Iraqi National Masses Party Ahmed Abdullah al Jubouri nominated Badr Mahmoud al Fahal for governor of Salah ad Din Province.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.

Iran Update, March 13, 2024

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Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, Ashka Jhaveri, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli media reported that the IDF Navy fired at two suspected Palestinian fighters in scuba gear approaching the border between the northern Gaza Strip and Israel.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF 98th Division expanded clearing operations in the northern and eastern Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: Saudi state-affiliated media claimed that Hamas agreed to a modified US ceasefire proposal on March 12, which Hamas later denied.
  • Iran: Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani claimed on March 13 that Iranian defense exports have increased by five times since 2022.
  • Yemen: The Houthi movement launched a close-range ballistic missile targeting the USS Laboon in the Red Sea.
  • West Bank: IDF Army Radio reported that the IDF completed a brigade-sized operation in Jenin.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting an official in Hamas’ military wing, Hadi Ali Mustafa, near Tyre, Lebanon.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli media reported on March 13 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Navy fired at two suspected Palestinian fighters in scuba gear approaching the border between the northern Gaza Strip and Israel.[1] CTP-ISW has not recorded Palestinian fighters attempting to infiltrate into Israel from the Gaza Strip since early November 2023.[2] An IDF Navy helicopter destroyed an unspecified Palestinian vessel near Gaza City on March 11.[3]

The presence of Palestinian fighters and infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip demonstrates that Palestinian militias retain some capacity to operate there, despite Israeli clearing operations. Israeli forces began clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip in late October 2023 and began withdrawing from the area in early 2024.[4] International governments and non-government organizations are beginning to build temporary infrastructure on the coast of the northern Gaza Strip to enable the distribution of aid from the sea.[5]

Israeli forces continued to operate in the central and northern Gaza Strip on March 13. The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) directed airstrikes targeting a Palestinian fighter entering a Hamas-affiliated building in the central Gaza Strip.[6] The IDF 143rd Division conducted several airstrikes targeting Palestinian militia infrastructure in Deir al Balah, including tunnel shafts and anti-tank guided missile positions.[7] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and is aligned with Hamas in the war, claimed the only attack targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on March 13. Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters mortared Israeli forces in southern Zaytoun in this attack.[8]

The IDF killed a Hamas commander in the Hamas “operations department”  at a UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) food distribution center in Rafah on March 13. The IDF assessed that the commanders’ death will “significantly harm the functioning” of Hamas’ forces in Rafah.[9] The IDF said that the commander, Muhammad Abu Hasna, directed Hamas forces engaged with Israeli forces elsewhere in the Strip from an intelligence command center in Rafah.[10]  The IDF reported that Abu Hasna had seized humanitarian aid equipment and distributing it to Hamas fighters.[11]

The IDF 98th Division expanded clearing operations in the northern and eastern Khan Younis on March 13.[12] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade detained several Palestinian militia fighters, including a Hamas Nukhba commander in Hamad.[13]  The IDF Egoz Unit (89th Commando Brigade) airstrikes and indirect fire targeting seven Palestinian fighters barricaded in a building in Hamad.[14] The IDF Maglan Unit (89th Commando Brigade) seized weapons in Hamad.[15] Palestinian militias did not claim attacks targeting Israeli forces in Khan Younis on March 13.

Saudi state-affiliated media claimed that Hamas agreed to a modified US ceasefire proposal on March 12, which Hamas later denied..[16] Saudi state-affiliated media cited an unspecified ”senior Hamas official” who said that Hamas representatives would travel to Cairo in the coming days to discuss final details and the modified proposal’s implementation.[17] Hamas denied the report and implored the media to “ensure accuracy and credibility in reporting the news and not to manipulate the feelings of [the Palestinian] people.”[18] Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh issued five maximalist demands for a hostage-for-prisoner exchange on March 10 and stated that the Hamas leadership would reject any agreement that called for a temporary ceasefire.[19] The United States' proposal directly conflicts with Haniyeh’s recent demands because it does not explicitly call for a path to a lasting ceasefire.[20]

The IDF announced that it conducted a pilot shipment to supply aid directly to the northern Gaza Strip.[21] Israel inspected six World Food Program aid trucks at the Kerem Shalom crossing before allowing the trucks to enter the northern Gaza Strip via "Crossing 96.“[22] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson said that the Israeli political establishment would decide whether to open ”Crossing 96” based on the results of the pilot shipment.[23] The trucks reached southern Gaza City without incident.[24] Israeli officials have expressed concern that Hamas is seizing aid from convoys in the Gaza Strip.[25] CTP-ISW reported that the Israeli War Cabinet approved a measure allowing the direct flow of humanitarian aid into northern Gaza Strip on February 25.[26]

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 13.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least 14 times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 12.[27] Nine of the clashes occurred in Jenin.[28] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and PIJ separately claimed small arms fire targeting IDF positions near Tulkarm on March 13.[29]

IDF Army Radio reported that the IDF completed a brigade-sized operation in Jenin on March 13.[30] The IDF killed two Palestinian fighters and destroyed planted IEDs during the operation.[31] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and PIJ detonated IEDs and fired small arms at Israeli forces conducting operations in Jenin on March 12.[32]  

An individual stabbed and wounded an IDF soldier and an Israeli guard near Bethlehem on March 13.[33] No group has claimed the attack, and the IDF did not specify whether the attacker was affiliated with an armed group. Hamas celebrated the stabbing attack and reiterated its call for Palestinians march towards the al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.[34]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 12.[35] Hezbollah claimed that it fired unspecified weapons targeting an Israeli drone and "forced it to retreat” to Israeli territory on March 13.[36] The IDF has not commented on the incident at the time of writing. Hezbollah has claimed three attacks targeting Israeli drones since March 11.[37] Hezbollah shot down an Israeli drone on February 26.[38]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting an official in Hamas’ military wing, Hadi Ali Mustafa, near Tyre, Lebanon, on March 13.[39] Mustafa reported to a close aide to Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh Arouri, who Israel killed in Beirut on January 2.[40] The IDF stated that Mustafa was involved in “directing terror cells in Lebanon” and that Mustafa supported terror attacks targeting Israelis and Jews around the world.[41] Hamas’ military wing acknowledged Mustafa’s death on March 13.[42]

The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting two Syrian Arab Army (SAA) military sites operated by Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Syria on March 12.[43] The IDF stated that it will not allow Hezbollah to establish itself along Syria’s border with the Israel-controlled Golan Heights and that the IDF will hold the SAA responsible for Hezbollah activity in Syria.[44] Local Syrian sources reported that the Israeli strikes targeted Hezbollah positions in Tal Ahmar and Ain al Nouriyah, Quneitra Province, Syria, near the Israel-controlled Golan Heights.[45] Israeli media reported in 2020 that the SAA’s 1st Corps, which is responsible for areas of southern Syria near the Golan Heights, is closely affiliated with Hezbollah.[46]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani claimed on March 13 that Iranian defense exports have increased by five times since 2022.[47] Iran uses its defense exports to expand its military influence abroad and to generate revenue for the Iranian economy.[48] Ashtiani separately stated that Iran seeks to develop greater defense cooperation with Armenia, Qatar, Russia, and Turkey.[49] Ashtiani recently held separate meetings with the Qatari and Armenian defense ministers in Doha on March 4 and in Tehran on March 6, respectively.[50] Ashtiani attended the Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference during his visit to Qatar.[51] Iran displayed its drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, and air defense systems, among other military equipment, in the exhibition. Iran has also reportedly supplied drones to Armenia since at least July 2023.[52]

The Houthi movement launched a close-range ballistic missile targeting the USS Laboon in the Red Sea on March 12 .[53] US CENTCOM reported that the missile did not impact the ship or cause any damage or injuries.

CENTCOM reported on March 12 that a US and coalition vessel intercepted two drones launched from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.[54]

Houthi-controlled media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted three airstrikes targeting Hudaydah International Airport on March 13.[55]


Iran Update, March 12, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Elizabeth Volynsky-Lauzon, Anne McGill, Kathryn Tyson, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern and Central Gaza Strip: The IDF 162nd Division continued to operate in the northern and central Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias continued to conduct a deliberate defense of Hamad neighborhood, northern Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: The Qatari foreign affairs minister said that Israel and Hamas are “nowhere near a deal” regarding a ceasefire deal and prisoner-for-hostage exchange.
  • IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani alluded to the need for Hamas to “negotiate firmly” in the ceasefire negotiations, possibly indicating support for Hamas’ maximalist position.
  • West Bank: IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani claimed that the Israeli fear of Palestinian operations in the West Bank “reached its peak” in the current Persian calendar year (March 2023-March 2024) during an interview with Iranian state media.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah launched over 100 rockets targeting Israeli forces in the Golan Heights.
  • The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure in Beqaa and Baalbek Governorates.
  • Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport in Lod, Israel.
  • Iraq and Syria: The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will “almost certainly” resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria
  • Yemen: The Houthi movement launched two anti-ship missiles on March 11 that targeted a Singaporean-owned, Liberian-flagged merchant vessel in the Red Sea.
  • US CENTCOM confirmed that it conducted preemptive strikes targeting 18 Houthi anti-ship missiles and an unmanned underwater vessel in Houthi-controlled Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 162nd Division continued to operate in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 12.[1] The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) located and destroyed rocket launchers that Palestinian fighters previously used to launch rockets into Israel.[2] Israeli forces directed an airstrike in the area targeting Palestinian fighters who had launched two rockets at them.[3]

A Palestinian activist separately reported sounds of clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters south of Gaza City on March 12.[4]

Palestinian militias continued to conduct a deliberate defense of Hamad neighborhood, northern Khan Younis, on March 12. Three IDF brigades have been clearing Hamad of Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure since March 3.[5] The IDF had intelligence that Palestinian fighters retreated from other areas in Khan Younis to hide in Hamad.[6] Israeli forces directed airstrikes to kill Palestinian cells and located weapons in buildings during clearing operations on March 12.[7] Four Palestinian militias claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in Hamad using mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and other unspecified explosive devices.[8]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in other sectors of northern Khan Younis on March 12. The IDF Bislamach Brigade have killed over 100 Palestinian fighters by sniper fire, mortar and shell fire, and airstrikes over the past two weeks in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, and in eastern Khan Younis.[9] Israeli forces located infrastructure, weapons, combat equipment, and a drone launcher.[10] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters detonated an explosively-rigged tunnel and a house-borne improvised explosive device (HBIED) targeting Israeli forces in Qarara.[11] The Wall Street Journal published a map of the tunnel network in the Gaza Strip from 2014, which does not include any tunnels in Qarara.[12] The New York Times reported in January 2023 that the IDF now believes that there are more tunnels underneath the Gaza Strip than previously thought.[13]

The Qatari Foreign Affairs Minister said on March 12 that Israel and Hamas are “nowhere near a deal” regarding a ceasefire deal and prisoner-for-hostage exchange.[14] The minister also noted that Qatar is engaged in a “constructive” dialogue with Israel and Hamas. CIA Director William Burns said on March 12 that a potential ceasefire deal “is still a possibility” despite the difficult process of negotiations.[15] Hamas’ maximalist demands for a permanent ceasefire, return of displaced people, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, and sufficient humanitarian aid do not align with Israeli plans to continue clearing operations in the Gaza Strip until Hamas is defeated.

Israeli media reported that Senior Hamas Political Bureau official Mohammad Nazzal told al Jazeera that ceasefire negotiations are ongoing.[16] Nazzal said that the talks ”had reached an impasse“ but that international mediators are continuing their work. He also accused Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of impeding progress on negotiations and affirmed that there will be no deal until Israel agrees to Hamas’ terms.

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani alluded to the need for Hamas to “negotiate firmly” in the ceasefire negotiations, possibly indicating support for the maximalist position that Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh presented on March 10.[17]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant put forth the head of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) General Intelligence Service, Majed Faraj, as a candidate to temporarily manage civilian life in the Gaza Strip.[18] Faraj is a member of Fatah‘s Revolutionary Council and considered a possible successor to PA President Mahmoud Abbas.[19] Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has consistently opposed the PA’s involvement in governing the Gaza Strip.[20] However, his post-war plan does not explicitly rule out the role for the PA.[21] Israel previously discussed turning to former PA security official Mohammad Dahlan for governance in the Gaza Strip.[22] Dahlan said in a November 2023 interview with Time that he would not participate in a future Palestinian government but that he would help rebuild the Palestinian political system.[23]

Israel reported that a Palestinian fighter launched mortars from the southern Gaza Strip into Israel on March 12.[24] Palestinian militias have not claimed the attack at the time of this writing. Israeli forces monitored the source of fire and directed an airstrike to target the perpetrator. The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting military infrastructure in the strip in retaliation for the attack.[25]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 11.[26] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades detonated an IED in the Psagot settlement on March 11.[27] An unspecified individual separately attempted to stab an Israeli civilian in Givat Ronen.[28]

Israeli forces detained 10 wanted individuals during operations across the West Bank on March 12.[29] The IDF said that Israeli forces detained PIJ fighter Mehdi Fayyad, who has conducted previous attacks on Israeli forces, according to the IDF.[30] Israeli forces also located four lathes for manufacturing weapons in Urif village south of Nablus.[31]

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani claimed that the Israeli fear of Palestinian operations in the West Bank “reached its peak” in the current Persian calendar year (March 2023-March 2024) during an interview with Iranian state media on March 12.[32]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 14 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 11.[33] Hezbollah launched over 100 rockets targeting Israeli forces in the Golan Heights.[34] This attack was one of the largest Hezbollah has conducted since the war began.

The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure in Beqaa and Baalbek Governorates, Lebanon, on March 11 and March 12, respectively.[35] The Baalbek Governorate is approximately 100 km north of the Israel-Lebanon border.[36] The IDF said that the strikes were in response to Hezbollah’s attacks targeting northern Israel. The IDF separately published a summary of its air campaign in Lebanon and Syria over the past five months.[37] The IDF reported that its attacks in northern Lebanon “harm Hezbollah’s air and ground capabilities as well as its top command.”

An unspecified Lebanese Hezbollah parliamentary source said that the group is “prepared for any expansion of hostilities” with Israel in a statement to al Araby on March 12.[38] The source said that “Hezbollah will not be silent about the Israeli attacks.” Hezbollah launched at least 60 rockets targeting an IDF site in the Golan Heights on February 26 in retaliation for the IDF’s only other airstrike near Baalbek.[39]

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah met with a delegation of Hamas officials in Beirut, Lebanon, on March 12.[40] Hamas’ Deputy Political Bureau leader for the Gaza Strip Khalil al Hayya led discussions on Hamas’ operations in the Gaza Strip as well as on the Israel-Hamas negotiations. Nasrallah and the Hamas delegation discussed the developments in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as well as the ”multiple support fronts,” likely referring to the Iranian-backed attacks from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen targeting Israel.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari discussed “security and training” cooperation with Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev in Baghdad on March 12, possibly as part of a Russian effort to supplant the United States as a security guarantor in Iraq.[41] Kutrashev has met with at least six Iraqi officials, including senior security leaders, since January 2024.[42] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to try to supplant the United States in anticipation of the United States reducing its military presence there.[43] Kutrashev previously told Russian media in January 2024 that Russia seeks to expand its “presence” in Iraq and “invest additional resources in areas related to security.”[44] The Iraqi Interior Ministry, which is largely controlled by the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, is responsible for domestic law enforcement and oversees the Federal Police.[45] Shammari is affiliated with the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties—and previously served as the deputy commander of the Joint Operations Command for Iraq.[46]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting Ben Gurion Airport in Lod, Israel, on March 11.[47] The group described the attack as part of its “second phase of operations” to support Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[48] CTP-ISW previously reported that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq appears to have refocused its attacks to target primarily Israel rather than US forces for the moment.[49] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has not attacked US forces since February 4 but has claimed 10 attacks targeting Israel during this same period.[50] It is unclear, however, how many of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s attacks targeting Israel have succeeded.

The Jordanian armed forces reportedly intercepted the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s drone after it entered Jordanian airspace from Syria.[51] A Jordanian security official stated on March 12 that the Jordanian armed forces had located drone fragments near the city of Irbid near the Jordan-Syria border.[52]

Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al Araji claimed that ending the US-led international coalition mission in Iraq will not affect NATO’s mission in Iraq during a meeting with the Dutch, German, Italian, and NATO mission ambassadors to Iraq on March 11.[53] Washington and Baghdad began talks to evaluate the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq in late January 2024.[54] Araji called for greater cooperation between the NATO Mission in Iraq and the Iraqi defense and interior ministries.[55] An Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member separately claimed on March 12 that the NATO Mission in Iraq does not present “a threat to Iraq’s security and stability” like the US-led international coalition allegedly does.[56]

The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will “almost certainly” resume attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria.[57] The ODNI published its findings in the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment on March 11. These militias suspended their attacks targeting US forces following a one-way drone attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan in late January 2024.[58] IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad after the attack and instructed the militias to pause their attacks. Numerous Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have signaled in recent weeks that they will resume conducting attacks targeting US forces in the region.[59] The ODNI’s assessment is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are using US support for Israel in the current war as an excuse to attack US forces. The militias’ actual objective of these attacks is to advance Iran’s long-standing effort to erode US influence in the Middle East.[60] Iran and its Axis of Resistance will almost certainly continue their decades-long effort to expel US forces from the Middle East regardless of whether there is a ceasefire agreement in the Israel-Hamas war.

The ODNI assessed in its annual report on March 11 that Iran is not currently pursuing nuclear weapons.[61] The DNI stated specifically that Iran is not conducting the “key nuclear weapons-development activities” for a testable nuclear explosive. The DNI also stated that Iran will likely pursue further nuclear advancements to “build negotiating leverage” and in response to “additional sanctions, attacks, or censure against its nuclear program.”

Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program since 2021. Iran has produced enriched uranium metal at its uranium conversion facility in Esfahan.[62] Enriched uranium metal can be used to develop the core for nuclear weapons.[63] Iran has also stockpiled several significant quantities (or bombs’ worth) of highly enriched uranium, which it can use in a nuclear weapon.[64] Iran has additionally amassed a large stockpile of low-enriched uranium, which it can enrich to higher levels in a short period of time given its current enrichment capacity.[65] The graph below illustrates Iran’s current uranium stockpile, the number of significant quantities therein, and how quickly it can enrich those stockpiles to weapons-grade uranium:

The Houthi movement launched two anti-ship missiles on March 11 that targeted a Singaporean-owned, Liberian-flagged merchant vessel in the Red Sea.[66] US CENTCOM confirmed that the missiles did not impact the merchant vessel, Pinocchio.[67] The Houthi military spokesperson falsely claimed that the vessel is an “American ship.” The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported an explosion near a vessel in the Red Sea on March 11.[68]

The Houthi military spokesperson said on March 11 that the group will escalate its military operations during Ramadan, which he called the “month of Jihad.”[69] The spokesperson was presumably referring to Houthi attacks targeting international shipping and Israel. Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi previously alluded to an expansion of attacks on March 7.[70]

US CENTCOM confirmed that it conducted preemptive strikes targeting 18 Houthi anti-ship missiles and an unmanned underwater vessel in Houthi-controlled Yemen on March 11.[71] CTP-ISW previously reported the preemptive strikes impacted around Ras Issa, al Urj, and Jabanah in Hudaydah Governorate on March 11.[72]

Western media reported on March 12 that the European Union is prepared to impose “new and significant measures” against Iran in response to reports that Iran may transfer ballistic missiles to Russia.[73] Reuters reported that EU leaders expressed concern in a draft conclusion for their upcoming March 21-22 summit that “Iran may transfer ballistic missiles and related technology to Russia.” Reuters also reported that the European Union in the draft text called on unspecified third parties to cease “providing material support to Russia” and that the European Union “is prepared to respond swiftly. . . with new and significant measures against Iran,” including further sanctions.

Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to Russia in early January 2024.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson said on February 21 that Ukraine does not possess any information confirming that Iran has transferred missiles to Russia.[75] The US National Security Council spokesperson similarly said on February 22 that the United States has yet to confirm that Iran has transferred missiles to Russia.[76]

The United States and Bahrain jointly sanctioned several Iran-based individuals on March 12 for supporting the Iranian-backed al Ashtar Brigades.[77] The US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) noted that the sanctions are meant to demonstrate “the critical role that the Iranian regime plays in providing support to Al-Ashtar Brigades.” OFAC and Bahrain sanctioned the following Iran-based individuals:

  • Hussein Ahmad Abdallah Ahmad Hussein Al Dammami for facilitating “lethal aid” into Bahrain to support the al Ashtar Brigades
  • Al Ashtar Brigades member Ali Abdulnabi Ahmed Ebrahim M Alshofa for facilitating “lethal aid”
  • Al Ashtar Brigades member Hasan Ahmed Radhi Husain Sarhan for “plotting terrorist operations” in Bahrain
  • Al Ashtar Brigades financier Isa Saleh Isa Mohamed Salman for involvement in money transfers

The al Ashtar Brigades is an Iranian-backed Shia militant group operating in Bahrain.[78] The US State Department previously designated the al Ashtar Brigades as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2018.[79]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated on March 12 his call for Muslim countries to cut political and economic ties with Israel.[80] Khamenei also reiterated his calls for Muslim countries to help Palestinians. Khamenei has repeatedly called on Muslim states to impose an international embargo on Israel since the Israel-Hamas war began.[81] Khamenei further expressed his desire for the Axis of Resistance to destroy the Israeli state.

Iran Update, March 11, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Anne McGill, Karolina Hird, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters mortared Israeli forces in Gaza City at least four times.
  • Central Gaza Strip: The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting Hamas’ military deputy commander, Marwan Issa, in Nuseirat.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh presented Hamas’ comprehensive demands in ceasefire and hostage negotiations in a speech marking the start of Ramadan.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least eight times.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Syria: Iranian officials expressed their displeasure with the Syrian Bashar al Assad regime’s failure to implement its economic agreements with Iran.
  • Yemen: Houthi-affiliated media reported that the United States and United Kingdom conducted airstrikes targeting three locations in Yemen.
  • Iran: Russia, China, and Iran will hold the joint Maritime Security Belt-2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman between March 11-15.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters mortared Israeli forces in Gaza City at least four times since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 10. The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fired mortars targeting Israeli forces east of Beit Hanoun on March 10.[1] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah, separately claimed mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun neighborhood.[2] PIJ also claimed a mortar attack targeting IDF troops south of Gaza City.[3] The IDF reported that its Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) killed 15 Palestinian fighters south of Gaza City.[4]

An IDF Navy helicopter destroyed an unspecified Palestinian vessel near Gaza City on March 11.[5]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting Hamas’ military deputy commander, Marwan Issa, in Nuseirat on March 11. Israeli media reported that Issa was in an underground tunnel in Nuseirat.[6] The IDF did not confirm whether the airstrike killed Issa.[7] The airstrike killed five Palestinians and wounded ten more.[8] Israeli journalists described Issa as the third most senior official in Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[9] Issa worked closely with Hamas’ leader for the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, and the head of Hamas’ military, Mohammad Deif, to plan the October 7 attack.[10]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis on March 11. The IDF 89th Commando Brigade detained Palestinian fighters and seized weapons and other military equipment in apartment buildings in Hamad.[11] Palestinian fighters fired an anti-tank guided missile at IDF Givati Brigade soldiers in Hamad, after which IDF Maglan Unit soldiers identified and killed the fighters.[12] The Egoz Unit (89th Commando Brigade) clashed with Palestinian fighters in Hamad.[13] The IDF 7th Armored Brigade raided tunnels and weapon assembly sites in Hamad to find explosives, intelligence materials, and small arms.[14] The 7th Brigade has detained dozens of Palestinian fighters, who tried to escape with evacuating civilians since the beginning of Israeli operations in Hamad.[15] The IDF Bislamach Brigade separately targeted Palestinian fighters with aerial, sniper, and tank fire in Qarara on March 11.[16]

Palestinian militias claimed only one attack targeting Israeli forces around Khan Younis on March 11. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, targeted Israeli armor with an IED in Hamad.[17]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh presented Hamas’ comprehensive demands in ceasefire and hostage negotiations in a speech marking the start of Ramadan on March 10. Haniyeh presented five maximalist demands for a hostage-for-prisoner exchange. Haniyeh proposed a comprehensive ceasefire, the complete withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, the complete and unconditional return of displaced Gazans, and the resolution of humanitarian issues, including relief, shelter, and reconstruction, and ending restrictions on the movement of people and goods out of the Gaza Strip.[18] Haniyeh said that the Hamas leadership would reject any agreement that does not meet these demands. Haniyeh’s framework is consistent with Hamas’ public demands over the past week.[19] Hamas’ unwillingness to negotiate on these issues is corroborated by statements from Israeli negotiators.[20] Some of the demands, particularly the permanent ceasefire and a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, remain an obstacle in the ongoing negotiations.

Haniyeh also laid out a proposal for a post-war unified Palestinian government that would include Hamas. Haniyeh called for elections to form a temporary national consensus government until legislative and presidential elections and a Palestinian National Council can be held.[21] Haniyeh presented a vision of an independent Palestinian state comprised of the Gaza Strip and West Bank with the right of return and self-determination.[22] Several Palestinian factions, including Hamas, met in Moscow on February 29 to discuss the formation of a new Palestinian government.[23] Hamas claimed that the talks were constructive, but Fatah leaders were less optimistic, expressing concerns of an international boycott against any government that includes Hamas.[24] Fatah currently leads the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

Haniyeh also called for Palestinians to “protect Jerusalem and al Aqsa Mosque” during Ramadan from any Israeli “conspiracies” to restrict access to these areas.[25] Haniyeh’s statement mirrors his and other Hamas leaders’ rhetoric to “storm” and “march to” al Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan over the past several weeks.[26] Haniyeh rejected the Israeli claim that Palestinian militia groups do not want a ceasefire during Ramadan because they intend to use popular anger to “revolutionize the West Bank.”[27]

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 11.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least eight times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 10.[28] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that it detonated IEDs and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm and Nablus on March 10.[29]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated on March 11 that Iran is actively attempting to orchestrate terror attacks by smuggling weapons into the West Bank.[30] Gallant also said that Israel must prepare for an ”increase in terror” during Ramadan, which began on March 10. Israel has repeatedly thwarted attempts to smuggle Iranian-made weapons from Jordan into Israel and the West Bank over the past year.[31]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 10.[32] Hezbollah claimed that it launched four drones targeting Israeli forces at the Kila barracks in the Golan Heights.[33] The IDF said that it detected two drone, which landed in open areas.[34]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The secretary of the Iranian Supreme Free Trade Zones Council said on March 6 that Iran, Iraq, and Syria are continuing talks to establish a trilateral free trade zone.[35] The secretary noted that the joint free trade zone would facilitate Iranian access to the Mediterranean Sea. Iran and Syria resumed negotiations over the establishment of a joint free trade zone after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Syria in May 2023.[36] The Supreme Free Trade Zones Council secretary said at the time that negotiations had entered a “technical and implementation stage.”[37] CTP-ISW previously assessed that a free trade zone through Iran, Iraq, and Syria would allow Iran to move materials across borders without oversight that would normally enforce sanctions on trade with Iran and Syria.[38]

Iranian officials expressed their displeasure with the Syrian Bashar al Assad regime’s failure to implement its economic agreements with Iran. A senior Iranian member of the Iran-Syria Commerce Chamber said on March 3 that Syria has not fulfilled its part of trade agreements with Iran despite “several meetings” and called on Syria to pay “special attention.”[39] The Iranian Trade Development director general for West Asia similarly noted on March 3 that Iranian exports to Syria declined in 2023.[40] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Syrian President Bashar al Assad signed 15 economic cooperations agreement in May 2023, covering banking, communications technology, energy, reconstruction, and transportation.[41]

Houthi-affiliated media reported that the United States and United Kingdom conducted airstrikes targeting three locations in Yemen on March 11.[42] The strikes reportedly occurred around Ras Issa, al Urj, and Jabanah in Hudaydah Governorate. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom have confirmed the strikes as the time of this writing.

Russia, China, and Iran will hold the joint Maritime Security Belt-2024 naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman between March 11-15.[43] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia reported on March 11 that a detachment ships of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, including the Varyag Slava-class cruiser, arrived at Iran’s Chabahar Port to participate in Maritime Security Belt-2024 alongside Iranian and Chinese naval detachments.[44] The exercise, which was first held in 2019, is intended to practice safe combined naval maneuvers to ensure safe maritime economic activity.[45] The Russian Marshal Shaposhnikov Udaloy-class destroyer; the Chinese Ürümqi destroyer, Linyi frigate, Dongpinghu replenishment ship; and 10 unnamed Iranian ships, boats, and supply vessels and three naval helicopters are taking part in the exercise.[46] Representatives of Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Oman, India, and South Africa will observe the exercise.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei awarded the Order of Fath medal (otherwise known as the Victory Medal) to IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami and Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi on March 10.[47] Khamenei awarded Salami and Mousavi for “improving the defense, combat, and deterrence power” of the Iranian armed forces, according to Khamenei‘s website.[48] Notable recipients of this aware include former IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani, former IRGC Commander Major General Mohmmad Ali Jafari, IRGC Deputy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, and former Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani.[49]

Western media reported on March 11 that Iran increased its export of liquefied petroleum gas by 28 percent in 2023.[50] Bloomberg noted that Iran has now become the largest Middle Eastern exporter of liquified petroleum gas, largely driven by increased production in the South Pars gas field and a greater shipping capacity between Iran and China. Iranian oil production similarly increased to an all-time high of three million barrels per day in late 2023.[51] Iran exported most of that crude to China. The National Iranian Oil Company chief executive said on March 11 that 2.5 billion barrels were added to Iran’s natural gas and crude oil reserves in 2023.[52]

The Iranian deputy foreign affairs minister for policy met with the Armenian deputy foreign affairs minister in Tehran on March 11.[53] The two officials discussed the Israel-Hamas war, economic cooperation, and regional security in the Caucasus. The Iranian official warned against foreign interference in the Caucasus, referring to the long-held Iranian assertion that Israel and Turkey are expanding their geopolitical influence there via Azerbaijan.[54] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Gharaei Ashtiani similarly warned against extra-regional interference in the Caucasus during their separate meetings with Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan in Tehran on March 6 and 7.[55] The Iranian regime has historically accused Baku of allowing Israel to use Azerbaijani territory to launch operations against Iran.[56] Iran has provided security assistance, including drone sales, to Armenia previously as part of its effort to push back against Azerbaijan.[57]

The Iranian foreign affairs minister’s senior adviser met with the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Middle East and North Africa development director in Tehran on March 11.[58] The two officials discussed the Israel-Hamas war and called for the continuation of political processes to end conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. The Iranian official warned that continued American and British strikes targeting Houthi military capabilities would “disrupt peace efforts” in Yemen. Iranian and Russian officials have engaged in political coordination vis-a-vis the Israel-Hamas war since at least October 26, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[59]

The Iranian parliament has likely approved a controversial veiling bill, although it is unclear if the regime will implement it. An Iranian newspaper reported on March 9 that Parliament approved legislation that would use facial recognition technology to fine unveiled women. This report is consistent with an Iranian parliamentarian’s March 8 claim that Parliament had approved such legislation.[60] The Guardian Council—a regime body that can overrule parliamentary legislation—has rejected prior iterations of Parliament’s hijab bill, however, making it unclear if the recent veiling bill will reach implementation.[61] Discussions surrounding mandatory veiling legislation coincide with social media reports of increased tensions between unveiled Iranian women and hardline clerics in recent days.[62]

Iran Update, March 10, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on March 9 and 10, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, March 11, 2024

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces operating in southern Gaza City.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis.
  • US Operations: The US Army sent a vessel to the Mediterranean Sea with the first load of equipment to establish a humanitarian port off the Gaza Strip.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least three times in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least 13 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces operating in southern Gaza City on March 10. Palestinian militias reported that their fighters fired mortars and small arms targeting Israeli forces in the Tal al Hawa and Zaytoun neighborhoods, south of Gaza City.[1] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement targeted Israeli forces southeast of Gaza City with short-range rockets.[2] The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) has continued to operate in “central” Gaza, likely referring to the areas south of Gaza City in which Palestinian militias continue to claim attacks.[3] Israeli forces are also operating south of Gaza City to demolish structures along a new road that splits the Gaza Strip between the north and south.[4]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis on March 10. The IDF Givati Brigade (162nd Division) raided Hamas infrastructure used during the October 7 attack and seized mortars, an explosively formed penetrator (EFP), and small arms in eastern Hamad.[5] The Givati Brigade killed and detained Palestinian fighters in the area.[6] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade continued fighting in Hamad in close-range clashes and detained two Hamas fighters who surrendered to the IDF.[7] The IDF Egoz unit directed an airstrike on a Palestinian fighter responsible for the death of an Israeli soldier in the southern Gaza Strip on March 8.[8] The IDF Bislamach Brigade continued to target Palestinian fighters in Qarara.[9]

Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against the IDF around Khan Younis on March 10. Hamas fighters detonated a building in Bani Suheila that Israeli forces had rigged to explode.[10] Hamas claimed the house explosion killed and wounded Israeli forces, but the IDF did not acknowledge casualties from the attack at the time of this writing. This attack bears similarities to a Hamas attack that killed 21 Israeli soldiers as the soldiers rigged a building to detonate in the Central Gaza Strip in January 2024.[11] Hamas fighters also targeted Israeli dismounted infantry operating in tunnels in Bani Suheila.[12] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, reported that its fighters fired mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces in Hamad and generally west of Khan Younis City.[13]

Israeli forces are targeting Hamas nodes involved in attacks outside of the Gaza Strip. Israeli journalists reported that the IDF conducted a strike in eastern Rafah on March 10 targeting a Hamas official who was responsible for directing attacks in the West Bank.[14] Israeli forces, separately, arrested a cell of Arab Israelis from Sakhnin that was planning an attack on Israelis in coordination with Hamas officials in the Gaza Strip.[15] Hamas instructed the Sakhnin cell to construct improvised explosive devices.[16] Shin Bet said that that Hamas is still attempting to stoke tensions outside of the Gaza Strip during Ramadan.[17]

US CENTCOM announced on March 9 that a US Army logistics support vessel departed from Virginia to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea with the first load of equipment to establish a temporary pier to deliver humanitarian supplies to the Gaza Strip.[18] US President Biden announced the temporary pier initiative on March 7 during his State of the Union address.[19] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that the US plan to provide aid to the Gaza Strip via a temporary port will “advance the collapse of Hamas’s rule.”[20] Gallant also acknowledged that Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel would be involved in the maritime corridor.[21]

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 10.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least three times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 9.[22]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 13 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 9.[23]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

There is no significant activity to report.

 

Iran Update, March 9, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli raids in several sectors of the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Central Gaza Strip: The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: Israeli Mossad Chief Dadi Barnea told CIA Director Bill Burns that Hamas is not interested in a ceasefire deal and is intent to “burn the area” during Ramadan.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Israel: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting Israeli military and civilian infrastructure in Haifa and in the Golan Heights.
  • Yemen: The Houthis fired naval missiles at Singapore-flagged, owned, and operated vessel M/V Propel Fortune in the Gulf of Aden.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli raids in several sectors of the northern Gaza Strip on March 9. An Israel Defense Forces (IDF) unit in the Combat Intelligence Collection Corps identified several Palestinian fighters operating near Israeli forces in Beit Hanoun and directed an airstrike targeting them.[1] Israeli forces have been conducting an operation in Beit Hanoun to reclear the area of Palestinian fighters and locate military infrastructure for the past week.[2] Palestinian militias reported that their fighters fired mortars and rockets targeting Israeli forces in eastern Jabalia and Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City.[3] Palestinian fighters also clashed with Israeli forces in Zaytoun neighborhood.[4]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 9. Israeli forces killed approximately 10 Palestinian fighters.[5] The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting areas in the central strip from where Palestinian fighters have launched rockets targeting Sderot in southern Israel.[6] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published footage of its fighters mortaring Israeli forces east of the central Gaza Strip.[7]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis on March 9. The IDF Givati Brigade (162nd Division) raided military infrastructure in Hamad neighborhood, northwestern Khan Younis, detained Palestinian militia fighters, and located improvised explosive devices (IED) in the area.[8] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, claimed that its fighters detonated a bomb in Hamad.[9] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, reported that its fighters fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces in Hamad.[10] The IDF Bislamach Brigade clashed with Palestinian fighters in Qarara.[11] Israeli armor, dismounted infantry, and engineering elements destroyed military infrastructure in Qarara, where Hamas’ Qarara Battalion (Khan Younis Brigade) remains combat effective.[12]

Israeli Mossad Chief David Barnea told CIA Director Bill Burns that Hamas is not interested in a ceasefire deal and is intent to “burn the area” during Ramadan.[13] Barnea and Burns met in Jordan to discuss the state of ceasefire negotiations on March 8.[14] Barnea said that Hamas is “entrenched in its position,” possibly referencing Hamas’ repeated demands for a permanent ceasefire, return of displaced people, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, and sufficient humanitarian aid.[15] The spokesperson for Hamas’ military wing called for the month of Ramadan to be an escalation of the ”flood of Al Aqsa,” referring to the October 7 attack.[16] Ramadan is expected to begin around March 10.

Three US and Israeli officials told Axios on March 9 that United States and international mediators are intensifying their efforts to reach a hostage deal and temporary ceasefire.[17]

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 9.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 8.[18]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 8.[19]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting Israeli military and civilian infrastructure in Haifa and in the Golan Heights on March 8.[20] The group fired drones targeting an oil refinery in Haifa and an IDF base in the Golan Heights. Israeli officials have not commented on the attack at the time of writing.

US CENTCOM conducted preemptive strikes targeting two Houthi mobile anti-ship missiles in Houthi-controlled Yemen on March 8.[21]

The Houthis separately fired naval missiles at Singapore-flagged, owned, and operated vessel M/V Propel Fortune in the Gulf of Aden on March 8.[22] CENTCOM and UK Maritime Trade Operations confirmed that the missiles did not impact the ship.[23]

The Houthis claimed that they launched 37 one-way attack drones targeting US warships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory on March 9.[24] CENTCOM reported that US Navy and coalition aircraft and ships intercepted at least 28 drones.[25] CENTCOM reported that the Houthi drones did not damage any US coalition or commercial vessels.


Iran Update, March 8, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Ahmad Omid Arman, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The United States will construct a temporary pier on the coast of the Gaza Strip to facilitate the arrival and distribution of humanitarian aid. US President Joe Biden said during the State of the Union address on March 7 that he ordered the US military to lead an “emergency mission” to establish the pier.[1] Biden stressed that US servicemembers would not operate on the ground in the Gaza Strip. The United States will conduct a Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS). A JLOTS involves creating a floating pier for ship-to-shore operations.[2] The Pentagon press secretary said that the pier will be able to receive two million meals per day.[3] The secretary also noted that the pier facilities could take two months to become fully operational and will require up to 1,000 US military personnel to complete it.[4] Biden told reporters on March 8 that Israel would secure the temporary pier.[5] Thousands of Palestinians have surrounded aid shipments in the past, which underscores the need for security to ensure the fair, safe, and organized distribution of aid.[6]

The European Union announced on March 8 that it is planning to open an emergency maritime aid corridor from Cyprus to the Gaza Strip sometime between March 8 and 10 as part of a joint effort with its allies, including the United States.[7] The EU and the Cypriot Government said that all the efforts to open a maritime corridor will be “closely coordinated with Israel.”[8] The Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesperson welcomed the maritime corridor plan, noting that the aid must go through "security checks...in accordance with Israeli standards."[9] An anonymous Israeli official said that under the latest plan, UAE-donated aid would first go to Cyprus. Unspecified authorities would then inspect the aid before ships transport it to the Gaza Strip coast.[10]

CENTCOM commander Gen. Michael Kurilla said that US forces have not deterred the Houthis during a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on March 7.[11] Kurilla added that in his estimation, the United States will need to impose a "cost” on Iran to stop the Houthis from continuing attacks.[12] Kurilla highlighted the importance of targeting Iran’s ability to resupply the Houthis.

Kurilla also said that US airstrikes on February 2 and February 7 deterred Iran or its proxies and partners from continuing attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria. Kurilla reported that there has not been an attack on US forces in Iraq or Syria in 32 days.[13] US forces struck 85 Iranian-backed targets in Iraq and Syria on February 2 and killed a senior Kataib Hezbollah commander in Baghdad on February 7 who was responsible for the deaths of US servicemembers. Kurilla emphasized that deterrence is temporary.[14] Iranian-backed militias have conducted attacks targeting US service members prior to October 7. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq can resume attacks at a time, place, and for reasons of their choosing, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.[15] ran has continued to send arms and funds to its militias despite the pause in attacks.

Kurilla also said that Iran continues to support Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and armed groups in the West Bank.

Key Takeaways:

  • Gaza Strip: The United States will construct a temporary pier on the coast of the Gaza Strip to facilitate the arrival and distribution of humanitarian aid.
  • The European Union announced that it is planning to open an emergency maritime aid corridor from Cyprus to the Gaza Strip sometime between March 8 and 10 as part of a joint effort with its allies, including the United States.
  • US Military Operations in the Middle East: CENTCOM commander Gen. Michael Kurilla said that US forces have not deterred the Houthis during a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing. Kurilla also said that US airstrikes on February 2 and February 7 deterred Iran or its proxies and partners from continuing attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria. Kurilla emphasized that deterrence is temporary.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces conducted a clearing operation to reclear Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Israeli news reported that the IDF ordered Brig. Gen. Moshe Tamir to draft plans for a possible Israeli ground operation into southern Lebanon.
  • Yemen: US CENTCOM intercepted three drones that the Houthis launched toward the Gulf of Aden.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a clearing operation to reclear Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF Kfir Brigade’s Netzah Yuhda Battalion (143rd Division) operated in Beit Hanoun during the last week, engaging Palestinian fighters and destroying military infrastructure, including tunnel shafts.[16] The Kfir Brigade previously operated in the Gaza Strip but withdrew in January 2024.[17] The IDF said on December 18, 2023, that it had destroyed Hamas’ Beit Hanoun Battalion after conducting a nearly two-month-long clearing operation in the area.[18] Hamas exploited Israeli withdrawals in late December 2023 to infiltrate areas that Israeli forces had previously cleared and reconstitute some of its militia units. CTP-ISW has observed Palestinian fighters active in Beit Hanoun four times in March. CTP-ISW only observed Palestinian fighter activity once in February.[19] Palestinian fighters in Beit Hanoun have operated a drone near Israeli forces, attempted to establish a reconnaissance position, and shot at Israeli forces since February.[20]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 8.[21] Israeli forces killed 15 Palestinian fighters with sniper fire, tanks, and airstrikes.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in some areas of northern Khan Younis on March 8. Three IDF brigades engaged Palestinian fighters in Hamad neighborhood, northwestern Khan Younis.[22] Palestinian fighters have been conducting a deliberate defense of Hamad since Israeli forces advanced into the neighborhood on March 3.[23] The IDF had intelligence that Palestinian fighters retreated from other areas in Khan Younis to hide in Hamad.[24] Palestinian fighters claimed most of their attacks in the Gaza Strip on March 8 in Hamad.[25] The IDF Bislamach Brigade continued offensive operations in Qarara, northern Khan Younis, and located tunnel shafts.[26] Hamas’ Qarara Battalion, which is in the Khan Younis Brigade, remains combat effective.[27]

Israeli media reported on March 8 that Israeli officials have discussed arming civilians in the Gaza Strip to provide security for aid convoys.[28] Local police are refusing to provide security for the convoys because of Israeli airstrikes targeting members of Hamas’ police force. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu postponed a decision on arming civilians. The United States has warned Israel that a “total breakdown of law and order” is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the strip.[29] The absence of a local security force contributes to this issue.[30]

A Palestinian journalist reported on March 8 that local tribal committees in the Gaza Strip agreed to ensure the safe passage of aid trucks in eastern Rafah after “local authorities” requested them to do so.[31] These ”local authorities“ are very likely Hamas. Hamas relies on its local police system to maintain social control. The IDF has targeted Hamas’ police and internal security apparatus to disrupt Hamas’ attempts to rebuild its governing authority in the Strip.[32] The Civil Police and the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry's Internal Security Forces in the Gaza Strip both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing.[33]

Palestinian fighters have conducted one indirect fire attack from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on March 7.[34] PIJ claimed responsibility for the rocket attack.[35] The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division), which has been targeting Palestinian militia positions and assets in the northern Gaza Strip, shelled the areas from which Palestinian fighters fired rockets targeting southern Israel on March 7.[36] The IDF destroyed a weapons depot, tunnels, and a rocket launcher.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least four times across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on March 7.[37] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted a complex attack targeting Israeli forces near Homesh, south of Jenin.[38] Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters first fired at an IDF outpost. The fighters then ambushed IDF reinforcements responding to the attack with small arms and rudimentary improvised explosive devices. A complex attack uses more than one type of weapon, such as IEDs and direct-fire weapons, to target opposing forces.

Hamas claimed that attacks targeting Israeli forces and Israeli settlers in the West Bank will intensify during Ramadan.[39]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 7.[40] Hezbollah claimed six total attacks.[41] The IDF said it intercepted a Hezbollah one-way attack drone that entered Israeli airspace on March 7.[42]

Israeli news reported that the IDF ordered Brig. Gen. Moshe Tamir to draft plans for a possible Israeli ground operation into southern Lebanon.[43] Israeli forces will reportedly use multiple entry points during a ground operation and seek to push Hezbollah forces 10 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border. An operation that only pushes Hezbollah forces 10 kilometers from the Israeli border does not reach the Litani River. UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Lebanon War, stipulates that Hezbollah cannot maintain military positions south of the Litani River.[44] Tamir formerly served as the commander of the Golani Brigade (36th Division) and drafted the IDF’s clearing operation plans for the Gaza Strip.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi in a telephone call on March 8.[45] Abdollahian and Busaidi discussed the need for Muslim countries to pressure Israel to end the war. Abdollahian accused the United States of acting in “bad faith” during negotiations aimed at lifting unspecified sanctions on Iran. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said in September 2023 that Oman would facilitate future nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West.[46]

US CENTCOM intercepted three drones that the Houthis launched toward the Gulf of Aden on March 7.[47] CENTCOM confirmed that its forces separately conducted preemptive strikes targeting four mobile anti-ship cruise missiles and one drone in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on March 7. Houthi-affiliated media confirmed that the strikes on March 7 struck areas in Hudaydah.[48]

 


Iran Update, March 7, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Amin Soltani, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Ahmad Omid Arman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Western media reported on March 7 that the United States will establish a temporary port in the Gaza Strip to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid.[1] US President Joe Biden is expected to announce the project during his State of the Union address on March 7. White House officials disclosed that the United States plans to build a temporary port off the coast of the Gaza Strip before moving the structure closer to shore. Western reporting noted that the project would require up to thousands of US service members stationed off the Mediterranean coast. Palestinian militias have previously condemned US humanitarian efforts in the Gaza Strip as insufficient and creating chaos.[2] CTP-ISW will follow up with additional details on the proposed temporary port in future updates.

Iranian military and security leaders are increasingly discussing the need to expand the Iranian military presence around the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea. Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi—a senior military adviser to the Iranian supreme leader—stated on March 6 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy and Aerospace Force should “focus” on the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea.[3] Safavi described the Mediterranean Sea as part of Iran’s strategic depth and that Tehran must accordingly “increase [its] strategic depth [by] 5,000 kilometers,” which would extend to the Strait of Gibraltar.[4] Safavi’s remarks come after IRGC Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi threatened in December 2023 that Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” could someday disrupt maritime traffic in the Mediterranean Sea and around the Strait of Gibraltar.[5] The Iranian desire to develop a military presence, especially a naval one, around the Mediterranean Sea and its periphery is not entirely new, as senior military officials have discussed the idea since at least 2016.[6]

The remarks from Safavi and Naghdi are noteworthy, nevertheless, given recent Iranian efforts in the area. Western media reported on March 3 that Iran requested Sudanese permission to establish a permanent naval base on the Red Sea, which would support Iranian out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping.[7] Separately, Israel was likely responsible for an airstrike that killed an IRGC Navy colonel around the coastal city of Baniyas, Syria, on March 1.[8] An Israeli social media account observed that the naval officer may have worked on coastal missile defenses and/or electronic warfare.[9]

Iran would probably use an expanding military presence around the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea to threaten commercial traffic, as Iran has long done so around the Persian Gulf and is currently supporting Houthi attacks on global commerce. Iran has invested in recent years in building surface vessels that are capable of hosting fast attack craft, drones, helicopters, and missiles. These vessels would not likely survive conventional engagements against the US Navy or other modern militaries—but they are optimized for the sort of commerce raiding that has long been a feature of Iranian regional strategy.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—appears to have refocused its attacks to target primarily Israel rather than US forces for the moment. The group has claimed four attacks targeting Israel in the first week of March, compared to three attacks targeting Israel in the month of February.[10] The group has contrastingly not claimed any attacks targeting US forces since February 4.[11] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq described its three most recent attacks as part of the “second phase of operations to . . . support our people in Gaza.”[12] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders have praised the Islamic Resistance in Iraq attack targeting Kiryat Shmona Airport on March 6 as the beginning of this second phase, which involves targeting Israeli airports and ports.[13] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq released a statement on March 6 stating that it means to expel US forces from Iraq and support Palestinian militias by continuing attacks targeting Israel until there is a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[14]

  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed three drone attacks targeting industrial and military locations inside Israel on March 5–7.[15] The IDF reported on March 4 that it intercepted a drone entering from Syria.[16] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed three attacks in February 2023 targeting unspecified Israeli targets near Eilat, the Golan Heights, and the Dead Sea.[17]
  • Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai called for a second phase of attacks targeting Israel on January 23.[18] Walai specifically called for targeting Israel’s ports. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed on March 3 that the group launched drones targeting the Haifa port.[19] Israeli journalists reported that the IDF intercepted a drone near Haifa on February 29.[20]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed on March 7 that it launched drones targeting an IDF military airport near Safed, Israel.[21] The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) separately claimed on March 7 that it intercepted a drone that resembles drones previously launched by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.[22] A Syrian social media account stated that the intercepted drone was an Iranian-made Shahed-101 and speculated that the SAA could have intercepted the drone by mistake.[23]

Key Takeaways:

  • Gaza Strip: Western media reported that the United States will establish a temporary port in the Gaza Strip to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid.
  • Iran: Iranian military and security leaders are increasingly discussing the need to expand the Iranian military presence around the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq appears to have refocused its attacks to target primarily Israel rather than US forces for the moment.
  • West Bank: Unidentified Palestinian fighters detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device targeting Israeli forces around Tubas.
  • Iraq: Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki said that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias must refrain attacking US forces so that Baghdad can negotiate a timeline for the US withdrawal.
  • Yemen: Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting Hudaydah.

Iran Update, March 6, 2024

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Ashka Jhaveri, Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Peter Mills, Marcus Mildenberger, Christian Engfer, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani said on March 6 that Iran’s proxies and partners have taken a more “offensive stance” in the Israel-Hamas war, which frames the war in terms consistent with Iran’s regional military doctrine.[1] Ghaani issued this statement during a speech to the Assembly of Experts. Iran and the Axis aim to seize the operational initiative to dictate the tempo and terms of action in conflict and force Iran’s adversaries to react constantly.[2] IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami said in 2022 that Palestinian militias needed to focus on successive offensive ground operations into Israel instead of defensive, static wars using their rocket systems.[3] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hamas’ decision to conduct a ground attack into Israel on October 7 may have been based on what Salami outlined in August 2022.[4]

The Houthis launched anti-ship missiles on March 6 that targeted a Greek-operated Barbados-flagged bulk-carrier in the Gulf of Aden and damaged the ship, killing two crewmembers and injuring at least six more.[5] The Houthi attack on March 6 forced the crew to abandon ship.[6] The crew was made up of south and southeast Asian nationals. The bulk-carrier, True Confidence, was carrying steel products and trucks from China to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.[7]

The March 6 attack is the first that has caused fatalities since the Houthis began attacking civilian ships in the Red Sea in November 2023. The Houthi attacks prior to March 6 were not calibrated to avoid casualties, however. These attacks—using drones, ballistic, and cruise missiles—risk the death of civilian crewmembers in every instance. A Houthi attack on February 18 that targeted the MV Rubymar caused the crew to abandon ship on February 18 and resulted in the sinking of the vessel on March 3.[8]

Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting Hudaydah International Airport on March 6.[9]

Palestinian militias claimed most of their attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip in southern Gaza City on March 6. Palestinian fighters used RPGs, sniper rifles, and mortars to target Israeli forces in Zaytoun neighborhood of Gaza City.[10] PIJ fighters mortared an IDF combat outpost south of Gaza City.[11] The IDF concluded a two-week long operation in Zaytoun on March 2 to re-clear Hamas fighters there.[12] Ongoing Palestinian attacks in the area suggest that Israeli forces did not fully clear Zaytoun and that Palestinian militias in southern Gaza City likely retain some capacity to fight.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran and the Israel-Hamas War: IRGC Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani said on March 6 that Iran’s proxies and partners have taken a more “offensive stance” in the Israel-Hamas war, which frames the war in terms consistent with Iran’s regional military doctrine.
  • Iran and the Axis aim to seize the operational initiative to dictate the tempo and terms of action in conflict and force Iran’s adversaries to react constantly.
  • IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami said in 2022 that Palestinian militias needed to focus on successive offensive ground operations into Israel instead of defensive, static wars using their rocket systems.
  • Yemen: The Houthis launched anti-ship missiles on March 6 that targeted a Greek-operated Barbados-flagged bulk-carrier in the Gulf of Aden and damaged the ship, killing two crewmembers and injuring at least six more.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias claimed most of their attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip in southern Gaza City on March 6.
  • Negotiations: Hamas said on March 6 that it will continue ceasefire negotiations and claimed that it has “shown flexibility” in the talks. Egyptian officials with knowledge of the talks told the Wall Street Journal on March 6 that Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamal prevented Hamas from walking away from negotiations.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The IDF conducted several airstrikes targeting Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) infrastructure and personnel in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF Air Force killed two Palestinian fighters in Beit Hanoun who had fled to an unspecified “military location.”[13] The IDF also killed two Palestinian fighters involved in the October 7, 2023, attack and three commanders in Hamas’ elite Nukhba forces.[14] The IDF also struck Hamas and PIJ infrastructure in Jabalia, where Palestinian fighters had launched rockets into Israel within the last week.[15] The IDF struck apartments where Palestinian fighters stored weapons, as well as other weapons depots, rocket launchers, and tunnels.[16] Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fighters also targeted an Israeli tank with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) east of Jabalia on March 6.[17]

The IDF reported on March 6 that it killed the Hamas’ commander who oversaw rocket fire from the central Gaza Strip into Israel.[18] The IDF reported that the leader, Amar Atiya Darwish Aladani, was a military commander in Hamas for the past several decades and directed attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Strip and into Israel during the current war. Aladani also played a significant role in planning the October 7, 2023, attack, according to the IDF.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in northern Khan Younis on March 6. The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) raided buildings in the Hamad neighborhood that Hamas fighters had used previously. The 89th Commando Brigade captured several Palestinian fighters, including a commander from a Hamas sniper cell.[19] Israeli forces detained approximately 250 PIJ and Hamas fighters in the neighborhood.[20] The Bislamach Brigade demolished buildings and clashed with Palestinian fighters in Qarara.[21] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, fired at two Israeli soldiers in Qarara.[22] A Palestinian activist reported clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters in Hamad and Qarara.[23]

Hamas said on March 6 that it will continue ceasefire negotiations and claimed that it has “shown flexibility” in the talks.[24] Hamas reiterated its demands for a permanent ceasefire, the return of displaced people, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, and sufficient humanitarian aid.[25] Hamas has consistently held its position on a permanent ceasefire.[26] Some of these elements, particularly the permanent ceasefire and a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, are an obstacle in the ongoing negotiations.

Egyptian officials with knowledge of the talks told the Wall Street Journal on March 6 that Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamal prevented Hamas from walking away from negotiations.[27]

Hamas’ proposal for a ceasefire includes the release of high-level Palestinian prisoners, according to Jordanian media.[28] The prisoners include a ”top“ Hamas “bombmaker” and the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The PFLP is a secular leftist Palestinian faction fighting with Hamas in the war. Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip are operating in a loose coalition and have aligned their stances in ceasefire negotiations.[29] Hamas has previously demanded the release of other high-level prisoners, including members of its elite Nukhba force.[30]

Parts of the Gaza Strip are experiencing a near-total telecommunications disruption. NetBlocks reported on March 5 that the disruption is particularly serious in the southern Gaza Strip.[31]

Palestinian militias did not claim any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 6.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least three times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on March 5.[32] The IDF detained 17 Palestinians in the West Bank overnight.[33]

Palestinian youth demonstrated in Qalandiya refugee camp north of Jerusalem against several countries for the temporary suspension of funding for the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East’s operations.[34]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 5.[35]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq —a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias— claimed it launched drones targeting Kiryat Shmona airport on March 6.[36]  The group separately claimed it launched drones targeting the Haifa power station near the airport on March 5.[37] The IDF has not acknowledged either attack. CTP-ISW cannot confirm that these attacks took place. 

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi President Abdel Latif al Rashid met with Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev on March 6 to discuss Russian investment in Iraq and strengthening bilateral relations.[38] Russian and Iraqi officials have discussed Russian investment in Iraq in a series of meetings since January 2024, including several meetings focused on security cooperation.[39] CTP-ISW assessed on February 20 that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence there.[40]

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki met with US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski and US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iran and Iraq Affairs Victoria Taylor on March 6.[41] Maliki said that the Iraqi government is eager to implement the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement after the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq ends.[42] The United States and Iraq have held a series of ”working group” meetings since January 2024 to discuss the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq and present an assessment of the capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces and of the threat posed by ISIS.[43] These meetings are a precursor to negotiations that Iraq seeks to use to transition from a multilateral security relationship between Iraq and the International Coalition to unspecified bilateral relationships between Iraq and individual coalition member countries.[44]

A Houthi official confirmed the group’s close ties with Iran.[45] He said that Iran provided technology and military expertise that enhanced the Houthis’ military and intelligence operations.[46] He reiterated prior Houthi claims that the group will stop attacking ships transiting through the Red Sea when there is a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. .[47] The Houthis conducted attacks targeting international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden prior to the Israel-Hamas War. The group could conduct attacks targeting international shipping in the future at minimal cost for reasons of its own choosing, even if a ceasefire is secured.

Jordanian border guards shelled unspecified targets inside Syria near the border with Jordan on March 6.[48] A local Syrian outlet reported that the Jordanian border guards targeted several farms outside Nassib, Daraa Governorate, on the Syria-Jordan border, without providing additional details.

The shelling is likely part of increasing Jordanian operations against smuggling networks in southwestern Syria. Jordanian forces have clashed with Iranian-backed smugglers along the Jordan-Syria border four other times since December 2023, including once on February 7.[49] The Jordanian Royal Air Force has also struck Iranian-backed drug smugglers three times since December 2023.[50] Western media reported in January that Western and Jordanian officials said that Lebanese Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed groups are driving the increase in drug smuggling into Jordan.[51] The Syrian regime, Lebanese Hezbollah, and other Iranian-backed militias mass produce Captagon in Syria and smuggle it through Jordan to the Gulf Arab states. This smuggling and distribution cartel generates billions of dollars in revenue for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[52]

Israel likely conducted a drone strike targeting Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) assets in eastern Syria on March 6. Syrian opposition media reported that a drone strike targeted an IRGC military vehicle in Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Governorate.[53] One Syrian outlet reported that the strike injured two IRGC personnel.[54] The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that the strike killed three Iranian-backed militia members.[55] This outlet sometimes incorrectly reports casualty counts and other events and information.[56] The IDF Air Force has increased its strikes into Syria since December 2023 to disrupt the IRGC Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah’s efforts to bring personnel and weapons into Lebanon from Syria.[57] Previous strikes killed several IRGC officers in Syria since December 2023, including an IRGC Navy officer on March 1.[58]

Iranian state media claimed that Iran offloaded crude oil from the Marshall Islands-flagged Advantage Sweet on March 6.[59] Iranian media claimed on March 6 that Iran offloaded the oil in response to longstanding American and European oil sanctions.[60] The Artesh Navy seized the Advantage Sweet in the Gulf of Oman in April 2023 as the vessel was transporting oil from the UAE to the United States.[61] American oil company Chevron chartered the Advantage Sweet at the time of the seizure.[62] Iran initially seized the Advantage Sweet in retaliation for US sanctions enforcements efforts, which included confiscating and unloading Iranian oil from the Suez Rajan.[63]

The Iranian Defense Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Ashtiani met with the Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan in Tehran on March 6.[64] Ashtiani said that countries in the region should be responsible for the security of the Caucasus region.Ashtiani was likely alluding to Iran’s belief that its adversaries outside the Caucasus, specifically the United States and Israel, are seeking to exploit conflict in the Caucasus to “undermine the security of the entire region.“[65] The Iranian regime has also historically accused Baku of allowing Israel to use Azerbaijani territory to launch operations against Iran, as CTP-ISW has reported on numerous occasions.[66]

 



Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Rachel Friedman, Ahmad Omid Arman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Iranian hardline factions are expected to retain their majority in parliament.[1] The majority of Tehran province’s 14 confirmed candidates were hardliners.[2] Incumbent hardline Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was re-elected to parliament for Tehran province.[3] Parliamentarians will vote for the next parliament speaker after run-off elections conclude in late April or early May.[4] Forty-five candidates will compete in the run-off election.[5]

Iran’s March 1 Parliament elections had the lowest voter turnout of any election in the history of the Islamic Republic.[6] Approximately 25 million Iranians out of 61 million eligible voters voted for 290 candidates for Parliament and 88 candidates for the Assembly of Experts.[7] The Assembly of Experts is the body responsible for choosing the supreme leader’s successor. Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi reported an official voter turnout of 41%.[8] This figure is likely inflated, given the Iranian regime’s historical tendency to exaggerate voter turnout.[9] Iran reported a 43% voter turnout in its 2020 parliamentary election.[10]

US President Joe Biden warned on March 5 that without a ceasefire “the situation in Jerusalem will become very dangerous during Ramadan.”[11] Biden said that Hamas is the impediment to a ceasefire deal, not Israel.

Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon Osama Hamdan confirmed that Hamas negotiators gave Qatari and Egyptian officials a response to the Paris ceasefire proposal “over the past two days” but that the group is prepared to continue fighting.[12] Hamdan stated that Hamas affirmed its conditions for a ceasefire, which are the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, the return of the displaced civilians to the northern Gaza Strip, and the supply of adequate aid, relief, and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. Hamdan continued to blame the Israeli prime minister for the lack of a ceasefire. A Hamas Telegram channel posted on March 5 an undated quote from another senior Hamas leader that reiterated that the group would not discuss a hostage-for-prisoner exchange before a ceasefire, the total Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, reconstruction of the Strip, and the return of displaced persons to their homes.[13] Israeli media reported on March 4 that Hamas recently asked for Israel to release more of its high-level prisoners as part of the ceasefire agreement.[14] Western and Israeli media previously reported during the week of January 31 that Hamas demanded the release of its elite Nukhba special forces and Palestinian political faction leaders.[15] The Nukhba forces took part in the October 7 attacks.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant met US envoy Amos Hochstein on March 5 and warned that Hezbollah attacks are pushing Israel towards “a decision point regarding military action in Lebanon.”[16] Gallant reiterated that Israel is committed to political efforts to reach an agreement to resolve the ongoing hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border. Gallant issued a similar warning on February 7 that the Israeli government could invade Lebanon in response to continuing Hezbollah attacks.[17]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iranian Elections: Iranian hardline factions are expected to retain their majority in parliament. Iran’s March 1 Parliament elections had the lowest voter turnout of any election in the history of the Islamic Republic.
  • Ceasefire Negotiations: US President Joe Biden warned on March 5 that without a ceasefire “the situation in Jerusalem will become very dangerous during Ramadan.” Biden said that Hamas is the impediment to a ceasefire deal, not Israel.
  • Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan stated that Hamas affirmed its conditions for a ceasefire, which are the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, the return of the displaced civilians to the northern Gaza Strip, and the supply of adequate aid, relief, and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.
  • Lebanon: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant met US envoy Amos Hochstein on March 5 and warned that Hezbollah attacks are pushing Israel towards “a decision point regarding military action in Lebanon.” Gallant reiterated that Israel is committed to political efforts to reach an agreement to resolve the ongoing hostilities along the Israel-Lebanon border.
  • Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias claimed an anomalously low number of attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on March 5. CTP-ISW is considering two factors to explain the sharp decrease in attack claims.
  • The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s transition to the third phase of its ground operation has decreased the number of targets Hamas and its allies can attack during a given period. There are currently fewer Israeli forces deep in northern Gaza and thus fewer targets for the militias to attack.
  • Palestinian militias may be experiencing communications difficulties.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias claimed an anomalously low number of attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on March 5. Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and three other Palestinian militias that have been active in the Gaza Strip did not claim attacks targeting Israeli forces on March 5. The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement and the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed a total of two attacks on Israeli forces south of Gaza City and zero attacks in Khan Younis.[18]

This drop in claims represents a sharp decrease in Palestinian militia activity across the Gaza Strip, but it does not indicate that Israeli action has destroyed or defeated Hamas. Palestinian militias claimed at least fifteen attacks on Israeli forces operating in the Gaza Strip on March 4.[19] Israeli forces continued operations throughout the Gaza Strip on March 5 and no negotiation parties announced a ceasefire deal.[20] CTP-ISW is considering two factors to explain the sharp decrease in claims:

  • The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s transition to the third phase of its ground operation has decreased the number of targets Hamas and its allies can attack during a given period. Israeli forces began the third phase of their military operation in the Gaza Strip in January, which consists of “targeted raids,” a decrease in the number of forces in the Strip, and the movement of many units to the buffer zone along the Israeli border.[21] Both Palestinian and Israeli sources reported in early January that Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip moved to the Israeli-Gaza buffer zone.[22] These sources reported that Israeli units are no longer permanently present in the Gaza City, and now conduct multi-week “targeted raids” from the border buffer zone.[23] IDF concluded a two-week-long operation to reclear Zaytoun neighborhood in southeastern Gaza City of Hamas fighters on March 3 and has not announced a new clearing operation in the north.[24] This means that there are fewer Israeli forces deep in northern Gaza and thus fewer targets for the militias to attack. Palestinian militias appear to conduct a spirited defense when Israeli forces do present themselves as targets deep in the Gaza Strip. Palestinian fighters attacked Israeli forces 92 times in 11 days during the Israeli clearing operation in Zaytoun, for example.[25]
  • Palestinian militias may be experiencing communications difficulties. CTP-ISW has previously hypothesized that communication problems can decrease the number of claims from a single militia group, but not five groups at once.[26] Israeli action in Khan Younis may be preventing militia forces there from rapidly reporting attacks to higher echelons that can distribute information about the attacks.

The IDF said that its engineering units finished destroying “the largest tunnel network discovered in the northern Gaza Strip” on March 5.[27] The IDF first disclosed the network’s existence in Beit Hanoun near the Erez Crossing in December 2023.[28] The IDF said the tunnel was dug toward Israel but did not extend out of the Gaza Strip. Israeli troops from the 98th Division conducted an airstrike targeting a Palestinian militia cell operating a drone near Israeli forces in Beit Hanoun on March 5.[29] The Palestinian fighters may have targeted the engineering units present in Beit Hanoun.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) killed over 20 Palestinian fighters using aerial, sniper, and tank fire in the central Gaza Strip on March 5.[30]

Israeli forces continued conducting clearing operations around northern Khan Younis on March 5. The IDF 89th Commando Brigade cleared militia infrastructure, including weapons caches, in Hamad neighborhood in northwestern Khan Younis.[31] The IDF 7th Brigade evacuated civilians from Hamad and detained dozens of Hamas and PIJ fighters who tried to hide among evacuating civilians to escape the area.[32] The IDF began operating in Hamad on March 3.[33] The IDF LOTAR counterterrorism unit (attached to the 7th Brigade) cleared two weapons storage sites in civilian areas of Khan Younis.[34] The IDF said that one of the sites was adjacent to a school in Khan Younis formerly used as a shelter for displaced Gazans.[35]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in six locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 4.[36] The IDF reported that Israeli forces arrested 21 wanted persons across the West Bank, including the commander of an unspecified Palestinian militia’s Balata Battalion, Mohammed Tanji.[37] The IDF stated that Tanji was planning to conduct an “imminent attack”.[38]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 13 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 4.[39] Hezbollah launched at least three salvoes of “dozens of rockets” targeting Gesher HaZiv, Kiryat Shmona, and Kfar Blum, in northern Israel.[40] Israeli media reported that multiple civilians' homes were damaged in the rocket attacks targeting Israel.[41] Hezbollah claimed that the attacks were in response to IDF airstrikes that killed Hezbollah-affiliated paramedics in Adissa on March 4 and Lebanese civilians in Hula, southern Lebanon, on March 5.[42]

The Israeli Air Force intercepted a drone over the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights that an unspecified actor launched from Syrian territory on March 5.[43]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi National Security Advisor and Badr Organization member Qasim al Araji stated on March 5 that Iraq is open to regional and international cooperation to combat drug trafficking in Iraq.[44] Araji claimed that drug trafficking is now the primary threat to Iraqi stability “[after] the defeat of [ISIS].” He clarified that Iraq should work with its partners to share intelligence to combat remaining ISIS fighters, however. The OIR quarterly report at the end of 2023 said that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) still faces deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, logistics, and planning that prevent it from defeating ISIS alone.[45]

The Houthis claimed that they targeted two US Navy vessels in the Red Sea using anti-ship missiles and one way attack drones on March 5.[46] Houthi military spokesperson Brig. Gen. Yahya Sarea said that the Houthis ”will not hesitate to expand their operations against all hostile targets” in support of Palestinians in Gaza.[47]

Houthi-controlled media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted strikes against unspecified targets in Ras Issa, Salif Province, and al Jabanah, Hudaydah province, in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.[48]

The United Kingdom Defense Secretary Grant Shapps said on March 5 that he possesses unspecified information on Iran providing ballistic missiles to Russia.[49] The British magazine The House asked Shapps whether he had any information on Iran providing ballistic missiles to Russia and Shapps said that he did have information but declined to elaborate. Shapps added that “whether it's ballistic missiles or the Shahed drones that they supplied Russia with, we've seen that if there's struggle in the world,” Iran often exacerbates it. Shapps called Iran a ”bad influence” not only in the Middle East but also to Europe as well, citing Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia to support its war in Ukraine.

Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia in early January.[50] This is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment in September 2023 that Iran and Russia would conclude a drone and missile sale agreement after UNSC Resolution 2231’s missile restrictions expired in October 2023.[51] UNSC Resolution 2231 suspended nuclear-related UN sanctions and established sunset dates for missile and other arms-related sanctions on Iran.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Secretary General Hussein Ibrahim Taha on March 5 in Jeddah.[52] Abdollahian called on the OIC and other Islamic countries to pressure Israel into ending the Israel-Hamas war.

Abdollahian and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan separately discussed the Israel-Hamas war and strengthening bilateral trade on March 5 in Jeddah.[53] Abdollahian called on Muslim countries to take a more “coherent and strong” position in support of Palestine.[54] Iran and Saudi Arabia normalized diplomatic relations in March 2023 after severing ties in 2016.[55]

Iran Update, March 4, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Andie Parry, Liam Karr, Marcus Mildenberger, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iran reportedly requested Sudanese permission to establish a permanent naval base on the Red Sea coast, which would support Iranian out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping. The Wall Street Journal reported the Iranian request on March 3, citing a senior Sudanese intelligence official.[1] Ahmad Hasan Mohamed—an intelligence adviser to the Sudanese military leader—said that Iran offered “a helicopter-carrying warship” in exchange for Sudan allowing Iran to establish the base. Mohamed stated that Iran wanted the base to gather intelligence on maritime traffic around the Suez Canal and Israel and to station warships at the base. The Wall Street Journal report is consistent with Iranian leaders advocating for building a naval base along the east African coast in recent years.[2] Mohamed added that Sudan rejected the Iranian request. Both the Iranian and Sudanese foreign affairs ministries have refuted the Wall Street Journal report.[3] The report follows Sudanese Armed Forces-affiliated Foreign Affairs Minister Ali al Sadiq Ali traveling to Tehran and meeting with senior Iranian officials in early February.[4]

The Iranian request to establish a naval base in Sudan is part of growing military cooperation between the two countries. Western media previously reported in January that Iran had recently supplied the Sudanese Armed Forces with Mohajer-6 multirole drones.[5] The Iranian effort to establish a naval base likely reflects how Tehran views its defense exports as a means of facilitating the expansion of its overall military influence abroad.

Iran may be attempting to compete with other rival Gulf Arab states in Sudan. The United Arab Emirates is the main backer of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) owing to various ties between the RSF head (Hemedti) and the emirates.[6] Abu Dhabi has invested in Sudan as part of its larger strategic effort to expand its influence along the Red Sea with friendly states and client ports.[7] The United Arab Emirates has funded and supplied the RSF with weapons and used neighboring Chad as a logistics hub for these efforts.[8]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Iran reportedly requested Sudanese permission to establish a permanent naval base on the Red Sea coast, which would support Iranian out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli clearing operations in the northern and central Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued conducting clearing operations around northern Khan Younis.
  • Negotiations: Hamas reportedly made the return of civilians to the northern Gaza Strip a priority in ceasefire negotiations with Israel.
  • Iraq: Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi discussed unspecified bilateral cooperation with US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski and other US officials.
  • Yemen: The Houthis launched anti-ship missiles that damaged the Liberian-flagged MSC Sky II commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden. The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that the group launched an unspecified number of anti-ship ballistic missiles and drones targeting US warships in the Red Sea.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • West Bank: Israeli media reported that Shin Bet arrested four “ISIS-inspired” Palestinians who planned to attack the IDF near Hebron.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli clearing operations in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 4. Hamas published footage of its fighters firing mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces advancing in Tal al Hawa neighborhood, southern Gaza City.[9] Hamas fighters also fired an anti-tank RPG targeting Israeli armor south of Tal al Hawa on March 4.[10] These attacks follow the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluding a two-week-long operation to reclear Zaytoun neighborhood in southeastern Gaza City of Hamas fighters.[11] Several other Palestinian militias attacked Israeli forces and military equipment across the northern Gaza Strip, including in eastern Jabalia.[12]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) killed 15 Palestinian fighters using aerial, sniper, and tank fire in the central Gaza Strip.[13] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, mortared Israeli armor in the central Gaza Strip.[14]

Israeli forces continued conducting clearing operations around northern Khan Younis on March 4. The IDF published details of an operation its forces conducted in the last few days in Hamad neighborhood in northwestern Khan Younis, which the IDF had not entered until March 3.[15] Two IDF brigades surrounded the neighborhood before Israeli special operations forces (SOF) raided the area. Israeli forces found weapons storage facilities and other unspecified infrastructure belonging to senior Hamas officials. An IDF intelligence assessment concluded that Palestinian fighters retreated from other areas in Khan Younis to hide in Hamad. Israeli forces detained about 80 Palestinians, including members of Hamas and PIJ, in Hamad.[16] The IDF Bislamach Brigade continued clearing operations in the Qarara area in northern Khan Younis, where Hamas’ local battalion remains combat effective.[17]

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in several other sectors of Khan Younis on March 4. Hamas fighters returned from areas of fighting in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis and reported attacks targeting Israeli armor and personnel.[18] Hamas fighters also captured two IDF drones in the area through unspecified means.[19] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades reported that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces in eastern Khan Younis.[20] The militia also mortared Israeli vehicles near Hamad.[21]

Hamas reportedly made the return of civilians to the northern Gaza Strip a priority in ceasefire negotiations with Israel.[22] An Israeli official and an unidentified source familiar with the matter told Axios that Egyptian and Qatari mediators conveyed Hamas' readiness to reduce the number of Palestinian prisoners whom Israel would release as part of a possible ceasefire agreement. The mediators added, however, that Hamas would instead require the IDF to allow civilians to return to the northern Gaza Strip and that Israel allow more aid into the area. Israeli negotiators were “surprised [by] how important the issue is to Hamas.”[23] Hamas presented the issue of Palestinians returning to the north as a humanitarian one. Axios reported that Israel is concerned that Hamas could rebuild itself as a governing body if Palestinians are allowed to return to the north, which would undermine the Israeli war objective of destroying Hamas. Over one million Palestinians living in the northern Gaza Strip have been displaced due to Israeli military operations.

Hamas could use the return of civilians to the north to bring its own fighters back into the area. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Hamas is trying to reconstitute its military capabilities and rebuild its governance system in the northern Gaza Strip. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported in early February that Palestinian fighters are hiding among civilians in humanitarian shelters to evade capture and facilitate infiltration in the northern Gaza Strip.[24] Israeli forces have identified Palestinian fighters attempting to hide among civilians to disguise their movement elsewhere in the Gaza Strip as well.[25] Hamas retains a command structure in the northern Gaza Strip that is attempting to reconstitute Hamas cells.[26] The IDF has explicitly conducted operations to prevent Hamas fighters from infiltrating Gaza City from the southern Gaza Strip.[27]

An Israeli Arab journalist reported on March 4 that unspecified Palestinian clans in the Gaza Strip have pledged their allegiance to the Palestinian Authority (PA).[28] The clans rejected Israel’s post-war plan for administering the Gaza Strip, which the PA has itself criticized as well.[29] The journalist claimed that the PA urged these clans not to engage the IDF, including with regard to facilitating the distribution of humanitarian aid.[30]

This reported alignment follows the PA and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) indicating that they may reform themselves and are trying to unify Palestinian factions, including Hamas. PA Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh announced his cabinet’s resignation in late February amid calls for leadership changes within the PA.[31] The PLO separately attended an intra-Palestinian meeting in Moscow on February 29 to discuss the formation of a new Palestinian government.[32]

Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip targeting southern Israel on March 4.[33] The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) identified PIJ fighters that fired rockets from the central Gaza Strip targeting towns in southern Israel on March 2.[34] Israeli forces directed an airstrike targeting the PIJ fighters.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in four locations across the West Bank on March 4.[35] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed IED and small arms attacks targeting Israeli forces near Tubas, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, and Ramallah.[36] Hamas and PIJ claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in Tubas on March 4 as well.[37]

Israeli media reported on March 4 that Shin Bet arrested four “ISIS-inspired” Palestinians who planned to attack the IDF near Hebron.[38] Shin Bet reported that the four individuals assembled 100 IEDs and received training from ISIS cells abroad. ISIS previously called for attacks targeting Israel in January 2020 and October 2023.[39] ISIS also claimed two terror attacks targeting Israeli civilians in March 2022.[40]

The IDF Army Radio reported that unspecified senior Israeli officials warned that a possible escalation in violence in the West Bank during Ramadan could halt IDF operations in Gaza Strip.[41] The unspecified source said that a violent escalation could force the IDF to transfer forces from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 3. Hezbollah claimed that it detonated IEDs and fired artillery to repel Israeli forces attempting to enter Lebanon at two locations along the Israel-Lebanon border on March 4.[42] CTP-ISW cannot verify that the incident occurred. The IDF has not acknowledged any incident. An unspecified Iranian-backed militia group separately launched anti-tank missiles that killed a foreign farm worker and wounded seven others in Margaliot, Israel.[43]

Israel conducted airstrikes targeting the Hezbollah-affiliated Islamic Health Organization Civil Defense in southern Lebanon following the attack in Margaliot.[44] Hezbollah acknowledged that members of the civil defense organization died in the airstrike.[45]

Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem warned the IDF against “expanding the campaign into Lebanon” on March 4.[46] Qassem stated that Israel ”will find itself facing an upgraded version of the 2006 war” if Israeli forces enter Lebanon.[47]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi discussed unspecified bilateral cooperation with US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski and other US officials on March 4.[48] Halbousi previously met with Romanowski on February 22 to discuss the US military presence in Iraq and the status of the US-led coalition mission to defeat ISIS.[49] Halbousi has previously indicated opposition to the Iranian-backed effort to expel US forces from Iraq.[50]

The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court removed Halbousi from his role as parliamentary speaker in November 2023 on charges of abusing power and violating his oath of office.[51] Halbousi claimed that the ruling was unconstitutional and meant to create political divisions within society.[52] Halbousi‘s expulsion from Parliament may have removed an obstacle for Iranian-backed actors to advance anti-US legislation and resolutions as CTP-ISW previously reported.[53]

The Houthis launched anti-ship missiles that damaged the Liberian-flagged MSC Sky II commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden on March 4.[54] The UK Maritime Trade Operations Authority reported that one of two missiles impacted Sky II and set fire to the ship.[55] The crew later brought the fire under control, and the Sky II proceeded under its own power to its next port of call.[56]

The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that the group launched an unspecified number of anti-ship ballistic missiles and drones targeting US warships in the Red Sea on March 4.[57] Houthi-affiliated media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted three airstrikes in northern Yemen on March 4.[58] US CENTCOM has not claimed any airstrikes or acknowledged the Houthi’s claimed attack on US warships at the time of this writing.

The Iranian defense minister discussed the Israel-Hamas war with his Qatari counterpart in Doha on March 4.[59] The Iranian defense minister is there to attend the 8th Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition and Conference. The Iranian foreign affairs minister recently discussed a potential Israel-Hamas ceasefire, an exchange of prisoners, and the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip with the Qatari prime minister on March 1.[60]

The Iranian judiciary executed an alleged Israeli Mossad-affiliated individual on March 3 for allegedly aiding Israeli sabotage of Iranian defense ministry facilities in January 2023.[61] The Iranian judiciary accused the individual of transporting Israeli drones into Iran for the purpose of striking Defense Ministry facilities in Esfahan.[62] The Esfahan provincial chief justice claimed that Intelligence and Security Ministry and IRGC Intelligence Organization agents apprehended the individual.[63] Israel conducted a one-way drone attack on a military munitions factory near Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on January 28, 2023.[64] The Defense Ministry reportedly uses the targeted facility to produce ballistic missiles and drones.[65]

Iran Update, March 3, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Amin Soltani, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a two-week long operation in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City on March 3. The continued Palestinian militia attacks demonstrate that Israeli forces have not fully cleared Zaytoun and Palestinian militias in southern Gaza City likely retain some capacity to fight despite the official end of the re-clearing effort.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces expanded clearing operations in Khan Younis on March 3.
  • Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas responded to the most recent ceasefire proposal with demands for a permanent ceasefire and increased humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip.
  • Northern Israel: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting a chemical plant at the Haifa Port on March 1.
  • Red Sea: Italian destroyer Caio Duilio intercepted an unspecified drone flying towards the ship in the Red Sea on March 2.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) concluded a two-week long operation in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City on March 3.[1] Israel launched the operation on February 20 to re-clear Hamas fighters from Zaytoun.[2] Palestinian militias sustained a high attack rate targeting Israeli forces throughout the operation and likely infiltrated the area from uncleared areas in the central Gaza Strip.[3] The IDF reported on March 3 that its 162nd Division killed over 100 fighters and destroyed Hamas- and Palestinian Islamic Jihad-affiliated military sites.[4]

Palestinian fighters continued to attack Israeli forces in Zaytoun on March 3. The continued Palestinian militia attacks demonstrate that Israeli forces have not fully cleared Zaytoun and Palestinian militias in southern Gaza City likely retain some capacity to fight despite the official end of the re-clearing effort.[5] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun and south of the neighborhood using rocket-propelled grenades and mortars.[6]

Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fighters fired an anti-tank rocket targeting an Israeli tank east of Jabalia.[7]

Israeli forces expanded clearing operations in Khan Younis on March 3.[8] The IDF Air Force conducted a wave of airstrikes as part of shaping efforts to enable ground maneuvers.[9] Local footage and reports confirmed that the IDF expanded operations to a pocket of uncleared area in Qarara in northern Khan Younis and Hamad neighborhood in northwestern Khan Younis.[10] Hamas’ Qarara Battalion in the Khan Younis Brigade remains combat effective.[11] Palestinian journalists reported that the IDF set up a checkpoint in Hamad neighborhood and told civilians to evacuate to the Mawasi humanitarian zone or Deir al Balah.[12]

Hamas responded to the most recent ceasefire proposal with demands for a permanent ceasefire and increased humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip. This is consistent with Hamas’ prior demands during ceasefire negotiations. International mediators have been waiting on a response from Hamas regarding the February 23 framework that included a six-week pause in fighting and the release of 400 Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Hamas releasing 40 Israeli hostages.[13] Israel has reportedly accepted the proposal.[14] An Israeli official told Israeli media on March 3 that Israel received an answer from Hamas about the framework. The official said that Hamas did not in its answer address Israel’s demand to receive information on the status of the hostages it holds in the Gaza Strip and how many Palestinian prisoners Israel must release for every hostage freed.[15] A senior Hamas official told an unspecified Qatari newspaper that Hamas "will not provide any details about the abductees it is holding without significant relief [for]...the residents of Gaza and the application of a comprehensive ceasefire."[16]

A “highly placed” diplomatic source told CNN that Hamas would not agree to any hostage deal without Israel agreeing “to [a] permanent ceasefire or at least a path to a ceasefire,” an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and allowing Gazan civilians to reenter the northern Strip.[17] Hamas is also demanding a certain amount of aid reach the southern and northern strip before agreeing to a deal. The source assessed that it is unlikely they will reach a deal in the next 48 hours.

A Hamas delegation arrived in Cairo on March 3 for ceasefire talks that US and Egyptian negotiators are also expected to attend.[18] An unspecified senior Hamas source confirmed to CNN that the delegation arrived. The official refused to confirm any details about the groups’ position, noting that what is being reported is “speculation and leaks.” It is unclear what parts of Hamas’ reported position the official was referring to. Israeli negotiators were initially expected to attend the talks in Cairo. However, unspecified Israeli officials stated on March 3 that Israel would not send a delegation to Cairo after Hamas reiterated its demands for a permanent ceasefire.[19]

Two US sources told Axios that US President Joe Biden urged Qatari and Egyptian leaders to “get a deal” from Hamas before the start of Ramadan.[20] Biden spoke with the leaders on February 29 to discuss ceasefire negotiations. Ramadan is expected to begin on March 10. Israeli officials, including War Cabinet member Benny Gantz, have warned that Israeli forces will begin clearing operations in Rafah at the start of Ramadan if Hamas does not release the remaining Israeli hostages the group holds.[21]

Palestinian fighters conducted three indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on March 3.[22]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in six locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 2.[23]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 2.[24]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq — a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias — claimed a drone attack targeting a chemical plant at the Haifa Port on March 1.[25] The group announced the attack on March 3. The IDF did not report a drone attack on Haifa on March 1, but an Israeli journalist reported that the IDF did shoot down a “suspicious aerial target” over the city on February 29.[26] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq last attacked Israel on February 12 in the Golan Heights.[27] The group has not claimed an attack on US forces since February 4 but has continued attacks targeting Israel.[28]

Italian destroyer Caio Duilio intercepted an unspecified drone flying towards the ship in the Red Sea on March 2.[29]


Iran Update, March 2, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 2. Hamas targeted Israeli forces in Zaytoun with rocket-propelled grenades and explosively-formed penetrators.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis.
  • Humanitarian Aid: The United States airdropped humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip for the first time on March 2.
  • Yemen: US CENTCOM conducted a preemptive strike targeting a surface-to-air missile that Houthi fighters had prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory into the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in the northern and central Gaza Strip on March 2. The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division) directed an airstrike targeting three Palestinian fighters in western Gaza City’s Rimal neighborhood.[1] Israeli forces concluded a clearing operation to reduce Hamas fighters and infrastructure in neighborhoods including Rimal on February 15.[2] The IDF joint special operations multidimensional unit and Nahal Brigade killed several fighters in the central Gaza Strip on March 2.[3] The Nahal Brigade has been operating in Zaytoun as part of the IDF’s clearing operation there, which began on February 20.

Hamas fighters in southeastern Zaytoun resumed contact with their headquarters and reported several attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[4] The fighters detonated explosively-formed penetrators and fired anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli armor in the area.[5]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement claimed to shoot down an IDF reconnaissance drone over Beit Lahia.[6]

The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis.[7] Israeli forces found small arms during a raid targeting a building owned by Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The IDF 7th Brigade directed a series of airstrikes that killed eight Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis, including one who was carrying a suspected IED.[8]

Hamas fighters detonated a house-borne improvised explosive device (HBIED) targeting seven Israeli soldiers in northern Khan Younis on March 2.[9] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, reported that its fighters conducted several attacks using mortars and RPGs in Khan Younis City.[10]

The United States airdropped humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip for the first time on March 2.[11] US Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Jordanian Air Force delivered 38,000 meals along the coastline of the Gaza Strip. US President Joe Biden said on March 1 that the "aid flowing to Gaza is nowhere [near] enough.”[12] An unspecified US official told Axios that he expected more airdrops to take place in the coming days.[13]

A senior US official told reporters that there needs to be a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip to allow for the large-scale delivery of aid.[14] Israel has reportedly agreed to a framework that would release up to 400 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for 40 Israeli hostages and a six-week truce.[15]

Palestinian militias have conducted at least two rocket attack from the Gaza Strip targeting southern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on March 1. PIJ fired rockets targeting Ashkelon and other unspecified towns in southern Israel on March 1.[16] The IDF Air Force targeted two areas in the northern Gaza Strip from which Palestinian fighters had previously fired rockets targeting Israel on March 1.[17] PIJ fired another rocket salvo targeting Hatzerim in southern Israel on March 2.[18]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in two locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 1.[19]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 1.[20]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US CENTCOM conducted a preemptive strike targeting a surface-to-air missile that Houthi fighters had prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory into the Red Sea.[21] Houthi fighters also launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory into the Red Sea on March 1. CENTCOM reported that the Houthi attack did not damage any vessels.

Iran Update, March 1, 2024

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Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Tor Lansing, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Iran held separate elections for Parliament and the Assembly of Experts on March 1.[1] These elections will likely preserve and possibly even reinforce hardliner influence in the Iranian regime. Parliament is the primary legislative body in the Iranian regime, though it is a relatively weak institution in the Iranian political landscape. One of Parliament’s most important roles is selecting a parliament speaker, who will serve ex officio on more prominent regime policymaking bodies, such as the Supreme National Security Council, Supreme Economic Coordination Council, and Supreme Cultural Revolution Council. Iranian parliamentarians serve four-year teams. Hardline political factions currently dominate Parliament and will likely continue doing so after the votes are counted. The Assembly of Experts is an Iranian regime entity constitutionally responsible for monitoring the supreme leader and selecting his successor.[2] Assembly members serve eight-year terms and are almost exclusively senior Shia clerics. 

The Iranian regime is continuing to engineer national elections to consolidate hardline influence in the political establishment. The Guardian Council—a regime body responsible for supervising elections and vetting candidates—barred many moderate and reformist candidates from competing in the March 1 Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections.[3] The Guardian Council barred former moderate President Hassan Rouhani from running for reelection to the Assembly of Experts, for example.[4] The Guardian Council previously disqualified 80 percent of candidates in the 2016 Assembly of Experts elections and 49 percent of candidates in the 2020 parliamentary elections.[5] The Guardian Council often disqualifies moderate and reformist figures to guarantee hardliner victories in these races. The Guardian Council spokesperson claimed on February 28 that the council had disqualified only 25 percent of parliamentary candidates for the most recent vote, although it is unclear how accurate this number is.[6] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei personally approves directly or indirectly the members of the 12-person Guardian Council, suggesting that the council operates with the backing of the supreme leader.

Voter turnout appeared to hit a record low, likely reflecting the population’s growing disillusionment with the regime. Initial reports indicate that voter participation was around 27 percent nationally and 12 percent in Tehran on March 1.[7] A voter turnout of approximately 30 percent would mark a record low for public participation in parliamentary elections since the Iranian revolution. Voter participation in parliamentary elections previously reached a record low of 42.5 percent in 2020. Voter participation in the presidential election in 2021 similarly hit a record low of 48.8 percent.[8] These recent numbers are particularly striking given that electoral participation has historically been high in Iran over the past few decades.[9] Regime officials have repeatedly called on the population to participate in the elections, likely reflecting concerns about low voter turnout amid calls for boycotting the elections.[10]

This year’s Assembly of Experts election is uniquely significant, as it could very well oversee the succession of Iran’s next supreme leader. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is currently 84 years old and will be 92 by the time of the next Assembly of Experts election in 2032. This cohort of the Assembly of Experts will at least formally choose Khamenei’s successor if he dies or otherwise leaves his post before then.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Iran held separate elections for Parliament and the Assembly of Experts. These elections will likely preserve and possibly even reinforce hardliner influence in the Iranian regime. Voter turnout appeared to hit a record low, likely reflecting the population’s growing disillusionment with the regime. This year’s Assembly of Experts election is uniquely significant, as it could very well oversee the succession of Iran’s next supreme leader.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias defended against Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and eastern Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: An unspecified senior Israeli official reported that Israel will not continue ceasefire negotiations until Hamas provides information on the status of the hostages it holds in the Gaza Strip.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in 13 locations across the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Syria: Israel was likely responsible for an airstrike that killed an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy officer in Baniyas, Syria.
  • Yemen: US CENTCOM intercepted a drone over the Red Sea and conducted two preemptive strikes targeting six mobile, anti-ship cruise missiles in Houthi-controlled Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias defended against Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip on March 1. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a new, “division-wide” clearing operation in the Zaytoun neighborhood in eastern Gaza City on February 20.[11] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published footage on March 1 of its fighters clashing with Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[12] The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division), which has been operating in Zaytoun, killed a Palestinian cell with mortar fire and small arms during clearing operations.[13] The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), a Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, reported that it fired rockets targeting Israeli military positions in the northern Gaza Strip. The PRC’s attack was in response to the humanitarian aid convoy incident on February 28.[14]

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, reported that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces east of Jabalia refugee camp.[15] Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fighters similarly fired an unspecified guided munition at an IDF tank east of Jabalia.[16] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas and has expressed close ties with Iran.[17]

PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared Israeli personnel near the Erez border crossing with Israel.[18]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and eastern Khan Younis on March 1. Israeli forces expanded clearing operations to “new areas” east and west of Khan Younis on February 21.[19] The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) raided the homes of senior Hamas officials in western Khan Younis and located a weapons depot.[20] The IDF Givati Brigade (162nd Division) has been operating in eastern Khan Younis neighborhoods for the past week, approximately two kilometers from the border with Israel.[21]

Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli operations in several sectors of Khan Younis on March 1. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades clashed with Israeli forces in al Qarara north of Khan Younis.[22] The militia also reported that its fighters in western Khan Younis fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and mortars targeting Israeli forces.[23]

Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, described high casualties among Palestinian civilians as a means to add international pressure on Israel should the IDF proceed with clearing operations in Rafah.[24] Sinwar’s comments reflect Hamas’ tendency to view civilian casualties as a tool to pressure Israel. The Wall Street Journal reported on February 29 that senior Hamas officials in Doha met in early February 2023 amid concerns that Hamas’ military wing in the Gaza Strip was taking heavy losses.[25] Sinwar delivered a message to the leaders claiming that the military wing is doing fine and is ready for an Israeli offensive into Rafah. Sinwar’s comments regarding civilian casualties are reflective of a broader Hamas mindset. A member of Hamas’ Political Bureau indicated two weeks after the October 7, 2023, attacks that the group was prepared to accept heavy losses for the attack—possibly even including high civilian casualties in the Gaza Strip—in support of Hamas’ effort to destroy the Israeli state.[26] There are over a million displaced Palestinian civilians currently in Rafah.[27]

An unspecified senior Israeli official reported that Israel will not continue ceasefire negotiations until Hamas provides information on the status of the hostages it holds in the Gaza Strip.[28] The official said that Qatari and Egyptian mediators failed to provide details from Hamas on the status of hostages.[29] Israel also wants Hamas to offer a ”serious response” on the number of Palestinian prisoners Israel would release under a deal.[30] Israel previously refused to further engage in hostage talks because Hamas demanded that Israel release thousands of Palestinian prisoners as part of the deal.[31] Israel has reportedly agreed since then to a framework that would release up to 400 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for 40 Israeli hostages and a six-week truce.[32] Israel is waiting to see whether the United States’ pressure on mediators and US President Joe Biden’s recent talks with Egyptian and Qatari officials will prompt Hamas to meet Israeli demands.[33]

Hamas claimed on March 1 that seven hostages died due to Israeli airstrikes in the Gaza Strip.[34] Hamas and other Palestinian militias holding hostages in the strip have repeatedly made this claim throughout the war.[35]

Hamas and Fatah agreed to continue meeting with each other after attending talks in Moscow.[36] Several Palestinian factions met in Moscow on February 29 to discuss the formation of a new Palestinian government. Hamas’ political wing published a statement signed by the “Factions that met in Moscow” saying that the talks between several Palestinian factions had been constructive.[37] Fatah emphasized the need for unity among Palestinian factions given the current war in the Gaza Strip after the meeting.[38]

Palestinian militias did not claim any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on March 1. The IDF Air Force targeted an area in the northern Gaza Strip from which Palestinian fighters previously fired rockets targeting Israel on February 29.[39] The PRC claimed the rocket attack.[40]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters in 13 locations across the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 29.[41] Local PIJ battalions claimed to have clashed with Israeli forces seven times around Jaba and Jenin.[42] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades clashed with Israeli forces around Hebron, Jenin, and Tulkarm.[43]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 29.[44]

The IDF is continuing to increase its combat readiness around northern Israel. Former IDF spokesperson Avi Benayahu stated that Israeli forces are conducting training meant to simulate combat against Hezbollah around the Israel-Lebanon border.[45]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Israel was likely responsible for an airstrike that killed an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy officer in Baniyas, Syria, on March 1.[46] Syrian media reported that the officer, Colonel Reza Zarei, had connections to Hamas.[47] Syrian media also reported that the airstrike killed three other individuals, two of whom were members of Lebanese Hezbollah.[48] Iranian state media reported that Zarei was assigned to the IRGC’s 1st Naval District, which is responsible for the Strait of Hormuz.[49]

It is unclear what Zarei was doing in Syria, although his deployment to Syria reflects the greater role that the IRGC services other than the Quds Force have assumed in Iran’s regional activities in recent years. The IRGC deployed its regular ground units, for instance, to fight in the Syrian civil war on behalf of Bashar al Assad, as CTP-ISW has assessed extensively.[50] The IRGC Navy and Aerospace Force have similarly increased their operations in Syria in recent years.[51] The Quds Force remains the lead Iranian entity for managing and supporting the so-called “Axis of Resistance” and conducting extraterritorial operations. But the Quds Force also appears to increasingly share part of that mission with other elements of the Iranian security apparatus.[52]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war during phone calls with his Turkish counterpart and the Qatari prime minister on February 29 and March 1, respectively. Abdollahian emphasized the need for cooperation among Islamic countries to end the war.[53] Abdollahian discussed a potential ceasefire, an exchange of prisoners, and the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip with the Qatari prime minister.[54]

US CENTCOM intercepted a drone over the Red Sea and conducted two preemptive strikes targeting six mobile, anti-ship cruise missiles in Houthi-controlled Yemen on February 29.[55] CENTCOM reported that the drone and cruise missiles presented imminent threats to merchant and US naval vessels in the region.


Iran Update, February 29, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Johanna Moore, Ashka Jhaveri, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson, Rachel Friedman, Ahmad Omid Arman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting US forces has impeded the US-led international campaign to defeat ISIS in recent months, according to the Lead Inspector General’s quarterly report.[1] US advisory forces are deployed to Iraq under Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) at the request of the Iraqi federal government to advise and assist partner forces to “independently maintain the enduring defeat of ISIS.”[2] The Iranian-backed attack campaign targeting US forces has required OIR to divert resources from supporting Iraqi partners to instead address “increased” and “immediate” threats.[3] OIR reported that the redirected resources “hindered momentum” in pursuing OIR’s objectives.[4] The previous OIR quarterly report at the end of 2023 said that Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) already faces deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, logistics, and planning that prevent it from defeating ISIS alone.[5]

The escalation cycle fueled by Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks negatively affected the relationship between US advisers and their Iraqi partners, according to the report.[6] The increased security threat from militia attacks to US forces required OIR to “cancel or delay engagements” with Iraqi officials.[7] The United States also evacuated and redeployed personnel that then reduced base operations and equipment and facility maintenance.[8] OIR reported that it has furthermore “scaled back Coalition engagements” and logistical support for NATO Mission-Iraq and other supporting entities.[9]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting US forces has impeded the US-led international campaign to defeat ISIS in recent months, according to the Lead Inspector General’s quarterly report.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF 162nd Division continued to conduct clearing operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City. Hamas fighters resumed contact with their command and returned from areas of fighting to report several attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and eastern Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: Dozens of individuals died in a crowd near a humanitarian aid convoy in the northern Gaza Strip. The incident may disrupt negotiations between Israel and Hamas.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least seven times in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: US officials are increasingly concerned that Israel will launch a ground incursion into Lebanon in early spring or summer 2024, according to unnamed Biden administration officials.
  • Syria: Israeli airstrike hit a Lebanese Hezbollah truck on the Lebanon-Syria border, according to Reuters, killing one Hezbollah fighter.
  • Yemen: Houthi-controlled media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted airstrikes on four sites in Hudayduh Governorate, Yemen.
  • Iran: Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen security and economic cooperation.
  • The United Kingdom sanctioned three Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force units, two Houthi members, and the IRGC Quds Force deputy commander.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that it has killed over 450 Palestinian fighters in the past 10 days across the Gaza Strip.[10] Israeli forces have concentrated their clearing operations around Zaytoun in the northern Gaza Strip as well as around western and eastern Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip.[11] The IDF added that it has killed over 13,000 Palestinian fighters since the beginning of fighting in the Gaza Strip.[12] Hamas’ military force had approximately 40,000 members prior to the war—not including the forces of other Palestinian militias aligned with Hamas in the war.[13]

The IDF 162nd Division continued to conduct clearing operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 29.[14] The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) located a small arms lathe and weapons storage facility in Zaytoun.[15] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published footage of its fighters firing rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli armor and special operations forces in Zaytoun.[16] The footage also shows Palestinian fighters detonating a house-borne improvised explosive device (HBIED).

Hamas fighters resumed contact with their command and returned from areas of fighting to report several attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[17] The Hamas fighters reported that they had detonated an HBIED and two explosive-rigged tunnels targeting Israeli forces. Hamas also fired an anti-tank RPG and detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting an IDF tank south of Zaytoun. A Palestinian activist reported on February 28 that Israeli vehicles operated in Mughraqa, south of Zaytoun, amid sounds of artillery fire.[18] These fighters' inability to communicate with higher headquarters until returning to rear areas indicates a breakdown of command and control and probably means that Hamas commanders cannot transmit orders to some of their fighters presently engaged with the IDF.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and eastern Khan Younis on February 29. The IDF 7th Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) killed four Palestinian fighters who attempted to plant a roadside IED in western Khan Younis.[19] The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division), which is operating in eastern Khan Younis, directed an airstrike to kill five Palestinian fighters.[20] PIJ fighters mortared an Israeli supply line in eastern Khan Younis.[21] Israeli forces expanded clearing operations in eastern Khan Younis on February 21, where CTP-ISW assesses that Israeli forces have not yet cleared agricultural and suburban terrain.[22] PIJ and another Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war claimed that their fighters clashed with Israeli forces in eastern Khan Younis on February 29.[23]

Several Palestinian factions, including Fatah, met in Moscow on February 29 to discuss the formation of a new Palestinian government.[24] Hamas’ political wing published a statement confirming the meeting and emphasized that the various factions agree on the need to form a Palestinian state.[25] Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov said during the opening remarks that violence will continue in the region until certain things are addressed, namely the issue of creating a Palestinian state.[26] Lavrov claimed that Russia has repeatedly advocated for the resumption of direct dialogue between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Lavrov's statement is consistent with how Russia has framed itself as a possible mediator between Israel and Hamas throughout the war.

The Israeli security establishment believes that the spokesperson for the Hamas police left the Gaza Strip with Egypt’s permission.[27] Unspecified Palestinian sources within the strip reported that the spokesperson’s name was on a list of people set to evacuate through the Rafah crossing.[28] The IDF claimed that Egypt never forwarded his name to Israel as part of the list.[29] The IDF has targeted Hamas’ police and internal security apparatus to disrupt Hamas’ attempts to rebuild its governing authority in the strip.[30] The Civil Police and the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry's Internal Security Forces in the Gaza Strip both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing.[31]

Dozens of individuals died in a crowd near a humanitarian aid convoy in the northern Gaza Strip on February 28.[32] The IDF reported that thousands of Palestinians swarmed 30 aid trucks south of Gaza City.[33] An eyewitness reported that the trucks attempted to escape the area and accidentally rammed people, causing deaths and injuries.[34] The Hamas-run Health Ministry reported that 104 people died and hundreds were injured after Israeli forces opened fire on them.[35] The IDF said that its forces did not fire at the crowd approaching the primary aid convoy.[36] Israeli forces did, however, fire at Palestinians who moved toward Israeli soldiers and a tank, as the Israeli forces concluded that they were “endangering [their] soldiers.”[37] The United States has warned Israel that a “total breakdown of law and order” is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the strip.[38] Aid officials have reported several incidents of unspecified personnel looting aid trucks.[39]

The humanitarian aid convoy incident in the northern Gaza Strip may disrupt negotiations between Israel and Hamas. US President Joe Biden stated that the humanitarian aid incident will likely complicate the hostage release deal and talks on a temporary truce.[40] Hamas released a statement warning that it could stop participating in negotiations following the incident.[41]

The Popular Resistance Committees, a Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, fired rockets from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel in response to the humanitarian aid convoy incident.[42]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least seven times in the West Bank on February 29.[43]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 28.[44]

US officials are increasingly concerned that Israel will launch a ground incursion into Lebanon in early spring or summer 2024, according to unnamed Biden administration officials.[45] One senior US official said that an Israeli campaign in Lebanon is a “distinct possibility” in the next several months. The New York Times previously reported in December 2023 that the United States held talks with Israel, Lebanon, and intermediaries for Lebanese Hezbollah to “reduce tensions” on the Israel-Lebanon border.[46]

Israeli airstrike hit a Lebanese Hezbollah truck on the Lebanon-Syria border on February 29, according to Reuters, killing one Hezbollah fighter.[47] Pro-Syrian regime media reported that the airstrike occurred around al Nahariyya, which is on the outskirts of Qusayr.[48] The IDF Air force has increased its strikes into Syria since December 2023 to disrupt the IRGC Quds Force and Hezbollah’s efforts to bring personnel and weapons into Lebanon from Syria[49] previously reported that the Israeli airstrikes are responding to Iranian efforts to accelerate the supply of military equipment to Lebanese Hezbollah.[50]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The IDF Air Force likely conducted a series of airstrikes targeting three Iranian-affiliated targets in the Sayyidah Zainab area of southern Damascus on February 28.[51] Iranian and Iranian-backed forces maintain a headquarters in Sayyidah Zainab and use it to manage Iranian operations throughout Syria.[52]

Houthi-controlled media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted airstrikes on four sites in Hudayduh Governorate, Yemen, on February 29.[53] Al Masirah stated the strikes targeted Ras Issa and al Kuwayzi areas of coastal Yemen. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom have confirmed the strikes at the time of this writing.

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi claimed the Houthis have attacked 54 vessels since the start of their anti-shipping campaign in November 2023.[54] Abdulmalik said that Houthi forces have used 384 drones and missiles in those attacks. CTP-ISW has recorded at least 97 instances of the Houthis threatening ships around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in this timeframe, however. The Houthi military spokesperson has only issued statements about Houthi attacks on approximately 36 vessels.[55]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed ongoing efforts to reach a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war during a meeting with Omani Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Khalifa al Harthi in Tehran on February 28.[56] Abdollahian thanked the Omani government for supporting Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[57]

The United Kingdom sanctioned three Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force units, two Houthi members, and the IRGC Quds Force deputy commander on February 27.[58] The sanctions targeted individuals and groups that support, enable, or contribute to the Houthis monetarily or militarily. The United Kingdom designated:

  • Ali Hussein Badr al Din al Houthi (the undersecretary in the Houthi-controlled Interior Ministry and the commander of the security and police forces)
  • IRGC Quds Force Units 190, 6000, and 340;
  • Sa’id al-Jamal (An Iran-based Houthi financier whom the United States previously sanctioned in January 2023); and[59]
  • Mohammad Reza Fallah Zadeh (the IRGC Quds Force deputy commander whom the United States similarly sanctioned on February 27).[60]

Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen security and economic cooperation. Russia launched the Iranian Pars-1 satellite into a low earth orbit using a Soyuz rocket on February 29.[61] Iranian state media reported that the Pars-1 satellite has three cameras and will scan Iran’s topography from an orbit of 500 kilometers.[62] Iranian Communications and Information Technology Minister Issa Zareh Pour claimed on February 29 that the Pars-1 satellite’s launch into orbit marks Iran’s 12th satellite launch in the past 25 months.[63] The Russian launch of this Iranian satellite is part of a larger trend in which Moscow has increasingly supported the Iranian space program. Russia previously launched a Kanopus-V satellite—alternatively referred to as the Khayyam in Iran—into orbit in August 2022 on Iran’s behalf.[64] Iran can use satellites capable of collecting imagery to improve its targeting for attacks abroad.[65] IRGC-affiliated media reported in July 2020 that the IRGC used its satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the Middle East.[66]

Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji separately announced on February 28 that Iranian and Russian officials signed 11 memorandums of understanding during the 17th annual Iran-Russia Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation in Tehran between February 26-28.[67] The agreements cover business, energy, political, and transportation cooperation. Owji stated that Iranian and Russian officials also discussed “peaceful space and nuclear cooperation,” banking and financial cooperation, the Rasht-Astara and Garmsar-Incheh Borun railways, and the Sirik Power Plant during the economic conference.[68]

Iranian Assembly of Experts member Mahmoud Mohammadi Eraghi claimed that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei opposes hereditary succession during an interview with state-affiliated media on February 29.[69] The Assembly of Experts is an Iranian regime entity constitutionally responsible for monitoring the supreme leader and selecting his successor.[70] Eraghi’s statement is noteworthy because Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, is considered a top contender to become the next supreme leader. Eraghi has served as the head of the supreme leader’s office in Qom since 2019.[71] He represents Kermanshah Province in the Assembly of Experts and is also a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, which is an advisory entity for the supreme leader.[72] Eraghi served as the supreme leader’s representative to the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War, after which he served as the head of the Islamic Propaganda Organization, the head of the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization, and a member of the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council.[73]

Iran Update, February 28, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Rachel Friedman, Amin Soltani, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Palestinian militias have claimed at least 92 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun, southeastern Gaza City, between February 19 and February 28.[1] At least seven Palestinian militias conducted attacks on Israeli forces in Zaytoun on February 27 and 28.[2] Palestinian militias have targeted Israeli forces with rocket propelled grenades, mortars, explosively-formed penetrators (EFP), improvised explosive devices, small arms, and rockets in Zaytoun since February 19.[3] These attacks are in response to the ongoing division-sized clearing operation targeting Zaytoun.

This high attack rate involving at least seven Palestinian militias using sophisticated military capabilities indicates that Palestinian fighters have retained military capacity in southern Gaza City despite two Israeli clearing operations there. The militias likely infiltrated into previously cleared areas of southern Gaza City from the uncleared central Gaza Strip. The militias also likely reactivated dormant cells after the Israelis decreased the size of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) contingent in the northern Strip. The IDF said that Hamas’ Central and Gaza City Brigades transferred fighters between battalions through tunnel networks.[4] Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh insinuated on February 28 that Israeli clearing operations in Zaytoun had failed, noting that Hamas’ continued attacks in Zaytoun are “the [fiercest] battles” despite Israel‘s 80-day “occupation.”[5]

The IDF 162nd Division continued its clearing operation in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 28. The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed Palestinian fighters and located weapons in Zaytoun.[6] The Israeli Air Force conducted airstrikes on a Hamas warehouse in Daraj, north of Zaytoun.[7]

Key Takeaways:

  • Gaza City: Palestinian militias have claimed at least 92 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun, southeastern Gaza City, between February 19 and February 28. This high attack rate involving at least seven Palestinian militias using sophisticated military capabilities indicates that Palestinian fighters have retained military capacity in southern Gaza City despite two Israeli clearing operations there.
  • The militias likely infiltrated into previously cleared areas of southern Gaza City from the uncleared central Gaza Strip. The militias also likely reactivated dormant cells after the Israelis decreased the size of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) contingent in the northern Strip.
  • The attacks in Zaytoun are in response to the ongoing division-sized clearing operation targeting Zaytoun. The IDF 162nd Division continued its clearing operation in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 28.
  • Rafah: IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari said on February 27 that Israel seeks to ensure displaced Gazan civilians have access to food, aid, medicine, and hospital facilities in a separate, safer zone before conducting ground operations in Rafah.
  • Negotiations: Israeli negotiators are expected to leave Qatar on February 29 if there is no significant breakthrough in ceasefire talks, according to two Israeli sources familiar with the process.
  • Yemen: CENTCOM and an unspecified coalition warship shot down five Houthi one-way attack drones over the Red Sea on February 27.
  • Iraq-Russia: The Iraqi government may request a sanctions waiver to purchase spare parts for Russian-manufactured helicopters. A Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member cited by an independent Iraqi news outlet said that there is an “unannounced” effort to resolve the shortage of parts for Iraq’s Russian-made helicopters.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The IDF continued clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 28. The IDF 7th Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) raided militia positions and fired a missile targeting five Palestinian fighters in a vehicle in western Khan Younis.[8] The IDF 35th Paratrooper Brigade also fired sniper rifles at several Palestinian fighters operating in western Khan Younis.[9] The 98th Division directed an airstrike on Palestinian fighters attempting an ambush of Israeli fighters in Khan Younis.[10] Palestinian militias conducted at least five attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in central and western Khan Younis on February 28.[11]

The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) continued operations in eastern Khan Younis and directed airstrikes targeting two Palestinian fighters on February 28.[12] Hamas fighters pre-placed and detonated two EFPs targeting Israeli tanks operating in Abasan al Kabira on February 28.[13] Hamas and other Palestinian militias claimed small arms clashes with Israeli forces in Abasan al Kabira and north of the town.[14]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh gave a rare recorded public address at a conference in Beirut on February 28.[15] Haniyeh claimed that Hamas has displayed flexibility in negotiations but remains ready to continue fighting.[16] He also warned Israel against imposing additional restrictions for Muslims on access to the al Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan and called on Palestinian residents of Jerusalem and the West Bank to march on al Aqsa Mosque on the first day of Ramadan, which begins around March 10.[17] Some far-right Israeli ministers have proposed restricting access to the al Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan, but Israel has not announced a new policy.[18]

IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari said on February 27 that Israel seeks to ensure displaced Gazan civilians have access to food, aid, medicine, and hospital facilities in a separate, safer zone before conducting ground operations in Rafah.[19] Israel facilitated the airdrop of aid into Khan Younis and access to the northern Gaza Strip for 31 aid trucks on February 27.[20] Israel is reportedly still considering opening a direct aid crossing from Israel into the northern Gaza Strip to increase aid flows.[21]

Russian state media confirmed that Fatah and Hamas officials will meet in Moscow on February 29 to discuss the formation of a new Palestinian government.[22] Hamas has not independently confirmed its attendance. A senior Hamas delegation last traveled to Moscow in late October 2023 to meet with Russian and Iranian officials.[23] Some smaller political factions actively fighting Israeli forces in Gaza, like the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, criticized the meeting for excluding other Palestinian groups.[24] Fatah leaders gave unoptimistic statements to media organizations about the meeting.[25] The Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Riyad al Maliki said that he does not expect “miracles to happen” and added that the time is not right for a ”national coalition government” or a government that includes Hamas. Maliki cited the risk of an international boycott against any government including Hamas.[26] Russia has framed itself as a possible mediator between Israel and Hamas.[27]

Israeli negotiators are expected to leave Qatar on February 29 if there is no significant breakthrough in ceasefire talks, according to two Israeli sources familiar with the process.[28] Reuters reported on February 27 that the parties are discussing the latest ”Paris Proposal” that would require both Israel and the Palestinian militias to completely stop their military operations in the Gaza Strip. The latest proposal would also force Israel to pause aerial surveillance in the Strip for eight hours daily and reposition IDF units away from densely populated areas. The proposal would allow the gradual return of all displaced civilians except military aged males to the northern Gaza Strip.[29] Hamas would release 40 female, child, and elderly hostages in exchange for approximately 400 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel under the latest proposal.[30] Israel would also commit to bring in 500 humanitarian aid trucks per day, 200,000 tents, 60,000 caravans, fuel, and heavy machinery to rehabilitate hospitals and bakeries in the Gaza Strip.[31] Hamas representatives have reportedly not provided a full response to the proposal.[32] Hamas Political Bureau member Muhammad Nazal said on February 28 that ”there is no escaping the end of the war” but that Hamas does not have to agree to ”the first stage of the deal.”[33]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired a rocket barrage from the Gaza Strip targeting Kissufim in southern Israel on February 28.[34]

The IDF Gaza Division and Southern Command directed airstrikes in Central Gaza targeting eight “significant targets,” including a PIJ rocket launcher used to attack Ashkelon on February 27.[35]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least five times in the West Bank on February 28.[36]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, has conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 27.[37] Hamas’ military wing said that it fired 40 rockets targeting two Israeli positions in northern Israel.[38] The IDF said that only 15 of the rockets that Hamas fired crossed into Israeli territory. One of the rockets damaged a home in the area.[39]

Unspecified sources familiar with Lebanese Hezbollah decisionmaking told Reuters on February 27 that the group will stop attacks on northern Israel if Hamas agrees to a ceasefire.[40] Hamas is currently considering a proposal that would include a six-week truce with Israel.[41]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Iraqi government may request a sanctions waiver to purchase spare parts for Russian-manufactured helicopters.[42] A Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member cited by an independent Iraqi news outlet said that there is an “unannounced” effort to resolve the shortage of parts for Iraq’s Russian-made helicopters. The US Department of Defense Inspector General’s Q3 Report on Operation Inherent Resolve said that “sanctions related to the war in Ukraine have prevented the acquisition of new parts [for Russian-produced helicopters].”[43] The report added that most of Iraq’s Russian-manufactured helicopters are not airworthy due to ”maintenance constraints, outdated systems, and lack of available spare parts.”[44] Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev has discussed security cooperation with several senior Iraqi political and military officials in a series of meetings since late January 2024. CTP-ISW assessed on February 20 that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as Iraq’s security partner in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence in Iraq.[45]

An unspecified “judicial source” told Iraqi Kurdish media that Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court rejected a lawsuit on February 28 that attempted to invalidate Parliament Speaker nominee Shaalan al Karim’s candidacy.[46] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court stated that the lawsuit does not fall under the court’s jurisdiction. Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians filed a lawsuit on January 13 to invalidate Karim’s candidacy as part of their efforts to install their preferred candidate, Mahmoud al Mashhadani, as speaker.[47]

The Sistan and Baluchistan Province prosecutor said that two unspecified “terrorist operatives” attempted to conduct attacks targeting Iranian security officials in Bampur on February 28.[48] The two fighters attempted to target an Iranian security forces patrol near an Iranian checkpoint in Bampur. The fighters prematurely detonated their explosives, killing one fighter.[49]

This incident is part of an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023. Jaish al Adl—a Balochi, Salafi-jihadi group operating along the Iran-Pakistan border—has conducted at least five attacks targeting Iranian security personnel since December 2023.[50] The Iranian Law Enforcement Command killed a purportedly Jaish al Adl-affiliated individual in Bampur City on January 8.[51] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State separately conducted a terrorist attack in Kerman Province in early January 2024, killing over 90 individuals.[52]

The Iranian communications and information technology minister announced on February 28 that Russia will launch the Iranian Pars-1 satellite into orbit on February 29.[53] Iranian state media claimed that Russia will use its Soyuz space launch vehicle to launch the Pars-1 into low earth orbit.[54] Russia similarly launched a Kanopus-V satellite—alternatively referred to as the Khayyam in Iran—into orbit in August 2022 on Iran’s behalf.[55] The IRGC Aerospace Force Command and Iranian Space Organization separately launched multiple Iranian satellites into low-earth orbit between April 2020 and January 2024.[56] Iran can use satellites capable of collecting imagery to help enable targeting capabilities for attacks abroad.[57] Iranian state media reported in July 2020 that the IRGC used its satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region.[58]

CENTCOM and an unspecified coalition warship shot down five Houthi one-way attack drones over the Red Sea on February 27.[59] CENTCOM said that the drones presented an ”imminent” threat to vessels in the Red Sea.

The German frigate Hessen shot down two Houthi one-way attack drones over the Red Sea on February 27.[60] The Hessen identified a suspicious target over the Red Sea on February 26 but did not successfully intercept the target.[61] It is unclear if the Hessen is the unspecified coalition warship noted by CENTCOM.

A Houthi-controlled media outlet said that the United States and United Kingdom targeted Houthi sites on Labwan Island, off the coast of Hudaydah, on February 27.[62] Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom have confirmed the strikes.

Iran Update, February 27, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Two Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated sources told the New York Times that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias “fiercely resisted” IRGC Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani’s orders in late January to halt attacks targeting US forces in the region.[1] The two IRGC-affiliated sources claimed that Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba commanders refused to stop attacking US forces during a meeting with Ghaani in Baghdad, which Reuters reported occurred on January 29.[2] Iranian and Iraqi sources added that senior Iraqi Shia clerics in Najaf and influential Iraqi politicians, including the Iraqi prime minister, convinced Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba to halt the attacks.

The timeline of events indicates that Ghaani was instrumental in convincing Kataib Hezbollah to pause attacks, not Iraqi leaders. Kataib Hezbollah responded to Iranian directives from Ghaani by announcing that it would “suspend attacks” on January 30—roughly 24 hours after the meeting with Ghaani on January 29. Reuters reported that Ghaani directed Iranian-backed Iraqi groups to “pause” attacks on US forces during the January 29 meeting. A senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia commander told Reuters that Ghaani’s influence was essential in convincing Kataib Hezbollah to pause attacks. Reuters added that one group, presumably Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, did not “initially agree” to Ghaani’s directive.[3] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba said on February 2 that it would continue attacks targeting US forces.[4] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed three attacks targeting US forces after Ghaani’s visit.[5]

Iraqi Shia clerics in Najaf may also lack the influence to convince Kataib Hezbollah to cease attacks. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba are loyal to the Iranian supreme leader, not Iraqi Shia clerics in Najaf.[6] It is not clear why Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba would follow orders from Iraqi Shia clerics over Ghaani, who speaks for the Iranian supreme leader.[7]

Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad illustrates both the extent of and limits to Iran’s control of its proxy network in the Middle East. Most of Iran’s proxies and partners in Iraq immediately ceased attacks following Ghaani’s directive, though it is possible additional pressure from the Iraqi government further reinforced Ghaani’s orders. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba initially did not agree to stop attacks, but Iranian-backed Iraqi groups have not resumed attacks targeting US forces since February 4. The Iraqi prime minister has ample reason to attempt to stop Iranian-backed attacks against US forces to avoid additional US airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed groups in Iraq. The attacks—and the ensuing US airstrikes—undermine the prime minister’s ability to retain even a small international coalition presence to support Iraqi forces against ISIS.[8] Ghaani and Iran can pressure their partners and proxies to pause or resume these attacks as needed, however. Ghaani represents the Iranian supreme leader, to whom groups like Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba proclaim loyalty, meaning that many Iranian-backed groups will respond as Ghaani directs.[9]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq: Two Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated sources told the New York Times that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias “fiercely resisted” IRGC Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani’s orders in late January to halt attacks targeting US forces in the region.
  • The timeline of events indicates that Ghaani—not Iraqi leaders—was instrumental in convincing Kataib Hezbollah to pause attacks. Kataib Hezbollah responded to Iranian directives from Ghaani by announcing that it would “suspend attacks” on January 30—roughly 24 hours after the meeting with Ghaani on January 29.
  • Iraqi Shia clerics in Najaf may also lack the influence to convince Kataib Hezbollah to cease attacks. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba are loyal to the Iranian supreme leader, not Iraqi Shia clerics in Najaf.
  • Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad illustrates both the extent of and limits to Iran’s control of its proxy network in the Middle East. Most of Iran’s proxies and partners in Iraq immediately ceased attacks following Ghaani’s directive, though it is possible additional pressure from the Iraqi government further reinforced Ghaani’s orders.
  • Gaza City: The IDF 162nd Division continued its clearing operation in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 27. Palestinian militias claimed at least 16 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun, southeastern Gaza City on February 27.
  • Iran and Yemen: The United States and the United Kingdom sanctioned Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and Houthi members on February 27.


Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is building a “well-controlled IDF highway” south of Zaytoun to enable “at least another year” of operations in the Gaza Strip.[10] CTP-ISW previously reported the IDF’s east-to-west road construction on February 19.[11] The IDF has not officially commented on the construction, but two journalists embedded with Israel forces operating in Gaza have published accounts of the construction project.[12] A correspondent from Israel Army Radio, a media organization run by the IDF, said Israeli forces are also building three forward operating bases near the east-west road for future raids and operations in the Gaza Strip.[13]

The IDF 162nd Division continued its clearing operation in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 27.[14] The 932nd Battalion (assigned to the Nahal Brigade) has operated in Zaytoun for a week to “destroy the enemy" in the area.[15] The battalion has raided Hamas buildings, weapons warehouses and observation posts to find intelligence on Hamas operations. The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed a Palestinian militia squad with tank fire and destroyed Hamas buildings as part of the division-sized clearing operation.[16] The 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed Palestinian fighters at close range, directed airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters, and uncovered a weapons factory in Zaytoun.[17]

Palestinian militias claimed at least 16 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun, southeastern Gaza City on February 27.[18] The groups used rocket propelled grenades, mortars, explosively-formed penetrators (EFPs), improvised explosive devices, and small arms in their attacks.[19] Palestinian Islamic Jihad engineers targeted Israeli infantry by detonating a missile from an F16 that they had rigged as an improvised explosive device in a house near al Dawla roundabout in Zaytoun.[20] The high number of attacks and the use of more sophisticated capabilities — such as EFPs — is inconsistent with an Israeli Army Radio journalist‘s characterization of the fighting on January 27 as “relatively [small in] scale.”[21] Palestinian militias conducted over triple the number of attacks on Israeli forces in southern Gaza City as they did in Khan Younis Governorate on February 27.

The IDF has continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis. The IDF 7th Brigade and 35th Paratrooper Brigade detained Palestinian fighters who tried to hide among evacuating civilians to escape Khan Younis.[22] The 7th Brigade detained Palestinian fighters attempting a similar escape on February 25.[23] The IDF Maglan and Egoz special operations forces continued clearing operations in western Khan Younis over the last week.[24] The special operations forces raided a Hamas compound and seized a large amount of weapons in western Khan Younis on February 27.[25] The special operations forces have killed and detained dozens of fighters per day for the last week.[26] Palestinian militias conducted at least five attacks on Israeli forces operating in central and western Khan Younis on February 27.[27]

The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) conducted clearing operations in the Gaza Strip along the Israel-Gaza border in eastern Khan Younis Governorate.[28] PIJ claimed mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in the border area in Abasan al Kabira.[29]

PIJ fired a rocket barrage from the Gaza Strip targeting Ashkelon on February 27.[30] The rocket barrage caused damage to civilian infrastructure. [31]

The IDF Gaza Division and Southern Command directed airstrikes targeting a Palestinian militia command center in the central Gaza Strip that Palestinian fighters used to direct rocket fire into Israel on February 26.[32] PIJ and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement both conducted rocket attacks on February 26.[33]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least three times in the West Bank on February 27.[34] Israeli forces killed a senior member in Palestinian Islamic Jihad‘s Tubas Battalion south of Tubas on February 27.[35]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted at least ten attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 26.[36] Lebanese Hezbollah launched approximately 35 rockets targeting an IDF base on Mount Meron that hosts air traffic control, radar, surveillance, communications, and jamming facilities.[37] The IDF said that the attacks did not cause any casualties or damage to the area.[38]

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said that Lebanese Hezbollah will "pay a very high price" for its continued attacks targeting northern Israel during a speech at the IDF 146th Division headquarters on February 27.[39] Lebanese Hezbollah said that it fired dozens of rockets targeting the headquarters on the same day.[40]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The United States and the United Kingdom sanctioned Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and Houthi members on February 27.[41] The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the United Kingdom designated the following individuals and organizations:

  • IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Mohammad Reza Falahzadeh for generating revenue to fund Houthi operations
  • Houthi member Ibrahim al Nashiri
  • A Hong Kong-based shipping company that was responsible for facilitating the transport of Iranian commodities sold in China by the Said Jamal network. Said Jamal is a Houthi and IRGC Quds Force financial facilitator sanctioned by the United States on January 12.[42]

Falahzadeh has played a key role in supporting and financing Houthi, Hamas, and Hezbollah operations.[43] OFAC stated that the IRGC Quds Force and the Houthis sell Iranian commodities to foreign buyers to generate funds to support the Houthis. The US State Department designated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group in January 2024.[44] The US State Department designated the entire IRGC–including the Quds Force–as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in April 2019.[45]

US CENTCOM stated that it destroyed three surface naval attack drones and two mobile anti-ship cruise missiles in Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory on February 26 that were ready-to-launch in Houthi-controlled Yemen.[46] Houthi-affiliated media outlets reported on February 26 that the United States conducted airstrikes targeting Houthi positions north of Hudaydah.[47]

 

Iran Update, February 26, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, Ahmad Omid Arman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern and Central Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces announced that its 162nd Division uncovered a Hamas tunnel network connecting the Central Gaza Governorate to the northern Gaza Strip over the past several weeks.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis. Palestinian militias targeted Israeli forces operating in Abasan al Kabira, east of Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh met with the Qatari Emir to discuss ceasefire negotiations.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least three times in the West Bank. Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh resigned.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iraq: Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have signaled that they will resume conducting attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East.
  • Syria: Local Syrian sources reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is trying to rebuild its military infrastructure in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria.
  • Yemen: US CENTCOM reported that it intercepted three Houthi one-way attack drones.
  • Iran: The International Atomic Energy Organization disclosed to UN member states that Iran has reduced its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since late October 2023.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that its 162nd Division uncovered a Hamas tunnel network connecting the Central Gaza Governorate to the northern Gaza Strip over the past several weeks.[1] The IDF Nahal Brigade and Yahalom combat engineering unit located at least 35 entrances to the 10-kilometer-long complex equipped with plumbing, storage rooms, bedrooms, and military equipment.[2] The tunnel passed under the Turkish-Palestinian Friendship Hospital in the central Gaza Strip and extended to al Isra University in southern Gaza City.[3] The IDF said that Hamas used the tunnel system to transfer personnel between the Central Brigade and Gaza City Brigade, particularly between the Zaytoun Battalion, the Nuseirat Battalion, and Sabra Battalion.[4] CTP-ISW previously reported on the cross-governorate tunnel system on February 21 and assessed that Hamas battalions likely used the system to infiltrate previously cleared areas of the northern Gaza Strip.[5] The 162nd Division destroyed the tunnel complex after documenting the route.

The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 26. The IDF 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) “intensified attacks” in Zaytoun and killed over 30 Palestinian fighters.[6] The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) targeted at least 10 Palestinian fighters as part of the division-wide clearing operations in the Gaza City and Central Gaza governorates.[7] 

Palestinian militias claimed at least seven attacks targeting Israeli forces in their continued defense of southern Zaytoun on February 26.[8] Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed several mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces south of Zaytoun.[9] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement targeted Israeli armor with rockets and anti-tank missiles in Zaytoun.[10] Hamas, PIJ, and the National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli armor and dismounted infantry east of Zaytoun in a combined operation on February 25.[11]

The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 26. The IDF 7th Armored Brigade and Unit 414 directed airstrikes on Palestinian fighters operating in Khan Younis.[12] The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) ambushed and clashed with fighters in western Khan Younis.[13] Israeli forces seized grenades, ammunition, and other unspecified military equipment in clearing operations in Khan Younis.[14]

Palestinian militias targeted Israeli forces operating in Abasan al Kabira, east of Khan Younis, on February 26. Hamas targeted about 20 Israeli personnel in Abasan al Kabira with anti-personnel devices.[15] Hamas fighters targeted Israeli armor in the same area.[16] PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, both claimed sniper attacks targeting Israeli infantry in eastern Khan Younis.[17]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh met with the Qatari Emir to discuss ceasefire negotiations on February 26.[18] US, Qatari, and Egyptian officials proposed a new hostage deal to Israeli negotiators during discussions in Paris on February 24.[19] Israel reportedly agreed to a framework that would release up to 400 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for 40 Israeli hostages and a six-week truce under the new proposal.[20] Haniyeh claimed Hamas had shown great “flexibility and seriousness” in its contacts with mediators about the deal on February 26 but accused the Israeli government of stalling.[21]  Haniyeh stated that Hamas’ most important goal is to “stop the humanitarian catastrophe” in the northern Gaza Strip and indicated that food aid for civilians in northern Gaza should not be tied to any other negotiation issues.[22] Senior Israeli officials believe Hamas will not agree to the proposed ceasefire deal based on reports from Qatari mediators that the proposal does “not correspond with Hamas demands.”[23] An Israeli intelligence and military delegation reportedly arrived in Qatar on February 26 to set up an operational center to support negotiations.[24]

The Israeli prime minister’s office said that the IDF presented the war cabinet with a plan for evacuating civilians from combat zones in the Gaza Strip on February 26.[25] The office did not specify the contents of the plan. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF may allow women and children under the age of 14 to return to the northern Gaza Strip as part of Rafah evacuation plans.[26] The IDF would establish transit corridors and vet those returning to the northern Gaza Strip.[27] The same correspondent stated the IDF discussed establishing tent cities in the central Gaza Strip and Khan Younis for Gazans whose homes were destroyed.[28] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told the families of Israeli hostages on February 26 that Israel would not allow Gazans to return to their homes in the northern Gaza Strip until Hamas releases all the hostages to ”maintain pressure.”[29] Another member of the three-man war cabinet, Benny Gantz, said on February 18 that the IDF would enter Rafah on March 10 if Hamas did not release the hostages it holds.[30]

The Israeli war cabinet approved a “new” unspecified plan to distribute humanitarian assistance in the Gaza Strip.[31] The war cabinet said that the plan aims to ”prevent the looting that has occurred in the northern Strip” where Israel has accused Hamas of stealing aid.[32] An unnamed Israeli official reported that the war cabinet is considering what organizations can take over the aid provision function from the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) in the Gaza Strip.[33] Humanitarian organizations have struggled to provide aid to civilians in the northern Gaza Strip over the past several weeks, citing security breakdowns.[34]

Palestinian militias conducted two rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on February 26. PIJ fired a rocket barrage at the Kissufim military site.[35] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement launched rockets at Reim.[36]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least three times in the West Bank on February 26.[37]

Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh resigned on February 26.[38] Shtayyeh had served as prime minister since 2019 and had participated in peace negotiations with Israel since 1991.[39] US and Palestinian officials stated that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas will likely appoint a close confidante and chairman of the Palestinian Investment Fund, Mahammad Mustafa, as the next prime minister.[40]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 25.[41] Hezbollah claimed that it intercepted an IDF Hermes 450 drone near Nabatiyeh, southern Lebanon, on February 26.[42] The IDF stated that its David’s Sling medium-range air defense system intercepted one of two surface-to-air missiles fired by Hezbollah targeting the drone.[43] The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting a Hezbollah air defense site that killed two Hezbollah fighters near Baalbek, Lebanon, following the incident.[44] This airstrike is the furthest airstrike inside Lebanon that Israel has conducted since October 7.[45] Hezbollah launched at least 60 rockets targeting an IDF site in the Golan Heights on February 26 in retaliation for the IDF airstrike near Baalbek.[46]

The IDF killed senior Hezbollah commander Hassan Hossein Salami in southern Lebanon on February 26. The IDF described Salami as “commander of the Hajir sector” under Hezbollah’s Nasser unit and stated that Salami had previously organized attacks targeting IDF bases near Kiryat Shmona.[47] Israeli journalists described Salami’s rank within Hezbollah as equivalent to a brigade commander.[48] Hezbollah’s Nasser unit is one of the primary Hezbollah military formations south of the Litani River in Lebanon.[49]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have signaled that they will resume conducting attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—halted its attacks targeting US forces following a one-way drone attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan on January 28.[50] Ashab al Kahf—an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia close to Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba—released statements on February 23 and 25, respectively, vowing to continue conducting attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East as well as Israel.[51] Ashab al Kahf also recently hung posters in Baghdad with an image of Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary General Akram al Kaabi with the warning “the matter is settled, what is coming is greater.”[52]

Kaabi separately released a statement on February 25 emphasizing that the current pause in attacks is a “temporary tactic” and the “calm before the storm.”[53] Kaabi claimed that “traitors” provided the United States with information about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia positions and that the militias must therefore “reposition” and “change [their] methods and tactics.”[54] Kaabi stated that Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba does not oppose the ongoing negotiations between Washington and Baghdad about the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq but described those who believe that the United States will leave Iraq via negotiations as “delusional.”[55] He claimed that the United States only understands “force and weapons.”[56]

Prominent Iraqi Shia cleric Ammar al Hakim discussed the ongoing negotiations between Washington and Baghdad about the status of US-led international coalition forces in Iraq during a meeting with US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski on February 26.[57] The United States and Iraq began these negotiations in late January 2024.[58] Hakim praised the Mohammad Shia al Sudani administration’s efforts to establish “bilateral relationships” with the United States and International Coalition countries.[59] Hakim separately praised the December 2023 provincial council elections for “strengthening” Iraqi democracy but condemned recent “attempts to destabilize [Iraq] by resorting to violence and the use of weapons.” Hakim may have been referring to the recent rise in intra-Shia assassinations across Iraq.[60]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadegh on February 25.[61] Iraqi and Iranian media reported that Sudani and Sadegh discussed “bilateral relations” and Iraqi development projects but did not provide further details about what the two officials discussed.[62] Sadegh is a senior officer in the IRGC Quds Force, which is consistent with the long-standing trend of Iran appointing IRGC Quds Force members to simultaneously work as the ambassador to Iraq.[63]

The Iraqi federal government granted Russian state-owned oil company Gazprom a contract to develop the Nasiriyah oil field in Dhi Qar Province on February 7.[64] The Iraqi state-owned Dhi Qar Oil Company, which is headed by Ali Khudair Abbas al Aboudi, previously operated the Nasiriyah oil field.[65] Aboudi is a member of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), a Shia political party formerly headed by prominent Shia cleric Ammar al Hakim.[66] The Iraqi National Security Service reportedly arrested Aboudi in March 2021 for accepting a $250,000 bribe.[67] Ammar al Hakim currently heads the National Wisdom Movement. The Dhi Qar provincial council elected a National Wisdom Movement member named Mortada al Ebrahimi as Dhi Qar governor on February 5, two days before the Iraqi government granted Russia the development contract.[68] Hakim previously discussed “attracting foreign investments” during a meeting with Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev on January 31.[69]

Local Syrian sources reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is trying to rebuild its military infrastructure in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, following the February 2 US airstrikes on Iranian and Iranian-backed positions. Four Iranian communications specialists entered Syria from Iraq and began installing advanced communications and surveillance systems on February 22.[70] The communications systems are used by IRGC-backed militias based near Deir ez Zor City. Syrian media reported these same communications systems were previously destroyed in US airstrikes.[71] Several IRGC officials returned to Deir ez Zor Province on February 23, according to other local reports.[72] The IRGC officials left Syria ahead of the February US airstrike. CTP-ISW cannot confirm the local Syrian reporting. 

Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated al Mayadeen reported that the IDF conducted a drone strike around al Qusayr, Homs Province, on the Syria-Lebanon border on February 25.[73] The strike targeted two trucks suspected of transporting Hezbollah military cargo.[74] Hezbollah-affiliated al Manar network claimed the strike killed two members of Hezbollah.[75]

US CENTCOM reported that it intercepted three Houthi one-way attack drones on February 24.[76] The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that the group launched an unspecified number of drones targeting a US warship on February 24.[77]

Houthi-affiliated media outlets reported that the United States and United Kingdom conducted airstrikes targeting Houthi positions north of Hudaydah on February 26.[78] The United States and United Kingdom has not claimed responsibility for any airstrikes in Yemen at the time of this writing.

The International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) disclosed to UN member states on February 26 that Iran has reduced its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since late October 2023.[79] The Iranian regime has, according to an IAEA report, diluted some of this stockpile to 20 percent enriched uranium, thereby reducing its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 6.8 kilograms to 121.5 kilograms.[80] The overall Iranian stockpile of enriched uranium has continued to expand since October 2023, however.[81] Iran has also refused the entry of several weapons inspectors into the country and the inspection of undeclared nuclear material, according to the IAEA.[82]

Iranian media claimed that Iranian security forces killed a Jaish al Adl commander inside Pakistani territory on February 23.[83] Jaish al Adl is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group that operates along the Iranian border with Pakistan. Iranian media described the commander as “the main perpetrator of recent terrorist operations in southeastern Iran.”[84] There has been an uptick in anti-regime militant activity in southeastern Iran since December 2023. Jaish al Adl conducted a two-stage attack targeting a police station in Rask, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, in December 2023.[85] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State also conducted a terrorist attack in Kerman Province in January 2024, killing over 80 individuals.[86] Pakistani media denied on February 24 that Iranian forces killed the Jaish al Adl commander.[87]

The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) arrested two men accused of being part of Sipah Sahaba in Hormozgan Province on February 25.[88] LEC spokesperson Brigadier General Saeed Montazer al Mahdi stated that the two men arrested had completed ”bomb-making courses” outside of Iran and intended to travel to an unnamed southern city in Iran. Mahdi stated the two had previously been imprisoned in Pakistan from 2010-15 on charges of bombing a Pakistani city. Mahdi described Sipah Sahaba as an “anti-Shia” terrorist group.[89] Sipah Sahaba is a prominent Sunni militant organization that originated in Pakistan.[90]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian called for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas during separate meetings at the 55th Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, on February 26. Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with the UN secretary general, International Committee of Red Cross president, Jordanian foreign affairs minister, and Kuwaiti foreign affairs minister on the sidelines of the meeting.[91] Abdollahian separately blamed the United States and Israel for the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip in a speech at the UN Human Rights Council meeting.[92]

The 17th annual Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation between Iran and Russia began in Tehran on February 26.[93] Russian and Iranian experts will examine bilateral cooperation in various sectors including oil, nuclear energy, gas, finance and information technology. Iranian media reported the Russian delegation will consist of 160-170 experts from various government ministries and members of the Russian private sector.[94] The 17th Commission is headed by Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak. Iranian media reported that Owji and Novak will preside over the signing of cooperation agreements on oil, energy, and free economic zones between Iran and Russia.[95] The conference will run from February 26 to 28.

Iran Update, February 25, 2024

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Andie Parry, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces has continued to conduct clearing operations in western and eastern Khan Younis.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least six times in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Yemen: The USS Mason intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile targeting US-flagged, owned, and operated oil tanker MV Torm Thor.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued clearing operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 25. The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) targeted Palestinian fighters, destroyed rocket launch sites, and located weapons during clearing operations in Zaytoun.[1] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi held a situational assessment meeting in the northern Gaza Strip with the commanders of Southern Command and the 162nd Division.[2] Halevi stated that Israeli forces are returning to previously cleared areas in the northern Gaza Strip “based on better intelligence“ to ”deepen achievements“ against Hamas.[3]

Palestinian militias continued to operate in Gaza City on February 25. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired rockets at an Israeli position east of Jabalia’s eastern cemetery.[4] The IDF 143rd Division directed an airstrike on a Palestinian squad operating a drone in Shati in northwestern Gaza City.[5] The 162nd Division completed a second round of clearing operations in al Shati refugee camp on February 15.[6] PIJ directed sniper fire targeting Israeli forces operating near al Dawla roundabout in Zaytoun.[7] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, fired rockets at Israeli forces south of Zaytoun.[8]

The IDF has continued to conduct clearing operations in western and eastern Khan Younis. The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) has operated in Abasan al Kabira and Abasan al Saghira in recent days.[9] The brigade seized a long-range rocket and launcher in a "medical laboratory" in the Abasan area, likely the Algerian Specialized Hospital in Abasan al Kabira.[10] The IDF‘s acknowledgement of its activity in the Abasan al Kabira area is consistent with local Palestinian reports of IDF activity on February 19-20.[11] The IDF 7th Armored Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) detained Palestinian fighters hiding among and evacuating with civilians in western Khan Younis on February 25.[12] The brigade also killed several Palestinian fighters and seized weapons.[13] IDF 98th Division forces killed a Palestinian drone squad in Khan Younis.[14]

The IDF announced on February 25 that its 98th Division commando forces ceased operations at Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis.[15] Israeli forces detained over 200 individuals and seized weapons from the hospital.[16] The IDF said it brought multiple rounds of humanitarian aid and a generator to the hospital during its operations.[17] The IDF said it will continue to abide by international law when operating in hospitals in the Gaza Strip.[18]

Israeli media reported that the Israeli War Cabinet approved a measure allowing the direct flow of humanitarian aid into northern Gaza Strip on February 24. Channel 12 stated humanitarian aid will begin directly entering the northern Gaza Strip “in the next few days.”[19] Aid currently enters the Gaza Strip via the Kerem Shalom crossing at the southern end of the Gaza Strip and must travel near active fighting in Khan Younis and Zaytoun. Several humanitarian organizations have halted transporting aid to the northern Gaza Strip in the past week, citing security concerns.[20]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least six times in the West Bank on February 25.[21]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 24.[22]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The USS Mason intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile targeting US-flagged, owned, and operated oil tanker MV Torm Thor on February 24.[23] CENTCOM reported that neither the USS Mason nor the MV Torm Thor were damaged in the Houthi attack.[24]

The United States and United Kingdom conducted 18 airstrikes targeting Houthi underground missile storage facilities, one-way attack drones, radars, air defense systems, and a helicopter in Houthi-controlled Yemen on February 24.[25]

Iran Update, February 24, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued clearing operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip.
  • Political Negotiations: US, Qatari, and Egyptian officials proposed a new hostage deal to Israeli negotiators during discussions in Paris.
  • Yemen: US CENTCOM reported that it destroyed seven Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles in Houthi-controlled Yemen that were ready to fire.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued clearing operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 24. The IDF 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) directed an airstrike on Palestinian fighters preparing to launch anti-tank munitions at Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[1]

Palestinian militias continued trying to disrupt Israeli operations in Zaytoun on February 24. The militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad fired mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[2] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, fired RPGs, mortars, and rockets and clashed with Israeli forces in Zaytoun and south of Zaytoun.[3] The Mujahideen Brigades fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[4] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas and has expressed close ties with Iran.[5] The military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine clashed with Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[6] The PFLP is a secular leftist Palestinian faction fighting with Hamas.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed several Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip between February 23 and 24.[7]

The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on February 24. The IDF 7th Armored Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) “deepened” its operations in western Khan Younis.[8] The brigade located weapons in a re-purposed UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) bag in western Khan Younis.[9] The same brigade raided the house of a senior military intelligence officer in Khan Younis and destroyed a tunnel shaft near the house.[10] The brigade also identified seven Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis and directed an airstrike that killed the fighters.[11] The 35th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) located weapons and clashed with Palestinian fighters in western Khan Younis.[12] The Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) directed sniper fire targeting several Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis.[13]

Palestinian militias continued to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on February 24. The al Quds Brigades mortared Israeli forces in Khan Younis.[14] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted mortar and improvised explosive device attacks and clashed with Israeli forces in Khan Younis City and western Khan Younis.[15] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement said that its fighters sniped Israeli soldiers in western Khan Younis.[16]

US, Qatari, and Egyptian officials proposed a new hostage deal to Israeli negotiators during discussions in Paris.[17] An IDF-affiliated media outlet reported that the Israeli delegation returned from Paris and that an unspecified source said, “There is progress in almost all parameters.”[18] However, Israeli war cabinet members said, “Hamas is still far from what Israel is willing to accept."[19] An unnamed foreign diplomat told Israeli media that all sides showed flexibility and that “hopefully” a deal can be reached before Ramadan, which is expected to begin around March 10, 2024.[20] Israeli officials have stated that Israeli forces will enter Rafah at the start of Ramadan if Hamas does not release the remaining Israeli hostages the group holds.[21]

An unspecified Hamas source told Saudi media that Hamas showed flexibility in the duration of the ceasefire, the number of prisoners Israel will release, and the “limits” of an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[22] The source stated that Hamas waived its previous requirement that Israel release 1,500 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the release of Hamas-held Israeli hostages. Israeli media reported that Israel would release 200-300 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for 24-50 Israeli hostages, according to the new deal.[23]

Three US and Israeli officials told Axios that the Biden administration asked Israel to stop targeting members of the Hamas-run police force who escort aid trucks in the Gaza Strip.[24] The administration warned that a “total breakdown of law and order” is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the strip. The Guardian similarly reported on January 30 that there is a general breakdown in law and order in the Gaza Strip.[25] Aid officials reported several incidents of unspecified personnel looting aid trucks.[26] The IDF has targeted Hamas’ police and internal security apparatus to disrupt Hamas’ attempts to rebuild its governing authority.[27] The Civil Police and the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry's Internal Security Forces in the Gaza Strip both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing.[28]

Unspecified Palestinian fighters conducted one indirect fire attack from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on February 24.[29]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least three times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 23.[30]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted at least 10 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 23.[31]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US CENTCOM reported that it destroyed seven Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles in Houthi-controlled Yemen that were ready to fire on February 23.[32] 

Iran Update, February 23, 2024

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Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

The Houthis claimed that Saudi Arabia and the United States conducted combined airstrikes in Houthi-controlled territory on February 23, likely to pressure Saudi Arabia to exert its influence on the United States to decrease US strikes targeting Houthi military assets.[1] A Houthi-controlled media outlet claimed that the alleged US-Saudi strikes hit unspecified targets in Amran, Marib, Saada, Hajjah, Taiz, Dhamar, Sanaa, Bayda, and Hudaydah provinces. The Houthi outlet also claimed that the strikes resulted in civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. A Saudi strike on Houthi-controlled territory would constitute a violation of the Yemeni ceasefire that went into effect in April 2022.[2] Saudi Arabia seeks to maintain its truce with the Houthis and has discouraged US attacks against the Houthis during the current escalation in the Red Sea.[3] CTP-ISW has not recorded any indications that Saudi Arabia conducted an airstrike into Houthi-controlled territory on February 23. Saudi Arabia, the Yemeni government, and the Houthis have maintained the ceasefire past its official expiration in October 2022.[4]

The Houthis are "fortifying” missile launch sites according to individuals “with knowledge of the situation” cited by Bloomberg on February 22, which will enable the Houthis to continue offensive attacks on military and civilian vessels in the Red Sea.[5] The sources claimed the Houthis are “fortifying” missile launch positions in the mountains and increasing one-way surface naval attack drone and one-way subsurface naval attack drone tests. This is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment on February 22 that Iran and the Houthis are likely using their attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to test and refine their approach to striking naval targets.[6] Houthi attacks provide Iran and the Houthis opportunities to evaluate the effectiveness of different strike packages to understand how they can evade and overwhelm US air and maritime defenses more effectively. The Houthi effort to better defend its launch sites enables to Houthis to continue offensive operations—namely, cruise and ballistic missile fire—that test US defense capabilities.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted six preemptive strikes targeting Houthi one-way attack drones and mobile anti-ship ballistic missiles and intercepted three one-way attack drones since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on February 22.[7] CENTCOM stated that it intercepted two mobile anti-ship cruise missiles and conducted four preemptive strikes targeting “Iranian-backed Houthi [drones]” on February 22. CENTCOM intercepted three one-way attack drones operating near commercial vessels in the Red Sea on February 23.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed a post-war plan for the Gaza Strip.[8] The proposal is the first time Netanyahu has presented a written position on his post-war plans. A senior aid to Netanyahu said the goal of the plan was to present principles that would get the “broadest consensus possible.”[9] Israeli media reported that Israel will continue its military operations in the Gaza Strip with the aim of destroying the military capabilities and governance infrastructure of Hamas and PIJ, securing the return of hostages, and preventing further threats from the Gaza Strip.[10]

The proposal covers long-term plans related to security, governance, and reconstruction. The IDF will maintain “operational freedom” in the Gaza Strip and establish a buffer zone along the Israeli border under the proposal.[11] Israel will also control the Gaza-Egypt border and monitor demilitarization efforts in the Gaza Strip. Unspecified "local elements with management experience" will be responsible for civilian management and public order in the strip.[12] Axios reported that the plan does not rule out a role for the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip, although it does not specifically mention the PA either.[13] Lastly, the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip will only be possible after the completion of the demilitarization process and the beginning of a “de-radicalization process.”[14]

Key Takeaways:

  • Yemen: The Houthis claimed that Saudi Arabia and the United States conducted combined airstrikes in Houthi-controlled territory on February 23, likely to pressure Saudi Arabia to exert its influence on the United States to decrease US strikes targeting Houthi military assets.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias continued to disrupt Israeli operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed a post-war plan for the Gaza Strip.
  • Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh completed a three-day trip to Cairo to discuss a hostage deal.
  • Iran: US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby said on February 23 that the United States has not yet confirmed that Iran transferred ballistic missiles to Russia.
  • The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two Iranian and Iran-linked entities on February 23 for facilitating the transfer of Iranian drones to Russia

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias continued to disrupt Israeli operations in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City on February 23. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters ambushed Israeli armor in Zaytoun using unspecified munitions.[15] Hamas published footage on February 23 that shows its fighters firing mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[16] Several other Hamas-aligned militias clashed with Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[17] [18] Israeli forces located weapons and military equipment in the area.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed several Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on February 23.[19] PIJ fighters mortared Israeli forces east of the central Gaza Strip.[20]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 23. The 89th Commando Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) continued to direct airstrikes, ambush Palestinian fighters with sniper fire, and clash with Palestinian fighters in western Khan Younis.[21] Israeli forces raided military infrastructure and located improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other weapons. The IDF Air Force destroyed a weapons depot in western Khan Younis.[22] PIJ and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine fighters detonated explosive devices in two separate attacks targeting Israeli forces in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis.[23] The DFLP is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war.

Palestinian militias clashed with Israeli forces in eastern Khan Younis on February 23. PIJ fighters detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting Israeli engineers in an ambush in eastern Khan Younis.[24] The militia also reported that its fighters fired a tandem-charge anti-tank rocket targeting Israeli forces in the same area.[25]

The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) launched an attack targeting Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure in an unspecified area of Khan Younis.[26] The IDF Air Force struck Palestinian militia sniper positions and weapons storage facilities prior to the attack.[27]

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh completed a three-day trip to Cairo to discuss a hostage deal.[28] An unspecified Hamas official reported on February 23 that Hamas did not offer a new proposal to Egyptian mediators.[29] Hamas is waiting to see what US, Egyptian, and Qatari mediators can accomplish during talks in Paris, according to the Hamas official. The same official said that Israeli negotiators arrived in Paris on February 23.[30]

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on February 23.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least six times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 22.[31] Israeli forces conducted a drone strike that killed a PIJ commander in Jenin.[32]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 22.[33]

Israel conducted an airstrike that killed a senior Lebanese Hezbollah member in the group’s elite Radwan Force in southern Lebanon on February 22.[34] Israeli and Lebanese sources reported that the Hezbollah member specialized in operating anti-tank systems and that he had operated in Shebaa Farms during the Israeli-Hamas war.[35]

The Israeli Navy concluded a week-long military exercise in northern Israel on February 23.[36] The Israeli Navy held drills to simulate countering drones, conducting aerial rescue operations, and refueling vessels.[37] Israeli media reported that Israel’s naval exercises are preparations for a potential war with Hezbollah.[38] Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz said on February 23 that Israel will not wait ”much longer for a diplomatic solution in the north.”[39]

Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz said on February 22 that Iran accelerated the pace of its weapon shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah after the beginning of the Israel-Hamas War.[40] Katz said in a letter to the UN Security Council that Iran’s shipments included ”components for air defense systems, drones, and several different missiles.“[41] The IDF Air Force said on February 3 and 19 that it has struck many Iranian, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Syrian targets in Syria since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.[42]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby said on February 23 that the United States has not yet confirmed that Iran transferred ballistic missiles to Russia.[43] Kirby added that the United States plans to impose additional sanctions on Iran for its support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine and that the United States is “prepared to go further” if Iran supplies ballistic missiles to Russia. Kirby noted that Iran seeks a significant amount of Russian military equipment in return for its material support to Russia. Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia in early January.[44]

The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two Iranian and Iran-linked entities on February 23 for facilitating the transfer of Iranian drones to Russia.[45] OFAC designated the following Iranian and Iran-linked entities: 

  • The Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry for helping to finance and produce Iranian drones at the Alabuga facility in Tatarstan, Russia.
  • The Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry-affiliated and UAE-based Generation Trading FZE for facilitating the sale of Iranian drone samples, parts, and ground stations that enable the Russian production of Iranian drones at the Alabuga facility.

Iran’s arms sales to Russia are part of Iran’s efforts to generate revenue to support its deteriorating economy.[46] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could seek to acquire cash from Russia in return for supplying Russia with missiles.[47] The Prana Network hacker group published documents on February 4 alleging that Russia is paying Iran roughly $4.5 billion per year to import the Iranian Shahed series drones.[48]

 


 

Iran Update, February 27, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Two Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated sources told the New York Times that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias “fiercely resisted” IRGC Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani’s orders in late January to halt attacks targeting US forces in the region.[1] The two IRGC-affiliated sources claimed that Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba commanders refused to stop attacking US forces during a meeting with Ghaani in Baghdad, which Reuters reported occurred on January 29.[2] Iranian and Iraqi sources added that senior Iraqi Shia clerics in Najaf and influential Iraqi politicians, including the Iraqi prime minister, convinced Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba to halt the attacks.

The timeline of events indicates that Ghaani was instrumental in convincing Kataib Hezbollah to pause attacks, not Iraqi leaders. Kataib Hezbollah responded to Iranian directives from Ghaani by announcing that it would “suspend attacks” on January 30—roughly 24 hours after the meeting with Ghaani on January 29. Reuters reported that Ghaani directed Iranian-backed Iraqi groups to “pause” attacks on US forces during the January 29 meeting. A senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia commander told Reuters that Ghaani’s influence was essential in convincing Kataib Hezbollah to pause attacks. Reuters added that one group, presumably Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, did not “initially agree” to Ghaani’s directive.[3] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba said on February 2 that it would continue attacks targeting US forces.[4] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed three attacks targeting US forces after Ghaani’s visit.[5]

Iraqi Shia clerics in Najaf may also lack the influence to convince Kataib Hezbollah to cease attacks. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba are loyal to the Iranian supreme leader, not Iraqi Shia clerics in Najaf.[6] It is not clear why Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba would follow orders from Iraqi Shia clerics over Ghaani, who speaks for the Iranian supreme leader.[7]

Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad illustrates both the extent of and limits to Iran’s control of its proxy network in the Middle East. Most of Iran’s proxies and partners in Iraq immediately ceased attacks following Ghaani’s directive, though it is possible additional pressure from the Iraqi government further reinforced Ghaani’s orders. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba initially did not agree to stop attacks, but Iranian-backed Iraqi groups have not resumed attacks targeting US forces since February 4. The Iraqi prime minister has ample reason to attempt to stop Iranian-backed attacks against US forces to avoid additional US airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed groups in Iraq. The attacks—and the ensuing US airstrikes—undermine the prime minister’s ability to retain even a small international coalition presence to support Iraqi forces against ISIS.[8] Ghaani and Iran can pressure their partners and proxies to pause or resume these attacks as needed, however. Ghaani represents the Iranian supreme leader, to whom groups like Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba proclaim loyalty, meaning that many Iranian-backed groups will respond as Ghaani directs.[9]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq: Two Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated sources told the New York Times that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias “fiercely resisted” IRGC Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani’s orders in late January to halt attacks targeting US forces in the region.
  • The timeline of events indicates that Ghaani—not Iraqi leaders—was instrumental in convincing Kataib Hezbollah to pause attacks. Kataib Hezbollah responded to Iranian directives from Ghaani by announcing that it would “suspend attacks” on January 30—roughly 24 hours after the meeting with Ghaani on January 29.
  • Iraqi Shia clerics in Najaf may also lack the influence to convince Kataib Hezbollah to cease attacks. Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba are loyal to the Iranian supreme leader, not Iraqi Shia clerics in Najaf.
  • Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad illustrates both the extent of and limits to Iran’s control of its proxy network in the Middle East. Most of Iran’s proxies and partners in Iraq immediately ceased attacks following Ghaani’s directive, though it is possible additional pressure from the Iraqi government further reinforced Ghaani’s orders.
  • Gaza City: The IDF 162nd Division continued its clearing operation in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 27. Palestinian militias claimed at least 16 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun, southeastern Gaza City on February 27.
  • Iran and Yemen: The United States and the United Kingdom sanctioned Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and Houthi members on February 27.


Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is building a “well-controlled IDF highway” south of Zaytoun to enable “at least another year” of operations in the Gaza Strip.[10] CTP-ISW previously reported the IDF’s east-to-west road construction on February 19.[11] The IDF has not officially commented on the construction, but two journalists embedded with Israel forces operating in Gaza have published accounts of the construction project.[12] A correspondent from Israel Army Radio, a media organization run by the IDF, said Israeli forces are also building three forward operating bases near the east-west road for future raids and operations in the Gaza Strip.[13]

The IDF 162nd Division continued its clearing operation in Zaytoun neighborhood, southeastern Gaza City, on February 27.[14] The 932nd Battalion (assigned to the Nahal Brigade) has operated in Zaytoun for a week to “destroy the enemy" in the area.[15] The battalion has raided Hamas buildings, weapons warehouses and observation posts to find intelligence on Hamas operations. The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed a Palestinian militia squad with tank fire and destroyed Hamas buildings as part of the division-sized clearing operation.[16] The 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed Palestinian fighters at close range, directed airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters, and uncovered a weapons factory in Zaytoun.[17]

Palestinian militias claimed at least 16 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun, southeastern Gaza City on February 27.[18] The groups used rocket propelled grenades, mortars, explosively-formed penetrators (EFPs), improvised explosive devices, and small arms in their attacks.[19] Palestinian Islamic Jihad engineers targeted Israeli infantry by detonating a missile from an F16 that they had rigged as an improvised explosive device in a house near al Dawla roundabout in Zaytoun.[20] The high number of attacks and the use of more sophisticated capabilities — such as EFPs — is inconsistent with an Israeli Army Radio journalist‘s characterization of the fighting on January 27 as “relatively [small in] scale.”[21] Palestinian militias conducted over triple the number of attacks on Israeli forces in southern Gaza City as they did in Khan Younis Governorate on February 27.

The IDF has continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis. The IDF 7th Brigade and 35th Paratrooper Brigade detained Palestinian fighters who tried to hide among evacuating civilians to escape Khan Younis.[22] The 7th Brigade detained Palestinian fighters attempting a similar escape on February 25.[23] The IDF Maglan and Egoz special operations forces continued clearing operations in western Khan Younis over the last week.[24] The special operations forces raided a Hamas compound and seized a large amount of weapons in western Khan Younis on February 27.[25] The special operations forces have killed and detained dozens of fighters per day for the last week.[26] Palestinian militias conducted at least five attacks on Israeli forces operating in central and western Khan Younis on February 27.[27]

The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) conducted clearing operations in the Gaza Strip along the Israel-Gaza border in eastern Khan Younis Governorate.[28] PIJ claimed mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in the border area in Abasan al Kabira.[29]

PIJ fired a rocket barrage from the Gaza Strip targeting Ashkelon on February 27.[30] The rocket barrage caused damage to civilian infrastructure. [31]

The IDF Gaza Division and Southern Command directed airstrikes targeting a Palestinian militia command center in the central Gaza Strip that Palestinian fighters used to direct rocket fire into Israel on February 26.[32] PIJ and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement both conducted rocket attacks on February 26.[33]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least three times in the West Bank on February 27.[34] Israeli forces killed a senior member in Palestinian Islamic Jihad‘s Tubas Battalion south of Tubas on February 27.[35]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted at least ten attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 26.[36] Lebanese Hezbollah launched approximately 35 rockets targeting an IDF base on Mount Meron that hosts air traffic control, radar, surveillance, communications, and jamming facilities.[37] The IDF said that the attacks did not cause any casualties or damage to the area.[38]

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said that Lebanese Hezbollah will "pay a very high price" for its continued attacks targeting northern Israel during a speech at the IDF 146th Division headquarters on February 27.[39] Lebanese Hezbollah said that it fired dozens of rockets targeting the headquarters on the same day.[40]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The United States and the United Kingdom sanctioned Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and Houthi members on February 27.[41] The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the United Kingdom designated the following individuals and organizations:

  • IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Mohammad Reza Falahzadeh for generating revenue to fund Houthi operations
  • Houthi member Ibrahim al Nashiri
  • A Hong Kong-based shipping company that was responsible for facilitating the transport of Iranian commodities sold in China by the Said Jamal network. Said Jamal is a Houthi and IRGC Quds Force financial facilitator sanctioned by the United States on January 12.[42]

Falahzadeh has played a key role in supporting and financing Houthi, Hamas, and Hezbollah operations.[43] OFAC stated that the IRGC Quds Force and the Houthis sell Iranian commodities to foreign buyers to generate funds to support the Houthis. The US State Department designated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group in January 2024.[44] The US State Department designated the entire IRGC–including the Quds Force–as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in April 2019.[45]

US CENTCOM stated that it destroyed three surface naval attack drones and two mobile anti-ship cruise missiles in Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory on February 26 that were ready-to-launch in Houthi-controlled Yemen.[46] Houthi-affiliated media outlets reported on February 26 that the United States conducted airstrikes targeting Houthi positions north of Hudaydah.[47]

 

Iran Update, February 22, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Peter Mills, Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iran and the Houthis are likely using their attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to test and refine their approach to striking naval targets. Houthi leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on February 22 that the group will “escalate” its operations targeting shipping around the Red Sea.[1] Abdulmalik added that the group would introduce "submarine weapons,” likely referring to unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), but gave no further details.[2] CENTCOM reported that the Houthis used a UUV for the first time to threaten shipping around the Red Sea on February 17.[3] The Houthis — enabled directly by Iran — have used combinations of cruise and ballistic missiles as well as aerial, surface, and underwater drones to attack civilian and military vessels around the Red Sea since November 2023. Iranian military advisers are providing targeting intelligence to support the Houthis’ attacks targeting US naval vessels.[4] US naval vessels have regularly intercepted Houthi munitions targeting civilian and military vessels off the coast of Yemen. These Houthi attacks provide Iran and the Houthis opportunities to evaluate the effectiveness of different strike packages to understand how they can evade and overwhelm US defenses more effectively.

Key Takeaways:

  • Yemen: Iran and the Houthis are likely using their attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to test and refine their approach to striking naval targets.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces 162nd Division continued to conduct clearing operations in Zaytoun, eastern Gaza City.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: Hamas said that there may be progress in negotiations with Israel over a prisoner-for-hostage deal.
  • Iraq: Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi discussed the US military presence in Iraq with US Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Chris Coons and US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski.
  • Iran: Iranian Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharazi met with senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad officials in Tehran.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 162nd Division continued to conduct clearing operations in Zaytoun, eastern Gaza City, on February 22.[5] Israeli forces launched new, “division-wide” clearing operation in Zaytoun on February 20.[6] Israeli forces killed approximately 20 fighters and directed airstrikes to attack over 10 unspecified targets. Palestinian militias, including Hamas, clashed with Israeli forces in Zaytoun using small arms and anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).[7]

Palestinian militias used mortars and rockets in most of their attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on February 22.[8] CTP-ISW cannot determine the point of origin of any of the indirect fire attacks. The militias targeted Israeli positions in Zaytoun as well as in the northeastern Gaza Strip.[9] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement mortared an IDF “dispatch site” east of Beit Hanoun.[10] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas that has expressed close ties with Iran.

The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) located and destroyed rocket launchers during clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on February 22.[11] Palestinian fighters had rigged the launchers to explode, according to the IDF.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 22. The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) used sniper fire to ambush a Palestinian fighter cell in western Khan Younis.[12] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) located weapons and documents affiliated with Hamas during clearing operations in the area.[13] The Hamas-run Gazan Health Ministry reported on February 22 that Israeli forces raided Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis shortly after withdrawing from it.[14] Nasser Hospital had been the largest functioning hospital in the Gaza Strip until Israeli forces raided it on February 15.[15] Israel received “credible intelligence” that Hamas-held hostages were in the hospital and detained ”hundreds” of Hamas fighters there.[16]

Hamas said that there may be progress in negotiations with Israel over a prisoner-for-hostage deal. Hamas International Relations head Musa Abu Marzouk said on February 22, “there may be progress in the negotiations of a prisoner swap in the near future.”[17] The Wall Street Journal reported on February 22 that Egyptian officials said that Hamas is ready to lower the number of Palestinian fighters it wants released as part of a deal.[18] Israel previously refused to further engage in hostage talks because Hamas demanded that Israel release thousands of Palestinian prisoners as part of the deal.[19] The Egyptian officials also stated that Hamas will not release Israeli soldiers until there is a permanent ceasefire and a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Hamas wants a plan where more hostages are released only if progress is made in ending the war during a ceasefire. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly emphasized that Israeli forces will continue the ground offensive until Hamas is defeated.[20]

Israel agreed to send negotiators to Paris for hostage talks on February 23 after the United States urged Israel to do so.[21] Israeli media reported on February 22 that the Israeli war cabinet approved sending negotiators to Paris.[22] US National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk met with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant during a meeting in Israel on February 22.[23] McGurk told Gallant that there has been progress in the negotiations between Egyptians and Qatari mediators and Hamas, according to three sources with knowledge on the issue who spoke to Axios.[24] CIA director Bill Burns is expected to travel to Paris on February 23 to hold talks with Qatari and Egyptian officials.[25]

Gallant told McGurk that the Israeli government “will expand the authority given to our hostage negotiators” while simultaneously “preparing [for] the continuation of intense ground operations” in the Gaza Strip.[26] Netanyahu previously ordered Israeli negotiators exclusively to listen during the most recent meeting between US, Israeli, Egyptian, and Qatari officials on February 13 in Cairo.[27] Gallant emphasized to McGurk that the IDF must “dismantle” the remaining Hamas battalions in the central and southern Gaza Strip.[28]

Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on February 22.[29]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters at least four times in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 21.[30]

Three Palestinian attackers fired small arms at Israeli civilian vehicles at an Israeli checkpoint outside of Jerusalem on February 22.[31] The attackers killed one Israeli civilian and injured at least eleven others before Israeli police killed all three attackers at the checkpoint.[32] Several Palestinian militia groups, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, praised the attack.[33]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 12 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 21.[34]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi discussed the US military presence in Iraq with US Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Chris Coons and US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski on February 22.[35] Halbousi, Coons, and Romanowski discussed the ongoing negotiations between Washington and Baghdad about the status of the US-led coalition mission to defeat ISIS. The United States and Iraq began these negotiations in late January 2024.[36] Halbousi described the negotiations as important for creating a “sustainable bilateral partnership” between the United States and Iraq.[37] Halbousi, Coons, and Romanowski also emphasized the need to “maintain security cooperation” between the United States and Baghdad to root out the “remnants of terrorism.” Iran and its Iraqi proxy and partner militias have intensified their campaign to expel the United States from Iraq since October 2023.[38] Halbousi previously released a statement on February 14 warning “war merchants and seditionists from the Islamist parties” against “tampering with the stability of Anbar [Province],” implying that Halbousi might oppose Iranian-backed efforts to expel the United States from Iraq.[39]

Unspecified individuals unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate State of Law Coalition parliamentarian Bagher Kadhim Naser al Saadi in al Jadriyah, Baghdad, on February 22.[40] Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki heads the State of Law Coalition. This assassination attempt comes amid an uptick in likely politically motivated killings between competing Shia factions in Baghdad and southern Iraq in recent weeks.[41] 

The Houthis claimed attacks targeting Israel, a commercial ship, and a US warship on February 22. The group launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles that hit the UK-owned, Palau-flagged MV Islander in the Gulf of Aden.[42] The Houthis separately claimed an attack targeting an unspecified US destroyer in the Red Sea.[43] US CENTCOM stated that it intercepted six Houthi one-way attack drones in the Red Sea.[44] The Houthi military spokesperson claimed the group launched drones and missiles targeting unspecified targets in Eilat, Israel.[45] Israel intercepted a surface-to-surface missile south of Eilat on February 21.[46]

Iranian Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharazi met with senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad officials in Tehran on February 22.[47] Kharazi claimed that “resistance” is the only way for Palestinians to achieve their goals and confront Israel during a meeting with senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan and PIJ Political Bureau member Ali Abu Shahin.[48] Hamdan and Shahin explained the “latest state” of the war in the Gaza Strip and thanked the Iranian regime for supporting Palestinian militias. Hamdan and Shahin are both based in Lebanon. Kharazi is a senior foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[49]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei repeated his criticism of unspecified Muslim countries for failing to sever political and economic ties with Israel during a meeting with Quran reciters on February 22.[50] Khamenei has, even before the Israel-Hamas war began, repeatedly called on Muslim countries to isolate Israel.[51]

Iran Update, February 21, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, Ahmad Omid Arman, Anne McGill, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to Russia in early January.[1] The three unspecified Iranian sources said that Iran provided roughly 400 SRBMs to Russia, including the Fateh-110 and the Zolfaghar. The sources said that Iran has sent at least four SRBM shipments to Russia since Iran and Russia concluded a missile sale agreement in late 2023. One Iranian official said that Iran will continue to ship missiles to Russia because Iran is ”allowed to export weapons to any country” it wishes, given the October 2023 expiration of UN missile restrictions on Iran under UNSC Resolution 2231. UNSC Resolution 2231 suspended nuclear-related UN sanctions and established sunset dates for missile and other arms-related sanctions on Iran. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger said on February 21 that Iran began missile shipments to Russia in early January, following the UN missile restrictions expiration.[2]

Iran’s arms sales to Russia are part of Iran’s efforts to generate revenue to support its deteriorating economy.[3] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could seek to acquire cash from Russia in return for supplying Russia with missiles.[4] The Prana Network hacker group published documents on February 4 alleging that Russia is paying Iran roughly $4.5 billion per year to import the Iranian Shahed series drones.[5]

Iran’s provision of these missile systems could improve Russia’s ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. Kremlin-affiliated milblogger Rybar claimed on February 21 that the acquisition of Iranian missile systems enables Russian forces to hit “remote Ukrainian targets.”[6] The Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson said on February 21 that possible Russian acquisition of the ballistic missiles is a ”serious threat for Ukraine.”[7] This Russo-Iranian military exchange is part of the deepening military and security relationship between the two states that CTP has covered extensively.[8] The expansion of these ties accelerated especially after Iran began providing military support to Russia for its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[9]

CTP-ISW assessed in September 2023 that Iran and Russia would conclude a drone and missile sale agreement after UNSC Resolution 2231’s missile restrictions expired in October 2023.[10] The expiration of UNSC Resolution 2231 in October provided an opportunity for Iran to meet Russian military needs without being violating sanctions or requiring Russia to do so. Iranian Defense Ministry and IRGC officials also showcased these SRBM and close-range ballistic missile (CRBM) variants to Russian officials in August and September 2023 in Moscow and Tehran, respectively.[11] This showcasing illustrates Iran’s efforts to conclude a sales agreement in advance of the expiration of UNSC Resolution 2231 in October. [12]

The United States, United Kingdom, and Ukraine have previously warned that Iran would supply ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[13] US officials said in November that Iran ”may be” preparing to supply short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, and the US National Security Council spokesperson said in January 2024 that Russia was attempting to acquire missiles from Iran.[14]

*Russia would violate its Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) obligations were it to acquire these missile systems. Iran would violate UNSCR 2231 if it had exported these systems prior to the October 18, 2023 expiration. Iran is not an MTCR member-state even though UNSCR 2231 references the MTCR’s banned Category I “complete delivery systems,” systems with a 300 or more-kilometer range and a 500 or more-kilogram payload.[19]

Key: CEP: Circular error probable; SRBM: Short-range ballistic missile; CRBM: Close-range ballistic missile; MaRV: Maneuverable re-entry vehicle; INS: Inertial Navigation System; GNSS: Global Navigation Satellite System; GPS: Global Positioning System.

Russian and Iraqi officials discussed deepening judicial and economic ties on February 21. Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev has discussed security cooperation with a number of senior Iraqi political and military officials in a series of meetings since late January 2024. CTP-ISW assessed on February 20 that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence there.

Iraqi Federal Integrity Commission Chairman Haider Hanoun, who is affiliated with the Badr Organization, and Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for anti-corruption coordination and training on February 21.[20] The Iraqi Federal Integrity Commission is the judicial body responsible for investigating corruption cases and drafting appropriate legislation. Integrity Commission staff will participate in trainings and lectures held by the Russian Public Prosecution office under the MOU.[21] Hanoun said that the two organizations will hold workshops, meetings, and trainings over the next two years to address anti-corruption efforts, recovering stolen funds, establishing national committees, and coordinating positions in international anti-corruption bodies.[22] He added that the Federal Integrity Commission and Russian General Prosecutor’s office will hold a roundtable discussion covering technologies that combat corruption.[23]

Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors have previously used Iraq’s judicial system to target political opposition. Under its current chairman, the Federal Integrity Commission weaponized legislation that barred candidates with corruption charges from running for office in Iraqi provincial elections in December 2023.[24]

The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office oversees subordinate prosecutor’s offices responsible for supervising adherence to the Russian constitution and implementing laws accordingly.[25] ISW previously reported on the Kremlin‘s use of the Russian Prosecutor General‘s Office to seize and nationalize assets from Russians and to widely apply administrative law to stifle any perceived source of opposition.[26] Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov is currently sanctioned by the United States Treasury Department in connection with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[27]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani met with the Chairman of the Russian Federation of Manufacturers and Entrepreneurs Committee and founder of the Russian oil company Lukoil Vagit Alekperov to discuss Russian development of the West Qurna and Eridu Iraqi oil fields.[28] ExxonMobile transferred its operations at West Qurna oil field to PetroChina on January 1, giving PetroChina a majority share in the oil field.[29] The West Qurna oil field is one of the largest oil fields in the world.[30]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani separately met with the US ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski on February 21 to discuss the status of International Coalition forces in Iraq.[31] Sudani denied on February 6 that the Iraqi government had directly discussed bilateral negotiations with the United States since the US airstrikes on February 2.[32]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on February 21 that Houthi fighters fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the MV Sea Champion, which was transporting humanitarian aid to Yemen, on February 19. CENTCOM reported that one missile detonated near the ship and caused minor damage. The missile struck the US-owned, Greek-flagged MV Sea Champion while it was transporting grain to the port of Aden, which is controlled by anti-Houthi forces. The MV Sea Champion has delivered aid to Yemen 11 times in the past five years, according to CENTCOM.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to Russia in early January. Iran’s arms sales to Russia are part of Iran’s efforts to generate revenue to support its deteriorating economy.
  • Iran’s provision of these missile systems could improve Russia’s ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses.
  • Iraq-Russia: Russian and Iraqi officials discussed deepening judicial and economic ties on February 21.
  • Iraqi Federal Integrity Commission Chairman Haider Hanoun, who is affiliated with the Badr Organization, and Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for anti-corruption coordination and training on February 21.
  • Iranian-aligned Iraqi actors have previously used Iraq’s judicial system to target political opposition.
  • ISW previously reported on the Kremlin‘s use of the Russian Prosecutor General‘s Office to seize and nationalize assets from Russians and to widely apply administrative law to stifle any perceived source of opposition.
  • Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on February 21 that Houthi fighters fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the MV Sea Champion, which was transporting humanitarian aid to Yemen, on February 19.
  • Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said that two brigades launched a new clearing operation in Zaytoun, southern Gaza City.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said that two brigades launched a new clearing operation in Zaytoun, southern Gaza City.[33] The 401st and the Nahal Brigades (both assigned to the 162nd Division) conducted clearing operations targeting Palestinian militia infrastructure and fighters.[34] The 401st Brigade recently completed a similar clearing operation targeting Hamas forces in western Gaza.[35] The two brigades engaged Palestinian fighters at close range and targeted ”dozens” of Palestinian fighters with airstrikes.[36] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that the 162nd Division’s operation in Zaytoun captured ammunition manufacturing sites and a tunnel that connects Gaza City to the central Gaza Strip.[37] Such a tunnel may have enabled Palestinian fighters to infiltrate previously cleared areas of the northern Gaza Strip. The Israeli defense minister said that the IDF has not defeated all four Hamas battalions in the central Gaza Strip and intends to dismantle the two remaining battalions in the next phase of operations.[38] The IDF will also target the Rafah Brigade in the next phase, according to the defense minister.

Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Zaytoun. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that Israeli forces sustained casualties in at least three attacks in the Zaytoun area on February 21.[39] The same correspondent noted that Israeli forces encountered significant militia ”resistance” in Zaytoun but not en route to Zaytoun.[40] Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters detonated four explosively-formed penetrators (EFP) targeting Israeli armor in Zaytoun.[41] Other militias targeted Israeli infantry and armor with mortars, rocket propelled grenades, and small arms in Zaytoun.[42]

Israeli forces expanded clearing operations to “new areas” east and west of Khan Younis on February 21. The Givati Brigade killed “many” fighters in new areas of eastern Khan Younis over the past day.[43] ISW-CTP assesses that Israeli forces have not cleared suburban and agricultural land east of Khan Younis. The 35th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) expanded operations targeting Palestinian fighters and infrastructure to new areas west of Khan Younis on February 21.[44]

Palestinian fighters conducted several attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in Khan Younis. The Popular Resistance Committees and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—both militias aligned with Hamas in the current war—targeted an Israeli military vehicle in Khan Younis with an EFP.[45] Hamas separately targeted an Israeli tank with an EFP in al Hawuz, western Khan Younis.[46] Hamas fighters also ambushed Israeli SOF and infantry in buildings in the al Hawuz and al Amal areas with rocket-propelled grenades, thermobaric rockets and small arms.[47]

The IDF uncovered and destroyed a 1 km long tunnel used by Hamas leaders in central Khan Younis.[48] Yahalom combat engineers and the 98th Division raided the tunnel to located intelligence and kill the fighters inside. The IDF destroyed the tunnel after raiding it. Hamas equipped the tunnel with several blast doors, fortifications, electricity, and water infrastructure. The IDF said that the tunnel’s defenses and infrastructure likely cost ”millions of shekels.” The IDF also published a map of Hamas’ tunnel infrastructure that it has located throughout the Gaza Strip.[49]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson warned that all members of “the Hamas apparatus,” including Hamas police officers, are legitimate targets during IDF operations in the Gaza Strip.[50] The spokesperson stated that the IDF would not allow any type of military activity in the Gaza Strip. The UNRWA communications director stated that the Civil Police in Gaza, which is run by Hamas, had stopped providing escorts for aid convoys into the Gaza Strip after Israeli strikes killed eight officers who were accompanying the trucks.[51]

Israel is preparing to attend a high-level ceasefire talks in Paris on February 23, according to Israeli media.[52] Israeli officials are reportedly waiting for progress in the ongoing talks between Hamas and Egyptian officials before confirming their participation. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh arrived in Cairo on February 20 to discuss a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war with Egyptian officials.[53]

A journalist working with IDF-operated Israeli Army Radio claimed that Lebanese Hezbollah and ceasefire mediators are pressuring Hamas to drop some of their “high” demands in ceasefire and hostage negotiations.[54] Hezbollah is reportedly pressuring Hamas to drop its demand that Israeli release all its Palestinian prisoners, especially those who have been convicted of severe crimes.[55] Hamas Deputy Chairman in Gaza Khalil al Hayya provided Hamas‘ three priorities in negotiations in a February 19 interview with al Jazeera. These priorities were the providing relief to Gazans to enable them to return to their normal lives, ending the war, and concluding a prisoner exchange that frees 10,000 prisoners in Israeli custody.[56]

PIJ and Popular Resistance Committee fighters mortared Israeli armor and infantry positions east of Jabalia in a combined operation on February 21.[57] The IDF said that mortars fired from Jabalia entered Israeli territory.[58] The 143rd Division identified the mortar launch site and conducted an airstrike minutes after the launch.[59]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least three times in the West Bank after CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 20.[60] Israeli forces detained 40 wanted individuals and confiscated weapons across the West Bank on February 21.[61]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least twelve attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel after CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 20.[62]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Houthis likely conducted a missile attack targeting an unspecified commercial vessel in the Red Sea on February 21. The vessel’s crew reported an explosion and flash of light approximately 40 nautical miles west of Houthi-controlled Hudaydah, Yemen.[63] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that the vessel and crew were unharmed.[64]

Houthi-controlled media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted three strikes on unspecified targets near Houthi-controlled al Salif on February 21.[65]

Israel likely conducted drone and missile strikes targeting Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated targets in Syria on February 21. These targets included multiple IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah military headquarters and weapons storage facilities in southwest Damascus and Albu Kamal.[66] The IDF Air Force said on February 3 and 19 that it has struck many Iranian, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Syrian targets in Syria since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.[67]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with senior Sri Lankan officials on February 20 and 21 in Colombo, Sri Lanka.[68] Abdollahian called for an end to the Israel-Hamas war. He also called Israel a “threat to regional security” during separate meetings with the Sri Lankan president and foreign minister.

Iran Update, February 20, 2024

click here to read the full report with maps

Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence there. Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev has met with several senior Iraqi political and military officials to discuss security cooperation since late January 2024. Kutrashev met with:

  • Iraqi Shia cleric and politician Ammar al Hakim on January 31;
  • Iraqi Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh on February 1;
  • Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on February 5; and
  • Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali on February 20.

Kutrashev’s meetings notably included discussing deepening security cooperation with prominent Iranian-backed security figures. Kutrashev and Fayyadh discussed “exchanging experiences” between Russia and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is an Iraqi security service that contains several Iranian-backed Shia militias.[1] Kutrashev also discussed Russian support for the Iraqi armed forces when meeting with Khazali.[2] Iraqi state media reported that Kutrashev and Khazali discussed Russia’s role in “arming and developing the capabilities of Iraqi security and military forces.”[3] Engaging Khazali on this subject is especially noteworthy, given that he heads Iranian-backed militia Asaib Ahl al Haq, which is part of the PMF. Kutrashev and Khazali also discussed counterterrorism cooperation. Kutrashev previously told Russian media in January 2024 that Russia seeks to expand its “presence” in Iraq and “invest additional resources in areas related to security.”[4]

Iran and its Iraqi proxy and partner militias have intensified their campaign to expel the United States from Iraq since October 2023 and have accordingly launched regular attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria within this timeframe.[5] These attacks aim to erode US willingness to maintain a military presence in the Middle East.[6] The United States and Iraqi federal government began negotiations over the status of the US-led international coalition in Iraq in late January 2024, which is around the same time that Kutrashev’s meetings began.[7] The United States and international coalition forces are deployed in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Russia may seek to replace the United States as the main provider of military equipment and training to the Iraqi armed forces. An Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee member claimed on February 20 that the United States has threatened to stop providing military equipment and training to Iraq to pressure the Iraqi federal government to keep US forces.[8] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim. Russia could exploit a potential vacuum in US military support to Iraq by providing Iraqi forces with small arms and spare parts in the short-term. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would likely prevent it from being able to supply Iraqi forces with high-end systems, such as tanks, helicopters, and aircraft, however. The US Defense Department reported in February 2023 that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has hindered Iraq’s ability to access spare parts for its Russian-designed Mi-17 helicopters.[9] The United States began replacing Iraq’s Mi-17 helicopters with US-made helicopters around February 2023.[10]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq: Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the United States as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the United States possibly reducing its military presence there.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces launched a new, “division-wide” clearing operation in the Zaytoun and Shujaiya neighborhoods in eastern Gaza City.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces assessed that it will complete ground operations in Khan Younis in the next few days, according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.
  • Political Negotiations: Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh arrived in Cairo to discuss a ceasefire in Gaza with Egyptian officials.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters nine times.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Yemen: The Houthis claimed three drone attacks targeting US and Israeli targets.
  • Iran: International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi said that Iran is continuing to produce highly enriched uranium at an elevated rate.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a new, “division-wide” clearing operation in the Zaytoun and Shujaiya neighborhoods in eastern Gaza City on February 20.[11] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that two brigades will clear the remaining Hamas infrastructure in eastern Gaza City over the next several weeks.[12] Local Palestinian sources reported Israeli armor operated on Road 8 and near the Dawla Roundabout in southern Zaytoun on February 20. Israeli ground forces have not operated in these areas at a large scale since late December 2023.[13] Israeli forces concluded a similar division-wide clearing operation in western Gaza City on February 15.[14] The IDF disclosed through an Israeli Army Radio correspondent on February 5 that it identified a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) cell in Zaytoun neighborhood as responsible for most of the rocket attacks into Israel in recent weeks.[15]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation orders for parts of Jabalia and Turkmen neighborhood south of Gaza City on February 20.[16] The order requested residents immediately evacuate to the al Mawasi humanitarian zone in the southwest Gaza Strip. Palestinian journalists reported Israeli ground forces operated within the evacuation zone on February 20.[17]

The IDF assessed that it will complete ground operations in Khan Younis in the next few days, according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.[18] Israeli forces operating under the 36th Division, 98th Division, and 162nd Division continued to clear Khan Younis of Palestinian militia infrastructure, weapons, and fighters.[19] Israeli forces are killing about half the Palestinian fighters per day than they did at the start of the operation in Khan Younis, according to unspecified IDF sources.[20] The IDF estimated that it has killed about 2,900 Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis since beginning operations there.[21] The 98th Division, the division leading clearing operations in Khan Younis, will deploy to Rafah or the central Gaza Strip in the coming days.[22]

Palestinian militias continued to attack Israeli forces in Khan Younis on February 20. PIJ fighters targeted six Israeli infantrymen who were operating in a building with a thermobaric rocket in western Khan Younis refugee camp.[23] Hamas fighters targeted another six Israeli infantrymen with an explosive device in western Khan Younis City.[24] Both groups claimed the attacks killed and wounded Israeli forces.

US and Israeli officials quoted in Axios disclosed that the IDF may not advance into Rafah until mid-April, despite Israeli officials' public announcements about an earlier timeline.[25] Israeli War Cabinet Minster Benny Gantz said on February 18 that Israeli forces will enter Rafah at the start of Ramadan around March 10 if Hamas does not release the remaining Israeli hostages the group holds.[26] The IDF is expected to present an operational plan for a Rafah ground operation and civilian evacuation to the Israeli security cabinet in the coming days.[27]

The Israeli Chief of Staff Major General Herzi Halevi issued a letter to Israeli commanders stressing the standard conduct of war on February 20.[28] Halevi wrote, “we are not on a killing spree, revenge, or genocide” and issued orders to “not to use force where it is not required, to distinguish between a terrorist and [not] a terrorist, not to take anything that is not ours a souvenir or a military item and not to shoot revenge videos.”[29] He also noted that the IDF would begin to pursue absentee soldiers.

Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh arrived in Cairo to discuss a ceasefire in Gaza with Egyptian officials on February 20.[30] US National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk will hold talks with Egyptian officials on February 21 before meeting with top Israeli officials the next day.[31] The Qatari Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson confirmed that all parties are participating in ongoing hostage exchange deal talks.[32] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to send an Israeli delegation to Cairo for follow-up talks on February 14.[33]

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on February 20.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have clashed with Palestinian fighters nine times in the West Bank since the CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 19[34]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel|

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 19.[35]  Hezbollah claimed six attacks using rockets and unspecified guided munitions targeting Israeli forces and military infrastructure north of Margaliot.[36]  The IDF confirmed that Hezbollah fired an anti-tank guided missile that detonated near Margaliot.[37]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias reached an “undeclared truce” during a meeting at Baghdad International Airport on January 29, according to an independent Iraqi outlet.[38] The truce followed the one-way drone attack that killed three US service members in northeastern Jordan on January 28.[39] Western media has attributed the attack to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah.[40] The US delegation’s meetings with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders and Iraqi officials coincided with IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad on January 29.[41] Reuters reported that Ghaani directed the militias to “pause” their attacks targeting US forces during his visit to Baghdad.[42] Kataib Hezbollah subsequently announced the suspension of its “military and security operations” targeting US forces on January 30.[43] An independent Iraqi outlet claimed that another Iranian-backed Iraqi militia, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, initially vowed to continue its attacks targeting US forces before suspending its attacks “without an official announcement.”[44] The US Defense Department deputy press secretary stated on February 14 that Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria had not attacked US forces since February 4.[45] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has not claimed an attack targeting US forces in this time.[46] An unspecified security source told Reuters on February 10 that US air defense systems intercepted one-way attack drones targeting Conoco Mission Support Site in eastern Syria, however.[47]

The rate of intra-Shia assassinations in Iraq has increased in February 2024, highlighting schisms among between the Shia factions.

  • Unspecified gunmen shot and killed a senior Asaib Ahl al Haq official in Maysan Province on February 4.[48] CTP-ISW previously assessed that followers of Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr may have been responsible.[49] Sadr’s followers, known as Sadrists, have significant influence in Maysan Province, and Sadrist militiamen have previously assassinated local Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated officials.[50]
  • Unspecified gunmen shot and killed two of Hadi al Ameri’s relatives in northern Baghdad on February 18.[51] Ameri is the secretary general of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization. The Iraqi Interior Ministry claimed that the gunman assassinated Ameri’s relatives due to a “land dispute.”[52]
  • Unspecified gunmen kidnapped and killed a Sadrist named Ayser al Khafaji in Babil Province on February 19.[53] Sadrist social media accounts blamed Khafaji’s death on Asaib Ahl al Haq.[54] Sadrists and members of the Khafaji clan—a major Shia clan in southern Iraq—gathered in Hillah, Babil Province, on February 20 to protest Khafaji’s death.[55]

The Houthis claimed three drone attacks targeting US and Israeli targets on February 20.[56] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said that Houthi fighters launched an unspecified number of drones targeting US Navy ships in the Red Sea and Eilat on February 20.[57] He added that Houthi fighters fired anti-ship missiles at the Israeli MSC Silver in the Gulf of Aden on the same date.[58]

An unspecified merchant vessel transiting through the Red Sea reported that two drones followed it for approximately 30 minutes on February 19.[59]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted strikes on Houthi targets on February 19 and 20 that presented “imminent threats” to merchant and US naval vessels in the region.[60] US forces destroyed a one-way attack drone prepared to launch from western Yemen.[61] US and coalition forces separately intercepted 10 one-way attack drones over the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[62] The USS Laboon intercepted a likely Houthi anti-ship cruise missile ”headed in its direction.”[63]

The French Ministry of Defense reported on February 20 that a French frigate intercepted two Houthi one-way attack drones over the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[64] The French Ministry of Defense said the drone originated from Yemen.[65]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi said on February 19 that Iran is continuing to produce highly enriched uranium at an elevated rate.[66] Grossi told Reuters that Iran is currently producing 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU) at a rate of seven kilograms per month. This rate is higher than its three kilogram per month enrichment rate between June and November 2023. Grossi added that he will travel to Tehran on an unspecified date in the coming weeks. Grossi last visited Tehran in March 2024.[67]

Iran has stockpiled at least five nuclear bombs worth of HEU, given its stockpile of 128.3 kilograms of 60 percent HEU as of October 28, 2023.[68] The IAEA defines 25 kilograms of 20 percent or more enriched HEU as a ”significant quantity” for ”which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive cannot be excluded.”[69] Iran has no plausible civilian use for 60 percent HEU but can use it in a compact nuclear explosive or further enrich it to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium.

 

Iran Update, February 19, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Amin Soltani, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Houthi movement launched an anti-ship ballistic missile that struck and disabled the UK-owned, Belize-flagged Rubymar cargo ship in the Bab al Mandeb strait on February 18.[1] The Rubymar’s Lebanon-based management company said that the vessel took on water after the missile struck the vessel’s engine room.[2] The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that the cargo vessel had completely sunk about 22 hours after the attack occurred.[3] Neither the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) nor CENTCOM has said that the Rubymar sunk. A warship operating under the auspices of Operation Prosperity Guardian and a commercial vessel responded to the attack.[4] The commercial vessel evacuated the Rubymar’s crew to Djibouti.[5] This incident marks the first time that a crew has had to abandon ship after a Houthi attack since Houthi attacks began during this round of escalation on November 19.[6] The Houthi military spokesperson falsely claimed that the Houthis “made sure that the ship’s crew exited safely.”[7]

The Houthi movement claimed two attacks targeting a US-owned, Greece-flagged vessel and a Marshall-Islands flagged vessel in the Gulf of Aden on February 19.[8] The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that the Houthis fired anti-ship missiles at the US-owned and Greece-flagged Sea Champion and the Marshall Islands-flagged Navis Fortuna. The spokesperson said that the ships were both “American.”[9] The UKMTO reported two explosions lightly damaged one vessel 100 NM east of Aden.[10] British maritime security firm Ambrey said that the Sea Champion was “involved“ in the two explosions.[11]

The Houthi movement claimed that it shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over Hudaydah on February 19.[12] The group posted a video showing Houthi surface-to-air missile hitting the drone.[13] The video also showed the drone’s wreckage. The Houthi military spokesperson did not specify what type of missile system the Houthis used to shoot down the drone. Two US officials told the New York Times that the Pentagon is investigating the cause of the drone “crash.”[14] An unspecified US official told Voice of America that the Houthis previously shot down a Reaper drone over Yemen in early November 2023.[15]

Local Houthi-affiliated media reported that US forces conducted a strike against an unspecified target in al Jabbana, Hudaydah Province. The Houthi movement spokesperson condemned US and UK strikes against Houthi targets near the time of the incident.[16] CENTCOM has not confirmed the airstrike.

Key Takeaways:

  • Yemen: The Houthi movement launched an anti-ship ballistic missile that struck and disabled the UK-owned, Belize-flagged Rubymar cargo ship in the Bab al Mandeb strait on February 18. This incident marks the first time that a crew has had to abandon ship after a Houthi attack since Houthi attacks began during this round of escalation on November 19.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces are constructing a road in the Gaza Strip to divide the northern Gaza Strip from the southern Strip and facilitate Israeli raids. An IDF battalion commander working on the road said that Israeli forces will use the road to protect the area and control the flow of Gazans from north to south.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF reported that Israeli forces are finishing clearing operation in western Khan Younis.
  • Negotiations: The Qatari prime minister said that a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas should not require a hostage deal.
  • Palestinian Politics: Russia invited Palestinian factions, including Hamas and PIJ, to meet in Moscow on February 26 for an “inter-Palestinian meeting.” The Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh said that the PA will see if Hamas “is ready to reach an understanding.”
  • Lebanon: The IAF conducted airstrikes that targeted two “Hezbollah military depots” near Sidon, Lebanon on February 19. This is the first time since October 7 Israel has conducted airstrikes in Sidon, which is roughly 30km north of the Litani River and 40km south of Beirut.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces are constructing a road in the Gaza Strip to divide the northern Gaza Strip from the southern Strip and facilitate Israeli raids.[17] An Israeli journalist embedded with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to observe the IDF’s construction of the new road. An IDF battalion commander working on the road said that Israeli forces will use the road to protect the area and control the flow of Gazans from north to south. The journalist reported that “the IDF was preparing for a very long stay” near the road.[18] Palestinian fighters have been infiltrating the northern Gaza Strip since early January and attempting to reconstitute their military capabilities and rebuild a governance system there.[19] Hamas’ return to providing services in areas that Israeli forces previously cleared undermines Israeli efforts to destroy Hamas.

Palestinian militias attempted to disrupt Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip on February 19. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in southern Gaza City, where the IDF are constructing the new dividing road.[20] Hamas and Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fighters conducted combined attacks using man-portable air defense systems to target Israeli drones and helicopters in southwestern Gaza City.[21] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas that has expressed close ties with Iran. Other Palestinian militias fired rockets targeting an IDF supply line and Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.[22]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) identified and killed a Palestinian fighter in Gaza City after the fighter fired a rocket from the central Gaza Strip into Israel.[23]

The IDF reported that Israeli forces are finishing clearing operation in western Khan Younis.[24] Israeli forces “expanded” ground operations in western Khan Younis on January 22 and have engaged Palestinian militias there on a near-daily basis since.[25] Three IDF brigades are operating in western Khan Younis to target Hamas’ battalion in the area and destroy military infrastructure.[26] Israeli forces used a drone to identify a Palestinian militia cell approaching their position in western Khan Younis on February 19 and directed an airstrike to target the cell.[27]

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the current war, detonated an unspecified explosive device and fired a rocket-propelled grenade targeting Israeli armor near Nasser Hospital.[28] Hamas fighters returned from “areas of fighting” in western Khan Younis and reported that they targeted 15 Israeli soldiers inside a house.[29] These fighters’ inability to communicate with higher headquarters until returning to rear areas indicates that their commanders may be unable to transmit orders to fighters engaged with the IDF. Several other Palestinian militia groups experienced similar delays in reporting as Israeli forces advanced across the Gaza Strip.[30]

Russia invited Palestinian factions, including Hamas and PIJ, to meet in Moscow on February 26 for an “inter-Palestinian meeting.”[31] Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister and Special Representative for the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov told Russian media on February 18 that Russia invited Palestinian factions that are based in different countries, including Syria and Lebanon. Bogdanov did not provide any additional details about the purpose of the meeting.[32] The Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh said that the PA will see if Hamas “is ready to reach an understanding.“[33] A senior Hamas delegation last traveled to Moscow in late October 2023 to meet with Russian and Iranian officials.[34] Hamas praised Russia’s stance toward the Israel-Hamas war after the meeting.[35] Russia has framed itself as a possible mediator between Israel and Hamas.[36]

The Qatari prime minister said that a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas should not require a hostage deal.[37] Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al Thani said that some unspecified countries believe that a hostage deal must be a condition of a ceasefire deal. Thani spoke at the Munich Security Conference on February 17, emphasizing the need to end the war. One of Israel’s stated war objectives is to recover the Hamas-held hostages from the Gaza Strip. Israel-Hamas negotiations have largely stalled since Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to send an Israeli delegation to Cairo for follow-up talks on February 14. Netanyahu refused to send a new delegation because Hamas demanded that Israel release thousands of Palestinian prisoners as part of the hostage deal.[38]

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks into southern Israel from the Gaza Strip on February 19.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters six times in the West Bank on February 19.[39] Unspecified Palestinian fighters threw an explosive device at a car northwest of Nablus that was operated by an Israeli civilian.[40] The attack injured one person.

Israeli Army Radio reported that violence in the West Bank increased 350% in 2023 compared to 2022.[41] The IDF recorded 608 shooting, stabbing, explosive, and vehicle ramming attacks in 2023 compared to 170 attacks in 2022.[42] Three hundred shooting attacks took place in 2023, which is the highest number of shootings recorded since the Second Intifada in the early 2000s. The report did not specify how many attacks occurred after October 7. Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other Palestinian militia groups have repeatedly called for violent attacks targeting Israeli security forces and Israeli settlers in the West Bank since October 7.[43]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 19.[44] Lebanese Hezbollah claimed three attacks targeting IDF positions along the Israel-Lebanon border.[45]

The IAF conducted airstrikes that targeted two “Hezbollah military depots” near Sidon, Lebanon on February 19.[46] This is the first time since October 7 Israel has conducted airstrikes in Sidon, which is roughly 30km north of the Litani River and 40km south of Beirut.[47] A Reuters journalist reported that the IDF has conducted airstrikes further north into Lebanon at a higher frequency in recent weeks.[48]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Houthi President Mahdi al Mashat issued a decree declaring the United States and the United Kingdom “enemy states of Yemen” on February 19 for their support of Israel.[49] The decree states that Houthi forces should confront the United States and United Kingdom. Houthi attacks have consistently targeted US and UK interests prior to the declaration, however. Most Houthi attack claims now allege that the attacks’ targets are US or UK shipping. The Houthis increased claims focusing on “US or UK shipping” after combined US-UK airstrikes began targeting Houthi positions in Yemen in early January. Houthi attacks prior to early January framed most attacks as targeting Israeli-associated assets. The Houthis fire missiles and drones targeting ships without ties to the United States, United Kingdom or Israel. The Houthis attacked a Marshall Islands-flagged cargo ship transporting corn from Brazil to Iran on February 12, for example.[50]

The European Council launched a Greek-led, defensive naval coalition to protect commercial vessels from Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The coalition, dubbed Operation Aspides, will be based out of Larissa, Greece and commanded by Greece. The EU mission will not take part in any military strikes and will only operate to provide “maritime situation awareness, accompany vessels, and protect them against attacks” at sea.[51]

Western media reported on February 19 that Iranian-backed Shia Afghan militias fighters expressed “anger and frustration” at the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)’s treatment of casualties within their ranks.[52] US airstrikes killed at least 12 fighters in the Fatemiyoun, an Iranian-backed Shia Afghan militia, in Syria on February 2. The New York Times reported that Fatemiyoun members and other unspecified Afghans were angered and frustrated because the IRGC was “silent” on the deaths of the Fatemiyoun fighters. Fatemiyoun members and other Afghans on pro-Fatemiyoun social media channels “questioned” the lack of IRGC acknowledgement of the Fatemiyoun casualties, with some suggesting that the IRGC Quds Forces discriminated against the Afghans. The IRGC ordinarily acknowledges or threatens to avenge the death of its own members. Local Iranian officials, clerics, and an unspecified IRGC representative attended some of the funeral ceremonies inside Iran for the Fatemiyoun fighters who were killed in Syria. Iran evacuated IRGC personnel from its military facilities in Syria but kept Fatemiyoun fighters stationed at those facilities ahead of the US strikes on February 2.[53]

The IDF Air Force said that it has conducted a series of strikes targeting Iranian, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Syrian targets inside Syria since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.[54] The IDF previously reported on February 3 that it had conducted a series of airstrikes targeting more than 50 Hezbollah and Hezbollah-affiliated targets in Syria since the start of the war.[55]

Iran Update, February 18, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Brian Carter, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, and Annika Ganzeveld

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

Reuters reported on February 18 that Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani directed Iranian-backed Iraqi groups to “pause” attacks on US forces during a January 29 meeting in Baghdad.[1] Ghaani met with the leaders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia groups less than 48 hours after the Iranian-backed drone attack on January 28 that killed three US servicemembers in Jordan. Kataib Hezbollah responded to Iranian directives from Ghaani by announcing that it would “suspend attacks” on January 30.[2] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba did not “initially agree” to Ghaani’s directive.[3] The group said that it would continue attacks targeting US forces on February 2, after Ghaani’s visit.[4] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed three attacks targeting US forces after Ghaani’s visit.[5] It has not claimed any attacks after February 4.[6]

Ghaani’s visit illustrates the degree to which Iran controls its proxy network across the Middle East. Most of Iran’s proxies and partners in Iraq immediately ceased attacks following Ghaani’s order. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba initially did not agree but Iranian-backed Iraqi groups have not resumed attacks targeting US forces since February 4.[7] Ghaani and Iran can pressure their partners and proxies to pause or resume attacks as needed, however. Nine Iranian and Iraqi sources told Reuters that Ghaani chose to pause attacks to “avoid a similar escalation” to the 2020 escalation cycle that resulted in the US airstrike that killed former IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani.[8] Ghaani could resume attacks in pursuit of Iranian objectives—namely, expelling US forces from Iraq—as needed when or if Iran calculates that the risk of “similar escalation” decreases.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq: Reuters reported on February 18 that Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani directed Iranian-backed Iraqi groups to “pause” attacks on US forces during a January 29 meeting in Baghdad. Ghaani’s visit illustrates the degree to which Iran controls its proxy network across the Middle East.
  • Khan Younis: The Israeli Defense Minister stated on February 18 that Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade has been “defeated and does not function as a military entity in any way.”
  • Rafah: Israeli War Cabinet Minster Benny Gantz said Israeli forces will enter Rafah at the start of Ramadan if Hamas does not release the remaining Israeli hostages the group holds.
  • Gantz’s statement reflects a possible change in the Rafah operation’s timeline. Channel 12 reported on February 10 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a War Cabinet meeting that the IDF would need to complete the operation into Rafah by March 10 due to international pressure.
  • Yemen: US Central Command conducted five preemptive strikes in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on February 17 that targeted three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, one subsurface naval attack drone, and one surface naval attack drone.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israeli Defense Minister stated on February 18 that Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade has been “defeated and does not function as a military entity in any way.”[9] Hamas has not claimed attacks against Israeli forces in Khan Younis since February 13.[10] Other Palestinian militias aligned with Hamas have continued attacks targeting Israeli forces in Khan Younis, however.[11]

Israeli special operations forces continued clearing operations in and around Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis on February 18. Israeli special operations forces (assigned to the 98th Division) began operating in Nasser Hospital on February 15 after receiving “credible intelligence” that Hamas-held hostages were in the hospital.[12] The special operations forces captured Israeli cars that Palestinian fighters stole on October 7 and seized weapons near Nasser Hospital.[13] The 35th Paratrooper Brigade killed Palestinian fighters and confiscated military equipment.[14] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on February 18 that over 200 suspected fighters had surrendered to Israeli forces at Nasser Hospital. Gallant added that the surrender of suspected fighters indicates Hamas' loss of ”fighting spirit.”[15] The IDF said many of the suspected fighters who surrendered participated in the October 7 attack and have links to the hostages held by Hamas.[16]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in additional areas of Khan Younis City. The 7th Brigade raided Palestinian militia weapons caches and killed over 20 fighters in Khan Younis City.[17] The IDF 98th Division directed airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters and a weapons warehouse.[18]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip. The Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed a Palestinian militia cell transporting weapons near Israeli forces.[19] Israeli aircraft conducted airstrikes targeting a Hamas operational headquarters and additional targets in Nuseirat and Deir al Balah on February 17.[20] The Israeli Defense Minister said on February 18 that the IDF would continue its operations to dismantle Hamas’s remaining six battalions in the central Gaza Strip and Rafah.[21] Hamas did not claim any attacks in the central Gaza Strip on February 18.

Israeli War Cabinet Minster Benny Gantz said Israeli forces will enter Rafah at the start of Ramadan if Hamas does not release the remaining Israeli hostages the group holds.[22] Ramadan is expected to begin on March 10, 2024. Gantz’s statement reflects a possible change in the Rafah operation’s timeline. Channel 12 reported on February 10 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a War Cabinet meeting that the IDF would need to complete the operation into Rafah by March 10 due to international pressure.[23] Israeli officials have committed to minimize civilian casualties in operations in Rafah, but they have not publicly outlined a plan for how the IDF would evacuate civilians from Rafah.[24] Israel’s partners and allies, including the United States, have refused to support a Rafah operation without a plan in place to protect civilians. The IDF Chief of Staff stated on February 13 that Rafah contains an estimated 10,000 Hamas fighters and over a million displaced Palestinian civilians.[25] Netanyahu said on February 17 that the IDF would enter Rafah to destroy the remaining Hamas battalions even if a hostage deal is achieved.[26] The Israeli Defense Minister said on February 16 that Israel would not evacuate Rafah’s civilian population into Egypt.[27]

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks into southern Israel from the Gaza Strip on February 18.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters six times in the West Bank on February 18.[28] Israeli forces killed an al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade commander during an IDF raid in Tulkarm refugee camp.[29]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 18.[30]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted five preemptive strikes in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on February 17 that targeted three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, one subsurface naval attack drone, and one surface naval attack drone.[31] CENTCOM reported that the Houthis used a subsurface naval attack drone on February 17 for the first time since the Houthis launched their attack campaign targeting international shipping in October 2023.[32] CENTCOM conducted the strikes after determining that the cruise missiles and naval drones were an “imminent threat” to merchant vessels and US Navy ships in the Red Sea.[33]

Iran Update, February 17, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on February 17 and 18, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, February 19, 2024Key Takeaways:

  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued operations in and around al Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis on February 17. Israeli special operations forces arrested 100 individuals at the Hospital and killed Palestinian fighters operating nearby.
  • Negotiations: An unspecified senior Hamas member told al Jazeera on February 17 that Hamas plans to suspend ceasefire negotiations with Israel until aid is delivered to the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Yemen: The Houthi movement said that it launched anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Pollux, a Panamanian-flagged and registered and Danish-owned vessel in the Red Sea on February 16 and 17.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in the northern and central Gaza Strip on February 17. The Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades–the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah–fired small arms and rocket-propelled grenades targeting Israeli forces east of Gaza City.[1] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Nahal Brigade and 215th Artillery Brigade (both assigned to the 162nd Division) directed an airstrike on February 17 that targeted Hamas fighters in an unspecified area of the central Gaza Strip.[2] 

Israeli forces continued operations in and around Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis on February 17. Israeli special operations forces began operating in Nasser Hospital on February 15 after receiving “credible intelligence” that Hamas-held hostages were in the hospital.[3]  Shayetet 13 arrested approximately 100 individuals at Nasser Hospital on February 17.[4] The IDF Egoz and Maglan units identified and killed Palestinian fighters operating around the hospital.[5]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis city.[6] The 7th Brigade raided Palestinian militia weapons caches in Khan Younis city and captured small arms and explosives.[7] The IDF 98th Division directed an airstrike that targeted three Palestinian fighters traveling towards a suspected launch position in Khan Younis.[8]

An unspecified senior Hamas member told al Jazeera on February 17 that Hamas plans to suspend ceasefire negotiations with Israel until Palestinians in the northern Gaza strip receive humanitarian aid.[9] Israel’s hostage and missing persons coordinator Gal Hirsch said that Hamas’ demands during ceasefire talks are “disconnected from reality.”[10]

Unspecified Palestinian fighters conducted one indirect fire attack targeting Ashkelon on February 17.[11] The IDF reported that it intercepted an unspecified munition targeting Ashkelon.[12] The Nahal Brigade and 215th Artillery Brigade directed an airstrike that targeted the Palestinian fighters who conducted the attack targeting Ashkelon.[13]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters one time in the West Bank on February 17.[14]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 17.[15]

Unspecified fighters fired rockets from Syria towards the southern Golan Heights on February 16.[16] Israeli forces conducted airstrikes targeting a Syrian Arab Army weapons depot in Mahjah, Daraa Province, Syria, overnight on February 16.[17]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Houthi movement said that it launched anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Pollux, a Panamanian-flagged and registered and Danish-owned vessel, in the Red Sea on February 16 and 17.[18] US Central Command (CENTCOM) said that the Houthis launched at least three anti-ship ballistic missiles at the Pollux. CENTCOM added that the attack did not damage the Pollux or any other ships in the area.[19]

CENTCOM conducted two preemptive strikes targeting one mobile anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) and one surface naval attack drone in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on February 16 and 17.[20] CENTCOM conducted the strikes after determining that the cruise missile and attack drone presented an “imminent threat” to merchant vessels and US Navy ships in the Red Sea.

 

Iran Update, February 16, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces continued targeting Hamas commanders and fighters in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces found medications belonging to Hamas-held hostages and weapons in Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis.
  • West Bank: A Palestinian resident of east Jerusalem conducted a shooting attack in Kiryat Malachi on February 16, injuring four and killing two.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The Israel Defense Forces conducted a training exercise to increase the combat readiness of forces stationed on Israel’s northern border.
  • Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with the commander of NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples to discuss NATO’s Mission Iraq.
  • Yemen: The Houthis likely conducted a missile attack targeting an unspecified Panama-flagged commercial vessel in the Red Sea.
  • Iran: Two unspecified Western officials and an IRGC-affiliated individual told the New York Times that Israel was responsible for the February 14 explosions on natural gas pipelines in central Iran.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip. 

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued targeting Hamas commanders and fighters in the northern Gaza Strip on February 16. The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed an aide to the Sabra Battalion commander in Hamas’ Gaza City Brigade.[1] Israeli forces killed the previous Sabra Battalion commander in November 2023.[2] Hamas has likely replaced the Sabra commander since his death as part of its effort to reconstitute itself militarily in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli aircraft struck a vehicle and killed three Hamas fighters in the northern Gaza Strip.[3]

Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.[4] CTP-ISW cannot determine the point of origin at this time.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on February 16. The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed several Palestinian fighters, and the IDF Air Force targeted a Palestinian fighter squad near Israeli ground forces.[5]

Israeli forces found medications belonging to Hamas-held hostages and weapons in Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis on February 16.[6] Israeli special operations forces began operating in Nasser Hospital on February 15 after receiving “credible intelligence” that Hamas-held hostages were in the hospital.[7] Israeli forces detained 20 fighters who participated in the October 7, 2023, attack as well as dozens of suspects for questioning.[8] The IDF Maglan Unit (assigned to the 98th Division) found mortars, grenades, and weapons belonging to Hamas in the hospital area.[9] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in the vicinity of Nasser Hospital for the third consecutive day.[10]

The IDF reported on February 16 that it has been causing “significant damage” to Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade.[11] Israeli forces killed several Palestinian fighters, raided military targets, and disarmed an improvised explosive device (IED) in Khan Younis.[12] Several Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli clearing operations, primarily in eastern Khan Younis, on February 16.[13] Israeli forces began conducting clearing operations in Khan Younis in early December 2023.[14]

Israel withdrew the IDF 646th Paratroopers Brigade from Khan Younis on February 15.[15] Only Israeli regular units remain in the Gaza Strip.[16]

Hamas policemen shot and killed a child, who was attempting to take food from a humanitarian aid truck in Rafah.[17] Riots erupted in the border area between Rafah and Egypt in response to the incident. The child’s family issued a statement holding Hamas responsible.[18] Israeli media reported that an unnamed Hamas official on the border denied the incident, saying that “there is no truth in what is being spread in the media and social networks.”[19]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Israel will not evacuate Palestinian civilians from Rafah to Egypt.[20] Gallant reported that Israel is “thoroughly planning future operations in Rafah” but did not offer more details.[21] Egypt has repeatedly raised concerns that an Israeli operation into the southern Gaza Strip will cause a flood of Palestinian refugees into Egypt and has even taken to reinforcing its border with the strip.[22]

US President Joe Biden reiterated to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel must have a plan for ensuring the safety of civilians in Rafah before proceeding with a military operation.[23] An Israeli official reported that the conversation lasted 40 minutes. Israel has not publicly outlined a plan for how it would evacuate civilians from Rafah in the event of a military operation there.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog “secretly” met with Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammad Bin Abdulrahman al Thani to discuss the release of Hamas-held hostages in the Gaza Strip, according to two sources familiar with the meeting.[24] The two met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu declined to send an Israeli delegation to Cairo for follow-up talks on February 14 due to Hamas’ demand that thousands of Palestinian prisoners be released as part of the deal.[25] An Israeli official told Axios that there is some progress and that Hamas may be willing to “soften its position.”[26]

Palestinian militias conducted three indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on February 16. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired rockets targeting an Israeli military site and Ashkelon from the northern Gaza Strip.[27] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters also fired rockets targeting Ashkelon.[28] An Israeli military correspondent reported that three rockets landed in the sea.[29] The launches demonstrate that Palestinian militias in the northern Gaza Strip retain some ability to fire rockets into Israel, despite Israeli operations.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

A Palestinian resident of east Jerusalem conducted a shooting attack in Kiryat Malachi on February 16, injuring four and killing two.[30] Israeli media reported the gunman fired at a bus stop.[31] The Mujahideen Brigades boasted that terror attacks like this one evade Israeli security. Hamas responded to the attack by repeating its previous calls for Palestinian civilians to conduct terror attacks targeting Israelis.[32] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF found an identification card in the attacker’s vehicle and used it to identify the perpetrator.[33] Local footage showed Israeli forces engaged in clashes with unidentified Palestinian fighters in Shuafat shortly after the shooting attack.[34] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the attack north of Kiryat Malachi “reminds us that the whole country is a front and that the murderers, who come not only from Gaza, want to kill us all.”[35]

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in three locations across the West Bank. The al Quds Brigades, which is the militant wing of PIJ, in Jenin fired at Israeli forces stationed at the Dotan checkpoint, south of the Israeli Mevo Dotan settlement.[36] Israeli forces arrested one wanted individual in Aqaba, east of Tubas, for shooting at Israeli forces.[37] Unidentified Palestinian fighters threw improvised explosive devices at Israeli forces around Aqaba.[38] Unidentified Palestinian fighters separately clashed with Israeli forces in Aboud.[39]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

The IDF Northern Command conducted a training exercise on February 16 to increase the combat readiness of forces stationed on Israel’s northern border.[40] The IDF 1st Golani Brigade of the 36th Armored Division and reserve forces from the 146th and 210th Divisions conducted a multi-day exercise to simulate combat on the border. Armored, infantry, engineering, and artillery units practiced camouflage techniques, open-field combat, and evacuations.

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 16. Hezbollah conducted two rocket attacks targeting IDF facilities in Ruwaisat al Alam and al Malikiyah.[41] Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces at the Zibdin and Ruwaisat al Alam barracks in Shebaa Farms, using unspecified guided munitions.[42] Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces in a fifth attack in an unspecified area of northern Israel.[43]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with the commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Allied Joint Force Command Naples Admiral Stuart Munsch to discuss NATO’s Mission Iraq (NMI) on February 16.[44] Sudani and Munsch discussed NMI’s intelligence sharing with and training Iraqi security officers as well as logistical issues for NMI following a withdrawal of international coalition forces from Iraq.[45] NMI works with Iraqi security forces in a ”non-combat advisory and capacity-building” capacity to ”prevent the return of ISIS/Daesh, fight terrorism, and stabilize their country.”[46] NMI operates in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government.[47]

Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri nominated Mohammed Jassim al Amiri on February 16 as a compromise candidate for governor of Diyala Province.[48] Mohammed Jassim al Amiri is the 28-year-old son of the president of Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court, Judge Jassim Mohammad Aboud.[49] Ameri claimed that his nomination was an attempt to break the political deadlock delaying the appointment of a governor. Provincial councils are responsible for voting a governor into office, under Iraqi law.[50] Ameri’s decision to nominate the candidate for Diyala Province is particularly noteworthy given the military and political influence the Badr Organization has historically had there.

Demonstrators blocked roads in Baqubah, Diyala Province, to protest Ameri’s nomination for provincial governor.[51] The Iraqi Kurdish news outlet Shafaq reported that demonstrators set fire to tires in the street and set up a tent on the road connecting Baqubah to Muqdadiyah and Balad Ruz. Demonstrators called for the provincial council to reinstate the former governor of Diyala Province, Muthanna al Tamimi, as governor.[52]

The Houthis likely conducted a missile attack targeting an unspecified Panama-flagged commercial vessel in the Red Sea on February 16.[53] The UK Royal Navy’s United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) and British maritime security firm Ambrey reported that the vessel’s captain reported an explosion but that the crew and vessel were unharmed. UKMTO and the Associated Press reported that missile fire caused the explosion.[54]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted preemptive strikes targeting Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) in Yemen on February 15.[55] CENTCOM struck three mobile ASCMs that the Houthis had prepared to launch against vessels in the Red Sea. CENTCOM conducted the strikes after determining that the ASCMs presented an “imminent” threat to US ships and merchant vessels in the Red Sea.

CENTCOM Deputy Commander Vice Admiral Brad Cooper stated that Iran directly supports the Houthis’ attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea during an interview with CBS News on February 15.[56] Cooper stated that Iranian support has been “critical” for the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping. Cooper also stated that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is “inside Yemen, and they are serving side by side with the Houthis, advising them and providing target information.” CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla separately told CBS News that the IRGC has continued supplying ”advanced conventional weapons to the Houthis. . . to undermine the safety of international shipping.”[57]

Other American officials and outlets have similarly detailed the IRGC’s direct involvement in the Houthi attacks in recent months. The US deputy national security adviser stated in December 2023 that the IRGC is helping Houthi forces plan and execute drone and missile attacks targeting ships.[58] The Wall Street Journal reported in December 2023 that the IRGC intelligence gathering ship Behshad, which is stationed in the Red Sea, provides the Houthi movement with real-time intelligence, enabling them to target ships that have gone silent.[59] US outlet Semafor reported on January 15 that the IRGC Quds Force placed drone and missile operators and trainers as well as intelligence personnel on the ground in Houthi-controlled Yemen to direct attacks and provide tactical intelligence support to the Houthis.[60] The US Treasury Department sanctioned the Houthi “procurement director” on January 25 for coordinating with the IRGC to smuggle Iranian-provided drones, missiles, and other weapons components into Yemen.[61]

Two unspecified Western officials and an IRGC-affiliated individual told the New York Times that Israel was responsible for the February 14 explosions on natural gas pipelines in central Iran.[62] The sources stated that the attacks on the pipelines required ”deep knowledge” and ”careful coordination.” The office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to comment on the article. The sabotage disrupted the gas supply to several villages. Iranian officials stated there were no casualties.[63] IRGC-affiliated media reported that the explosions were a ”terrorist act of vandalism.”[64] Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji noted on February 14 that the gas pipelines are ”targets” for the United States and its allies, though he did not name Israel specifically.[65]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed Israeli operations around Rafah in a phone call with Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal bin Farhan on February 16.[66] The ministers called for an end to the Israel-Hamas war and humanitarian aid provision to the Gaza Strip.

Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers arrested two Jaish al Adl fighters allegedly responsible for a December 2023 attack on a police headquarters in Rask, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[67] The LEC spokesperson stated that the LEC also seized firearms and “related equipment” from the fighters. Jaish al Adl militants killed at least 11 LEC officers in a two-stage attack targeting a police station in Rask on December 15, 2023.[68] This incident is part of an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[69]


Iran Update, February 15, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Russian Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov paid an official visit to Iran, likely to discuss Russo-Iranian defense industrial and military cooperation. Minnikhanov visited unspecified “large industries and industrial towns” in Esfahan Province and met with the provincial governor on February 14.[1] Several prominent defense industrial and military sites, including some operated by the IRGC and Defense Ministry for aerospace work, are in Esfahan Province. These sites include the Kashan airfield, for instance, which Russian delegations visited in June and July 2022 to examine Iranian Shahed drones.[2] The Iranian Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company, which builds Ababil and Shahed drones, is also located in Esfahan Province.[3] Minnikhanov’s visit is particularly noteworthy given that Iran is helping to construct a military drone manufacturing facility in Yelabuga, which is in the Republic of Tatarstan.[4]  This factory is expected to produce at least 6,000 drones in the “coming years.”[5]

Minnikhanov is a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin and has extensive ties to Russia’s defense industry. He has served as the head of the Republic of Tatarstan since 2010 and also heads the Russian oil and gas company Tatneft.[6] Minnikhanov has separately chaired the board of directors for the Tupolev Public Joint Stock Company since September 2021.[7] Tupolev produces strategic bombers, such as the Backfire and Blackjack bombers, for the Russian armed forces.[8] The United States sanctioned Minnikhanov in January 2023 for his involvement in the “defense and related materiel and aerospace sectors of the Russian Federation economy.”[9] Canada sanctioned Minnikhanov in April 2023 for supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[10]

Minnikhanov separately met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi to discuss “economic cooperation” in Tehran on February 13.[11] Raisi called for increasing economic, industrial, scientific, and tourism cooperation with the Republic of Tatarstan and other Russian federal subjects. Russian media reported that Raisi will travel to Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, in October 2024 to attend a BRICS summit.[12]

Some Sunni and Shia Iraqi political factions appear divided on expelling US forces from Iraq.[13] Khaled al Dabouni, a member of the Sunni Mutahidun Alliance, stated that Sunni political parties will not support the Iranian-backed effort to remove US forces. Dabouni argued that Iraq needs US forces to confront ISIS because Iraq is currently incapable of doing so by itself. This assertion is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that an Iraqi decision to expel US forces would very likely create space for ISIS to resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq.

The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-aligned Iraqi Shia political parties—and other Iranian-backed Iraqi actors regularly argue that Iraq no longer needs US-led coalition forces because the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) can independently protect Iraq from threats, such as ISIS.[14] These statements ignore the deficiencies that the ISF continues to face in terms of intelligence, fire support, and logistics. Iranian-backed Iraqi parliamentarians accused Sunni and Kurdish factions of “boycotting” the February 10 parliamentary session to discuss the removal of US-led International Coalition forces from Iraq, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[15]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iran: Russian Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov paid an official visit to Iran, likely to discuss Russo-Iranian defense industrial and military cooperation.
  • Iraq: Some Sunni and Shia Iraqi political factions appear divided on expelling US forces from Iraq.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces reported that it concluded a two-week long, division-sized raid in western Gaza City.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces continued to conduct clearing operations in several sectors of Khan Younis.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least six times. Hamas called for three days of demonstrations in the West Bank and abroad.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted eleven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Yemen: The Houthis claimed that they conducted a missile attack targeting a Barbados-flagged, Greek-owned vessel in the Gulf of Aden.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on February 15 that it concluded a two-week long, division-sized raid in western Gaza City.[16] Several Israeli regular units and special operations forces (SOF) advanced into Gaza City over a few hours—a short period relative to the week that it took Israeli forces to maneuver into Gaza City during the initial phase of clearing operations in November 2023.[17] Israeli forces cleared military infrastructure, located intelligence materials and weapons, and killed around 120 Palestinian fighters during the raid.[18] The IDF previously announced that Israeli forces had “dismantled” all of Hamas’ battalions in the northern Gaza Strip on January 6.  Hamas exploited Israeli withdrawals in late December 2023 to infiltrate areas where Israeli forces previously cleared and reconstitute some of its militia units.[19]

The IDF continued targeting Hamas commanders and fighters in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces killed the al Shati Battalion commander in Hamas’ Gaza Brigade on February 14.[20] The IDF 215th Artillery Brigade killed at least 15 Hamas fighters, including a security official, in Gaza City and other parts of the northern Gaza Strip on February 15.[21] The IDF is continuing to search for the Hamas Gaza Brigade commander, who is responsible for some of Hamas’ reconstitution efforts.[22] Hamas will almost certainly continue to replace commanders killed and/or detained by Israel and learn from its mistakes to better protect its leadership from future Israeli operations.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in the northern and central Gaza Strip on February 15. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, targeted an Israeli military vehicle with an unspecified explosive device in the northern Gaza Strip.[23] Palestinian militias fired mortars and rockets targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip, although CTP-ISW cannot confirm the point of origin.[24] The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) clashed with Palestinian fighters and directed an airstrike to kill a Hamas commander in the central Gaza Strip.[25]

Israeli SOF operated in Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis on February 15 to locate Palestinian fighters and Hamas-held hostages.[26] Israeli forces received “credible intelligence” that Hamas-held hostages were in the hospital and that their bodies may remain on the complex grounds.[27] Hamas rejected such claims and denied that it was operating in the hospital.[28] The IDF confirmed that its forces detained several suspects inside Nasser Hospital, including three Hamas fighters who participated in the October 7, 2023, attack.[29]

Nasser Hospital is the largest functioning hospital in the Gaza Strip. The IDF briefed its forces on the importance of preventing harm to patients, medical teams, and medical equipment prior to entering the hospital complex.[30] Doctors Without Borders staff in the hospital reported on February 15 that the situation is ”chaotic” and called on Israel to stop its operations.[31] Israel assesses that Hamas has used over 85 percent of major medical facilities in the Gaza Strip for military operations.[32]

The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations in several sectors of Khan Younis on February 15. The 89th Commando Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) raided the homes of senior Hamas officials’ family members.[33] Hamas used these homes for military purposes, according to the IDF. Israeli forces detained Palestinian fighters, who participated in the October 7, 2023, attack, including those from Hamas’ elite Nukhba unit.[34] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed on February 15 that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces in the vicinity of Nasser Hospital for the second consecutive day.[35] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters launched mortars and rockets targeting an Israeli supply line east and northeast of Khan Younis.[36]

Egypt is constructing a walled “enclosure” in the Sinai Desert to address concerns that an Israeli operation into Rafah will cause a surge of Palestinian refugees into Egypt, according to Egyptian officials.[37] The enclosure is meant to accommodate over 100,000 people, but an Egyptian official said that Egypt would limit the number of refugees to below the enclosure’s capacity. Egypt has repeatedly expressed concern in recent weeks that an Israeli operation into Rafah could create a flow of Palestinian refugees into the Sinai Peninsula.[38] Egypt has added other fortifications to the border and deployed approximately 40 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to the Rafah border crossing over the past several weeks.[39] Israel has not publicly outlined a plan for how it would evacuate civilians from Rafah in the event of a military operation there.

The US Central Intelligence Agency director met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel on February 15 to discuss the recent hostage negotiations, according to Israeli media and two sources familiar with the meeting.[40] Netanyahu declined to send an Israeli delegation to Cairo on February 14 after the Israeli, US, and Egyptian intelligence chiefs met with the Qatari prime minister to broker a deal for hostages’ releases and an extended pause in fighting in the Gaza Strip.[41]

PIJ fighters fired rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Ashkelon in southern Israel and the periphery of the Gaza Strip on February 14.[42] These attacks occurred after CTP-ISW's data cutoff from the previous update.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters at least six times across the West Bank. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted three attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern West Bank with small arms fire and explosive devices on February 14.[43] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted a separate small arms attack targeting the Shaked settlement south of Jenin.[44] Unidentified Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces with small arms fire and threw Molotov cocktails in Arroub refugee camp and Beitunia.[45]

Hamas called for three days of demonstrations in the West Bank and abroad from February 16 to 18. Hamas in Ramallah and al Bireh called on local Palestinians to hold demonstrations on February 16 after Friday prayers in support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[46] Hamas also called for demonstrations in Arab countries on February 17 and globally on February 18.[47]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted eleven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 15.[48]

Israel conducted an airstrike on February 15 that killed a Hezbollah Radwan Unit commander and his deputy in Nabatiya, Lebanon.[49] One source “familiar with Hezbollah thinking” told Reuters that the Israeli airstrike was an “escalation” but “within [the] unwritten rules of engagement]” between Hezbollah and Israel.”[50] The IRGC Quds Force established the Radwan Unit, which is Hezbollah’s special operations forces unit focused on infiltrating Israeli territory.[51]

Israel held a military exercise to increase the national readiness to handle several scenarios in case of a “multi-arena war.”[52] The exercises included scenarios involving damage to Israel's electricity sector and threats to civilians, such as mass shootings. The IDF, Ministry of Defense, and National Emergency Authority organized the exercise, which follows an Israeli assessment of the northern Israel border with Lebanon.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed on February 15 that it conducted a drone attack targeting an unspecified “military target” in the Golan Heights.[53] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other unspecified Arab countries are restricting US military operations out of US bases in their countries, according to a Politico report citing US and other Western officials “familiar with the issue.”[54] An unidentified US official said that Arab countries, especially those “attempting a detente with Iran,” are “increasingly restricting” US self-defense strikes. Another Western official specified that the UAE is attempting to portray itself as a neutral actor between the United States and Iran to pacify domestic popular opinion. Another official added that some countries are restricting airspace and facilities for assets used in strikes targeting Iranian-backed actors in the region. An unidentified US Department of Defense official cited in the report rejected reports of tensions between the United States and UAE over these issues. Pentagon spokesperson Major General Pat Ryder separately said in a statement to Politico that the United States and US Central Command (CENTCOM) maintain “the capability. . . to defend our forces and conduct self-defense strikes at the times and places of our choosing.”

The Houthis claimed that they conducted a missile attack targeting a Barbados-flagged, Greek-owned vessel in the Gulf of Aden on February 15.[55] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree stated that the Houthis will continue conducting such attacks in the Red Sea until Israel and Hamas reach a ceasefire agreement.[56] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations agency separately posted that a vessel reported an explosion approximately 85 nautical miles east of Aden.[57]

The United States conducted preemptive strikes targeting Houthi missile sites and naval attack drones in Houti-controlled areas of Yemen on February 14.[58] US forces conducted four strikes against seven mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, three drones, and one explosive mobile unmanned surface vehicle that the Houthis were ”prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea.”

CENTCOM reported on February 15 that a US Coast Guard cutter intercepted a shipment of Iranian weapons bound for Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen.[59] CENTCOM said that the US Coast Guard seized medium-range ballistic missile components, explosives, one-way surface and sub-surface naval attack drone components, military-grade communication and network equipment, anti-tank guided missile launcher components, and other unspecified military equipment.[60] US and allied naval forces routinely interdict Iranian shipments to the Houthis in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.[61]

Three unspecified US officials told NBC News on February 15 that the United States recently conducted a cyberattack on the Iranian Behshad intelligence-gathering ship.[62] The US officials said that the cyberattack was part of the US response to the January 28 Iranian-backed attack that killed three US servicemembers in Jordan. The cyberattack was reportedly meant to hinder the Behshad’s ability to share targeting intelligence with the Houthis.[63]  The Wall Street Journal reported in December 2023 that the Behshad, which is stationed in the Red Sea, provides the Houthi movement with real-time intelligence, enabling them to target ships that have gone silent.[64] Western media and officials said in December 2023 that the IRGC is helping Houthi forces plan and execute the Houthi drone and missile attacks on ships.[65]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian criticized recent Israeli operations in Rafah during separate phone calls with Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Secretary General Hissein Brahim Taha and Algerian Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmad Attaf on February 15.[66]

Iran Update, February 14, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET 

Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei discussed the removal of US forces from Iraq, counterterrorism, and border security with senior Iraqi politicians in Baghdad on February 13 and 14. Iranian judicial officials rarely travel abroad. Acting Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi claimed that the Iraqi Parliament will pass a law in the coming weeks to “completely” end the US presence in Iraq during his meeting with Ejei.[1] Mandalawi described Iraq as a “strong” country that “does not need foreign forces to protect it.”[2] Prominent Shia cleric Ammar al Hakim separately expressed support for the Iraqi federal government’s negotiations with the United States about the status of US-led international coalition forces in Iraq during his meeting with Ejei.[3] Ejei expressed support for ending the US-led international coalition’s mission to defeat ISIS in Iraq.[4] Facilitating the removal of US forces from the Middle East is one of Iran’s most important strategic objectives and Iran supports Iranian-backed Iraqi actors’ ongoing military and political campaign to expel US forces from Iraq.

Mandalawi and Ejei’s positions support Iran’s goal to remove US forces from Iraq, but these positions ignore the current security situation in Iraq. Iran and its proxies and partners support the effort to expel US forces from Iraq. Mandalawi’s claim that Iraq “does not need foreign forces to protect it” ignores the realities of the US mission in Iraq and the issues plaguing the Iraqi Security Forces. The US mission in Iraq focuses primarily on advising Iraqi general officers and improving the ISF’s deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics.[5] US forces in Iraq do not conduct combat operations. Iran's partners in Iraq aim to remove US forces in part because the US support for the ISF strengthens the ISF's position vis-a-vis the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Iranian-backed actors in the PMF view some ISF units as a possible threat and seek to undermine them. The Counterterrorism Service (CTS), for example, arrested 14 Kataib Hezbollah members in a raid in June 2020.[6] CTP-ISW continues to assess that an Iraqi decision to expel US forces from Iraq would very likely create space for ISIS to rapidly resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq.[7]

Ejei separately discussed border security and counterterrorism with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani. The Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office reported that Ejei and Sudani discussed joint efforts to confront terrorism and drug trafficking, while Iranian state media emphasized that Ejei called on the Iraqi government to “fully implement” the March 2023 security agreement between Tehran and Baghdad.[8] This agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups away from Iran’s borders.[9] Iran has historically accused anti-regime Kurdish militant groups and Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate joint operations into Iran. Ejei also met with Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid.[10]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani visited Iraqi Army and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) headquarters in northwestern Iraq on February 12.[11] Sudani visited an Iraqi Army 21st Division headquarters along the "Wadi al Tharthar line,” an area that extends from Salah al Din Province to the Iraqi border with Syria in western Ninewa Province.[12] Sudani formed the 21st Division in February 2023 at the request of the Iraqi Defense Ministry.[13] Brig. Gen. Imad Ahmed Mohammad assumed command of this division after serving in the Directorate of Military Engineering.[14] Sudani also visited the 44th PMF Brigade (Liwa Ansar al Marjaiya) in Hatra, Ninewa Province.[15] The 44th PMF Brigade is affiliated with Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, who is an influential quietist grand ayatollah based in Najaf.[16] Hamid al Yasiri commands the brigade.[17] Iraqi media reported that Sudani traveled to northwestern Iraq to demonstrate that areas where ISIS members previously infiltrated Iraq from Syria are now safe.[18] Sudani reiterated during his visit to these headquarters that Iraq has an “obligation” to end the US-led international coalition’s presence in Iraq.[19]

Former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi released a statement on February 14 that warned “war merchants and seditionists from the Islamist parties” against “tampering with the stability of Anbar [Province].”[20] Halbousi was likely referring to the Shia Coordination Framework, a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties that are pushing for the expulsion of US forces from Iraq. An independent Iraqi outlet framed Halbousi’s warning within the context of Sudani’s visit to Iraqi Army and PMF headquarters on February 13.[21] The outlet suggested that Halbousi might oppose the Shia Coordination Framework efforts to end the US-led international Coalition’s mission to defeat ISIS in Iraq.[22] Halbousi may also have been referring to Shia Coordination Framework efforts to prevent his favored candidate from becoming parliament speaker.

The number of Palestinian militia attacks in the northern Gaza Strip dropped from a daily average of 5 attacks between January 31 and February 6 to a daily average of 2.7 attacks between February 7 and February 13. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters mortared Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on February 14, but CTP-ISW cannot confirm the point of origin. The IDF conducted a two-week, division-sized clearing operation in early February that targeted Hamas underground infrastructure and fighters.[23] The IDF degraded Hamas units during previous clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip earlier in the war, but Hamas “took advantage” of the IDF’s withdrawal in late December to reconstitute some of its military units.[24] Hamas will likely continue to appoint new commanders in the aftermath of the latest clearing operation and learn from its mistakes to better protect its new leaders from future Israeli operations.[25] Hamas retains many experienced commanders—including the Gaza City Brigade commander—who will continue to rebuild the organization between Israeli clearing operations.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq: Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei discussed the removal of US forces from Iraq, counterterrorism, and border security with senior Iraqi politicians in Baghdad on February 13 and 14. The effort to expel US forces from Iraq supports Iran’s goals but ignores the current security situation in Iraq.
  • Former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi released a statement on February 14 that warned “war merchants and seditionists from the Islamist parties” against “tampering with the stability of Anbar [Province].” Halbousi was likely referring to the Shia Coordination Framework, a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties that are pushing for the expulsion of US forces from Iraq.
  • The Gaza Strip: The number of Palestinian militia attacks in the northern Gaza Strip dropped from a daily average of 5 attacks between January 31 and February 6 to a daily average of 2.7 attacks between February 7 and February 13.
  • The IDF conducted a two-week, division-sized clearing operation in early February that targeted Hamas underground infrastructure and fighters.
  • The IDF degraded Hamas units during previous clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip earlier in the war, but Hamas “took advantage” of the IDF’s withdrawal in late December to reconstitute some of its military units.
  • Ceasefire Negotiation: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined to send an Israeli delegation to Cairo on February 14 for “low-level” follow-up talks to discuss ceasefire proposals.
  • Lebanon: Likely Lebanese Hezbollah fighters fired 11 122mm Grad rockets at the IDF Northern Command headquarters in Safed in northern Israel on February 14. The IDF conducted a series of major airstrikes on February 14 that targeted Hezbollah positions and assets in southern Lebanon in response to the attack targeting Safed.

Iran Update, February 13, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israel presented a proposal to move displaced Gazans in Rafah to Egyptian-built tent cities in the southwestern Gaza Strip, according to the Wall Street Journal.
  • Negotiations: Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan claimed on February 12 that Egyptian and Qatar mediators believe that the Hamas ceasefire proposal that Qatar delivered to Israel “opened a way to reach an agreement.”
  • Hamdan reiterated Hamas’ longstanding requirements for a ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, which include the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the end of Israeli military operations, humanitarian aid and reconstruction, and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal.
  • Lebanon: France outlined a three-step plan to deescalate the conflict on the Israel-Lebanon border and force Lebanese Hezbollah to withdraw six miles from the Israeli border.
  • Iran: Former Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Director General Ali Akbar Salehi said during an interview on February 11 that Iran is able to develop nuclear weapons.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias did not claim any attacks targeting the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the northern Gaza Strip on February 13. IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said that the IDF would continue to operate in the northern Gaza Strip.[1] He added that the northern Gaza Strip remains “isolated” from the remainder of the Strip because the IDF does not want civilians to reenter areas where Palestinian militia fighters are continuing to operate.[2] The al Quds Brigades posted footage of the group’s previous targeting of Israeli forces in western Gaza City but did not claim new attacks.[3]

The Nahal Brigade (operating under the 162nd Division) killed at least 10 Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip, including a Palestinian anti-tank cell.[4]

Israeli forces continued operations in several areas of Khan Younis Governorate. Israeli forces concentrated on clearing western Khan Younis between January 22 and February 10.[5] Palestinian militias have resumed attacking Israeli forces in eastern, southern, and northern Khan Younis governorate after February 8. The militias focused most of their attacks in western Khan Younis between January 25 and February 8.[6]

Palestinian militias attacked Israeli forces north of Khan Younis on February 13. Hamas conducted at least four attacks on Israeli personnel and armor in the al Qarara area, north of Khan Younis on February 13, including a house-borne improvised explosive device attack targeting Israeli forces as they entered a home there.[7] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters also targeted Israeli forces with small arms in northern Khan Younis.[8]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in western Khan Younis and clashed with Palestinian fighters there. The IDF 7th Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) raided militia infrastructure, conducted patrols, and killed over thirty Palestinian fighters in western Khan Younis.[9] The 35th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) killed two Palestinian fighters in western Khan Younis who were hiding among civilians to disguise their movement.[10] Local Palestinian sources reported that Israeli forces advanced to the gates of the Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis on February 13 and ordered the occupants to evacuate the grounds.[11]  

The 646th Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) engaged Palestinian fighters and captured Hamas weapons caches during clearing operations in Abasan al Saghira, east of Khan Younis, during the last week.[12] The 646th Brigade evacuated thousands of civilians from a humanitarian shelter that Hamas fighters were using for refuge. The 646th Brigade detained and killed dozens of Palestinian fighters as the fighters attempted to evacuate alongside the civilians in the shelter.[13]

Palestinian fighters attempted to defend against the 646th Brigade’s operations in Abasan al Saghira. Palestinian fighters detonated a house-borne improvised explosive device that killed three Israeli soldiers, including a battalion commander, during the brigade’s operations in the town on February 13.[14] Hamas fighters also fired small arms targeting seven 646th Brigade soldiers in Abasan al Saghira on the same day.[15]

Israel presented a proposal to move displaced Gazans in Rafah to Egyptian-built tent cities in the southwestern Gaza Strip, according to the Wall Street Journal.[16]  Unspecified Egyptian officials said the Israeli proposal plan would obligate Egypt to 15 camps in the Gaza Strip containing 375,000 tents with funding from the United States and unspecified Arab partners. The camps would contain medical clinics, and Israel would coordinate with Egypt to permit the evacuation of wounded Gazans. The Israeli and Egyptian governments did not comment on the alleged proposal. The IDF Chief of Staff stated on February 13 that Rafah contains an estimated 10,000 Hamas fighters and over a million displaced Palestinian civilians, which requires the IDF to evacuate Rafah before beginning major clearing operations in the city.[17]

Israel is also considering other plans to evacuate the population from Rafah. Israel’s public broadcaster reported that Israel is considering other plans to enable operations in Rafah by evacuating the population from Rafah to Khan Younis or by allowing some civilians to return to designated zones in the northern Gaza Strip.[18] The IDF Chief of Staff said that the IDF would not allow northern Gaza residents to return as long as militant activity persists in the northern Gaza Strip, however.[19]

Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan claimed on February 12 that Egyptian and Qatar mediators believe that the Hamas ceasefire proposal that Qatar delivered to Israel “opened a way to reach an agreement.”[20] Hamdan reiterated Hamas’ longstanding requirements for a ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, which include the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the end of Israeli military operations, humanitarian aid and reconstruction, and a hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal.[21] An unspecified Hamas source told CNN on February 13 that the next 24 hours are critical to the ceasefire negotiations.[22] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected Hamas’ previous three-stage ceasefire and hostage exchange proposal on February 7.[23] Hamas’ February 7 proposal is the last publicly acknowledged proposal. The United States, Egypt, and Qatar are continuing to mediate negotiations between Israel and Hamas.[24] 

Palestinian militias launched at least two rocket salvoes from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on February 13. The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fired a rocket salvo from the Gaza Strip into a town in southern Israeli adjacent to Beit Lahia.[25] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) fired an unspecified number of rocket salvoes at unspecified Israeli towns near the Gaza Strip.[26]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters four times across the West Bank on February 13.[27] Israeli security forces shot and captured one attacker who attempted to run over civilians with his vehicle near Gush Etzion.[28] The IDF detained 18 wanted individuals across the West Bank on February 13.[29] The IDF separately reported that Israeli security forces detained a Hamas fighter in Jenin. The IDF described the fighter as the head of ”Hamas’ military infrastructure in Jenin”.[30]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 13.[31] Hezbollah fired anti-tank guided missiles targeting Kiryat Shmona. The Hezbollah attack targeting Kiryat Shmona injured two Israeli civilians.[32]

France outlined a three-step plan to deescalate the conflict on the Israel-Lebanon border and force Lebanese Hezbollah to withdraw six miles from the Israeli border.[33] An unspecified French diplomat told Reuters that France delivered the proposal to Israel, the Lebanese government, and Hezbollah.[34] The proposal calls on Israel and Hezbollah to end military operations—including airstrikes and cross-border attacks—along the Israel-Lebanon border. Hezbollah would then withdraw at least six miles north of the border. The Lebanese Armed Forces would backfill Hezbollah to serve as a buffer between the border and Hezbollah forces. Israel and Lebanon would resume negotiations to demarcate the border between the two countries in the plan’s third stage. A Hezbollah official said in response that the group would not negotiate until Israel stopped military operations in the Gaza Strip.[35]

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech on the state of the Israel-Hamas war on February 13. Nasrallah said that Hezbollah will not escalate against Israel unless Israel escalates against Hezbollah.[36] He added that Hezbollah will continue its attacks into northern Israel until Israel ends its operations in the Gaza Strip.[37] Nasrallah demanded that the Lebanese government set ”new conditions” on UN Security Council 1701. Nasrallah said the government should not ”implement” 1701, which says that Hezbollah cannot deploy military forces south of the Litani River.[38]

Israeli media reported on February 13 that Lebanese Hezbollah has incorporated hundreds of Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters in Syria into Hezbollah’s Radwan Force.[39] The Radwan Force is an elite Hezbollah unit. Hezbollah has enabled Palestinian militias to conduct attacks targeting Israel from southern Lebanon since the war began.[40]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Russian Ambassador to Iraq offered condolences to the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh for the deaths of Popular Mobilization Forces members in the February 2 US airstrikes.[41] The February 2 airstrikes targeted two Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in Anbar and Babil provinces.[42]

Iranian militias transported weapons from Iraq through the unofficial and Iranian-backed militia-controlled al Sikka crossing into Syria on February 13.[43] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militia group Liwa al Tafuf facilitates the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)’s movement between Iraq and Syria and weapons shipments into Albu Kamal, Syria from Iraq.[44] The United States targeted Liwa al Tafuf and the al Sikka crossing on February 2 in response to the January 28 Iranian-backed attack in Jordan that killed three US servicemembers.[45]

Israel likely conducted a drone strike targeting an IRGC missile storage facility in al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province, Syria on February 13.[46] Israel has conducted a series of airstrikes during the Israel-Hamas War targeting IRGC and IRGC-affiliated military facilities, weapons warehouses, and personnel in Syria. These strikes are Israel’s response to Iranian attempts to accelerate weapons shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah through Syria.[47]

Local Syrian media reported that unspecified Iran-backed militias targeted US forces stationed at the al Omar oil field in eastern Syria on February 13.[48] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has regularly conducted drone and rocket attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria since October 18, 2023, but it did not claim this attack.[49]

The IRGC fired short and medium-range ballistic missiles from a forward base ship in the Gulf of Oman toward central Iran during a military exercise on February 12.[50] The IRGC Navy and Aerospace Force launched the missiles from the Shahid Mahdavi forward base ship using a launcher disguised as a shipping container.[51] The ability to launch ballistic missiles from a containerized launcher means that Iran has the capability to hide the launcher on otherwise unassuming, civilian container ships. Iran could use these container ships as commerce raiders to attack merchant shipping and disrupt maritime traffic without a requirement for land-based launchers.[52] Iranian officials and media used this event to signal the IRGC’s ability to directly target Iran’s adversaries, including Israel.[53]

Former Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Director General Ali Akbar Salehi said during an interview on February 11 that Iran is able to develop nuclear weapons.[54] Salehi claimed that Iran has the components it requires to make nuclear weapons and noted that these parts have non-weapons related purposes. Salehi was responding to a state television presenter’s question about Iran’s ability to build a nuclear weapon. International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi called for transparency from the Iranian nuclear program and expressed concern over Salehi’s remarks during the World Government Summit in Dubai on February 13.[55]

An unspecified Iranian official and “two others briefed on the matter” told Western media on February 13 that the IRGC recalled its senior commanders from Syria ahead of US strikes on February 2.[56] The unspecified Iranian official told the Financial Times that Iran sought to avoid direct confrontation with the United States by recalling its commanders. The New York Times similarly reported on February 2 that Iran recalled its senior commanders from Iraq and Syria ahead of the US strikes.[57] The United States struck over 85 IRGC Quds Force and Iranian-backed militia targets in Iraq and Syria on February 2 in response to the January 28 Iranian-backed attack in Jordan that killed three US servicemembers.[58]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian implied that Israel will not achieve its war time goals in a meeting with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh. Abdollahian implied the Israel will not achieve its goals, citing Hamas’ participation in “political negotiations” with Israel, the United States, Qatar, and Egypt.[59] Abdollahian claimed that the United States and Israel recognize Hamas as a “party to political negotiations“ in the war and the group‘s “irreplaceable role and position. He also ”praised” the Axis of Resistance for its “brave support” of  the Palestinian people.

Abdollahian is using his ongoing regional tour to coordinate politically with Axis of Resistance leaders, including Haniyeh. Abdollahian met with Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut on February 10.[60] He separately met with senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine officials in Beirut on the same date.

Abdollahian separately met with the Qatari prime minister and foreign affairs minister and the Qatari emir in separate meetings in Doha on February 13.[61] Abdollahian and the Qatari leaders discussed a political solution to the Israel-Hamas war in both meetings. The Qatari prime minister and foreign affairs minister stressed the necessity contain the scope of the war.[62] This marks Abdollahian’s fifth trip to Doha since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.[63]

Barron’s reported that Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK)-affiliated hackers said that they conducted a cyberattack targeting the Iranian parliament’s website and the Iranian parliament-affiliated news agency.[64] The United States listed the MEK as a foreign terrorist organization between 1997 and 2012.[65] MEK claimed that it penetrated 600 Parliament-affiliated servers. The group published hundreds of pages of material that it acquired during the cyberattack on its Telegram channel.

 

Iran Update, February 12, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, Brian Carter, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Karolina Hird, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Key Takeaways:

  • Russia: Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate reported that elements of Lebanese Hezbollah and the IRGC are training Russian drone operators at the Shayrat Air Base in Syria.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement stated that it reestablished contact with its “combat units” in southwestern Gaza City.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces conducted an overnight raid to rescue Hamas-held hostages in Rafah.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters two times.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iraq: The Iraqi Parliament discussed the removal of US-led international coalition forces from Iraq in a session.
  • Yemen: The Houthis launched at least two anti-ship missiles targeting a Greek-owned, Marshall Islands-flagged commercial vessel carrying Brazilian corn to Iran.
  • Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian is conducting a regional tour and politically coordinating with senior Axis of Resistance leaders in Lebanon, Syria, and Qatar.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement stated that it reestablished contact with its “combat units” in southwestern Gaza City on February 12.[5] The militia fighters reported that they detonated a house-borne improvised explosive device targeting Israeli forces. The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas and has expressed close ties with Iran.[6] The inability of these fighters to communicate with higher headquarters indicates that their commanders may be unable to transmit orders to fighters that are engaged with Israeli forces.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in eastern Khan Younis on February 12. Most of the engagements between the IDF and Palestinian militias occurred in eastern Khan Younis. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) reported that its fighters conducted a complex ambush targeting Israeli forces in Maan, southeast of Khan Younis.[7] Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fighters reported that their fighters conducted separate attacks targeting Israeli forces east of Khan Younis.[8] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades is the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah. The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) targeting Israeli armor in a combined attack in Khan Younis.[9]

Palestinian militias did not claim any attacks in western Khan Younis on February 12 for the first time since Israeli forces “expanded” ground operations there on January 22.[10] The IDF reported on February 11 that its 84th Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) “deepened” the damage it inflicted on Hamas’ Western Khan Younis Battalion.[11]

The IDF reported on February 11 that Israeli forces have operated in the Amal Hospital in western Khan Younis in recent days.[12] The Palestinian Red Crescent Society reported that Israeli forces entered the hospital on February 9.[13] The IDF 84th Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) and Israeli special operations forces (SOF) detained about 20 Palestinian fighters, including some Hamas fighters hiding in the hospital.[14] The IDF said that Israeli forces searched the hospital without firing weapons and without harming medical staff or patients. The IDF briefed its forces on the importance of preventing harm to civilians "in accordance with international law” before the 84th Givati Brigade and SOF entered the building.[15] The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), a unit under the Israeli Defense Ministry, supported the distribution of dozens of oxygen cylinders to the hospital after the operation.[16]

Israeli forces conducted an overnight raid to rescue Hamas-held hostages in Rafah on February 12.[17] An IDF armored brigade and other Israeli security services used "highly sensitive and valuable intelligence” to launch the raid.[18] Israeli SOF rescued two Hamas-held hostages and exfiltrated them from the Gaza Strip.[19] The operation marks the second time since October 7, 2023, that Israeli forces have successfully retrieved hostages from the Gaza Strip.[20] The IDF Air Force provided air support to suppress the local Hamas battalion during the raid.[21] The Palestinian Red Crescent Society reported that Israeli airstrikes killed approximately 100 people.[22] The US State Department spokesperson said on February 12 that the United States does not view the Israeli airstrikes in Rafah as “the launch of a full-scale offensive.”[23]

Two unspecified security officials told CNN on February 12 that Egypt has increased security along its border with the Gaza Strip as a “precautionary measure” in anticipation of an Israeli ground operation into Rafah.[24] An eyewitness told CNN that the Egyptian Army reinforced checkpoints near the Rafah crossing and prepared roads in an unspecified manner for the deployment of tanks and military equipment. Egypt has added other fortifications to the border and deployed approximately 40 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to the Rafah border crossing over the past two weeks.[25] Egypt has repeatedly expressed concern that an Israeli operation into Rafah could create a flow of Palestinian refugees into the Sinai Peninsula.[26]

Israeli media reported that the IDF plans to release a report on alleged war crimes its service members have committed during the Israel-Hamas war.[27] The IDF told Haaretz that the Israeli General Staff investigative team is working to ”examine reports and complaints of the violation of Israeli and international law in the course of the fighting.” The IDF said that the team is collecting data regarding various wartime events and that the investigation is in its initial stages.

The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fired a rocket salvo from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on February 12.[28]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters two times across the West Bank on February 12.[29] The IDF killed on February 11 an unspecified fighter who attempted to stab an IDF soldier.[30] Israel police killed a separate attacker who also attempted to stab police officers.[31] The IDF detained 17 wanted individuals across the West Bank overnight on February 11.[32]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 12.[33] The IDF Air Force targeted a Hezbollah field commander, who was responsible for the Maroun al Ras region, in an airstrike near Bint Jbeil in southern Lebanon.[34] The commander survived the attack.[35]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Senior Kataib Hezbollah official and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chief of Staff Abu Fadak (Abdul Aziz) al Mohammadawi stated that the Iraqi federal government and Islamic Resistance in Iraq will “coordinate” before any retaliation for the US strike that killed a Kataib Hezbollah commander in Baghdad on February 7.[36] Abu Fadak said that the “greatest revenge” for the US strike will be the expulsion of “foreign forces” from Iraq.[37]

Abu Fadak’s remarks are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the primary objective driving the Iranian-backed attacks on US forces is expelling these forces from the region. Iranian-backed militias are using Israeli operations as an excuse to attack US forces, when the actual objective of these attacks is to advance the long-standing Iranian effort to erode American influence in the Middle East. Iranian-backed militias have thus exploited the Israel-Hamas war to justify their attacks and partially obfuscate the core objective driving their escalation. Iran and its Axis of Resistance will almost certainly continue their decades-long effort to expel US forces from the Middle East regardless of whether there is a ceasefire agreement in the Israel-Hamas war.

The US force presence in Iraq aims to defeat ISIS at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government. CTP-ISW continue to assess that ISIS could resurge in Syria and then threaten Iraq 12 to 24 months after a US withdrawal.[38] The expulsion of US forces from Iraq would require the United States to end operations in Syria because US forces there rely on Iraqi bases for logistics and other support. The expulsion of US forces from Iraq would benefit ISIS by constraining US support to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which still faces deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics.[39]

The Iraqi Parliament discussed the removal of US-led international coalition forces from Iraq in a session on February 10. Over 100 parliamentarians called for an emergency parliamentary session following the February 7 US strike that killed a senior Kataib Hezbollah commander in Baghdad.[40] Acting Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi ordered the formation of a parliamentary committee to “support” the Iraqi federal government’s negotiations with the United States to end the US-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq.[41] Washington and Baghdad began talks about the status of the US-led coalition mission to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria on January 27.[42] Mandalawi also submitted a January 2024 draft law to the Parliamentary Security and Defense and Legal Committees.[43] The draft law calls for the removal of all foreign forces from Iraq.[44] The law would also require Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to author a report detailing how his administration would end the US presence in Iraq.[45]

Iranian-backed actors control the Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee, which is reviewing this draft law. Badr Organization member Abbas Zamili heads the committee. Zamili described the US presence in Iraq as a “threat to Iraqi security” and called for accelerating the removal of US forces on February 4.[46] Mandalawi and PMF Chief of Staff Abu Fadak were with Zamili when he made these remarks.[47] The Security and Defense Committee previously announced a draft resolution in December 2023 to expel US forces from Iraq.[48]

Iranian-backed Iraqi parliamentarians accused Sunni and Kurdish factions of hampering the parliamentary efforts to expel the United States from Iraq. Parliamentarians affiliated with Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al Haq, and the Badr Organization accused Sunni and Kurdish politicians of “boycotting” the February 10 parliamentary session discussing the removal of US-led international coalition forces.[49] A member of Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political wing called for Kurdistan Democratic Party Chairman Masoud Barzani and the leaders of other unspecified political blocs to be “punished for their support of the US presence in Iraq.”[50] National Progress Alliance member Nihal al Shammari denied that Sunni and Kurdish parliamentarians "boycotted” the February 10 session and claimed that only 60 members of the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—attended the session.[51] The Shia Coordination Framework controls 138 out of 329 seats in Iraq’s parliament.[52]

The Houthis launched at least two anti-ship missiles targeting a Greek-owned, Marshall Islands-flagged commercial vessel carrying Brazilian corn to Iran on February 12.[53] The Houthis claimed that they targeted an "American” ship.[54] The Greek shipping company that owns the vessel is listed publicly in the United States but is not US-owned.[55]

Iranian Deputy Interior Minister for Security and Law Enforcement Majid Mir Ahmadi announced on February 10 that Iranian security forces killed an Islamic State member attempting to enter Iran from Iraq.[56] Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) border guards recently arrested several unspecified individuals attempting to smuggle weapons from Iraq into Ilam Province on February 6.[57]

Unspecified individuals shot and killed two Basij members near the Zahedan-Bam railway in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on February 11.[58] The Basij is a regime-run, paramilitary organization responsible for civil defense and social control in Iran.[59] This incident is part of an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023. Jaish al Adl—a Balochi, Salafi-jihadi group operating on the Iranian border with Pakistan—has conducted at least five attacks targeting Iranian security personnel since December 2023.[60] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State separately conducted a terrorist attack in Kerman Province in early January 2024, killing over 90 individuals.[61]

IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami claimed on February 12 that the IRGC Navy and Aerospace Force jointly launched a long-range ballistic missile from a warship for the first time.[62] Salami did not specify the type of missile launched or when it occurred.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian is conducting a regional tour and politically coordinating with senior Axis of Resistance leaders in Lebanon, Syria, and Qatar. Abdollahian discussed developments in the Gaza Strip, southern Lebanon, and the “other fronts of the Axis of Resistance” during a meeting with Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut on February 10.[63] Abdollahian also called on Palestinian militias to adopt a “unified position” on unspecified political initiatives to end the war.[64] Abdollahian made this statement on February 10 during a meeting in Beirut with Palestinian Islamic Jihad Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah, senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Deputy Secretary General Jamil Mazhar.[65] Abdollahian also met with the Lebanese prime minister, foreign affairs minister, and parliament speaker during his visit to Beirut.[66] This trip marked Abdollahian’s third visit to Lebanon since the Israel-Hamas war began.[67]

Abdollahian criticized US efforts to create “political plans” for the post-war Gaza Strip during a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus on February 11.[68] Abdollahian emphasized that Palestinians and the leaders of Palestinian militias can and should “decide the management of the post-war Gaza Strip and West Bank.”[69] Abdollahian also met with Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal Mekdad in Damascus on February 11.[70]

Abdollahian traveled to Doha on February 12, marking his fifth visit to Qatar since the Israel-Hamas war began.[71] Abdollahian could meet with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, who is based in Doha. Abdollahian has previously met with Haniyeh and other Hamas officials during his recent visits to Doha.

Iran Update, February 11, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern and central Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in the northern and central Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Hamas, Egyptian, and Houthi officials issued threats likely to dissuade the IDF from a military operation into Rafah.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters twice.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Syria: Likely Iranian-backed militants tried to conduct a drone attack targeting US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria.
  • Yemen: US Central Command forces conducted self-defense strikes targeting Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles and unmanned surface vessels.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) clashed with Palestinian fighters in the northern and central Gaza Strip on February 11. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) mortared Israeli military positions east of Gaza City.[1] The PFLP is a secular leftist Palestinian faction fighting with Hamas. The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fired rockets at an Israeli military position in southeast Gaza City.[2] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas and has expressed close ties with Iran. The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) clashed with and killed Palestinian fighters targeting Israeli forces with anti-tank missiles in the central Gaza Strip.[3] Israeli aircraft targeted a weapons warehouse and Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip.[4]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western and eastern Khan Younis on February 11. The IDF 35th Paratroopers Brigade and 89th Commando Brigade (both assigned to the 98th Division) clashed with Palestinian fighters in western Khan Younis.[5] The 646th Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) launched a new clearing operation in eastern Khan Younis and detained approximately 60 Palestinian fighters.[6] Palestinian militias mortared Israeli forces in eastern Khan Younis.[7] The IDF 98th Division directed airstrikes targeting three weapons depots and a Palestinian militia squad in Khan Younis.[8] The commander of the 98th Division stated that Israeli forces have “dismantled and destroyed” Hamas in Khan Younis both under and above ground.[9]

The IDF reported on February 11 that its 84th Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) “deepened” the damage it inflicted on Hamas’ Western Khan Younis Battalion.[10] Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade is composed of five battalions.[11] The Givati Brigade killed about 100 Palestinian fighters in several clashes using tanks, small arms, and air support “in the last few weeks.” Israeli forces “expanded” ground operations in western Khan Younis on January 22.[12]

Hamas, Egyptian, and Houthi officials issued threats likely to dissuade the IDF from a military operation into Rafah on February 11. An unspecified senior Hamas official speaking to a Hamas-affiliated outlet said that an Israeli ground incursion into Rafah would “torpedo” hostage exchange negotiations.[13] Two Egyptian officials and a Western diplomat told the Associated Press that an Israeli ground operation in Rafah would freeze the Egypt-Israel Camp David Accords peace treaty.[14] A senior Houthi official warned that the Houthi movement would intensify attacks against Israel if the IDF entered Rafah.[15] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in an interview with ABC that Israeli forces would “provide safe passage” to Gazan civilians from Rafah to unspecified, already cleared areas north of Rafah and reiterated that the IDF will enter Rafah in the near future.[16]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on February 11.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters twice across the West Bank on February 11.[17]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 11.[18]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Likely Iranian-backed militants tried to conduct a drone attack targeting US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on February 10.[19] US air defense systems intercepted the drones.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces conducted self-defense strikes targeting Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and unmanned surface vessels (USV) on February 10.[20] CENTCOM forces struck three mobile ASCMs and two USVs north of Hudaydah in Yemen. CENTCOM conducted the preemptive, self-defense strikes after determining that the ASCMs and USVs presented an “imminent threat” to merchant vessels and US Navy ships in the Red Sea.

Iran Update, February 10, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl 

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces published details of a division-sized clearing operation it has been conducting for the past two weeks in western Gaza City.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: Unidentified Egyptian officials warned that Egypt would suspend the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty if Israel conducted a ground operation into Rafah.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters four times.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed that the United States violated “the rules of engagement” when it killed senior Kataib Hezbollah member Wissam Mohammed Saber al Saedi.
  • Yemen: US Central Command forces conducted preemptive, self-defense strikes targeting Houthi unmanned surface vessels and missiles.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) engaged in “intense” fighting with Palestinian fighters in the northern and central Gaza Strip on February 10.[1] Hamas fighters fired anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces southwest of the Zaytoun neighborhood of Gaza City.[2] Palestinian media reported on February 10 that Israeli artillery targeted areas in eastern Jabalia.[3] The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed and detained an unspecified number of Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip.[4] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters mortared Israeli forces east of Maghazi in the central Gaza Strip.[5]

The IDF published on February 10 details of a division-sized clearing operation it has been conducting for the past two weeks in western Gaza City.[6] The IDF 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) and Israeli special operations forces (SOF) killed approximately 120 Palestinian fighters and destroyed Hamas infrastructure in al Shati refugee camp and the Tal al Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City. Israeli forces located a Hamas “data center” underneath the headquarters of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in addition to weapons inside the headquarters.[7] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu showed US Secretary of State Antony Blinken photos of the tunnel underneath the UNRWA headquarters on February 7.[8]

The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 10. The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division), 35th Paratroopers Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division), and the 646th Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) found large quantities of weapons and clashed with Palestinian fighters.[9] PIJ fighters returned from the areas of fighting in western Khan Younis and reported several attacks targeting Israeli forces.[10] A physician at Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis reported that Israeli tanks reached the hospital gates on February 10.[11] Associated Press reported that the IDF said that it is not currently operating inside the hospital and called the surrounding area “an active combat zone.”[12]

The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting three Hamas members, including two senior military operatives, in Rafah.[13] Western media and Palestinian sources reported that Israeli airstrikes in Rafah killed two policemen and three senior officers in the Civil Police on February 10.[14] One of those killed was Ahmed al Yaqoubi, who was ”responsible for security for senior Hamas leaders and served as a senior commander in the Rafah district.”[15] The IDF identified another member as Iman Rantisi, who was Yaqoubi’s deputy, according to Palestinian sources.[16] The IDF has targeted Hamas’ police and internal security apparatus to disrupt Hamas’ attempts to rebuild its governing authority.[17] The Civil Police and the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry's Internal Security Forces in Gaza both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing. [18]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to complete clearing operations in Rafah before Ramadan begins on March 10, according to an unidentified Israeli source.[19]

Unidentified Egyptian officials warned that Egypt would suspend the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty if Israel conducted a ground operation into Rafah.[20] The 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty limits the Egyptian military presence in the Sinai Peninsula.[21] Egypt has deployed approximately 40 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to the Rafah border crossing and added additional fortifications to the border over the past two weeks in anticipation of a potential wave of refugees from Rafah.[22] Israel approved previous Egyptian requests to surge forces into the Sinai for counterterrorism operations[23]

Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns will travel to Cairo on February 13 to discuss resuming hostage release negotiations with Egyptian officials, according to unidentified US and Israeli officials.[24]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters four times across the West Bank on February 10.[25]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 10.[26]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraq militias—claimed that the United States violated “the rules of engagement” when it killed senior Kataib Hezbollah member Wissam Mohammed Saber al Saedi (Abu Baqr al Saedi).[27] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq called on its supporters to take up arms against the United States and join an Iranian-backed militia. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani previously claimed that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias agreed to pause attacks targeting US forces in exchange for a pause in US strikes.[28]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed an attack on an unspecified “vital” target near the Dead Sea on February 10.[29]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces conducted preemptive, self-defense strikes targeting Houthi unmanned surface vessels (USV) and missiles on February 9.[30] CENTCOM forces struck two USVs, four anti-ship cruise missiles, and one land attack cruise missile in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen. CENTCOM conducted the preemptive, self-defense strikes after determining that the USVs and missiles presented an “imminent threat” to merchant vessels and US Navy ships in the Red Sea.

Iran Update, February 9, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, Amin Soltani, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Talia Tayoun, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters continued to infiltrate Gaza City on February 9, where they are attacking Israeli forces.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to draft plans to evacuate civilians from Rafah and to “dismantle Hamas’ battalions in the Rafah area” on February 9.
  • Iraq: The Central Bank of Iraq revoked the license that allows Iran’s largest bank to operate in Iraq on January 31, according to a Central Bank of Iraq document obtained by Reuters.
  • Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian is engaging in political coordination with senior leaders in the Axis of Resistance during his visits to Lebanon, Syria, and Qatar.
  • Two Western intelligence officials told Politico on February 8 that Iran used German financial institutions to funnel money to its regional proxy groups.
  • Syria: Israel likely conducted missile strikes targeting Iran-affiliated targets in southwestern Damascus, Syria, on February 9.
  • Yemen: The United States conducted preemptive strikes targeting Houthi missile sites and naval attack drones in Yemen on February 8.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters continued to infiltrate Gaza City on February 9, where they are attacking Israeli forces. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Mujahideen Brigades fighters conducted a combined attack that targeted a group of Israeli soldiers and vehicles near Eastern Cemetary, between eastern Jabalia and the Israel-Gaza Strip border.[1] Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—a leftist group aligned with Hamas in the current war—fired rockets and mortars targeting Israeli forces operating in Gaza City.[2] Israeli forces also directed an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters near a Hamas military position during clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip.[3]

Palestinian fighters continued attacks targeting Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip. Al Quds Brigades fighters launched rockets targeting Israeli vehicles in the central Gaza Strip.[4] The Al Aqsa Martyrs‘ Brigades targeted an Israeli soldier with sniper fire east of al Maghazi refugee camp.[5] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades are a self-identified military wing of Fatah, a Palestinian nationalist organization.

Israeli forces continued clearing operations and targeted raids in Khan Younis on February 9. The Egoz Unit (assigned to the IDF 89th Commando Brigade) and the 35th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) seized several small arms clashes during raids on Palestinian militia “compounds” in western Khan Younis.[6] The IDF 646th Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) captured tunnel shafts, explosives, and small arms.[7] The brigade also captured a rocket launch site near a kindergarten.[8]

Palestinian fighters continued attacks targeting Israeli forces in Khan Younis on February 9. PIJ and Hamas fighters fired rocket-propelled grenades and other unspecified munitions at Israeli armored vehicles advancing in an unspecified area of Khan Younis City.[9]

Palestinian fighters did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on February 9.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to draft plans to evacuate civilians from Rafah and to “dismantle Hamas’ battalions in the Rafah area” on February 9.[10] Netanyahu said that the IDF must conduct clearing operations in Rafah to destroy Hamas. Destroying Hamas is one of Israel’s stated war aims.[11] He added that the civilian population must be evacuated from Gaza to achieve this objective. The US National Security Council spokesperson said that the White House is not aware of any "imminent“ plans for the IDF to conduct operations in Rafah. He added that “absent any full consideration of protecting civilians at [the scale of the number of people in Rafah]“ the United States would not support a Rafah operation.[12]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in three locations across the West Bank on February 8 and 9.[13] Unspecified fighters conducted three attacks targeting Israeli forces in Beit Furik, Tulkarm, and Kafr Qaddum.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine cross-border attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 9.[14]

The commander of the IDF Northern Command said that the IDF is preparing for an “expansion of the war” in Lebanon during a meeting with northern Israeli town councils.[15] The councils represented Israeli towns that the IDF evacuated due to the threat of Lebanese Hezbollah attacks. The commander said that the IDF’s goal is to “change the security situation” to enable the return of northern Israeli residents.[16] The head of the Meta Asher town council said that he “told the commanding general that [he hopes] the political echelon will let the IDF act” against Hezbollah.[17] Israeli officials have said repeatedly that they are attempting to reach a diplomatic agreement wherein Hezbollah will withdraw north of the Litani River in Lebanon, but that Israel may need to resort to military action against Hezbollah in the absence of a diplomatic solution.[18] UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Lebanon War, stipulates that Hezbollah cannot maintain military positions south of the Litani.[19]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi politicians continued to call for the expulsion of US forces from Iraq in response to the February 7 US strike in Baghdad that killed a senior Kataib Hezbollah commander.[20] A Sadiqoun member of parliament called on Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad al Sudani on February 9 to take ”immediate action” to end the US presence in Iraq.[21] The Sadiqoun bloc is the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political arm in Iraq’s Parliament.[22] Iraqi Deputy Parliament Speaker Shawkhan Abdullah called on the UN to prevent ”military attacks” targeting Iraq during a February 9 UN session with other heads of parliament from around the world.[23] Abdullah said that the Iraqi government has the authority to take ”all legal and diplomatic measures to stop attacks and protect [Iraqi] national sovereignty.”[24] Abdullah is a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party from Sulaymaniyah, a province in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Kurdistan Regional Prime Minister and top KDP leader Masrour Barzani said on February 9 that the Kurdistan Region required greater US support to counter ”threats,” referencing Iran’s January 15 drone and missile attack that targeted Erbil.[25]

The Central Bank of Iraq revoked the license that allows Iran’s largest bank to operate in Iraq on January 31, according to a Central Bank of Iraq document obtained by Reuters.[26] Reuters reported that the Central Bank of Iraq canceled the license due to international sanctions on the bank, the bank’s losses accrued in Iraq, and its limited activities in Iraq. The US Treasury Department sanctioned Bank Melli Iran in 2018 for transferring funds to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia groups via the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[27] The Central Bank of Iraq dated this document January 31, two days after US Treasury Department Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson discussed US sanctions on Iraqi actors and companies with Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan on January 29.[28]

Two Western intelligence officials told Politico on February 8 that Iran used German financial institutions to funnel money to its regional proxy groups.[29] Politico reported Western intelligence officials notified German financial authorities that Iran used Varengold Bank AG in Hamburg, Germany, to transfer funds to Iranian proxy groups, including Lebanese Hezbollah and the Houthis, for an unspecified number of years. The unspecified Western intelligence officials also said that the IRGC Quds Force-linked front companies used the German bank. The IRGC Quds Force is responsible for providing financial and material support to Iranian proxy groups across the Middle East. Politico reported that the US Treasury Department had previously sanctioned the unspecified Iranian front companies for their connections to the IRGC Quds Force. The IRGC Quds Force routinely utilizes international money laundering and oil smuggling networks to financially support Iranian proxy groups.[30]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian is engaging in political coordination with senior leaders in the Axis of Resistance during his visits to Lebanon, Syria, and Qatar.[31] Abdollahian arrived in Beirut on February 9 to meet with unspecified “senior Lebanese officials" and ”resistance” leaders.[32] Abdollahian will travel to Damascus, Syria, and Doha, Qatar, in the coming days.[33] Abdollahian met with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh during his last visit to Doha.[34] Abdollahian repeatedly engaged in political coordination with senior Axis of Resistance leaders during similar visits to Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Qatar between October 12 and November 3, 2023, as CTP-ISW reported.[35]

Israel likely conducted missile strikes targeting Iran-affiliated targets in southwestern Damascus, Syria, on February 9. Local Syrian sources reported that Israel targeted IRGC-affiliated positions near the Mezzeh Military Airport in southwestern Damascus.[36] Pro-Syrian Regime sources claimed that Syrian air defense systems shot down the drones.[37] A UK-based Syrian outlet claimed that the strikes targeted Lebanese Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed militia positions and an Iranian cargo plane that landed at the airport several hours before the strike.[38] The IDF has conducted a series of airstrikes targeting Syrian airports and other facilities in Syria to degrade Iran’s ability to move weapons to Hezbollah.[39] Hezbollah uses these weapons to support attacks into northern Israel.

Lebanese Hezbollah said on February 8 that an Israeli airstrike killed three of its fighters in Homs City, Syria, on February 7.[40] Hezbollah claimed that Israel struck a residential building in which the three fighters were planning to hold a meeting.

The United States conducted preemptive strikes targeting Houthi missile sites and naval attack drones in Yemen on February 8.[41] The United States conducted seven strikes targeting four Houthi naval attack drones and seven Houthi mobile anti-ship cruise missiles that Houthi fighters had prepared to launch at ships in the Red Sea. Houthi and other regional sources reported that US forces targeted al Jabanah, al Durayhimi, and al Kathib in Hudaydah Governorate and al Qutaynat in Saada Governorate.[42] Houthi leader Abdulmalik al Houthi said on February 8 that the US strikes will not deter the Houthis.[43] The US previously conducted strikes against Houthi missile sites in Yemen on February 7.[44]

 


Iran Update, February 8, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Key Takeaways:

  1. Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters are continuing to infiltrate previously cleared areas.
  2. Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces 98th Division continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis.
  3. Political Negotiations: Israel reportedly proposed to the United States exiling the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, in exchange for Hamas returning all hostages and an end to the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip.
  4. West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in two locations.
  5. Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted 10 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  6. Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are continuing to exploit US military operations in Iraq to amplify pressure on the Mohammad Shia al Sudani administration to expel US forces from Iraq.
  7. Syria: An unspecified Iraqi militia group conducted a drone strike targeting US forces at the al Omar oil field in Deir ez Zor Province, according to regional and local Syrian outlets.
  8. Yemen: The United States conducted self-defense strikes targeting Houthi missile sites in Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters are continuing to infiltrate previously cleared areas in the northern Gaza Strip. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Unit 414 Intelligence Battalion (assigned to the 143rd Division) directed a drone strike on February 8 targeting a Palestinian militia squad that was attempting to “transfer technological systems” to Hamas in the northern Gaza Strip.[1] Unit 414 previously encountered Palestinian fighters that were attempting to establish a Hamas reconnaissance position in Beit Hanoun on February 6.[2] CTP-ISW assessed on January 22 that Hamas and other Palestinian militias are likely in the early stages of reconstituting their military capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip.[3]

The IDF 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed 10 Palestinian fighters in several clashes in the northern Gaza Strip on February 8.[4] Palestinian militias, including Hamas, claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in Gaza City using small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).[5] A Palestinian activist reported clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters in several neighborhoods of western Gaza City, including Sheikh Ijlin and Tal al Hawa, on February 8.[6]

The IDF 98th Division continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on February 8. The 35th Commando Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) “increased attacks” in western Khan Younis, according to the IDF.[7] Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters, raided military facilities, and located weapons, including long-range rockets. Palestinian militias have been conducting a deliberate defense against Israeli ground operations in western Khan Younis since the IDF began operating there on January 22.[8]

The IDF 35th Paratroopers Brigades (assigned to the 98th Division) and 84th Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed over 20 Palestinian fighters during attacks in Khan Younis on February 8.[9] Several militias aligned with Hamas in the war attacked Israeli forces in southern and western Khan Younis.[10] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC) reported that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces in Khan Younis.[11] The PFLP-GC is a Palestinian faction based primarily in Syria.[12] The faction receives support from Iran and has cooperated with other elements of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” such as Lebanese Hezbollah and the Syrian regime.[13] CTP-ISW has not previously observed the PFLP-GC attacking the IDF in the Gaza Strip since the war began.

The IDF published on February 8 footage of a conversation with a detained commander in Hamas' elite Nukhba unit.[14] The commander Muhammad Nasser Suleiman Abu Namer, who the IDF detained in Khan Younis, told Israeli Shin Bet officers that he and two other Hamas fighters “didn’t want to fight” and turned themselves over to Israeli forces approaching them in tunnels in Khan Younis. Namer urged other Palestinian fighters to surrender in the footage. Namer has been a member of Hamas since 2009.[15]

Israel reportedly proposed to the United States exiling the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, in exchange for Hamas returning all hostages and an end to the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip, according to six unspecified Israeli officials.[16] A senior adviser to the Israeli government said that the idea of exiling Sinwar and other Hamas leaders has been “on the table” since November 2023, referring to the ongoing negotiations between Israel and Hamas. Israeli officials have vowed to kill Sinwar and other planners of the October 7, 2023, attack.[17] Sinwar founded and led Hamas’ internal security apparatus and is responsible for the deaths of many Israelis and Palestinians in that role.[18] Israel proposed exiling Sinwar as part of several suggestions sent to the United States.[19] These suggestions included replacing Hamas with “hand-picked” civilian leaders and reforming the education system in the Gaza Strip.

The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fired rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting 13 locations in southern Israel, as the group commemorated the anniversary of its launch on February 8.[20] The group is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas and has expressed close ties with Iran.[21] The group announced on February 8 that Israeli airstrikes killed five of its military council members.[22] Israeli Army Radio reported that Palestinian fighters fired the rockets from the northern and central Gaza Strip.[23] The launches demonstrate that Palestinian militias in the northern and central Gaza Strip retain some ability to fire rockets into Israel, despite Israeli operations. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, reported that its fighters fired a rocket salvo targeting a town in southern Israel bringing the total number of targeted locations on February 8 to 14.[24] Palestinian militias have not claimed responsibility for this many rocket attacks since December 4, 2023.[25]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in two locations across the West Bank on February 8.[26]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted 10 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 8.[27] Hezbollah launched rockets at an IDF base on Mount Meron that hosts air traffic control, radar, surveillance, communications, and jamming facilities.[28] Hezbollah said that it conducted the rocket attack ”in retaliation” for an Israeli strike on a car in Nabatiyeh, southern Lebanon.[29] Hezbollah has previously targeted the Meron Base in response to Israeli strikes in Lebanon and not as part of its regular attack campaign along the border.[30] Hezbollah fighters also targeted the headquarters of the IDF 769th Eastern Brigade (assigned to the 91st Galilee Division) in Kiryat Shmona, seriously injuring one IDF soldier.[31]

The IDF Northern Command Commander Major General Uri Gordin visited Israeli forces in training on February 8.[32] The IDF 36th Division, which operated in the northern Gaza Strip in 2023, is part of the force training to increase ”readiness for the operational plans against the northern enemy in defense and attack.”[33] The IDF began this week a series of intensive platoon- and battalion-level training focused on combat in densely populated neighborhoods in winter conditions.[34]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are continuing to exploit US military operations in Iraq to amplify pressure on the Mohammad Shia al Sudani administration to expel US forces from Iraq. The United States killed on February 7 a senior Kataib Hezbollah commander who planned and participated in attacks targeting US forces in the region.[35] The Iraqi Parliament announced that it will convene on February 10 to discuss “attacks on Iraqi sovereignty.”[36] An Iranian-backed Badr Organization member stated that Parliament will meet to draft a law requiring the Iraqi federal government to implement the January 2020 non-binding parliamentary resolution to expel “all foreign forces” from Iraq “by the end of next June.”[37] It is unclear whether this parliamentarian was referring to June 2024 or 2025. The Iraqi Parliament passed this resolution after the United States killed IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani in January 2020. Acting Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi recently expressed support for implementing the January 2020 non-binding resolution on February 4.[38] Mandalawi is affiliated with the Shia Coordination Framework, which is a coalition of prominent Iraqi Shia parties, including some closely tied to Iran. Another Badr Organization member stated that Mandalawi agreed to put a January 2024 draft law to remove “all foreign troops” from Iraq on Parliament’s agenda[39] This draft law differs from the January 2020 resolution in that it requires Prime Minister Sudani to author a report detailing how his administration would end the US presence in Iraq.[40]

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors also criticized how the Sudani administration is approaching negotiations with the United States over this issue. The United States and Iraqi federal government announced in late January 2024 the beginning of “working group meetings” to evaluate the status of the US-led Global Coalition’s mission to defeat ISIS.[41] The next such meeting will take place on February 11.[42] Politico previously reported that senior Iraqi advisors to Sudani told the US State Department that Sudani does not seek the expulsion of US forces.[43] The head of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc stated that negotiating with the United States after its February 7 strike “will represent an insult to Iraq.”[44] A former commander of Kataib Hezbollah similarly described negotiations with the United States as “shameful and flawed.”[45]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are trying to rally Iraqi citizens against the United States. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba released a statement on February 8 calling on the Iraqi people to help the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and “men of resistance” confront the United States.[46] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada similarly called on Iraqis to “join” and “rally around” Iraqi militias that are “resisting” the United States on February 8.[47] These militia calls follow a large demonstration against the United States in front of the US Embassy in Baghdad immediately after the US strike that killed a senior Kataib Hezbollah commander on January 7.[48]

An American analyst provided new details about the senior Kataib Hezbollah official, named Wissam Mohammad Saber al Saedi (Abu Baqr al Saedi), whom the United States killed in a precision strike in Baghdad on February 7.[49] Saedi headed the PMF Central Security Directorate in Rusafa and suppressed protesters during the popular Tishreen protest movement that began in October 2019.[50] The Tishreen movement erupted in response to high unemployment, poor government service provision, and rampant corruption within the government.[51] 600 protesters died during the first six months of the protests.[52]

Saedi was involved in the February 2022 Alwiya Waad al Haq (the Righteous Promise Brigades) attacks targeting “vital facilities” in the United Arab Emirates.[53] Alwiya Waad al Haq threatened to attack US forces in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates at the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.[54] CTP-ISW previously assessed that this group was likely a front for Kataib Hezbollah.[55]

Saedi was additionally involved in Kataib Hezbollah’s operations in Syria.[56] An Axis of Resistance-affiliated Iraqi Telegram channel claimed on February 7 that Saedi conducted “relief work” in Syria following the February 2023 earthquake.[57] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran and its proxy and partner militias exploited the February 2023 earthquake to move advanced weaponry and military equipment into Syria.[58]

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander said on February 8 that unspecified US officials told the SDF that US forces would not withdraw from Syria.[59] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said that a US withdrawal from Iraq could cause a US withdrawal from Syria.[60] The United States and Iraqi federal government announced on January 25 that they will soon start negotiations to discuss Iraq’s current security arrangement with US-led coalition forces.[61] These negotiations could precipitate the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and, in turn, a scaling back of US forces in Syria.[62] The US force presence in Syria relies on US logistical networks in Iraq. A US withdrawal from Iraq and Syria would likely create space for ISIS to quickly resurge, as CTP-ISW has assessed.[63]

An unspecified Iraqi militia group conducted a drone strike targeting US forces at the al Omar oil field in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, on February 8, according to regional and local Syrian outlets.[64]

The United States conducted self-defense strikes targeting Houthi missile sites in Yemen on February 7.[65] US forces struck two Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles and a land attack cruise missile. US CENTCOM said that the Houthi missiles were prepared to launch and posed an ”imminent” threat to US ships and merchant vessels in the Red Sea. Houthi and other regional sources reported that US forces targeted missile sites in al Salif and Ras Issa in Hudaydah Governorate and al Qutaynat in Sadaa Governorate.[66] Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdul Salem said that the strikes will not deter the Houthis from conducting further attacks.[67]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei discussed the Israel-Hamas war in a meeting with Iranian regime officials and representatives from other Muslim countries on February 7.[68] Khamenei claimed that the war illustrates that the current world order is “invalid and unsustainable and will disappear.” Khamenei claimed that the withdrawal of pro-Western forces “from this issue” is the solution to the war. Khamenei reiterated his months-long call for all countries to sever economic and political relations with Israel.

Iran Update, February 7, 2024

click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

US Central Command (CENTCOM) killed a senior Kataib Hezbollah commander on February 7 who planned and participated in attacks targeting US forces in the region.[1]  CENTCOM said the strike was in response to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s drone attack on January 28 that killed three US servicemembers in Jordan.[2] Local Iraqi media reported that the US airstrike hit a vehicle and killed three of its occupants in Mashtal, eastern Baghdad.[3] Two Kataib Hezbollah commanders, Wissam Mohammed Saber al Saadi and Arkan Aleaoui, were in the vehicle.[4] The Associated Press cited ”two officials with Iranian-backed militias in Iraq” who claimed that Saadi oversaw KH operations in Syria.[5] An Iraqi journalist identified Aleaoui as a KH field commander.[6]  Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba said on February 7 that it will retaliate for the US strike in Baghdad if the Iraqi government does not immediately remove US forces from Iraq.[7]

Iraqis demonstrated outside the US Embassy in Baghdad following Iranian-backed social media calls to storm the embassy on social media.[8]  Pro-Iranian-backed Iraqi militia social media channels issued calls after the US drone strike for demonstrators to gather in Jadiriyah and march towards the embassy.[9]

Sudani said that the Iraqi Federal government has not had direct contact with the United States since the US airstrikes in Iraq on February 1.[10] Sudani also said that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) will be involved in future bilateral negotiations on the status of US and International Coalition forces in Iraq. It is unclear what role the KRG will play in the bilateral negotiations.

The Microsoft Threat Analysis Center reported that Iran accelerated its cyberattacks and influence operations after October 7 to support Hamas and weaken Israel and its allies and business partners.[11] Microsoft assessed that Iran’s operations immediately after October 7 were “hasty and chaotic,” but that these efforts have “achieved growing success.”[12] Microsoft said that traffic to Iranian state media websites increased 42 percent between October 7 and October 14 and that the traffic “was still 28 percent above pre-war levels” in early November.[13] Microsoft said that the “hasty and chaotic” operations targeting Israel shifted to an “all hands on attack threat environment” in late October.[14] It reported that the cyberattacks were increasingly “destructive” and Iran began employing “networks of social media ‘sockpuppet’ accounts.”[15] Microsoft also said that Iran gradually expanded its operation to target countries other than Israel, including Albania, Bahrain, and the United States.[16] Iran also used artificial intelligence for the first time in a cyber or influence operation to replace ”streaming television services...with a fake news video featuring an apparently AI-generated news anchor.”[17] This AI-enabled operation targeted audiences in Canada, the UAE, and the United Kingdom.[18]

Israel rejected a Hamas three-stage proposal for a ceasefire on February 7.[19] Hamas’ proposed the February 7 deal after Egypt, the United States, and Israel proposed a separate three-stage agreement on January 31 after talks in Paris.[20] The January 31 Paris proposal did not include an end to the war.[21] Hamas offered a three-stage ceasefire deal that would release all Israeli hostages over a four-month period in exchange for the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and discussions on the end of the war.[22] Each phase would last 45 days. The deal includes a “comprehensive reconstruction” of the Gaza Strip.  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected the Hamas counterproposal in a national address, but he did not rule out the possibility of further negotiations.[23]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on February 7 that the IDF would prepare to operate in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.[24] Israeli officials have said repeatedly that the IDF will clear Rafah.[25] Netanyahu’s announcement follows weeks of talks between Israel and Egypt discussing an Israeli operation into Rafah.[26] The Israel-Hamas war has displaced over 50 percent of the Gaza Strip’s two million residents to Rafah.[27] Egypt is concerned that an Israeli military operation in Rafah could force displaced Gazans to flee into the Sinai Peninsula.[28] Western media reported on February 6 that unspecified Egyptian officials said that Israel told Cairo in private that the IDF would allow people in Rafah to evacuate north before beginning operations in Rafah.[29]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other senior Israeli officials on February 7 to discuss negotiations to reach a ceasefire that would release remaining hostages in the Gaza Strip and allow more aid to reach Palestinians.[30] Israeli officials told CNN that the IDF briefed Blinken on the upcoming expansion of Israeli ground operations and that Blinken raised concerns regarding the densely populated area, particularly related to the measures the IDF would take to mitigate harm to civilians.[31]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq: US Central Command (CENTCOM) killed a senior Kataib Hezbollah commander responsible for Syria on February 7 who planned and participated in attacks targeting US forces in the region. The strike also killed a Kataib Hezbollah field commander.
  • Iraqis demonstrated outside the US Embassy in Baghdad following Iranian-backed social media calls to storm the embassy on social media.
  • Iran: The Microsoft Threat Analysis Center reported that Iran accelerated its cyberattacks and influence operations after October 7 to support Hamas and weaken Israel and its allies and business partners.
  • Negotiations: Israel rejected a Hamas three-stage proposal for a ceasefire on February 7.
  • Hamas offered a three-stage ceasefire deal that would release all Israeli hostages over a four-month period in exchange for the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and discussions on the end of the war.[32] Each phase would last 45 days.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on February 7 that the IDF would prepare to operate in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.
  • Israeli officials told CNN that the IDF briefed US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the upcoming expansion of Israeli ground operations and that Blinken raised concerns regarding the densely populated area, particularly related to the measures the IDF would take to mitigate harm to civilians.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters continued to infiltrate western Gaza City, where they are attacking Israeli forces. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi met with division commanders in the northern Gaza Strip on February 6.[33]  Halevi said that Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip are killing Palestinian fighters, commanders, and destroying infrastructure. Palestinian militias claimed most of their attacks in the Gaza Strip on February 7 in western Gaza City.[34] The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) launched one-way attack drones targeting Israeli forces western Gaza City in one such attack.[35] A Palestinian activist reported clashes between Palestinian fighters and Israeli forces in several neighborhoods of western Gaza City, including al Shati Camp, Sheikh Ijlin, and Tal al Hawa.[36]

Israeli media reported on February 7 that Israeli forces located a large Hamas underground tunnel underneath a UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) headquarters in Rimal neighborhood, Gaza City.[37]

The IDF 98th Division located two interconnected tunnel complexes in Khan Younis that Hamas used to hold hostages.[38] The IDF reported that senior Hamas officials used the complex before Hamas repurposed it to hold hostages. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in the tunnels and found a cell for holding hostages. The tunnel system is under central Khan Younis City. The IDF estimates that Hamas invested millions of shekels into its construction.

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on February 7. The 35th Paratroopers Brigade and the 89th Commando Brigade (both assigned to the 98th Division) clashed with Palestinian fighters in western Khan Younis and raided military infrastructure.[39] The IDF reported that the 646th Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) redeployed to Khan Younis after the brigade conducted clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.[40] Hamas and several Palestinian militias allied with Hamas attempted to disrupt Israeli operations in Khan Younis.[41] The militia fighters targeted Israeli forces with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), thermobaric rockets, and unspecified explosive devices.[42]

Saudi Arabia told the United States that it will not normalize relations with Israel “unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized.”[43] The Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministry called on permanent members of the UN Security Council to recognize a Palestinian state ”on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.“ US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on January 10 that normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel is still possible.[44]

The IDF published details of a law that would increase the amount of time conscripts and reservists serve in the military.[45] The law will increase the age at which reservists become exempt from reserve duty.  The IDF will also call upon reservists more frequently and increase regular service to three years. Israeli Army Radio reported on February 7 that due to ”the war and the large number of casualties...the number of combat forces in the IDF“ declined.[46] The IDF published on January 15 that 188 Israeli troops have died in the ground offensive and that 1,113 IDF soldiers have sustained injuries.[47]

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on February 7.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in 10 locations across the West Bank on February 7.[48] Israeli forces conducted raids in the Noor Shams and Jenin refugee camps.[49] The IDF detained 21 wanted individuals across the West Bank.[50]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 7.[51]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Jordanian Armed Forces clashed with Iranian-backed drug smugglers on the Jordan-Syria border on February 7.[52] Western media reported that the Jordanian armed forces killed three of the smugglers.[53] Local Syrian media said that the smugglers belonged to Lebanese Hezbollah.[54]

This clash is part of increasing Jordanian operations against smuggling networks in southwestern Syria. Jordanian forces have clashed with Iranian-backed smugglers along the Jordan-Syria border three other times since December 2023, including once on February 5.[55] The Jordanian Royal Air Force has also struck Iranian-backed drug smugglers three times since December 2023. Western media reported in January that Western and Jordanian officials said that Lebanese Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed groups are driving the increase in drug smuggling into Jordan.[56] The Syrian regime, Lebanese Hezbollah, and other Iranian-backed militias mass produce Captagon in Syria and smuggle it through Jordan to the Gulf Arab states. This smuggling and distribution cartel generates billions of dollars in revenue for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[57]

Raisi administration officials held several meetings with Sudanese Armed Forces-affiliated Foreign Affairs Minister Ali al Sadiq Ali to discuss Israel and bilateral relations. Ali claimed that Israel is driving the continuation of the Sudanese civil war in retaliation for Sudan’s support of the Palestinian people in a meeting with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian.[58] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said that isolating Israel is one of Iran’s ”basic policies” and added that he supported the establishment of a strong government in Sudan.[59] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian separately expressed his desire to resume full diplomatic relations between Sudan and Iran.[60] Iran and Sudan maintained a strong relationship from the 1980s until the mid-2010s, when Sudan began improving its relationship with Saudi Arabia.[61]

Iran likely seeks to increase economic investment in Sudan to generate revenue for the Iranian economy, including by selling Sudan combat drones. Western media reported on January 24 that Iran had supplied the Sudanese Armed Forces with combat drones.[62] French media previously reported on January 23, 2023 that Iran had likely supplied Sudan with Mohajer-6 drones as early as 2019.[63] The IRGC and regime-affiliated outlets have repeatedly encouraged increased investment in Africa to obtain gold payments that Iran can use to evade sanctions.[64] Iranian economic investment in Africa has increased during the Raisi administration.[65] CTP-ISW previously assessed in June 2023 that Iran’s increased economic investment in Africa is part of the Raisi’s effort to generate revenue through economic trade with non-Western countries.[66]

Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi discussed the Israel-Hamas war during a meeting with Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul Amir al Shammari on February 7.[67] Vahidi thanked the Iraqi government for supporting the Palestinian people. Vahidi said that Iraq ”took good positions” in the United Nations Security Council by condemning the February 2 US strikes that targeted Iranian-backed militia positions in Iraq and Syria.[68]

Iranian media reported that Iranian security forces arrested several unspecified individuals across Iran for espionage and terrorism “directed by a center in Azerbaijan.” Iranian media reported that the suspects were planning to conduct “sabotage operations” in Iran.[69] The Iranian Intelligence Ministry said on February 2 that it identified ”a significant number of [Israeli] spies and terrorists” working in Iran.[70] Iran frequently arrests individuals in Iran‘s East Azerbaijan and West Azerbaijan provinces that it accuses of spying for Israel.[71]

An Artesh-controlled social media account warned that Iran would respond to any “terrorist action” targeting IRGC spy ship Behshad in the Red Sea.[72] The Behshad assists Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden by providing the Houthis with real time intelligence on ships operating in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.[73] The Behshad held a position near the Dahlak archipelago in the Red Sea prior to entering the Gulf of Aden on January 11.[74] An online shipping tracker reported that Houthi attacks targeting ships in the Gulf of Aden increased after January 11.[75] The Behshad is currently anchored off the coast of Djibouti City.[76] Iran claims that the Behshad is participating in a counterpiracy mission in the Red Sea.[77] AP noted that Iran has not publicly participated in any recent operations countering Somali piracy.[78]


Iran Update, February 6, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on February 5 that Israeli operations have dismantled 18 of 24 Hamas battalions, rendering them “no longer [functional] as fighting military” organizations.[1] Gallant and the IDF have not identified a precise definition for “dismantle." The IDF previously announced Israeli forces had “dismantled” all of Hamas’ battalions in the northern Gaza Strip on January 6.[2] Hamas cells have continued attacks in the northern Gaza Strip after the IDF withdrew most of its forces on December 31.[3] The continued Palestinian militia attacks in the northern Strip demonstrate the risk posed by small, networked military cells in the northern Gaza Strip. The size of the cells and the degree of organization and coordination between them is not clear. Palestinian militia activity in the northern Gaza Strip spurred a division-sized IDF clearing operation in western Gaza City over the last week, however.[4] These cells remain capable of reorganizing into an embryonic military structure.[5] The Hamas Gaza City Brigade commander will continue to support this reorganization.[6]

A top UN official in Iraq claimed that both US self-defense strikes and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting US forces “recklessly heighten tensions,” which ignores Iran’s role in driving escalation in Iraq. The head of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq stated on February 6 that “messaging by strikes only serves to recklessly heighten tension,” in reference to both Iranian-backed attacks and US self-defense strikes responding to these attacks.[7] Beginning on October 22, Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted 33 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq without triggering a US response inside Iraq.[8] US forces first responded in Iraq to attacks targeting US forces after Kataib Hezbollah fired a ballistic missile targeting a US position in late November 2023.[9] The United States has the right to protect and defend its personnel in Iraq, who are deployed at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government to fight ISIS. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are themselves escalating tensions in Iraq and the region and violating Iraqi sovereignty by continuing to attack US forces unilaterally and without provocation.

Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias reiterated their plans to continue attacking US forces on February 6. The leader of Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba said that the “resistance” will expel the United States.[10] A field commander for Ashab al Kahf, a militia close to Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, also warned that Ashab al Kahf will apply “extreme force” until the United States withdraws from Iraq and ends support for Israel’s operation in the Gaza Strip.[11] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Ashab al Kahf both vowed to continue attacking US forces after Kataib Hezbollah announced on January 30 that it suspended “military and security” operations targeting US forces.[12]

Key Takeaways:

  • Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on February 5 that Israeli operations have dismantled 18 of 24 Hamas battalions, rendering them “no longer function as fighting military organizations.” Gallant and the IDF have not identified a precise definition for “dismantle.“
  • Palestinian fighters are using more sophisticated weapons to attack Israeli forces in the areas Palestinian militias have infiltrated in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Iraq and Syria: A top UN official in Iraq claimed that both US self-defense strikes and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting US forces “recklessly heighten tensions,” which ignores Iran’s role in driving escalation in Iraq. Several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias reiterated their plans to continue attacking US forces on February 6.
  • Yemen: Houthi fighters targeted two merchant vessels in the Red Sea with anti-ship missiles on February 6.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters are continuing to infiltrate previously cleared areas of the northern Gaza Strip. CTP-ISW assessed on February 3 that Palestinian fighters infiltrated southwestern Gaza City.[13]

The IDF said that Hamas is attempting to restore its “intelligence collection” capacity in the northern Gaza Strip, likely to aid its attacks on Israeli forces and reestablish control over the local population. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Unit 414 Intelligence Battalion (assigned to the 143rd Division) directed airstrikes targeting four Palestinian fighters in Beit Hanoun who attempted to establish a Hamas reconnaissance position in the area.[14]  Palestinian militants last conducted attacks from Beit Hanoun on January 25.[15]

Palestinian militias have conducted several combined attacks in the areas that they have infiltrated in the northern Gaza Strip since mid-January.[16] This trend indicates several militias have infiltrated into the previously cleared zones and that they are closely collaborating against Israeli forces. The Palestinian militias arrayed against the IDF in the Gaza Strip organized themselves into a “Joint Operations Room" in 2018 to fight the IDF.[17] This force is led by Hamas' military wing.

Palestinian fighters are using more sophisticated weapons to attack Israeli forces in the areas Palestinian militias have infiltrated in the northern Gaza Strip. PIJ fighters detonated an explosively-formed penetrator (EFP) targeting an Israeli military vehicle in western Gaza City, where the 162nd Division launched a new, division-size clearing operation last week.[18] Local Palestinian journalists reported that Israeli forces pulled a “charred” military vehicle from the attack site, corroborating PIJ’s attack claim.[19]

Elements of the IDF 143rd Division directed an airstrike targeting a PIJ fighter in the Deir al Balah area on February 6.[20] The IDF said that the PIJ fighter participated in the attack in Nir Oz on October 7.[21] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade said separately that an Israeli airstrike killed one of its senior commanders in Deir al Balah between February 3 and 4.[22] Palestinian militias did not claim any attacks on Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip on February 6.

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 6. The IDF said that the IDF 98th Division killed “dozens” of Palestinian fighters and detained over 80 others on February 5 and 6 in western Khan Younis, including fighters that the IDF suspects participated in Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel.[23] The Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed over 15 fighters in multiple engagements with Palestinian militias in the same area.[24] The IDF 646th Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) killed a Palestinian fighter hiding in a building in western Khan Younis.[25] The IDF 646th Brigade and the Egoz Unit located small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and EFPs during raids in the area.[26]

Palestinian militias continued to attempt to defend against Israeli clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 6. Hamas’ military wing detonated EFPs and fired thermobaric and anti-tank rockets at IDF forces in several areas of western Khan Younis.[27] PIJ’s military wing fired rocket-propelled grenades at Israeli armor and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in western Khan Younis.[28] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also detonated EFPs and fired anti-tank weapons and small arms at Israeli forces in the same area.[29]

The Qatari prime minister said during a press conference with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on February 6 that Qatar had received a "positive response" from Hamas on the framework of a hostage exchange agreement.[30] Blinken said that the United States is reviewing Hamas’ response to the deal and that he will discuss Hamas’ response with Israeli officials during his visit to Israel on February 7. Hamas said on February 6 that the group dealt with the proposal with a “positive spirit,” including by reiterating Hamas’ demands for a "comprehensive and complete ceasefire.”[31] Netanyahu said on January 21 that Israel will not accept a comprehensive ceasefire, which has been an obstacle for several weeks during the negotiations.[32] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office released a statement acknowledging that it received Hamas’ response.[33]

IDF published captured Hamas documents showing that Iran supplied Hamas and Yahya Sinwar with millions of dollars of operational funding. Israeli forces found six years of financial documents outlining 150 million dollars of funding to Hamas and Sinwar.[34] The IDF also uncovered about 5.5 million dollars in cash during the raid.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters eight times across the West Bank.[35] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in Jenin, Tulkarm, and Beit Ummar detonated improvised explosive devices and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces during Israeli raids in the West Bank.[36] The IDF said unidentified Palestinian fighters shot at an Israeli settlement in Merav, east of Jenin.[37]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted ten attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 6.[38] Hezbollah claimed nine of the attacks.[39]

Iranian-backed militias fired one rocket salvo into the Golan Heights from southwestern Syria on February 5.[40]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting Eilat, Israel, on February 5.[41] CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim.

The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Border Guards arrested several unspecified individuals attempting to smuggle weapons from Iraq into Ilam Province, Iran on February 6.[42] The LEC Border Guards commander said that the LEC identified and arrested the smugglers with support from the Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry and unspecified Iraqi forces. Iranian security forces interdicted anti-regime Kurdish separatist weapon shipments from Iraq into Kurdistan Province and Ilam Province, Iran in September 2023.[43] Iranian officials have long expressed concerns that Israel and anti-regime Kurdish militant groups are using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations targeting Iran.[44] Iranian forces conducted airstrikes into Iraqi Kurdistan in March, September, October, and November 2022 and in January 2024 in response to these perceived threats.[45]

The LEC arrested several likely Salafi-Jihadi insurgents throughout southeastern Iran on February 5 and 6. LEC officers arrested one suspected ISIS fighter and one suspected Ansar ul Furqan fighter in two separate incidents in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[46] Ansar ul Furqan is a Balochi Salafi-jihadi group linked to al Qaeda.[47] LEC officers arrested one individual suspected of killing a senior LEC officer in Fars Province.[48] Balochi Salafi-jihadi militant group Jaish al Adl has conducted at least five attacks targeting Iranian security personnel since December 2023, including one assassination targeting an LEC officer.[49] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State separately detonated two suicide vests in Kerman Province on January 3, killing over 90 individuals.[50]

Houthi fighters targeted two merchant vessels in the Red Sea with anti-ship missiles on February 6.[51] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that Houthi fighters successfully hit the Greek-owned and Marshall Islands-flagged Star Nasia and the UK-owned Morning Tide merchant vessels.[52] An unidentified Greek official said that the attack damaged the Star Nasia but that the attack did not harm any crewmembers.[53] The Morning Tide’s owners reported that a separate attack caused an explosion near the Morning Tide, but that the explosion did not damage the ship.[54] Sarea falsely claimed that the Star Nasia was US-owned.[55] Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi alleged that the United States is attempting to camouflage its vessels by operating its ships under different flags.[56]  Sarea stated that the Houthis will continue attacks on US and UK targets in the Red Sea in response to US and UK strikes.[57] He also said the Houthis will continue attacks targeting Israeli vessels and vessels en route to Israel.[58] 

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted two self-defense strikes targeting Houthi one-way naval surface attack drones in Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory.[59] CENTCOM said that the drones presented an imminent threat to US Navy ships and merchant vessels in the region.[60]  

Iran Update, February 5, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

Iranian-backed Iraqi officials are using recent US airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to retroactively justify their political pressure on the Iraqi federal government to expel US forces from Iraq. The United States has the right to respond and defend itself against these attacks from Iranian-backed groups in Iraq. Iranian-backed groups in Iraq are themselves violating Iraqi sovereignty by launching attacks from Iraqi territory targeting US forces, who are in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government, and American assets elsewhere in the region. Acting parliament speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi called on the Iraqi federal government to implement the January 2020 parliamentary resolution to expel “all foreign forces” from Iraq while touring the sites of the US strikes in al Qaim and Akashat in western Anbar Province on February 5.[1] Popular Mobilization Forces Chief of Staff and Kataib Hezbollah official Abu Fadak al Muhammadawi and Iranian-backed Badr Organization member and Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee Chairman Abbas Zamili accompanied Mandalawi to al Qaim and Akashat.[2] The Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee announced in December 2023 a draft resolution in December 2023 that would expel US forces from Iraq.[3]

Mandalawi is a Shia politician who is close to the Shia Coordination Framework, a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties. Mandalawi became acting parliament speaker in November 2023, when the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court unconstitutionally dismissed former speaker Mohammad al Halbousi.[4] The Shia Coordination Framework has sought to postpone the election of a new parliament speaker to replace Mandalawi by invalidating the candidacies of parliament speaker hopefuls.[5] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors filed a lawsuit on January 23 that includes a clause preventing Parliament from resuming the vote for a parliament speaker until the Federal Supreme Court issues a ruling on the eligibility of Halbousi-backed candidate Shaalan al Karim.[6]

Other Iranian-backed politicians in Iraq also issued statements to increase pressure on Iraqi officials. Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh said that the US airstrikes went “too far” because they targeted a Popular Mobilization Forces facility, adding that the Iraqi people, government, and political forces must end the foreign presence in Iraq.[7] Fayyadh said that targeting the Popular Mobilization Forces was a “red line” and that US strikes will not go “unnoticed.”[8] Key Iranian proxy Hadi Ameri and the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Shia parties—called for the expulsion of US forces immediately.[9] Iran backs some Shia Coordination Framework parties.

Iran’s surrogates in Iraq co-opted and lead the Popular Mobilization Forces. Fayyadh, who leads the PMF, has closely cooperated with Quds Forces operatives to implement Iranian directives in Iraq, including by killing Iraqi citizens during peaceful protests in 2019.[10] The PMF contains many Iranian proxy groups. The US strikes targeted two such groups on February 2.[11]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad on February 5.[12] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson stated on January 29 that Ahmadian would discuss border security and terrorism with Iraqi officials.[13] Ahmadian emphasized Iran’s willingness to cooperate with Iraq during a meeting with the Iraqi prime minister, citing the March 2023 security agreement between the two countries.[14] The March 2023 agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups away from Iran’s borders.[15] Ahmadian’s visit to Iraq follows the IRGC’s drone and missile strikes targeting alleged Mossad-affiliated facilities and individuals in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan on January 15.[16] Iran claims frequently that anti-regime Kurdish groups and Israel use Iraqi Kurdistan to conduct operations in Iran.[17]

Ahmadian also likely discussed the recent US strikes targeting IRGC Quds Force and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets in Iraq during his meetings with Iraqi officials. Sudani stated that Iraq opposes “any unilateral actions” that violate the principle of “respect for sovereignty” during his meeting with Ahmadian.[18] Sudani was likely referring to both the IRGC’s January 15 strikes in Erbil and the February 2 US strikes, which the Sudani administration described as a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty on February 3.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq and Syria: Iranian-backed Iraqi officials are using recent US airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to retroactively justify their political pressure on the Iraqi federal government to expel US forces from Iraq.
  • The United States has the right to respond and defend itself against these attacks from Iranian-backed groups in Iraq. Iranian-backed groups in Iraq are themselves violating Iraqi sovereignty by launching attacks from Iraqi territory targeting US forces in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government and American assets elsewhere in the region.
  • Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad on February 5.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Force 162nd Division launched a new, division-size clearing operation in central and northern Gaza City in the past week. CTP-ISW assessed on February 3 that Palestinian fighters infiltrated southwestern Gaza City
  • The IDF is conducting operations in the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt Hamas' attempts to reconstitute its governing authority.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reiterated that the IDF plans to clear Hamas fighters and military infrastructure from Rafah and the central Gaza Strip on February 5.
  • Yemen: US Central Command conducted preemptive strikes targeting four Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles and a land-attack cruise missile on February 4.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Force (IDF) 162nd Division launched a new, division-size clearing operation in central and northern Gaza City in the past week.[20] The IDF withdrew a large number of forces from the northern Gaza Strip on December 31 after months of fighting there.[21] CTP-ISW assessed on February 3 that Palestinian fighters infiltrated southwestern Gaza City.[22] The IDF 162nd Division commander said on February 5 that the Nahal Brigade and 401st Brigade began conducting new clearing operations to reduce Hamas fighters and infrastructure in al Shati camp and Rimal neighborhood in western Gaza City. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said on February 4 that the 162nd Division’s operation aims to target Hamas underground infrastructure over two weeks.[23] Palestinian militias continued attacks targeting IDF forces during these operations in western Gaza City.[24]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that Palestinian fighters are hiding among civilians in humanitarian shelters to evade capture and facilitate infiltration in the northern Gaza Strip.[25] The IDF is evacuating the entire population from the shelters in the northern Strip to find and detain the fighters.[26] The correspondent said that the IDF captured over 70 ”high-level” Hamas and PIJ fighters over the last week using this method.[27] The IDF estimates there are 200,000 Gazans in the northern strip, mostly concentrated within humanitarian shelters.[28] The IDF is continuing to search for Hamas Gaza City Brigade commander Izz al Din al Hadad, who has evaded capture and is responsible for Hamas’ reconstitution efforts in the Gaza Strip, according to the IDF.[29] Hadad’s capture would slow but not stop Hamas’ reconstitution and infiltration in the Gaza City area.

The IDF is conducting operations in the northern Gaza Strip to disrupt Hamas' attempts to reconstitute its governing authority.[30] Israeli operations are targeting Hamas’ police and internal security apparatus.[31] The Civil Police and the Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry‘s Internal Security Forces in Gaza both employ fighters from the Hamas military wing.[32] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent estimated that half of Hamas’ police officers are also fighters in the group’s military wing, the al Qassem Brigades.[33]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stressed on February 5 that establishing a political alternative to Hamas is crucial to the success of Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip.[34] Gallant’s statement about establishing a civil alternative echoes the four-pronged security and governance plan he articulated for the Gaza Strip on January 4.[35] The lack of a suitable political alternative has enabled Hamas to begin rebuilding its governance system in the northern Gaza Strip as it infiltrates into areas where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations.[36]

Israeli forces and Palestinian militias clashed three times in the central Gaza Strip. The al Quds Brigades claimed mortar attacks on Israeli infantry and armor east of Maghazi and east of Deir al Balah.[37] Israeli forces struck a five-man Hamas cell operating near Israeli forces in the Central Gaza Strip.[38]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 5. The 646th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) cleared militia sites, captured weapons, killed at least 10 Palestinian fighters, and directed airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis.[39] The Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) cleared Hamas infrastructure and killed dozens of Palestinian fighters in western Khan Younis.[40]

Palestinian militias continued to attempt to defend against Israeli operations in the Khan Younis. Militia groups claimed 11 attacks on Israeli forces in Khan Younis on February 5.[41] Hamas’ militant wing conducted a complex attack on Israeli armor using improvised explosive devices and rocket-propelled grenades in the al Amal area in Khan Younis.[42] Hamas and PIJ’s militant wings conducted a combined attack on an Israeli tank in the same area of western Khan Younis.[43]

The IDF is increasing its focus on degrading Hamas and PIJ rocket capabilities. The IDF concentrated on other tactical objectives during earlier phases of the ground operation. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that the IDF estimates Hamas has about 1,000 rockets left in its arsenal.[44] These rockets are mostly in small, relatively simple underground launch silos, which enable Hamas and its allies to disguise and protect their rocket infrastructure. Hamas fighters launched a rocket salvo targeting Tel Aviv from disguised, buried launch silos only 20 to 30 meters from Israeli troops, which illustrates the challenges involved in detecting and destroying similar sites.[45] Unspecified senior IDF officials told the correspondent that it will take up to two years to completely wipe out Hamas’ rocket launch capability in the Gaza Strip.[46] The IDF also added that a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) cell operating in Zaytoun, southern Gaza City, is responsible for most rocket attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip in recent weeks.[47]

Palestinian militias did not conduct indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on February 5.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reiterated that the IDF plans to clear Hamas fighters and military infrastructure from Rafah and the central Gaza Strip on February 5.[48] The IDF said on February 2 that the 99th Division’s operations in the central Gaza Strip aim to prevent Hamas fighters from infiltrating Gaza City from the southern Gaza Strip.[49] Gallant did not specify a timeline for the operation, nor did he address where the Gazan civilians sheltering in Rafah would be moved during an operation in Rafah. An unspecified senior Israeli official said on February 4 that Israel would work with Egypt to evacuate Gazans northward before any ground offensive begins in Rafah.[50]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blamed Hamas for impeding hostage negotiations by making demands Israel “will not agree to.”[51] Netanyahu said that defeating Hamas will take “months, not years” in a Likud party meeting on February 5.[52] Netanyahu reiterated that Israel seeks to completely defeat Hamas and that the IDF will need to operate in all areas of the Gaza Strip to defeat Hamas. Israel’s public broadcaster reported on January 31 that Hamas was demanding the release of all elite Nukhba unit fighters currently held in Israeli jails.[53] The Nukhba unit is an elite Hamas unit that participated in the October 7 attack on Israel. Egyptian officials reported that Hamas political leadership demanded the release of 3,000 Palestinian prisoners, including two top Palestinian leaders.[54]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades battalions in Nablus, Tulkarm, and Tubas attacked Israeli forces during Israeli raids in the West Bank on February 5.[55] The IDF said that it conducted raids in Nablus, Hebron, and Tulkarm arresting 33 “wanted persons.”[56] Unspecified Palestinian militia fighters fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Hebron on February 5.[57]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 5.[58] Hezbollah claimed four attacks.[59]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada announced on February 4 that it will continue conducting attacks targeting US forces.[60] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah announced on January 30 that it suspended its “military and security operations” targeting US forces.[61] Kataib Hezbollah’s announcement followed a visit by IRGC-QF commander Esmail Qaani in the wake of the January 28 attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan.[62] Western media reported that Kataib Hezbollah, which is part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, launched the one-way drone attack from western Iraq.[63] The Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada spokesperson stated on February 4 that the February 2 US airstrikes on IRGC Quds Force and Iranian-backed militia targets in Iraq and Syria will not deter Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada’s “resistance operations” targeting US forces.[64] The United States conducted the airstrikes on February 2 in response to the January 28 attack. Several other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, also announced between January 31 and February 2 that they will continue attacking US forces.[65]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a drone attack that killed six US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) members at the al Omar oil field in eastern Syria on February 4.[66] The SDF said that “Iran-backed militias” targeted a training ground at al Omar, killing the SDF members.[67] US forces are stationed at al Omar but the attack did not injure any.[68] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for the attack on a backup Telegram channel that it created in October 2023. The group started using the backup on February 2.[69]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed separate drone attacks targeting US forces at Harir Airbase in Erbil Province, Iraq, and Rumaylan Landing Zone in Syria on February 3.[70] CTP-ISW previously reported that IRGC-controlled and local Syrian media claimed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted these attacks.[71] Three ”security sources” told Reuters on February 3 that there was no attack targeting the al Harir airbase.[72] US Department of Defense Press Secretary Major General Patrick Ryder confirmed on February 5 that there have been two attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East since February 2. Ryder did not specify where the attacks occurred and stated that no US forces were injured in the attacks.[73]

Unspecified gunmen shot and killed senior Asaib Ahl al Haq official Naji al Kaabi (Abu Ali) in Maysan Province on February 4.[74] Kaabi was responsible for Asaib Ahl al Haq relations in Maysan Province.[75] The deputy commander of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces 43rd Brigade blamed Kaabi’s death on “unruly militias.”[76] The 43rd Brigade is part of Asaib Ahl al Haq, an Iranian-backed militia.

Followers of Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr may have assassinated Kaabi. Sadr’s followers, known as Sadrists, have significant influence in Maysan, which is a Sadrist stronghold. Sadrist militiamen have previously assassinated local Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated officials.[77] Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali issued a de-escalatory statement calling on Asaib Ahl al Haq members to avoid actions “contrary to Sharia, the law, or tribal customs” following Kaabi’s death.[78] This suggests that Khazali is attempting to avoid an outright confrontation with other groups in the province.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani met with Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev on February 5, likely to discuss the recent US strikes targeting IRGC Quds Force and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia targets in Iraq.[79] The United States conducted strikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in Anbar Province and Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, on February 2 in response to the January 28 drone attack that killed three US servicemembers in Jordan.[80] Iraqi state media reported that Sudani and Kutrashev discussed “efforts to prevent further escalation” in the region.[81] Kutrashev emphasized Russia’s support for “stability and security” in Iraq.[82] Russian state media has not published an official readout of the meeting at the time of writing. Kutrashev has held a series of meetings with senior Iraqi officials, including Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid, and Iraqi Shia cleric and politician Ammar al Hakim, since January 23.[83] Kutrashev told Russian media on January 25 that Russia seeks to expand its “presence” in Iraq and “invest additional resources in areas related to security.”[84]

Sudani also met with Chinese Ambassador to Iraq Cui Wei on February 5.[85] Sudani and Cui Wei discussed Sino-Iraqi economic cooperation, including Chinese companies’ participation in the Development Road project. Iraq launched the Development Road project in March 2023 to connect the Grand Faw Port in southern Iraq to Turkey by road and rail.[86] Sudani said that major powers should help end the Israel-Hamas War.

A pro-Syrian Arab Army source reported that the Jordanian Army fired anti-aircraft guns across the Syria-Jordan border targeting an agricultural area near Daraa City.[87] The source did not specify what the Jordanian Army targeted. The Jordanian military has conducted three airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed drug-smuggling networks in southwestern Syria since December 2023.[88] Jordanian forces have also clashed with Iranian-backed drug smugglers along the border twice since December 2023.[89]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted preemptive strikes targeting four Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles and a land-attack cruise missile on February 4.[90] CENTCOM said that the missiles were “an imminent threat to US Navy ships” and commercial shipping in the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden region.[91]

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani and Deputy Commander Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh attended the funeral of an IRGC Quds Force officer on February 4.[92] Anti-Iranian regime media reported that an Israeli airstrike in Syria killed IRGC Quds Force officer Saeid Alidadi on February 2.[93] Alidadi served as an IRGC Quds Force military “advisor” in Syria.[94] Iran uses the title of ”advisor” to describe IRGC Quds Force operatives deployed to Syria in support of the Bashar al Assad regime since 2011.[95] Iran did not announce his rank.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei criticized unspecified Islamic countries for continuing economic relations with Israel during a gathering with Artesh Air Force and Air Defense Force commanders and servicemembers on February 5.[96] Khamenei stated that Muslim nations must deliver a ”decisive blow” to Israel by cutting off economic relations. Khamenei criticized unspecified Islamic countries for providing economic aid and “weapons” to Israel. Khamenei also called on Islamic states to cut economic and political ties with Israel prior to the Israel-Hamas war.[97]

Iran Update, February 4, 2024

click here to read the full report with maps

Brian Carter, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, and Alexandra Braverman

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on February 3 and 4, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, February 5, 2024.

Unspecified officials familiar with the hostage negotiations told the Wall Street Journal that divisions between Hamas’ leadership in the Gaza Strip and its exiled political leadership are impeding negotiations. The officials said that Hamas’ political leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, is prepared to accept a six-week pause in fighting and hostage exchange, but that Hamas’ exiled political leadership is calling for more concessions and a permanent ceasefire.[1] Egyptian officials added that Hamas’ political leadership is also demanding the release of 3,000 Palestinian prisoners—including some who took part in the October 7, 2023 attacks—in return for 36 Israeli civilian hostages.[2] Beirut-based senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan said on February 3 that Hamas and its allies rejected the six-week pause in fighting in a “united decision.”[3] Hamdan added that Hamas and its allies are committed to a permanent ceasefire. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader demanded that any negotiations guarantee a “comprehensive ceasefire,” an Israeli withdrawal from and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, and a “clear political solution.”[4]

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that approving a hostage release deal is “up to Hamas,” but that he is not able to give a precise timetable on a hostage release deal.[5] He added that a deal is not imminent. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel will not release “thousands” of prisoners in a hostage deal and that a permanent ceasefire will not be part of any hostage release deal.[6]

Sinwar may calculate that a six-week pause would slow Israel’s momentum sufficiently enough to permanently end fighting and secure Hamas’ rule in the Gaza Strip. The Wall Street Journal reported on January 31 that US officials are seeking a six-week pause in fighting to “stall Israel’s military momentum and potentially set the stage for a more lasting truce.”[7] US and Arab officials “familiar with the negotiations” told the Wall Street Journal that Israel would find it “difficult to resume the war at its current intensity.”[8] An interim pause leading to less intense Israeli ground operations or an end to Israeli operations would likely ensure Hamas‘ survival as a governing authority in the Gaza Strip.

Sinwar also likely seeks a pause in fighting to secure short-term military advantage. A six-week pause would enable Sinwar to reorganize his military forces, accelerate their infiltration into areas previously cleared by Israeli forces, and continue the reconstitution of Hamas’ military organization in the northern Gaza Strip free from Israeli interference. An IDF military correspondent reported on February 4 that Hamas’ Gaza City Brigade commander is still alive and a “major factor in Hamas’ reconstitution efforts” in the northern Strip.[9] This commander, free from the threat of Israeli strikes during a pause, could accelerate these efforts.

Key Takeaways:

  • Negotiations: Unspecified officials familiar with the hostage negotiations told the Wall Street Journal that divisions between Hamas’ leadership in the Gaza Strip and its exiled political leadership are impeding negotiations.
  • US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that approving a hostage release deal is “up to Hamas,” but that he is not able to give a precise timetable on a hostage release deal.[10] He added that a deal is not imminent.
  • Hamas’ political leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, may calculate that a six-week pause would slow Israel’s momentum sufficiently enough to permanently end fighting and secure Hamas’ rule in the Gaza Strip. An interim pause leading to less intense Israeli ground operations or an end to Israeli operations would likely ensure Hamas’ survival as a governing authority in the Gaza Strip.
  • Sinwar also likely seeks a pause in fighting to secure short-term military advantage. A six-week pause would enable Sinwar to reorganize his military forces, accelerate their infiltration into areas previously cleared by Israeli forces, and continue the reconstitution of Hamas’ military organization in the northern Gaza Strip free from Israeli interference.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters continued their efforts aimed at disrupting Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip, primarily in the al Sinaa area of southwestern Gaza City, on February 4.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces have “intensified” fighting in al Amal area of western Khan Younis in recent days.
  • Yemen: The United States and the United Kingdom conducted strikes targeting 36 Houthi military positions and assets in 13 locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on February 3.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters continued their efforts aimed at disrupting Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip, primarily in the al Sinaa area of southwestern Gaza City, on February 4.[11] CTP-ISW assessed on February 3 that Palestinian fighters infiltrated southwestern Gaza City.[12] Hamas and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a leftist militia aligned with Hamas in the current war, claimed four separate attacks targeting Israeli forces in al Sinaa on February 4.[13] Hamas fighters also targeted Israeli armor with rocket-propelled grenades in the al Sabra area, southwest of Gaza City.[14] The 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed seven Hamas fighters in the northern Gaza Strip.[15]

Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli infantry and armor with small arms fire and RPGs in Khan Younis City on February 4.[16]

Israeli forces have “intensified” fighting in al Amal area of western Khan Younis in recent days.[17] The IDF said al Amal neighborhood is a Hamas stronghold.[18] The 35th Paratroopers Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) raided Hamas military infrastructure in the neighborhood.[19]

The Givati Brigade raided the main headquarters of Hamas’s Khan Younis Brigade in the southern Gaza Strip on February 4.[20] The IDF said that Hamas used the facility to train fighters for the October 7 attacks and to military direct operations.[21] Mohammad Sinwar, the commander of the Khan Younis Brigade and brother of Hamas political leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar, had a main office in the compound.[22] Israeli forces also raided a ”combat management” building in western Khan Younis used by a senior Khan Younis commander on February 4.[23] The forces killed Palestinian fighters and captured weapons warehouses and weapons manufacturing equipment in the raid.[24]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian militias eight times across the West Bank on February 4.[25] Israeli forces detained four wanted individuals and confiscated weapons in overnight raids across the West Bank on February 4.[26]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 4.[27]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The United States and the United Kingdom conducted strikes targeting 36 Houthi military positions and assets in 13 locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on February 3.[28] The targets included “multiple underground storage facilities, command and control, missile systems, UAV storage and operations sites, radars, and helicopters.”[29] US Central Command said that the strikes targeted facilities used by the Houthis to attack international shipping and US Navy ships in the region.[30] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted 48 strikes and warned that the strikes will not go “without response and punishment.”[31]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted preemptive strikes targeting seven Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles prepared to launch toward ships in the Red Sea on February 3.[32] CENTCOM determined in both instances that the cruise missile presented an “imminent threat” to commercial vessels and US Navy ships in the Red Sea.

IRGC-controlled media claimed on February 3 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian backed Iraqi militias—conducted two rocket attacks targeting US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site in northeastern Syria.[33] CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq did not claim responsibility for either of the attacks on its Telegram account.

Iran Update, February 2, 2024

Brian Carter, Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

The February 2 US airstrikes in Iraq and Syria targeted Iranian-backed militia positions along the Euphrates River in Syria, the Iraq-Syria border, and south of Baghdad, Iraq. An anonymous US official told Politico that the United States struck all of its planned targets and several “dynamic targets that popped up as the mission unfolded,” including surface-to-air missile systems and drone launch sites.[1] Two unspecified US officials also told the New York Times that the United States conducted unspecified cyber attacks targeting Iran on February 2.[2]

The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) reported that the strikes hit the al Qaim district, Anbar province, targeting the PMF Anbar Operations “mobile” headquarters, an element of the 13th PMF Brigade, and two 45th PMF Brigade positions.[3] The strikes also hit an artillery position, and multiple “armor” sites. The 13th Brigade is Liwa al Tufuf, an Iranian-backed militia controlled by Kataib Hezbollah.[4] Liwa al Tufuf has facilitated Iranian supply lines through al Qaim border crossing with Syria.[5] The 45th Brigade is one arm of Kataib Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy militia. Iranian-backed Badr Organization leader Hadi al Ameri added that the strikes targeted Jurf al Sakhr, a previously Sunni town south of Baghdad that Kataib Hezbollah occupied after committing acts of sectarian cleansing against the previous residents.[6]

The Iraqi prime minister formally commands the PMF, but “power and political realities“ mean that large portions of the PMF, including Liwa al Tufuf and Kataib Hezbollah, answer to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[7] The PMF’s leader, Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, has operated alongside IRGC Quds Force operatives to implement Iranian directives in Iraq.[8] The Popular Mobilization Commission is technically responsible for ensuring that the militias that make up the PMF answer to the Iraqi government.[9] Fayyadh’s installation as the chairman and his relationship with the IRGC safeguards the PMF from actual central government control.

A local Syrian source reported that the US strikes targeted Iranian-backed positions in Albu Kamal, a railway crossing west of Albu Kamal, the outskirts of Mayadeen, Deir ez Zor City, Ayyash (west of Deir ez Zor), and Tabani (west of Deir ez Zor).[10] Iranian-backed militias are active in Albu Kamal, Deir ez Zor City, and Mayadeen. The railway crossing west of Albu Kamal runs along the edge of Imam Ali military base, which is a key Iranian military base in Syria.[11]

Iran, its partners in Iraq, and the Iraqi government falsely claimed that the strikes were violations of Iraqi sovereignty.[12] Western media outlets reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah launched the attack from Rutba, Anbar province, western Iraq.[13] The United States has the right to respond and defend itself against these attacks from Iranian-backed groups in Iraq. Iranian-backed groups in Iraq are themselves violating Iraqi sovereignty by launching attacks from Iraqi territory targeting US forces in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government and American assets elsewhere in the region.

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq and Syria: The February 2 US airstrikes in Iraq and Syria targeted Iranian-backed militia positions along the Euphrates River in Syria, the Iraq-Syria border, and south of Baghdad, Iraq.
  • The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) reported that the strikes hit al Qaim district, Anbar province, targeting the PMF Anbar Operations “mobile” headquarters, an element of the 13th PMF Brigade (Liwa al Tufuf), and two 45th PMF Brigade (Kataib Hezbollah) positions.[14]
  • The Iraqi prime minister formally commands the PMF, but “power and political realities” mean that large portions of the PMF, including Liwa al Tufuf and Kataib Hezbollah, answer to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
  • A local Syrian source reported that the US strikes targeted Iranian-backed positions in Albu Kamal, a railway crossing west of Albu Kamal, the outskirts of Mayadeen, Deir ez Zor City, Ayyash (west of Deir ez Zor), and Tabani (west of Deir ez Zor).
  • Iran, its partners in Iraq, and the Iraqi government falsely claimed that the strikes were violations of Iraqi sovereignty.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias are continuing to infiltrate southwestern Gaza City. The militias, including Hamas, have conducted ten attacks targeting Israeli forces in Tel al Hawa since January 31.
  • The Red Sea: US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces shot down eight Houthi drones over the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea on February 2. CENTCOM also conducted preemptive strikes targeting four drones that the Houthis had prepared to launch towards the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea on February 2.
  • Iraq: IRGC-controlled and local Syrian media claimed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted four drone and rocket attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria on February 3. Three ”security sources” told Reuters that there was no attack targeting the al Harir airbase.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters continued their efforts aimed at disrupting Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip on February 3.[15] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah, fired small arms and mortars targeting Israeli forces in central and western Gaza City.[16] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a leftist militia aligned with Hamas in the current war, targeted Israeli forces in western Gaza City.[17] Hamas fighters mortared Israeli forces in the al Jamia area, in southwestern Gaza City.[18]

Palestinian militias are continuing to infiltrate southwestern Gaza City. The militias, including Hamas, have conducted ten attacks targeting Israeli forces in Tel al Hawa since January 31.[19]

Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces with small arms fire and mortar rounds in Khan Younis City on February 3.[20]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 3.[21] Israeli forces raided a building used by Palestinian fighters and captured weapons and tunnel shafts inside.[22]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian militias seven times across the West Bank on February 3.[23] Israeli forces detained seven wanted individuals and confiscated weapons in the West Bank on February 3.[24]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 3.[25]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces shot down eight Houthi drones over the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea on February 2. CENTCOM also conducted preemptive strikes targeting four drones that the Houthis had prepared to launch towards the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea on February 2.[26] CENTCOM conducted the preemptive self-defense strikes after determining that the drones presented an “imminent threat” to merchant vessels and US Navy ships.

IRGC-controlled and local Syrian media claimed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted four drone and rocket attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria on February 3.[27] IRGC-controlled media claimed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted drone and rocket attacks targeting US forces at al Harir Airbase, Erbil Province and Ain al Assad Airbase, Anbar Province, Iraq.[28] Three “security sources” told Reuters that there was no attack targeting the al Harir airbase.[29] IRGC-controlled and local Syrian media also claimed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted drone and rocket attacks targeting US forces stationed at the al Tanf garrison, Homs Province, and Rumaylan Landing Zone, Hasakah Province, Syria.[30] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq did not claim either of the attacks in Iraq and Syria on its Telegram account.

 

Iran Update, February 2, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Brian Carter, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, and Nicholas Carl 

The United States struck over 85 Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force and Iranian-backed militia targets in Iraq and Syria on February 2.[1] The strike involved “numerous aircraft to include long-range bombers flown from [the] United States” using “more than 125 precision munitions.”[2] The strikes targeted operations and intelligence centers, rockets, missiles, drone storage facilities, and “logistics and munition supply chain facilities” of the IRGC and Iranian-backed militia groups.[3] 

US President Joe Biden called these strikes the beginning of the US response to the January 28 Iranian-backed attack in Jordan that killed three US servicemembers but vowed that the response will “continue at times and places of our choosing.”[4] US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated that the strikes are the “start of the response” and that Biden has already “directed additional actions to hold the IRGC and affiliated militias accountable for their attacks on US and Coalition forces.[5]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias said that they will continue attacks targeting US forces until US forces are expelled from Iraq. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary General Akram al Kaabi said on February 2 that Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba will continue attacks targeting US forces until they are removed from Iraq and until Israel stops operations in the Gaza Strip.[6] He also said that he respected Kataib Hezbollah’s decision to pause its attacks targeting US forces and ”looked forward“ to Kataib Hezbollah resuming attacks targeting US forces. The IRGC Quds Force supports Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba.[7] Ashab al Kahf, a militia close to Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, announced on February 1 that it would continue attacks until US forces left Iraq.[8] The group claimed that Iraqi militias make their own ”independent decisions,” which is a reference to Kataib Hezbollah’s decision to pause attacks targeting US forces.[9]

Western media reported on February 1 that unspecified elements in the Iranian regime are concerned by Iranian-backed militia attacks against US forces.[10] This framing inaccurately assumes the regime is a monolith rather than a government comprised of multiple political factions with a relatively diverse set of foreign policy views. Western media suggested that some Iranian authorities are concerned that the combined Iranian and Houthi attack campaign targeting international shipping could adversely affect the economic interests of Iranian partners, such as China and India.[11] This notion is unsurprising given the relatively diverse stances across the Iranian political establishment. The reports do not, however, indicate conclusively that the senior Iranian leadership responsible for national security policy and the Iran-led regional escalation are reconsidering their current approach. Prominent Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have celebrated the attacks on commercial vessels in recent weeks.[12]

Western media also reported on February 1 that US intelligence officials assess that Iran does not exercise full control over the proxy and partner militia groups that are attacking US service members in the Middle East.[13] This assessment is consistent with how Iran has led and influenced its so-called ”Axis of Resistance” for decades. Tehran has long provided financial, military, and political support to like-minded actors across the region in exchange for some degree of control and influence over their activities.[14] Iran uses its proxy and partner militias, in part, to obfuscate Iranian responsibility for their actions. Iran has demonstrated on many occasions the ability to stop militia attacks on US positions, however, which highlights that Iran can restrain its militias in Iraq and Syria.[15]

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq and Syria: The United States struck over 85 Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force and Iranian-backed militia targets in Iraq and Syria on February 2. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias said that they will continue attacks targeting US forces until US forces are expelled from Iraq.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias, including Hamas, attempted to disrupt Israeli operations in the “Passport area,” northwest of the Gaza Interior Ministry in Tel al Hawa neighborhood, Gaza City on February 2.
  • Central Gaza Strip: The IDF reported that the 99th Division’s operations in the central Strip aim to prevent Hamas fighters from infiltrating Gaza City from the southern Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reported that the IDF has “dismantled” Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade and that the IDF will “continue to Rafah.”
  • Political Negotiations: Hamas rejected a proposed ceasefire deal that would include “prolonged” pauses in fighting in the Gaza Strip and swaps of Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners.
  • Iran: Western media reported on February 1 that unspecified elements in the Iranian regime are concerned by Iranian-backed militia attacks against US forces. This framing inaccurately presents the regime as a monolith rather than a government comprised of multiple political factions with a relatively diverse set of foreign policy views.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias, including Hamas, attempted to disrupt Israeli operations in the “Passport area,” northwest of the Gaza Interior Ministry in Tel al Hawa neighborhood, Gaza City on February 2. Hamas’ military wing claimed two attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in the area.[16] The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting the Gazan Interior Ministry on January 31.[17] Hamas controls the Gazan Interior Ministry. The ministry’s Internal Security Forces are comprised of Hamas al Majd operatives who target supposed “collaborators” with the Israeli state.[18] Turkish state-controlled media reported that the Internal Security Forces continued to operate in the northern Gaza Strip during Israeli ground operations.[19] The al Majd has continued to warn Gazans against accidentally engaging with Israeli security officials and issued periodic reminders about operational security during the ground operation.[20]

The IDF reported that the 99th Division’s operations in the central Strip aim to prevent Hamas fighters from infiltrating Gaza City from the southern Gaza Strip.[21] The IDF 99th and 162nd Divisions continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on February 2.[22] The IDF 646th Paratroopers Brigade (assigned to the IDF 99th Division) captured a Palestinian militia rocket manufacturing facility in Nuseirat on February 2.[23] The IDF also said that the 179th Armored Brigade (assigned to the IDF 99th Division) killed “hundreds” of Hamas fighters.[24]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reported that the IDF has “dismantled” Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade and that the IDF will “continue to Rafah.”[25] Gallant did not explain how the IDF would conduct an operation into Rafah. The war displaced over 50 percent of Gaza’s population of two million to Rafah.[26] CTP-ISW assesses that the IDF has degraded but neither defeated nor destroyed Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade. Other Palestinian militias also support Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas operates as the leader of a 12-militia coalition defending against the Israeli ground operation.[27]

Hamas and its partner militias continued to defend against Israeli clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 2. Hamas claimed two attacks targeting Israeli forces in western Khan Younis.[28] Both Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the self-affiliated military wing of Fatah, mortared Israeli forces in western Khan Younis.[29] PIJ also fired a thermobaric rocket at Israeli forces in western Khan Younis.[30]

The IDF continued clearing operations in Khan Younis on February 2. The 89th Commando Brigade, 35th Paratrooper Brigade, and the 84th Givati Brigade (all assigned to the IDF 98th Division) continued operations aimed at destroying Hamas’ military infrastructure.[31] An IDF special operations forces (SOF) unit also raided a mosque that Hamas had repurposed as a military position.[32] The SOF unit discovered small arms, communication devices, explosives, and a tunnel entrance.[33] This is notable, given Hamas’ repeated claims that it does not use civilian infrastructure for military operations.

Hamas rejected a proposed ceasefire deal that would include “prolonged” pauses in fighting in the Gaza Strip and swaps of Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners.[34] The deal was not fundamentally different from any of the preceding three-stage deals.[35] The Wall Street Journal reported on February 1 that Israel and Hamas were considering a three-part agreement for a six-week ceasefire. The deal included a six-week ceasefire and resumption of aid in the Gaza Strip, which would be followed by Hamas releasing female Israeli soldiers. Hamas would release male Israeli soldiers and the bodies of dead hostages in the final phase of the deal. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh rejected the deal because it did not include “a complete end to [the Israeli operation],” and a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[36] This has been Hamas’ long-held negotiating position after the collapse of the pause in fighting in early December.[37]

Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan said that Hamas seeks to release “thousands of Palestinian prisoners,” including top Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) leader Ahmed Saadat.[38] Hamas’ ability to secure the release of these two leaders would help it cement its role as the leader of the Palestinian factions by demonstrating its laurels as a leader of the alliance of Palestinian militias prosecuting the war.

PIJ and the PFLP claimed a combined indirect fire attack targeting an IDF base near Tel Aviv on February 2.[39]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there 

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces in Jenin on February 2.[40] Israeli forces arrested 15 individuals across the West Bank on February 2.[41]

Hamas’ military wing in Jenin called on supporters in the Middle East and Europe to send money to support the group in a Telegram post.[42]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 2.[43] 

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi told Western media on February 1 that Iran has slowed its production rate of 60 percent enriched uranium.[44] The New York Times noted that it is not clear when exactly Iran began to slow its production rate of highly enriched uranium (HEU).

The United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) confirmed in a joint statement on December 28 that Iran had increased its enrichment rate of highly enriched uranium.[45] Iran decreased its enrichment rate and highly enriched uranium stockpile after it reached an informal nuclear agreement with the United States in August 2023.[46] Iran has no use for 60 percent HEU other than for use in a compact nuclear explosive or to further enrich it to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium.

The IDF Air Force likely conducted airstrikes targeting an IRGC weapons storage facility and the IRGC military headquarters at Sayyida Zeinab, Syria on February 1.[47] IRGC-controlled media reported that the IDF Air Force strikes killed an IRGC military adviser.[48] Since early December 2023, Israel has targeted IRGC Quds Force weapons shipments and personnel responsible for supplying Lebanese Hezbollah through Syria.[49] Israeli media said on December 29 that Israel’s strikes are responding to Iranian efforts to accelerate the supply of military equipment to Lebanese Hezbollah. Lebanese Hezbollah is using the Iranian-provided equipment to support attacks into northern Israel.[50]

The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security also announced on February 2 that it identified Israeli military facilities and personnel in 28 unspecified countries.[51]

The Houthis launched one surface-to-surface missile targeting Eilat, Israel on February 2.[52] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the attack was part of the Houthi movement’s "moral and humanitarian duties” to support Palestinians in Gaza.[53] Israel’s Arrow air defense system intercepted the surface-to-surface missile over the Red Sea.[54]

 


Iran Update, February 1, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: A spokesperson for the Israeli prime minister’s office said that the IDF “shifted into a new phase of the fighting” and will “target pockets of resistance” in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Political Negotiations: Two Israeli sources told Axios that Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar and Egyptian Intelligence Minister Abbas Kamel discussed future Israeli operations in the southern Gaza Strip during a meeting in Cairo.
  • West Bank: US President Joe Biden signed an executive order that enables the United States to place financial and visa sanctions on foreign nationals involved in attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said on February 1 that northern Israelis will only return when it is safe for them to do so during a meeting with the IDF Northern Command and 91st Division commanders.
  • Iraq: US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby emphasized the role that all of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed militias—plays in attacks on US forces in Iraq.
  • Syria: Reuters reported on February 1 that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) withdrew several of its senior and mid-ranking officers from Syria ahead of possible US strikes, according to unspecified regional sources “familiar with the matter."

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in the northern Gaza Strip. The commander of the IDF Southern Command met with division commanders and IDF personnel in the northern Gaza Strip on February 1.[1] He said that the IDF can operate and attack Palestinian fighters in "the heart of” Gaza City despite the IDF’s withdrawal. A spokesperson for the Israeli prime minister’s office said that the IDF “shifted into a new phase of the fighting” and will “target pockets of resistance” in the northern Gaza Strip.[2] The IDF 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) raided unspecified Hamas-affiliated military buildings and killed fighters in the northern Gaza Strip on February 1.[3]

Palestinian militias, including Hamas, attempted to disrupt Israeli raids in Gaza City on February 1. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters claimed that they fired a thermobaric rocket targeting Israeli infantry inside a building in western Gaza City.[4] Hamas published footage that showed its fighters firing small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces in Tal al Hawa in southwestern Gaza City and Sheikh Radwan in northwestern Gaza City.[5] Hamas claimed two attacks targeting Israeli forces in Sheikh Radwan on February 1.[6] CTP-ISW previously reported on January 16 that Palestinian militias had renewed attacks in Sheikh Radwan during January.[7]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on February 1.[8] Israeli forces directed an airstrike targeting a Palestinian militia cell in an unspecified location in the central Strip. Hamas fighters fired RPGs at Israeli armor in Bureij and Maghazi.[9] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the current war, also clashed with Israeli forces east of Bureij.[10]

The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis on February 1. The IDF 35th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the IDF 98th Division) killed fighters in western Khan Younis City in “close-range incidents.”[11] The 98th Division destroyed a long-range rocket launcher in western Khan Younis.[12]

Palestinian militias continued to attempt to defend against Israeli operations in the southern Gaza Strip. Hamas’ military wing fired a thermobaric rocket and a tandem rocket targeting Israeli forces in western Khan Younis City.[13] The military wing of PIJ engaged Israeli forces in small arms clashes southwest and west of Khan Younis.[14] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades clashed with and mortared Israeli forces in separate engagements in Khan Younis.[15]

Israel told Egypt that it would not operate in Rafah until it allowed civilians to evacuate the area. Two Israeli sources told Axios that Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar and Egyptian Intelligence Minister Abbas Kamel discussed future Israeli operations in the southern Gaza Strip during a meeting in Cairo.[16] Egypt has expressed concern that an operation could create a flow of Palestinian refugees into the Sinai Peninsula.[17] Unspecified sources familiar with the details of the negotiations told an Israeli Army Radio correspondent on February 1 that Egypt and Israel are “on the way to finding solutions [to the issues over Rafah and Philadelphi].” The correspondent added that Israel has not decided where it will evacuate the civilian population.[18] The correspondent reported that in the Israeli-Egyptian agreement over the Philadelphi Corridor, Israel will have “some influence” along the border but there will not be a permanent Israeli force presence.[19] The Philadelphi Corridor is a 14-kilometer-long strip of land between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. An unspecified Arab Gulf country will finance the construction of an underground wall to prevent smuggling via tunnels if Egypt agrees to the plan.[20]

The IDF’s Home Front Command eased restrictions on civilian activities in southern Israel on February 1.[21] IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari said that Israel will allow educational activities in schools near “protected” areas in the Gaza Envelope. The Gaza Envelope describes populated areas in southern Israel that are within seven kilometers of the Israel-Gaza border. Hagari also said that the IDF is allowing gatherings of 100 people in open-air settings and 300 in indoor settings in the envelope. Hagari said that gathering size limits are lower in some areas, including Kissufim and Nahal Oz. Palestinian militias have repeatedly targeted some of these areas, including Kissufim and Nahal Oz, with rocket and mortar fire in January.[22]

Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks into southern Israel on February 1. The military wing of PIJ fired mortars targeting Israeli forces in Kissufim.[23] The Mujahideen Brigades fired rockets at an Israeli military base and ”airstrip“ in Reim.[24] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas and has expressed close ties with Iran.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters and Israeli forces clashed in four locations across the West Bank on February 1.[25] The Tubas Battalion of Hamas and the Tubas Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted multiple attacks on Israeli forces during an Israeli raid in Tubas.[26]

US President Joe Biden signed an executive order that enables the United States to place financial and visa sanctions on foreign nationals involved in attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank.[27] The US State Department sanctioned four Israeli West Bank settlers after the executive order went into effect.[28] The order also allows the United States to sanction individuals who direct, order, or fail to enforce policies that lead to acts of violence against Palestinian civilians.[29] Axios reported that the Biden “administration had considered including ultranationalist Ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich on the list of sanctioned individuals, but it ultimately decided to leave them off for now and focus on those who perpetrated attacks.”[30]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six cross-border attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 1.[31]

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said on February 1 that northern Israelis will only return when it is safe for them to do so during a meeting with the IDF Northern Command and 91st Division commanders.[32] Israeli media reported separately that local residents will not return until mid-2024.[33]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting the port of Haifa, Israel on February 1.[34] CTP-ISW has not observed any evidence that this attack took place. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq later deleted the claim on its Telegram channel after posting the claim.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh discussed security and counterterrorism cooperation with Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev in Baghdad on February 1.[35] Fayyadh and Kutrashev discussed “exchanging experiences” between the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and Russia. The PMF is an Iraqi security service that contains several Iranian-backed Shia militias. Kutrashev told Russian media on January 25 that Russia seeks to expand its “presence” in Iraq and “invest additional resources in areas related to security.”[36] Kutrashev met with Iraqi President Abdul Latif al Rashid and Iraqi Shia cleric and politician Ammar al Hakim on January 23 and 31, respectively.[37]

Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein discussed the “repercussions” of the January 28 attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan in a phone call with his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan on February 1.[38] Western media previously reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah conducted the one-way drone attack targeting US forces in Jordan.[39] The Iraqi federal government condemned the attack and called for an end to “the cycle of violence” on January 29.[40] Hussein and Farhan emphasized the need for continued cooperation and communication between Baghdad and Riyadh to prevent an “all-out war” in the Middle East and to safeguard the security of Iraq and Saudi Arabia.[41]

US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby emphasized the role that all of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed militias—plays in attacks on US forces in Iraq. Kirby said that the United States does not take Kataib Hezbollah’s announcement that it will suspend its attacks targeting US forces “at face value,” and added that Kataib Hezbollah is not the only Iranian-backed militia attacking US forces.[42] Kataib Hezbollah suspended attacks on US forces on January 30 following the January 28 attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan.[43] Western media previously reported that Kataib Hezbollah launched the January 28 one-way drone attack from southwestern Iraq.[44] Kataib Hezbollah’s announcement also followed Iraqi media reports that IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on January 29 to “stop [the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias'] military escalation” against US forces.[45]

Kirby’s statement is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran and Kataib Hezbollah are conducting an information operation to distance Iran from the January 28 attack.[46] Iranian officials denied Iran's involvement in the attack and Kataib Hezbollah claimed in its January 30 announcement that Iran opposes “pressure and escalation” against US forces in Iraq and Syria.[47]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) said that it conducted strikes targeting a Houthi drone ground control station and 10 one-way attack drones on January 31.[48]  A senior US defense official in Bahrain told a CBS reporter that F-18 aircraft struck the targets in western Yemen as the Houthis prepared to launch the drones.[49] Local Yemeni sources reported the strikes hit Hudaydah city.[50]

CENTCOM said that it intercepted two Houthi attacks on international shipping on February 1.[51] US forces shot down one drone over the Gulf of Aden. US forces also destroyed a Houthi one-way attack naval surface drone maneuvering towards international shipping lanes in the Red Sea. CENTCOM said that the naval surface drone “presented an imminent threat to merchant vessels and the US Navy ships in the area.”[52] The Houthis first used a naval surface drone during the Israel-Hamas war to attack international shipping lanes on January 4.[53]

The Houthi movement claimed that it fired anti-ship ballistic missiles at the Liberian flagged, Bermuda-owned KOI cargo ship in the Red Sea on January 31.[54] CENTCOM said that it monitored two anti-ship ballistic missiles fired toward the KOI in the Red Sea on February 1.[55] CTP-ISW cannot confirm whether the Houthis conducted more than one attack on the KOI. The Houthis claimed that the KOI was bound for an Israeli port.[56] Marine Traffic, a maritime analytics provider, reported that the KOI is bound for Djibouti in eastern Africa, not Israel.[57]

The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that the group targeted an unspecified British commercial vessel with anti-ship missiles in the Red Sea on February 1.[58] The spokesperson did not name the vessel or clarify when the attack occurred. He said that the attack was in retaliation for US-UK strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. He also claimed that the vessel was headed to an Israeli port.

Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the West Bank, the Israel-Hamas war, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, and other unspecified regional developments with the Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal bin Farhan by phone on January 31.[59] The Saudi Foreign Affairs Ministry said that the two officials discussed the latest developments in the Gaza Strip, focusing on security and humanitarian concerns. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry reported that the two ministers discussed ending the war and the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. It added that they discussed restoring peace in the region. Abdollahian invited Farhan to visit Iran in the future, according to the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry.

CBS News reported on February 1 that the United States will conduct multiple strikes targeting Iranian personnel and facilities in Iraq and Syria over the coming days, according to unspecified US officials.[60] CBS News reported that the strikes will be in retaliation for the January 28 Iran-backed militia drone attack targeting US forces in Jordan, which killed three US servicemembers and injured at least 30 others.[61]

Reuters reported on February 1 that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) withdrew several of its senior and mid-ranking officers from Syria ahead of possible US strikes, according to unspecified regional sources “familiar with the matter.”[62] Local Syrian media also claimed on January 31 that the IRGC withdrew a senior officer from Syria.[63] Reuters caveated that the Iranian commanders would continue to remotely oversee Iranian efforts inside Syria with support from Lebanese Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Shia militias in Iraq. This caveat illustrates that Iran remains committed to its long-term project in Syria, even if it has temporarily recalled some of its officers to prevent further losses.[64] Israel already conducted a series of strikes in December 2023 and January 2024 that killed multiple senior IRGC officers in Syria.[65]

The Iranian interior minister discussed the Israel-Hamas war with the Saudi ambassador to Iran in a meeting in Tehran on January 30.[66] The Iranian minister called the situation in the Gaza Strip “the most important issue of the Islamic world,” before also highlighting the importance of distributing humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip. The Saudi ambassador said that the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia are on the “natural and correct path,“ according to the Iranian readout. The Iranian interior minister previously served as Iranian defense minister and Quds Force commander. The Saudi Foreign Ministry did not publish a readout.


Iran Update, January 31, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, Amin Soltani, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET 

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in western and southwestern Gaza City. Palestinian fighters likely infiltrated these areas during January.
  • Political Negotiations: An unspecified senior Hamas official told Reuters on January 30 that mediators provided a ceasefire proposal of unspecified length to Hamas.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian militias six times in the West Bank on January 31.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that northern Israel may lose power in the event of a wider war with Lebanon during a meeting with the heads of local municipalities in northern Israel.
  • Iraq and Syria: An “informed source” told Iraqi media that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on January 29 to “stop [the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias'] military escalation” against US forces.
  • Iran: Iranian officials are attempting to deter a US response to the January 28 attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan. Iranian officials warned on January 30 and 31 that Iran would respond “decisively” to any US retaliation targeting Iran.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in western and southwestern Gaza City. Palestinian fighters likely infiltrated these areas during January. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 5th Infantry Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) killed an unspecified number of Palestinian fighters on the outskirts of al Shati camp.[1] The IDF resumed operations in al Shati camp on January 29.[2] The 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed at least 16 Hamas fighters in the northern Gaza Strip during operations on January 31.[3] Israeli forces raided a school in the northern Gaza Strip, detaining ten Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters. The IDF also destroyed five rockets during the raid that Palestinian fighters had prepared to launch.[4] A local Palestinian journalist also reported that Israeli tanks have taken up positions in several areas in western Gaza City.[5]

Hamas and PIJ fighters attempted to defend against Israeli raids in the Tel al Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City.[6] CTP-ISW previously reported that Palestinian militias infiltrated some areas in southwestern Gaza City, including Tel al Hawa, on or before January 19.[7] Hamas published footage on January 31 that shows Hamas rocket teams firing rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli tanks.[8] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a leftist militia aligned with Hamas in the current war, mortared Israeli vehicles in Tel al Hawa.[9] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement clashed with Israeli infantrymen in western Gaza City.[10] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the current war.

Israeli airstrikes struck the Hamas-run Interior Ministry’s headquarters in Gaza City on January 31. Local residents and Hamas-affiliated media reported the incident, according to Reuters.[11] Hamas appointed the current undersecretary of the interior ministry in 2021 and a founder of the al Qassem Brigades, Hamas’ military wing, previously served as Hamas-run interior minister between 2009 and 2014.[12] The ministry’s undersecretary in Gaza now functions as the de facto minister for the Gaza Strip. Hamas has been attempting to rebuild its governance system in the northern Gaza Strip as it infiltrates into areas where Israeli forces operated previously.[13] There is currently no functioning civil apparatus in the northern Gaza Strip, which enables Hamas-backed governing structures to reemerge in some areas. Hamas’ return to providing services undermines Israeli efforts to destroy Hamas.

The IDF withdrew the 5th Infantry Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) from the northern Gaza Strip.[14] The 646th Reserve Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) is the only reserve brigade still operating in the Gaza Strip. The withdrawal of the 5th Infantry Brigade is consistent with the Israeli third phase of operations, which reportedly includes the release of reservists and a transition to targeted raids.[15]

Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on January 31. The IDF Nahal Brigade clashed with armed Palestinian fighters in unspecified areas of the central Gaza Strip.[16] PIJ’s military wing said that it targeted Israeli forces east of Bureij with mortar and rocket attacks.[17]

The IDF 98th Division continued to conduct clearing operations focused on western Khan Younis on January 31. The 7th Brigade Combat Team (assigned to the 36th Division) raided a PIJ munitions manufacturing facility in western Khan Younis.[18] The IDF destroyed manufacturing equipment, weapons, and tunnels in the facility.[19] The IDF said that the raid “damaged” PIJ’s ability to “produce rockets for a significant period of time.”[20] IDF 35th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the IDF 98th Division) and other units in the 98th Division directed airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighter cells in western Khan Younis.[21] The IDF 414th Reconnaissance Battalion and elements of the 143rd Gaza Division also directed strikes targeting Hamas fighters in Khan Younis.[22] The 414th Reconnaissance Battalion previously operated in Bureij in the central Gaza Strip.[23]

Palestinian militias continued to attempt to defend against Israeli forces in western Khan Younis. The Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and the military wings of Hamas and PIJ conducted at least 9 attacks on Israeli forces in western and southern Khan Younis using mortars, rockets, anti-tank RPGs, and small arms.[24] PIJ’s military wing fired mortars and rockets at Israeli forces operating in eastern Khan Younis.[25] The group also detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting Israeli armor in Jurat al Aqqad in western Khan Younis.[26]

Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip have been implementing a plan to flood Hamas’ tunnel system with seawater.[27] Israeli officials have been sharing information with foreign media about the operation for months.[28] Israel only recently allowed journalists to report details of the flooding plan. The IDF said that the flooding operation is one of many methods for destroying Hamas’ tunnels. Israel previously informed the United States in early November that it was considering flooding the tunnels and in December the Wall Street Journal reported that the IDF began flooding the tunnels.[29]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent cited unspecified Israeli security sources that reported on January 31 that the IDF has only destroyed a few kilometers of the tunnel system. The sources added that the IDF is experiencing issues achieving sufficient water pressure to flood tunnels further inland.[30] The sources admitted that they did not have a “decisive solution” to deal with tunnels in Gaza prior to the war.[31] The New York Times reported on January 16 that the IDF now believes that there are more tunnels underneath the Gaza Strip than the IDF previously believed.[32]

The IDF declared the Nitzana border crossing with Egypt a closed military zone on January 31.[33] The decision follows protesters attempting to block humanitarian aid convoys destined for the Gaza Strip from crossing for inspection.[34] The IDF created a closed military zone at Kerem Shalom crossing on January 28 amid similar demonstrations.[35]

An unspecified senior Hamas official told Reuters on January 30 that mediators provided a ceasefire proposal of unspecified length to Hamas. The deal involves a three-stage truce, during which Hamas would release the remaining civilians held hostage in the Gaza Strip, then soldiers, and finally the bodies of killed hostages.[36] Hamas is still considering the proposal. Israeli security cabinet Minister Miri Regev said that the Israeli government would likely approve the deal despite opposition from far-right ministers.[37] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on January 30 that he would not release “thousands” of Palestinian prisoners or remove Israeli forces from Gaza until achieving total victory, however.[38]

Israel’s public broadcaster reported that Hamas demanded for Israel release all elite Nukhba unit fighters as part of hostage negotiations.[39] Hamas has not made this claim publicly but has repeatedly raised it with negotiators, according to the public broadcaster.[40] The Nukhba units are Hamas’ special operations forces that participated in Hamas‘ October 7th attacks.[41] These forces also form the nucleus of Hamas’ military capabilities.[42] The release of Nukhba fighters would permit Hamas to more rapidly reconstitute by providing it with hardened, elite combat veterans that could train new recruits.

The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement conducted two rocket attacks into southern Israel from the Gaza Strip on January 31.[43] The group fired one salvo at Reim military base and one salvo at Beer Sheva. The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas.[44] The group has expressed close ties with Iran.[45]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian militias six times in the West Bank on January 31.[46] Israeli forces detained 14 wanted individuals and confiscated weapons across the West Bank.[47]

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi told IDF commanders on January 31 that the IDF will not allow Palestinian militia fighters to use hospitals in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Lebanon as shelter.[48] Halevi made this remark after an IDF raid in the West Bank on January 30 in which Israeli forces killed three Palestinian militia fighters inside a hospital. Israel said that the fighters were planning an attack on Israeli citizens.[49]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted ten cross-border attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 31.[50]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that northern Israel may lose power in the event of a wider war with Lebanon during a meeting with the heads of local municipalities in northern Israel.[51] Israeli officials have repeatedly expressed concerns about the threat that Hezbollah poses to Israel.[52] Gallant said on January 4 that Israel prefers a diplomatic solution to Hezbollah’s attacks targeting northern Israel, but he added that there is a "short window of time” to find a diplomatic solution.[53]

Israeli media reported that the IDF withdrew soldiers from Israeli towns on the northern Israeli border with Lebanon on January 31.[54] Unspecified officials told Israeli media that the move is intended to prevent damage to homes in northern Israel near areas where IDF soldiers are located.[55] Hezbollah targets Israeli military positions in northern Israel daily.

The Israeli Air Force struck Syrian military infrastructure in Daraa city, southern Syria on January 31 following an attack from Syria into the Golan Heights on January 30.[56] Syrian opposition media reported that the strike injured Syrian Military Security head Louay al Ali and two other officials in the local Military Security branch.[57] Ali previously served as the head of military intelligence in Daraa.[58]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Houthi movement targeted at least one US vessel in the Red Sea on January 30 and 31.[59] CENTCOM reported that the USS Gravely shot down a Houthi anti-ship cruise missile in the Red Sea on January 30.[60] CNN reported that the Houthi cruise missile came within a mile of the Gravely before the Gravely intercepted the missile.[61] This is the closest a Houthi missile has come to a US warship.[62] The USS Carney separately intercepted several Houthi drones and an anti-ship ballistic missile on January 31.[63] The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that the group fired multiple unspecified anti-ship missiles that hit an ”American commercial ship” on January 31 after the US airstrikes in Saada.[64] US officials reported that the Houthis did not hit any US warships or commercial vessels on January 31.[65]

US aircraft destroyed a Houthi surface-to-air missile in Saada, Yemen, on January 31 that was ready-to-fire and “presented an imminent threat to US aircraft.”[66]

An “informed source” told Iraqi media that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on January 29 to “stop [the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias'] military escalation” against US forces.[67] Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad followed the January 28 one-way drone attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan.[68] Western media previously reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah launched the drone from western Iraq.[69] Ghaani met with militia leaders from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that includes Kataib Hezbollah.[70] Ghaani asked the militia leaders to “calm the security situation.” Kataib Hezbollah’s announcement on January 30 that it suspended its “military and security operations” against US forces notably came after Ghaani’s reported visit.[71]

A member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq said that it will continue attacks targeting US and “Israeli forces” in Iraq after other militias suspended their attacks.[72] The group, Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq (The Truthful Promise Corps), has unconfirmed ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al Haq and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba. Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq proclaims adherence to Wilayat al Faqih, which is the founding principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran.[73] Wilayat al Faqih refers to a governing system in which a supreme clerical leader provides guardianship over the state. Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq previously condemned the Islamic Resistance of Iraq’s December 8 attack that targeted the US Embassy in Baghdad on the grounds that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq should only target military forces that “threaten the security of Iraq.”[74]

The US Treasury Department’s Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson met with senior Iraqi officials on January 28 and 29 to discuss illicit financial activity in the Iraqi financial system.[75] Nelson met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, Central Bank of Iraq chief Ali al Allaq, Chief Justice of the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council Faiq Zaidan, and Transport Minister Razzaq Muhaibis, Trade Bank of Iraq Chairman Bilal al Hamdani, and representatives from privately owned banks in Baghdad.[76] CTP-ISW previously reported that Nelson and Zaidan may have discussed the US Treasury Department‘s decision to sanction Iraqi airline Fly Baghdad for aiding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and its militias in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.[77] An unidentified senior US Treasury official cited by Reuters claimed that the United States “expects” the Iraqi government to “identify and disrupt” Iranian-backed financial networks in Iraq that support Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[78]

The Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enhancement Network issued a notice that isolated the al Huda Bank from the US financial system, citing a “primary money laundering concern.” The Treasury Department said that Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias used the bank to launder funds.[79] The Office of Foreign Assets Control also imposed sanctions on the al Huda Bank CEO.[80]

Iraqi Shia cleric and politician Ammar al Hakim met with Russian Ambassador Elbrus Kutrashev on January 31.[81] Hakim’s office reported that Hakim and Kutrashev discussed strengthening bilateral relations between Iraq and Russia and domestic Iraqi politics, including ongoing provincial council appointments. Hakim and Kutrashev also discussed establishing a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and post-war reconstruction efforts in Gaza.

Iranian officials are attempting to deter a US response to the January 28 attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan. Iranian officials warned on January 30 and 31 that Iran will respond “decisively” to any US retaliation targeting Iran. Western media previously reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah conducted the one-way drone attack targeting US forces in Jordan.[82] Multiple US officials, including US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby, said that the United States may use a “tiered approach” involving “multiple” operations and targets to respond to the attack.[83] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami warned on January 31 that Iran will respond to any US “threat.”[84] Multiple Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, warned that Iran will respond to “attacks” and “threats” targeting Iran “decisively” and “immediately.”[85] Iranian officials often use fiery rhetoric like this during periods of heightened tension with the United States.

The Iranian Deputy Interior Minister for security and law enforcement discussed Iranian training to support the Syrian security forces in counter terrorism and drug trafficking with the Syrian interior minister in Damascus on January 29.[86] The Iranian Interior Ministry oversees the Law Enforcement Command (LEC), which is the Iranian national police force. The LEC has many subordinate units conducting internal security-related activities, including intelligence gathering on criminals, protest suppression, border security, and counterterrorism.[87]

Iran Update, January 30, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters clashed in western Gaza City where Palestinian militias have likely infiltrated. The Guardian reported that Hamas is returning to the northern Gaza Strip and rebuilding a system of governance there.
  • Central Gaza Strip: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters, including conducting an airstrike on Palestinian fighters armed with rocket-propelled grenades. Palestinian fighters separately mortared Israeli forces.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued conducting clearing operations around Khan Younis. Palestinian fighters continued conducting a deliberate defense against Israeli forces in western Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: Hamas is considering a new hostage-for-prisoner proposal. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh will soon travel to Cairo to discuss the proposal.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian militias 10 times. Israeli forces killed three Palestinian fighters affiliated with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in a hospital in Jenin.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. Unidentified militants launched rockets from Syria into the Golan Heights.
  • Iraq and Syria: Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah are conducting an information operation to distance Iran from the January 28 one-way drone attack that killed three US service members in northeastern Jordan.
  • Yemen: Houthi Defense Minister Mohammad Nasser al Atifi said that the Houthis are prepared for a long-term confrontation with US and UK forces in the Red Sea.
  • Iran: The Iranian Law Enforcement Command Border Guards commander announced that it killed a member of the Baloch militant group, Ansar al Furqan, in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters clashed on January 30 in western Gaza City where Palestinian militias have likely infiltrated. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) resumed operations in western Gaza City on January 28 and 29.[1] The IDF 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed “many” Palestinian fighters in al Shati refugee camp on January 30.[2] The IDF 5th Brigade (assigned to the 143rd Division) separately engaged Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip.[3] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued a warning to Hamas operatives in al Shati refugee camp on January 30, calling on them to surrender.[4] The spokesperson published an infographic of Hamas commanders in the Shati and Sheikh Radwan battalions of Hamas’ Gaza Brigade whom the IDF has killed.[5] Palestinian sources reported on January 30 that Israeli forces clashed with and detained Palestinian fighters in Rimal neighborhood of Gaza City.[6]

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces in northern, southern, and western Gaza City on January 30.[7] Other Palestinian militias are similarly defending against Israeli raids in the northern Gaza Strip. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the current war, fired unspecified munitions at Israeli forces advancing in Gaza City.[8]

This activity is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas and other Palestinian militias are likely infiltrating some of these areas.[9] CTP-ISW defines infiltration as the process by which “an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by [opposing] forces to occupy a position of advantage behind those [opposing] positions while exposing only small elements to [opposing] defensive fires.”[10]

The Guardian reported on January 30 that Hamas is returning to the northern Gaza Strip and rebuilding a system of governance there.[11] A former official from Israel’s National Security Council said that Hamas is policing in the northern Gaza Strip and governing trade. A Tel Aviv-based think tank researcher similarly reported that Hamas has re-established control in parts of the Gaza Strip where the IDF previously operated, namely al Shati refugee camp, Jabalia refugee camp, and Shujaiya. Several sources discussed the general breakdown in law and order in the Gaza Strip. Aid officials reported several incidents of unspecified personnel looting aid trucks, primarily in the central Gaza Strip.

This reporting is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Palestinian militias are likely infiltrating into areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations.[12] Hamas’ return to providing services in areas that Israeli forces previously cleared undermines Israeli efforts to destroy Hamas.

Western media appears, however, to have exaggerated Hamas' infiltration into the northern Gaza Strip by framing it as preparation for a "new offensive" against Israel.[13] Hamas and other Palestinian fighters are likely in the early stages of the reconstitution of their governance and military capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip.[14] But these efforts do not necessarily indicate that Hamas is preparing for an offensive campaign in the way that Western media has suggested.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on January 30. The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) directed a drone strike targeting Palestinian fighters armed with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) in the central Gaza Strip on January 30.[15] PIJ fighters mortared a concentration of IDF personnel east of Maghazi.[16]

The IDF 98th Division continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 30. The 35th Paratroopers Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) and 7th Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) killed Palestinian fighters and located weapons in western Khan Younis.[17] The 98th Division directed the IDF Air Force to destroy the rocket launchers from which Hamas fighters fired rockets targeting Tel Aviv in Khan Younis on January 29.[18] The IDF reported that the launchers were loaded and that the Air Force also destroyed an unspecified military asset belonging to Hamas’ anti-tank unit.[19]

Palestinian militias continued to execute a deliberate defense against Israeli forces in western Khan Younis. PIJ fighters targeted four IDF tanks with RPGs west of Khan Younis on January 30.[20] Other Palestinian militias, including Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, continued to target Israeli forces in western Khan Younis with RPGs and explosive devices.[21] Palestinian militias separately contested Israeli operations in southwestern Khan Younis.[22]

Hamas is considering a new hostage-for-prisoner proposal.[23] An unspecified senior Hamas official told Reuters on January 30 that the proposal involved a three-stage truce, during which Hamas would release remaining civilians held hostage in the Gaza Strip, then soldiers, and finally the bodies of killed hostages. Reuters reported that the proposal is part of what appears to be the most “serious peace initiative for months.” The ceasefire proposal follows talks involving the US, Israeli, and Egyptian intelligence chiefs and the Qatari prime minister.[24] Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh confirmed that Hamas received a ceasefire proposal and affirmed that the groups’ top priority is the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.[25] Haniyeh will travel to Cairo to discuss the proposal.[26] Hamas and other Palestinian groups in the Gaza Strip have previously insisted that they will only accept a deal that ends the war permanently.[27] The proposal, as outlined by the Hamas official, does not include the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.

The Israeli Shin Bet director met with his Egyptian counterpart to discuss expanding Israeli operations to Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.[28] Two unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on January 30 that the two officials discussed cooperating to prevent weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip that would enable Hamas to rearm itself. Egypt is concerned that an Israeli military operation in Rafah along the Philadelphi Corridor—a 14-kilometer stretch of land between Egypt and the Gaza Strip—could create a flow of Palestinian refugees into the Sinai Peninsula. Israel informed Egypt that it is planning a military operation to secure the Egypt-Gaza Strip border in early January.[29] The Wall Street Journal reported that the timing of the Israeli operation will depend on negotiations with Egypt regarding Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip and a ceasefire.[30]

Palestinian militias did not claim any indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on January 30.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian militias 10 times across the West Bank. Israeli forces conducted raids, detained six wanted individuals, and captured currency and weapons during operations in Tulkarm, Nour Shams, Nablus, Ein Arik, Azzun, and Tarqumiya.[31] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, a militia aligned with Hamas in the current war, claimed that it detonated IEDs and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm and Jenin on January 29 and 30.[32] Hamas fighters separately fired small arms targeting Israeli forces conducting raids in Jenin on January 30.[33]

Israeli forces killed three Palestinian fighters affiliated with Hamas and PIJ in a hospital in Jenin on January 30.[34] The IDF conducted a joint operation with Shin Bet and undercover Israeli police to target a founder of and spokesperson for Hamas’ Jenin Brigade.[35] The IDF said that the target was planning to execute an attack like Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack in the “immediate time frame”.[36] Israeli forces killed two other Palestinians affiliated with PIJ’s Jenin Brigade during the operation.[37] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi stated that the IDF is not seeking to fight in hospitals but that the IDF will go wherever necessary to eliminate Hamas.[38] Hamas and PIJ both condemned the operation and acknowledged the fighters’ affiliation with their respective organizations.[39]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 30.[40] This number of attacks marks a significant decrease from the 15 attacks conducted by Iranian-backed militias, including Hezbollah, into northern Israel on January 29.[41]

Unidentified militants launched rockets from Syria into the Golan Heights on January 30.[42] The IDF responded by shelling the attack’s point of origin in Syria.[43]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah are conducting an information operation to distance Iran from the January 28 one-way drone attack that killed three US service members in northeastern Jordan. Kataib Hezbollah announced the suspension of its “military and security operations” against US forces on January 30 and claimed that Iran objects to “pressure and escalation” against US forces in Iraq and Syria.[44] Western media previously reported that Kataib Hezbollah conducted the January 28 drone attack into Jordan.[45] Iranian officials previously denied Iranian involvement in the attack, claiming that the attack is part of a conflict only between “resistance groups and the US military,” adding that these “resistance groups...do not take orders” from Tehran.[46] Iran provides “extensive training, funding, logistic support, weapons, and intelligence” to Kataib Hezbollah.[47] Iran also materially supports more broadly the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that includes Kataib Hezbollah. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has attacked US forces in Iraq and Syria over 160 times since the Israel-Hamas war began.[48] This information operation sets conditions for Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi factions to frame the United States as the aggressor if the United States strikes Kataib Hezbollah in retaliation for the Iranian-backed drone strike into Jordan.

US President Joe Biden announced on January 29 that he decided on the US response to the Jordan attack, adding that the United States does not seek to expand the war in the Middle East.[49] Biden did not provide details about what course of action the United States will take. US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby added in separate comments that the United States may use a “tiered approach” involving “multiple actions” to respond to the attack.[50]

A Kataib Hezbollah official told Western media that the group decided to halt its attacks targeting US forces following separate Iraqi federal government contacts with US officials and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias “to prevent escalation after the Jordan attack.”[51] Iraqi social media sources claimed that a “high-level” US delegation traveled to Baghdad on January 29 to discuss the attack, but they did not provide evidence to corroborate their claims.[52] An “informed source” told Iraqi media that the Iraqi federal government asked the United States to avoid conducting retaliatory strikes inside Iraqi territory to prevent “any escalation and security tension inside Iraq.”[53] The United States has previously conducted strikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facilities in response to militia attacks that injured US personnel.[54] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors incorrectly frame these US self-defense strikes as “violations” of Iraqi sovereignty to pressure the Iraqi federal government to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. The United States has the right to protect and defend its personnel in Iraq, who are deployed at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government to fight ISIS.[55]

The Iraqi parliament speaker election is driving tensions between Iranian-backed Iraqi actors.[56] Iraqi parliamentarians voted for a new parliament speaker on January 13 after the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court removed the previous incumbent, Mohammad al Halbousi, in November 2023.[57] Halbousi’s candidate, Shaalan al Karim, won the most votes in the first round of voting.[58] No candidate secured the 165 votes required to become parliament speaker, however. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors, particularly Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki, are trying to prevent Karim from becoming parliament speaker. Khazali and Maliki hope to instead install their preferred candidate, Mahmoud al Mashhadani.[59] The Washington Institute for Near East Policy reported on January 29 that the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties—charged acting Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi with ensuring that Mashhadani becomes parliament speaker.[60] Such a demand is not legal under the Iraqi constitution. Parliamentarians aligned with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq also claimed after the January 13 vote that members of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization and the Iraqi Shia National Wisdom Movement voted for Karim.[61] The Victory Alliance, headed by former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, recently denied that members of the Victory Alliance political party voted for Karim.[62]

Syrian Kurdish news outlet North Press Agency (NPA) claimed that Israel killed eight Lebanese Hezbollah fighters in an airstrike in Sayyida Zeynab, Damascus, on January 29.[63] NPA identified two of the Hezbollah fighters as Hussein Khalil Hashem and Hussein Fadel Awada. Hezbollah claimed both fighters but did not specify how they died.[64]

Houthi Defense Minister Mohammad Nasser al Atifi said that the Houthis are prepared for a long-term confrontation with US and UK forces in the Red Sea.[65] Atifi added that US and UK interests in the Red Sea will be considered ”legitimate targets.” Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi previously identified US and UK vessels as ”legitimate targets“ on January 18.[66]

The Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Border Guards commander announced that the LEC killed a member of the Baloch militant group, Ansar al Furqan, in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 30.[67] The LEC Border Guards commander said that the LEC killed the fighter in Jakigur, Rask County, near the Iran-Pakistan border. The LEC killed one other Baloch fighter in Jakigor on January 29.[68] Ansar al Furqan previously claimed to attack IRGC personnel near the border in December 2023 and conducted another attack targeting a police station in Zahedan on January 25.[69]

Salafi-jihadi groups and other insurgents have increased the rate of their attacks targeting the regime in southeastern Iran since December 2023. Salafi-jihadi and Balochi militant group Jaish al Adl has conducted at least five attacks targeting Iranian security personnel in this period.[70] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State separately detonated two suicide vests conducted a terrorist attack in Kerman Province on January 3, killing over 90 individuals.[71] Iran retaliated for this uptick in militancy by conducting drone and missile attacks on alleged Islamic State positions in Syria on January 15 and alleged Jaish al Adl targets in Pakistan on January 16.[72]

Iran Update, January 29, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Annika Ganzeveld, Brian Carter, Peter Mills, Andie Parry, and Kathryn Tyson

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET 

Key Takeaways:

  • Jordan: Iran and its proxies are advancing an information operation to obfuscate the origin of the January 28 attack that killed three US service members in Jordan. Statements from Kataib Hezbollah before the attack and Iraqi militia actions afterward suggest that the attack came from Iraq.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias are continuing to conduct attacks against Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip as they infiltrate previously cleared areas.
  • Central Gaza Strip: The IDF reported that the Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) raided a building and seized a weapons cache in an unspecified area of the central Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: The 89th Commando Brigade (assigned to the IDF 98th Division) captured Palestinian militia weapons caches and killed five Palestinian fighters in western Khan Younis.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces conducted raids, detained "wanted individuals,” and captured weapons during operations in the West Bank.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: LH claimed 13 attacks targeting Israeli forces and border outposts. LH has claimed on average six attacks per day in January 2024.
  • Syria: Unspecified militants conducted an attack targeting US forces at al Shaddadi, Hasakah Province, Syria.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces resumed operations in western Gaza City on January 28 and 29. Local Palestinian journalists and activists reported at 1832 ET (0132 local on January 29) on January 28 that the IDF moved into areas near al Shifa Hospital and the Rimal, Nasser, and Wahda neighborhoods.[1] A Palestinian journalist also said that the IDF conducted airstrikes and fought engagements with Palestinian militias in the Zaytoun, Tel al Hawa, and Sheikh Radwan areas.[2] The IDF issued evacuation orders for the residents of western Gaza City at 0232 ET (0932 local) on January 29.[3] The IDF reported at 1402 ET on January 29 (2102 local) that “during the night hours [local time],” the IDF moved into western Gaza City from the north, south, and west.[4] The IDF said on January 29 that the 5th Brigade (assigned to the 143rd Division) captured Palestinian militia weapons caches, tunnels, and observation posts, during the operation in al Shati Camp.[5]

Palestinian militias infiltrated some areas in southwestern Gaza City, including Tel al Hawa, on or before January 19. Palestinian journalists reported that Palestinian fighters engaged Israeli forces in southwestern Gaza City on January 19 and 21.[6] CTP-ISW defines infiltration as the process by which “an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by [opposing] forces to occupy a position of advantage behind those [opposing] positions while exposing only small elements to [opposing] defensive fires.”[7]

Palestinian militias are continuing to conduct attacks against Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip as they infiltrate previously cleared areas. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed that it conducted an indirect fire attack targeting a “major [IDF] logistical support” position near the Sudaniya area, north of Shati camp.[8] PIJ published a video that did not show the results of the attack.[9] The IDF has maintained a position near Sudaniya since the beginning of the war. Fatah’s self-affiliated military wing, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, fired small arms targeting Israeli forces northeast of Sudaniya, near al Atatra, on January 27.[10]

The IDF continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on January 29. The IDF reported that the Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) raided a building and seized a weapons cache in an unspecified area of the central Strip.[11] The IDF said that the brigade killed “dozens” of Palestinian fighters on January 28 and 29.

The IDF’s 98th Division captured a major tunnel complex under Bani Suheila that served as a command-and-control site for the Hamas Eastern Khan Younis Battalion on January 28.[12] The IDF reported that the Eastern Khan Younis Battalion commander used the tunnel on October 7 to direct the attack. The system included an operations center, a “battalion combat management” facility, and sleeping quarters for Hamas commanders and fighters.

The IDF continued clearing operations in western Khan Younis on January 29. The 89th Commando Brigade (assigned to the IDF 98th Division) captured Palestinian militia weapons caches and killed five Palestinian fighters in western Khan Younis.[13] The 35th Paratroops Brigade (assigned to the IDF 98th Division) also killed four Palestinian fighters before the fighters could attack IDF forces near the al Amal Hospital.[14]

Palestinian fighters attempted to defend against Israeli clearing operations in western Khan Younis on January 29. Palestinian Islamic Jihad detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting Israeli armor near Hassan Salama Mosque in western Khan Younis on January 29.[15] Other Palestinian militias, including Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, continued to target Israeli forces in western Khan Younis with small arms and shoulder-fired rockets.[16]

Hamas’ military wing fired one rocket salvo targeting Tel Aviv on January 29.[17] Hamas last conducted a rocket attack on January 18.[18] The group last targeted Tel Aviv on January 8.[19]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told US Ambassador to Israel Jack Lew and US Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs David Satterfield that he would not allow the rebuilding of Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip.[20] Israeli and US officials told Axios that Lew and Satterfield asked Gallant if Israel’s one-kilometer security buffer zone in the Gaza Strip “was a basis for settlements.”[21] Gallant responded that the buffer zone “would be temporary and for security purposes only.”[22] A senior Israeli official told Axios that the IDF operations branch head said during that meeting that allowing Israeli civilians to enter the buffer zone would “contradict the security purpose.”[23]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian militias 14 times across the West Bank on January 29.[24] Israeli forces conducted raids, detained "wanted individuals,” and captured weapons during operations in the West Bank.[25]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 15 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 29.[26] LH claimed 13 attacks targeting Israeli forces and border outposts.[27] LH has claimed on average six attacks per day in January 2024. LH used Burkan and Falaq rockets in seven of its attacks on January 29.[28] The Burkan and Falaq rockets have 300 to 500-kilogram and 50 to 120-kilogram warheads respectively, making them a more destructive weapon system than the smaller rockets LH typically employs.[29]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Israel conducted an airstrike targeting an “Iranian military advisor center” in Sayyida Zainab, Damascus on January 29.[30] Iran’s ambassador to Syria denied that the targeted location was an Iranian “military advisory center,” and claimed that no Iranian citizens died in the strike.[31] Syrian opposition media reported that the airstrike killed four people, including IRGC members.[32] Israel previously killed two IRGC general officers in an airstrike in Sayyida Zainab on December 2.[33] Iranian-backed militia groups and the IRGC maintain a headquarters in Sayyida Zainab and use it to facilitate Iranian lines of effort elsewhere in Syria.[34]

Unidentified gunmen killed nine Pakistani auto repair workers in Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 27.[35] No group claimed responsibility for the attack, although a Pakistani journalist speculated that the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) or Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF) conducted the attack.[36] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani condemned the attack on January 27.[37] Pakistani officials ordered the Iranian government to conduct an immediate investigation into the attack.[38] This attack comes amid a rise in insecurity in southeastern Iran. Iran and Pakistan also recently exchanged missile and drone strikes targeting terrorist groups in the two countries.

The Iranian Law Enforcement Command Border Guard commander announced on January 29 that it “destroyed” a “terrorist” cell near Jakigour, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[39] The commander added that Iranian border guards killed one “terrorist” and wounded two others who were attempting to enter Iran to conduct “subversive actions.” The border police found three hand grenades, three grenades, and a suicide vest following the clash.

Iranian officials are seeking to strengthen security and counterterrorism cooperation with neighboring countries following an uptick in terrorist activity in Iran since December 2023. Jaish al Adl—a Balochi Salafi-Jihadist group that operates along the Iranian border with Pakistan—conducted a two-stage attack targeting a police station in Rask, Sistan and Baluchistan Province in December 2023.[40] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State also conducted a terrorist attack in Kerman Province on January 3, killing over 80 individuals.[41]

Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with the Pakistani Army Chief of Staff General Syed Asim Munir, Foreign Affairs Minister Jalil Abbas Jilani, and caretaker Prime Minister Anwar ul Haq Kakar in Islamabad, Pakistan on January 29.[42] Abdollahian and Munir discussed increasing intelligence sharing and coordination to confront common threats such as terrorism. They also agreed to dispatch military liaison officers to each other’s countries.[43] Abdollahian said separately during a press conference with Jilani that Iran and Pakistan will not allow terrorists to threaten their national security. Abdollahian added that terrorists operating along the Iran-Pakistan border are backed by “third parties.”[44] Abdollahian’s visit to Islamabad follows the IRGC’s strikes targeting Jaish al Adl fighters in Baluchistan Province, Pakistan on January 16.[45] The Pakistani armed forces responded to the IRGC’s strikes by conducting strikes targeting Baloch separatists near Saravan, Iran, on January 18.[46]

Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani announced on January 29 that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian will travel to Iraq to discuss border security and terrorism.[47] Ahmadian’s visit to Iraq follows the IRGC’s drone and missile strikes targeting alleged Mossad-affiliated facilities and individuals in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan on January 15.[48] Iraqi Kurdish media denied Iran’s claims regarding a Mossad presence in Erbil.[49] Iranian officials accused Israel of being behind the December 15 and January 4 attacks in Rask and Kerman.[50] Iran has historically accused anti-regime Kurdish militant groups and Israel of jointly using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations into Iran.

The Iranian regime falsely claimed that Iran had no role in the January 28 one-way drone attack that killed three US servicemembers in northeastern Jordan. Western media outlets reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah launched the attack from Rutba, Anbar province, western Iraq.[51] The drone bypassed US air defenses by trailing a US drone that was returning to base in Jordan at the same time.[52] Iranian officials claimed that the attack is part of a conflict only between “resistance groups and the US military,” adding that these “resistance groups . . . do not take orders” from Tehran.[53]

Iranian officials frequently consult with their Iraqi proxies and partners, including Kataib Hezbollah, during periods of increased military action in the region. The Iranian supreme leader, for example, has issued fatwas that have ordered Iraqi militias to cooperate with one another and to listen to IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani as the supreme leader’s representative.[54] Social media users and Iraqi sources claimed that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on January 28.[55] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify these claims. Ghaani would likely use such a visit to meet and coordinate with Iran’s Iraqi partners and proxies ahead of an expected US strike in response to the attack in northeastern Jordan. Ghaani frequently travels to Baghdad to meet and plan with Iran’s Iraqi partners and proxies, presumably to ensure alignment.[56] CTP-ISW also reported in June 2023 that Iraqi proxies stopped threatening to attack US forces following IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad that month.[57] The cessation of proxy threats suggested that Ghaani had directed the proxies to deescalate.

Kataib Hezbollah’s statements before and Iraqi militia actions after the January 28 attack suggest that the attack came from Iraq. Kataib Hezbollah said on January 25—three days before the attack in Jordan— that it would expand its scope of militia attacks to include additional US interests in Iraq and the Middle East.[58] Kataib Hezbollah published this statement in response to the January 23 US airstrikes targeting three Kataib Hezbollah facilities.[59] A telegram account affiliated with Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr reported that Iraqi Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh ordered Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) to vacate their bases in al Qaim, Jurf al Sakhr, and Albu Aitha. The order suggests that Fayyadh fears a US strike in response to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on US forces in Jordan.[60] US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Kataib Hezbollah controls the al Qaim border crossing between Iraq and Syria.[61] The group also committed acts of sectarian cleansing in Jurf al Sakhr, which it now controls.[62]

Iran and its proxies are advancing an information operation to obfuscate where the January 28 attack that killed three US service members took place to falsely frame the attack as part of the Iran-backed campaign to expel US forces from Iraq and Syria. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed on January 28 that it conducted one-way drone attacks targeting US forces in Rukban and al Tanf, Syria.[63] Al Tanf is 20 kilometers north of Tower 22, the US military base where three US service members died on January 28. Tower 22 is located in northeastern Jordan, near Jordan’s border with Iraq and Syria, and it supports the United States’ ongoing counter-ISIS mission.[64] US officials reported that Iranian-backed proxies launched another drone attack targeting al Tanf an hour and a half after the attack on Tower 22.[65] The Jordanian government spokesperson said that the January 28 attack on US forces targeted only al Tanf and falsely added that the attack that killed US service members did not take place in Jordan.[66] This statement is similar to the Iranian state media reporting, which emphasized that the attack took place in Syria, not in Jordan.[67]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali met with the Houthi representative to Iraq in Baghdad on January 28.[68] Khazali praised the Houthis for supporting Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and for threatening US interests in the Red Sea. The Houthis have conducted more than 30 attacks targeting international shipping since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023.[69]

Unspecified militants conducted an attack targeting US forces at al Shaddadi, Hasakah Province, Syria, according to a US journalist.[70] Axis of Resistance-affiliated media claimed that the militants used rockets to conduct the attack.[71]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted a drone attack targeting an unspecified Israeli “military target” in Israel on January 29.[72] Israeli officials did not confirm the attack.

US Treasury Department Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson met with Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan to discuss US sanctions on Iraqi actors and companies on January 29.[73] Nelson and Zaidan may have discussed the US Treasury Department’s recent decision to sanction Iraqi airline Fly Baghdad for aiding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and its militias in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.[74] The US Treasury Department identified the Iraqi al Huda Bank as a “conduit for terrorist financing” and imposed sanctions on the bank’s owner on January 29.[75] The Treasury Department reported that al Huda used its access to US dollars to support the IRGC and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias such as Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al Haq.

Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea falsely claimed that the Houthis launched anti-ship missiles targeting the USS Lewis Puller in the Gulf of Aden on January 29.[76] The Houthis said that the attack was "defensive,” given that the Lewis Puller provides logistical support to US forces conducting operations against the Houthis. An anonymous US defense official told the Associated Press the attack did not occur.[77] The Houthis also falsely claimed an attack on a US-contracted logistics ship on January 22. The US Navy called the January 22 claim “patently false.”[78] The Lewis Puller thwarted an Iranian weapon smuggling attempt to the Houthis in the Red Sea on January 11.[79]

Iran Update, January 28, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps 

Nicholas Carl, Ashka Jhaveri, and Alexandra Braverman

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST  

Key Takeaways:

  • Jordan: An Iranian-backed militia conducted a one-way drone attack targeting US forces in northeastern Jordan, killing three American service members and wounding another 25. This attack is part of the ongoing Iranian-led campaign to expel US forces from the Middle East. The Iranian-backed attack highlights the growing prominence of Jordan in Iranian regional strategy.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces 5th Brigade (assigned to the 143rd Division) located and destroyed a tunnel route.
  • Central Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 143rd Division) clashed with Palestinian fighters.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces withdrew the 4th (Kiryati) Brigade and 55th Paratrooper Brigade from Khan Younis.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in seven locations, primarily around Jenin.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iraq and Syria: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for five attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria.

An Iranian-backed militia conducted a one-way drone attack targeting US forces in northeastern Jordan on January 28, killing three American service members and wounding another 25.[1] This attack is part of the ongoing Iranian-led campaign to expel US forces from the Middle East. CTP-ISW has reported extensively in recent months on how Iranian-backed militias have used military and political pressure to catalyze a US withdrawal from Iraq and Syria.[2] These militias have conducted over 170 attacks targeting US positions as part of this effort since October 2023.[3] The militias have framed their attacks as responses to the Israel-Hamas war when the attacks are in actuality part of the larger Iranian project in the Middle East. Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” view the Israel-Hamas war as an opportunity to accelerate their campaign to expel US forces, as they have used the war to narratively justify their attacks.

The Axis of Resistance is demonstrating its readiness to sustain and even further escalate its attack campaign, despite the United States and Iraqi federal government announcing that they will negotiate over the status of US forces in Iraq. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced on January 25 that Washington and Baghdad will soon hold “working group meetings” to evaluate the status of the US-led coalition mission to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).[4] Such negotiations could precipitate the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. The United States reportedly dropped a precondition requiring that Iranian-backed militias stop their attacks before such negotiations.[5] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a coalition of Iranian-backed militias, vowed on January 26 to sustain its attacks, asserting that the United States only understands “the language of force.”[6]

Iranian-led efforts to expel the United States from Iraq would complicate sustaining a US force presence in Syria. US forces and military infrastructure in Iraq provide logistical support that enables the US force presence in Syria. The United States withdrawing from Iraq would therefore necessitate the withdrawal of many US forces from Syria. The Axis of Resistance could launch a concerted effort to expel US forces from Jordan to deprive the United States of another avenue from which it could support an American force presence in Syria.

The United States leaving Iraq and Syria risks allowing ISIS to resurge there. CTP-ISW continues to assess that the United States and its partners in Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS and that a US withdrawal from Syria would very likely cause a rapid ISIS resurgence there within 12 to 24 months.[7] A resurgent ISIS could then threaten Iraq. Iraqi security forces still face significant deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics that will impede their ability to defeat ISIS alone.[8]

The Iranian-backed attack highlights the growing prominence of Jordan in Iranian regional strategy. Jordanian territory offers multiple ground routes through which Iran could move military materiel into the West Bank. Tehran has sought to develop its militia capabilities and infrastructure in the West Bank in recent years, but the Israel-Hamas war has highlighted Iranian shortcomings there.[9] Recent clashes and Israeli raids in the West Bank have revealed that the Palestinian militias there remain relatively disorganized and still use rudimentary capabilities compared to the militias in the Gaza Strip. Iranian leaders could conclude that they need to invest further in building their networks into Jordan to develop their militia infrastructure in the West Bank more effectively. The Jordanian armed forces have conducted four airstrikes into Syria targeting Iranian-affiliated smuggling networks since the war began, suggesting either a change in Iranian-backed smuggling patterns and/or a change in Jordanian tolerance of them.[10] Iran likely directed the drone attack into Jordan partly to message to Jordanian leaders the capability and willingness of the Axis of Resistance to escalate.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 5th Brigade (assigned to the 143rd Division) located and destroyed a tunnel route in the northern Gaza Strip on January 28.[11] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) separately mortared IDF armor and dismounted infantry east of Jabalia. Palestinian militias have likely reinfiltrated these areas around Jabalia and are contesting IDF raids there.[12]

The IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 143rd Division) clashed with Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on January 28.[13]

Palestinian militias continued to conduct a deliberate defense against Israeli clearing operations in western Khan Younis on January 28. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli armor and dismounted infantry in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis.[14] Other Palestinian militias are operating in western Khan Younis, including the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah.[15]

The IDF withdrew the 4th (Kiryati) Brigade and 55th Paratrooper Brigade from Khan Younis on January 28.[16] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the 646th Paratroopers Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) is expected to deploy to Khan Younis. The 646th brigade is currently operating in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.[17]

Israeli media reported that Palestinian militias have slightly increased in recent days the number of rocket attacks they are launching from areas where Israeli forces operated previously in the northern Gaza Strip.[18] The launches demonstrate that Palestinian militias in the northern Gaza Strip retain some ability to fire rockets into Israel, despite Israeli operations. CTP-ISW previously reported that Hamas fighters are reinfiltrating areas that Israeli forces cleared in the northern Gaza Strip, which will facilitate Hamas’ reconstitution.[19] Israeli media speculated that the IDF could be leaving a power vacuum by exiting without designating a Palestinian civil authority to govern in areas of the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli media further reported there is growing fear amongst Israeli military leadership that Hamas will be able to reconstitute in these areas.

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that as much as 80 percent of Hamas’ tunnels remain intact in the Gaza Strip.[20] The tunnels run for over 300 miles underneath the Gaza Strip. The New York Times reported on January 16 that the IDF now believes that there are more tunnels underneath the Gaza Strip than previously thought.[21]

Palestinian fighters fired three rocket salvos from the Gaza Strip into Israel on January 28.[22]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in seven locations across the West Bank, primarily around Jenin.[23]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 28.[24]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

See the topline of this report for coverage of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq's attack into Jordan.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for five attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria.[25] The group targeted three positions in Syria, one in Jordan, and one in Iraq.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed that it fired unspecified munitions at an Israeli military site in Zuvulun, Israel.[26] The group has claimed two other attacks targeting Israel in recent days.[27]

Iran Update, January 27, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps 

Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters claimed clashes with Israeli forces. Hamas and other Palestinian fighters have contested Israeli raids in certain areas of the northern Gaza Strip throughout January 2024. 

  • Central Gaza Strip: Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s militant wing targeted an Israeli supply line with mortars and rockets.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces 98th Division destroyed weapons warehouses and clashed with Palestinian fighters in western Khan Younis. Several Palestinian militias, including Hamas, continued to execute a deliberate defense against the Israeli ground operations in Khan Younis, particularly west and south of the city.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in three locations.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted 14 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iraq and Syria: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for four attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria.
  • Yemen: US Central Command announced that the United States struck a Houthi anti-ship missile that was prepared to launch and presented an imminent threat to commercial vessels and US Navy ships in the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters claimed clashes with Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, targeted Israeli forces in the al Atatra area north of Gaza City.[1] Hamas and other Palestinian fighters have contested Israeli raids in certain areas of the northern Gaza Strip throughout January 2024.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)’s militant wing targeted an IDF supply line into the central Gaza Strip with mortars and rockets on January 27.[2]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 98th Division destroyed weapons warehouses and clashed with Palestinian fighters in western Khan Younis on January 27. The IDF stated its 89th Commando forces have killed over 100 Palestinian fighters operating in western Khan Younis in the past week.[3] The IDF Magallan Unit operating under the 89th Commandos raided Palestinian militia weapons sites as the corresponding fire group conducted airstrikes on three Palestinian fighters burying charges near IDF ground forces.[4] The Egoz Command Unit raided a house that belonged to an associate of Yahya Sinwar and a weapons warehouse in Khan Younis.[5]

Several Palestinian militias, including Hamas, continued to execute a deliberate defense against the Israeli ground operations in Khan Younis, particularly west and south of the city. The militant wings of Hamas, PIJ, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) claimed several attacks targeting Israeli infantry and armor with small arms, RPGs, and mortars in western Khan Younis.[6] The DFLP is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war.

Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on January 27. PIJ fired rockets targeting Sderot and Nir Am.[7]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in three locations across the West Bank.[8] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades targeted Israeli forces three times using small arms fire and IEDs.[9] Its fighters also fired on an Israeli settlement near Hebron.[10]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted 14 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 27.[11] This rate of attacks is well over double this week’s average of 5.8 attacks per day. Hezbollah conducted 13 attacks primarily targeting Israeli military forces and infrastructure.[12]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for four attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed separate drone attacks targeting US forces at al Omar oilfield and Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province on January 26.[13] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a rocket attack targeting US forces at Conoco on January 27.[14] The group also claimed a drone attack targeting US forces at Ain al Assad airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, on January 27.[15]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that the United States struck a Houthi anti-ship missile that was prepared to launch and presented an imminent threat to commercial vessels and US Navy ships in the Red Sea on January 27.[16] Houthi-controlled outlet al Masirah claimed on January 27 that the United States and United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting Ras Issa, which is Yemen’s main oil export terminal.[17] It is unclear whether the CENTCOM announcement and al Masirah claim are referring to the same incident. The US strike follows the Houthis’ anti-ship missile attack targeting the British-owned, Marshall Islands-flagged commercial oil tanker Marlin Luanda on January 26.[18] The attack caused a 19-hour fire at one of the vessel’s tanks, making it the “most damaging” Houthi attack since the Houthis started their attack campaign targeting international shipping in October 2023.[19]

 

Iran Update, January 26, 2024

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Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq released a statement rejecting the US and Iraqi decision to begin negotiations over the status of US-led coalition forces in Iraq and vowed to continue attacking US forces. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq will likely continue to attack US forces in Iraq and Syria to pressure the Mohammad Shia al Sudani administration to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.
  • Yemen: The Houthis conducted multiple attacks on a US Navy warship and two commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden. CENTCOM reported that the Houthis fired one anti-ship ballistic missile targeting the USS Carney. two missiles exploded within a few hundred meters of the Panama-flagged commercial tanker Achilles around the same time as the attack on the USS Carney.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) destroyed military infrastructure and clashed with Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas and other Palestinian fighters have contested Israeli raids in certain areas of the northern Gaza Strip throughout January 2024.
  • Central Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias conducted multiple attacks on Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip. Hamas’ military wing detonated explosives in a tunnel entrance targeting Israeli infantrymen near the Maghazi refugee camp.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias conducted seven indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in three locations across the West Bank. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah, and the Tubas Battalion of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad military wing claimed that they targeted Israeli forces with explosives and small arms fire in Tubas.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 26. Hezbollah conducted three attacks targeting Israeli forces using rockets and other unspecified munitions.
  • Iran: The Iranian regime denied a recent Wall Street Journal report that the United States secretly warned Iran that the Islamic State was preparing to conduct the January 3 terrorist attack in Kerman.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) destroyed military infrastructure and clashed with Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip on January 26. The IDF Navy provided fire support to the IDF Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division), which was operating in Beit Lahia as of January 7.[1] The IDF 5th Brigade (assigned to the 143rd Division) killed six fighters and directed IDF Air Force strikes on Hamas military infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip.[2]

Hamas and other Palestinian fighters have contested Israeli raids in certain areas of the northern Gaza Strip throughout January 2024. Hamas’ military wing clashed with the IDF in the Sheikh Ijlin neighborhood, Gaza City.[3] Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) military wing claimed that it shot down an Israeli drone conducting intelligence activities near Shujaiya in the northern Gaza Strip.[4]

Palestinian militias conducted multiple attacks on Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip on January 26. Hamas’ military wing detonated explosives in a tunnel entrance targeting Israeli infantrymen near the Maghazi refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip.[5] The group also fired Yasin-105 anti-tank rockets and detonated an explosively-formed penetrator (EFP) targeting Israeli Merkava tanks in the same area.[6] PIJ’s military wing fired a tandem-charge anti-tank rocket targeting IDF armor east of the Maghazi refugee camp.[7] PIJ mortared Israeli infantry and vehicles east of the Maghazi camp.[8] The group mortared IDF infantry near the Bureij refugee camp and al Musaddar village in the central Gaza Strip.[9]

The IDF 98th Division continued operations in Khan Younis on January 26. The IDF 636th Reconnaissance Unit is using drones to target and track Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis.[10] The unit has located about 200 tunnel shafts and destroyed 10 rocket launchers and other Palestinian militia-affiliated infrastructure. The 89th Commando Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) directed an airstrike targeting four Palestinian fighters who fired anti-tank munitions at Israeli forces in Khan Younis.[11] The Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) used sniper weapons and tank fire to kill six Palestinian fighters during clearing operations in Khan Younis.[12]

Several Palestinian militias including Hamas continued to execute a deliberate defense against the Israeli ground operations in Khan Younis, particularly west of the city. The 98th Division began an “expanded” ground operation in western Khan Younis on January 22.[13] Hamas, PIJ, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) claimed several attacks targeting Israeli personnel and armor with IEDs, mortars, and rockets in western Khan Younis.[14] The DFLP is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war. The military wing of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, clashed with and fired mortars at Israeli forces in Khan Younis.[15]

Al Jazeera reported that the Israeli military believes that Hamas has returned to providing services in areas where the IDF has reduced its presence.[16] An Israeli Army Radio journalist similarly reported on January 16 that Hamas is trying to restore its control over the civilian population in the northern Gaza Strip, in part, by rehabilitating local police there.[17] The reporting is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Palestinian militias are likely infiltrating into areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations.[18] Hamas’ return to providing services in areas that Israeli forces previously cleared undermines Israeli efforts to destroy Hamas.

The US State Department temporarily paused funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) on January 26 following evidence that its staff were involved in the October 7 attack.[19] Israeli authorities provided evidence to UNRWA that showed 12 staff members participated in the October 7 attack. Israel also provided evidence showing the use of the agency’s vehicles and facilities during the attack.[20] UNRWA reported on January 26 that it would terminate the staff member’s contracts “immediately” and launch an investigation into the allegations.[21] The United States will review the allegations and the steps that the UN is taking to address them.[22]

Palestinian militias conducted seven indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on January 26. PIJ fired rockets targeting five locations in southern Israel, including Ashkelon, Sderot, and Nir Aam.[23] The Mujahideen Brigades fired rockets at what it claimed is an IDF headquarters for the Gaza Division’s ”Northern Brigade” and at Nahal Oz.[24] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas and has expressed close ties with Iran.[25]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in three locations across the West Bank on January 26. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah, and the Tubas Battalion of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad military wing claimed that they targeted Israeli forces with explosives and small arms fire in Tubas, on January 25 and 26.[26] Hamas’ military wing and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms targeting Israeli forces near Jenin and Qalandiya respectively.[27] The IDF reported that Israeli forces arrested five wanted persons across the West Bank and seized small arms and ammunition on January 26.[28]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 26.[29] Hezbollah conducted three attacks targeting Israeli forces using rockets and other unspecified munitions.[30] Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces at the Gonen barracks using an Iranian-made Falaq-1 rocket system.[31] Hezbollah said that this was the first attack in which it used the Falaq-1 during this war. The IDF intercepted an unspecified aerial target over Kfar Rosh HaNikra.[32] 

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Houthis conducted multiple attacks on a US Navy warship and two commercial vessels in the Gulf of Aden on January 26. CENTCOM reported that the Houthis fired one anti-ship ballistic missile targeting the USS Carney.[33] Carney intercepted the missile and suffered no casualties or damage.[34] UK Maritime Trade Operations reported that two missiles exploded within a few hundred meters of the Panama-flagged commercial tanker Achilles around the same time as the attack on the USS Carney.[35] The Houthis claimed that they fired multiple anti-ship missiles that hit and set the British-owned Marshall Islands-flagged commercial oil tanker Marlin Luanda on fire on January 26.[36]

Reuters reported on January 25 that unspecified Iranian sources said that China asked Iran to prevent Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[37] China warned that if Houthi attacks harmed Chinese interests, it would impact China’s business with Iran. Houthi spokesperson Mohammad Abdulsalam said on January 25 that Iran has not conveyed any message from China to the Houthis regarding scaling back attacks in the Red Sea.[38]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq launched two one-way attack drones targeting US forces stationed at Ain al Assad Airbase on January 25 and 26.[39] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq said both attacks are part of its ongoing campaign to expel US forces from Iraq.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq released a statement on January 26 rejecting the US and Iraqi decision to begin negotiations over the status of US-led coalition forces in Iraq and vowed to continue attacking US forces.[40] The United States and the Iraqi federal government announced on January 25 that they will soon begin negotiations on Iraq's current security arrangement with US-led coalition forces.[41] These negotiations could precipitate the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. US-led coalition forces are currently deployed in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government to fight ISIS.[42] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed that the announcement of the start of negotiations is a US attempt to “buy time to carry out more crimes” against Iraq.[43] The group also vowed to continue attacking US forces in the region and claimed that the United States only understands “the language of force.”[44] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has conducted over 150 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began.[45] A senior leader of Kataib Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed proxy militia that is part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, also described the upcoming negotiations as a US effort to “deceive” Iranian-backed Iraqi militias on January 26.[46]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq will likely continue to attack US forces in Iraq and Syria to pressure the Mohammad Shia al Sudani administration to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. The Iraqi federal government has executive agreements with the United States that govern the US force presence in Iraq. This means that Prime Minister Sudani is the only individual who can order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[47] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conduct attacks targeting US forces with the expectation that the United States will respond with self-defense strikes. The militias subsequently frame these self-defense strikes as “violations” of Iraqi sovereignty to mount pressure on the Sudani administration to order the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also stated that the United States and Iraq should not hold talks until the United States proves its commitment to withdrawing US forces from Iraq, removes its military aircraft and drones from Iraq, and removes US advisers from the Joint Operations Command (JOC).[48] The Joint Operations Command coordinates the efforts of regional operations commands across Iraq and US advisers work alongside the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in an advise and assist role to help the ISF fight ISIS.[49] US advisers assist the ISF at the strategic and operational levels. Removing US advisers from the JOC would further hamper the ISF’s ability to defeat ISIS. The ISF already faces deficiencies in planning, fire support, intelligence, and logistics that prevent it from defeating ISIS alone.[50]

Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Ala al Walai called on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to launch the “second phase” of operations against the United States and Israel on January 23.[51] Walai made this call following the January 23 US airstrikes that targeted three Kataib Hezbollah facilities in Iraq.[52] Walai specified that the “second phase” of operations will block Israeli maritime activity in the Mediterranean Sea and render Israeli ports inoperable. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted separate attacks targeting the Israeli port Ashdod, south of Tel Aviv, on January 23 and 25.[53] Israeli officials did not confirm the attacks. CTP-ISW cannot verify that these attacks occurred.

The Balochi militant group Ansar al Furqan claimed that it fired small arms targeting a police station in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 25.[54] The Zahedan Law Enforcement Commander announced that two “terrorist operatives” fired small arms at the police station and subsequently fled.[55] This incident is part of a rise in terrorist activity and insecurity in southeastern Iran since December 2023. Jaish al Adl—a Balochi Salafi-Jihadist group that operates along the Iranian border with Pakistan—conducted a two-stage attack targeting a police station in Rask, Sistan, and Baluchistan Province, in December 2023.[56] Eleven police officers died in the attack. The Afghan branch of the Islamic State also conducted a terrorist attack in Kerman Province on January 3, killing over 90 individuals.[57]

The Iranian ambassador to Pakistan and the Pakistani ambassador to Iran returned to their posts following the exchange of strikes between Iran and Pakistan between January 16-18.[58] Pakistan recalled its ambassador to Iran and expelled the Iranian ambassador to Pakistan following the IRGC’s drone and missile strikes on Jaish al Adl targets in Pakistan on January 17.[59] The Pakistani armed forces responded late on January 17 with strikes targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran.[60] The return of the Iranian and Pakistani ambassadors to their posts is part of Iranian and Pakistani efforts to de-escalate tensions and restore bilateral relations in the aftermath of the strikes.

The Iranian regime denied a recent Wall Street Journal (WSJ) report that the United States secretly warned Iran that the Islamic State was preparing to conduct the January 3 terrorist attack in Kerman.[61] The United States provided Iran with intelligence, including the location of the attack, that the Iranian regime could have used to thwart the attack.[62] “Informed [Iranian] sources” denied the WSJ reporting on January 26.[63] An unidentified security official also claimed that a US warning to Iran would have been meant to protect the United States from Iran’s “response [to the attack].”[64] This statement is consistent with Iranian officials’ efforts to place blame for the January 3 attack on the United States and Israel.[65] 

 


Iran Update, January 25, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Ashka Jhaveri, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  • Iraq: The United States and the Iraqi federal government will soon begin negotiations on Iraq's current security arrangement with US-led coalition forces, which could involve US forces withdrawing from Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors praised the US and Iraqi decision to begin negotiations about the status of US-led coalition forces in Iraq.
  • Yemen: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi falsely claimed that Houthi attacks on maritime traffic in the Red Sea have not significantly impacted maritime trade. Abdulmalik separately reiterated the false Houthi narrative that the anti-shipping attacks have only targeted Israel-linked vessels and further claimed that the Houthis have allowed almost 5,000 non-Israel-linked vessels to freely operate in the Red Sea.
  • Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to engage Palestinian fighters throughout the northern part of the strip. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hamas and other Palestinian militias are reinfiltrating areas that Israeli forces previously cleared.
  • Central Gaza Strip: Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine conducted a combined attack targeting an Israeli supply line. The operation marks the third claimed indirect fire attack targeting Israeli supply lines in recent days.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued conducting clearing operations in Khan Younis. Palestinian fighters continued conducting a deliberate defense against Israeli clearing operations in western and southern Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: US Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns will meet with the Qatari prime minister and the Egyptian and Israeli intelligence chiefs in the coming days to broker a deal for the release of hostages and a pause in fighting in the Gaza Strip.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighter four times in the northern West Bank, primarily around Jenin and Tubas.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iran: The Wall Street Journal reported that the United States secretly warned Iran that the Islamic State was preparing to conduct the January 3 terrorist attack in Kerman.

The United States and the Iraqi federal government will soon begin negotiations on Iraq's current security arrangement with US-led coalition forces, which could involve US forces withdrawing from Iraq. US-led coalition forces have been deployed to Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government since 2014 to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).[1] US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced on January 25 that the US-Iraq Higher Military Commission (HMC), which is comprised of US and Iraqi federal government officials, will soon hold “working group meetings” to evaluate the status of the US-led Global Coalition’s mission to defeat ISIS.[2] Unspecified sources told Western media that the United States dropped a condition requiring Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to stop attacking US forces in Iraq before negotiations start.[3] Austin said that US defense professionals will advise the HMC on the “threat from ISIS, operational and environmental requirements, and the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) capability levels.”[4] Austin added that the HMC meetings will “enable the transition to an enduring bilateral security relationship” between the United States and Iraq.[5] This statement is consistent with previous statements from Mohammad Shia al Sudani administration officials that the Iraqi federal government seeks to establish “bilateral relationships” with the United States and International Coalition countries.[6]

The Iraqi Foreign Affairs Ministry confirmed on January 25 the start of negotiations about the presence of US-led coalition forces in Iraq in the near future.[7] The ministry announced that the HMC meetings aim to “initiate the gradual and deliberate reduction of [International Coalition] advisers on Iraqi soil” and "end the coalition's military mission against ISIS.” The ministry additionally expressed support for establishing comprehensive relations with coalition countries.[8]

US forces and military infrastructure in Iraq provide critical logistical support that enables the presence of US forces in Syria. A US military withdrawal from Iraq would therefore necessitate the withdrawal of US forces from Syria.[9] CTP-ISW continues to assess that the United States and its partners in Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS and that a US withdrawal from Syria would very likely cause a rapid ISIS resurgence in Syria within 12 to 24 months.[10] A resurgent ISIS would then be able to threaten Iraq. The ISF still faces significant deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics that will impede its ability to defeat ISIS alone.[11]

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors praised the US and Iraqi decision to begin negotiations about the status of US-led coalition forces in Iraq. The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—released a statement on January 25 lauding the Sudani administration’s efforts to “redraw” Iraq’s relationship with the US-led Global Coalition.[12] This statement is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have used military and political pressure in recent months to expel US forces from Iraq. The framework expressed support for the “transition to comprehensive bilateral relations with the coalition countries in the political, economic, cultural, security and military fields,” although it is not clear whether the framework shares Sudani’s interpretation of bilateral relations. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Sudani is attempting to retain some US presence in Iraq and that his approach conflicts with Iranian-backed Iraqi actors’ maximalist demands to immediately remove all US forces from Iraq.

Iranian-backed militias and political factions in Iraq would likely frame a US departure from Iraq as a victory for Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance.” An Iraqi parliamentarian affiliated with the Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah, Mustafa Sanad, claimed on January 25 that US-led coalition forces “will leave [Iraq] under the influence of weapons.”[13] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have attacked US positions in Iraq and Syria over 150 times since the Israel-Hamas war began to impose a cost on the United States for supporting Israel and to erode willingness to remain militarily in the Middle East.[14] Sanad’s statement highlights Iranian and Axis of Resistance leaders’ theory that relatively low levels of militant pressure will gradually diminish the willingness of the US political establishment to sustain deployments in the Middle East.[15]

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi falsely claimed that Houthi attacks on maritime traffic in the Red Sea have not significantly impacted maritime trade. Abdulmalik made the statement in a speech on January 25 criticizing recent US strikes targeting Houthi military targets.[16] Major shipping companies have rerouted their operations away from the Red Sea in response to Houthi attacks, disrupting supply chains and driving higher inflation rates.[17] Maritime traffic through the Suez Canal decreased by 30 percent in early January 2024 compared to the previous year.[18] Reuters reported on January 11 that Houthi attacks caused a 40 percent decrease in US dollar revenues from the Suez Canal from 2023 to 2024.[19] Approximately 10 to 12 percent of global trade passes through the Suez Canal, generating roughly eight billion dollars of revenue.[20] Abdulmalik claimed that the Houthis have used 200 drones and 50 missiles thus far in their anti-shipping attack campaign, which, if true, demonstrates the relatively little the Houthis had to spend to disrupt a major corridor for international trade.

Abdulmalik separately reiterated the false Houthi narrative that the anti-shipping attacks have only targeted Israel-linked vessels and further claimed that the Houthis have allowed almost 5,000 non-Israel-linked vessels to freely operate in the Red Sea since the onset of their attack campaign.[21] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted merchant vessels with no obvious connections to Israel, as CTP-ISW has continually reported.[22]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Several Palestinian militias attacked Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on January 25. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired rockets at Israeli infantry northwest of Beit Hanoun.[23] The militia previously fired a rocket salvo from Beit Hanoun toward southern Israel on January 15.[24] Separately, Hamas and the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, which is a Palestinian faction aligned with Hamas and that has expressed close ties with Iran, fired rockets at a group of Israeli forces in a combined attack northwest of Gaza City.[25] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which is a secular Palestinian faction fighting with Hamas, mortared Israeli forces in eastern Jabalia.[26] Hamas and other Palestinian fighters have contested Israeli raids in this area throughout January 2024. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 5th Brigade (assigned to the 143rd Division) killed an unspecified number of Palestinian fighters and located weapons in the northern Gaza Strip.[27]

PIJ and the PFLP conducted a combined attack targeting an Israeli supply line in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 25.[28] The PIJ operation marks the third indirect fire attack that the group has claimed targeting Israeli supply lines in recent days.[29] The IDF Yiftach Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) raided several buildings in the central Gaza Strip.[30] Israeli forces identified Palestinian fighters in a building in the area and directed a helicopter strike targeting it.[31]

Palestinian fighters continued conducting a deliberate defense against Israeli clearing operations in western and southern Khan Younis on January 25. Hamas’ military wing fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting two Israeli tanks west of Khan Younis City.[32] PIJ’s military wing fired small arms and mortars and RPGs and detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting Israeli armor and infantry in western and southern Khan Younis.[33] The military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, clashed with the IDF in western Khan Younis.[34] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—fired small arms and ”appropriate weapons” at the IDF in western Khan Younis City.[35]

The IDF continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 25. The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) conducted several raids in Khan Younis.[36] The IDF Egoz Unit fired an Iron Sting precision mortar and killed three fighters. The Egoz Unit also eliminated four fighters in clashes in a building in Khan Younis. The IDF said that the Egoz Unit adapted a method of sniper fire to target Palestinian fighters exiting tunnels. The Maglan Unit (assigned to the 98th Division) raided the military headquarters of a commander of PIJ’s information unit.[37] The Maglan Unit also raided a Hamas military headquarters and located military equipment and weapons. IDF paratroopers expanded raids and eliminated multiple fighters in the al Amal neighborhood of Khan Younis.[38] The paratroopers directed an airstrike on four fighters approaching IDF soldiers in the area. A Palestinian journalist published footage of what the journalist said was the IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) demolishing buildings in Khan Younis.[39]

US Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns will meet with the Qatari prime minister and the Egyptian and Israeli intelligence chiefs in the coming days to broker a deal for the release of hostages and a pause in fighting in the Gaza Strip.[40] An unspecified senior Israeli official told Axios that Burns’ meeting is crucial to reaching a breakthrough in talks on a new deal that would include a two-month pause in fighting in exchange for Hamas releasing all Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip.[41] Another senior Israeli official said that Hamas must recognize that Israel will not agree to ending the war or releasing Hamas’ desired number of Palestinian prisoners as part of the deal.[42] The United States, Egypt, and Qatar have in recent days pushed a new diplomatic effort to end the Israel-Hamas war.[43]

Israel proposed a two-month pause in fighting on January 21 in exchange for Hamas releasing the remaining hostages in the Gaza Strip.[44] Hamas reportedly rejected the Israeli proposal, likely because it did not include measures to end Israel’s plan to destroy Hamas. Egypt also rejected the proposal because it did not include an agreement to end the war, according to the Wall Street Journal.[45]

The military wing of the DFLP fired mortars targeting IDF vehicles at the Karm Abu Salem site in southern Israel.[46]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighter four times in the northern West Bank on January 25. Israeli forces conducted operations around Jenin governorate and identified road-buried improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Jenin refugee camp.[47] PIJ fighters detonated an IED targeting an Israeli armored vehicle in the camp.[48] PIJ claimed it damaged the vehicle and wounded Israeli soldiers inside. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah, claimed it targeted Israeli forces with explosives and small arms fire in Jenin City.[49] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also posted footage showing Palestinian fighters targeting Israeli forces at the Tayasir checkpoint in Tubas.[50] Israeli forces shot and killed a Palestinian fighter in Bir al Basha, who fired on Israeli forces.[51] Hamas later claimed that the Palestinian fighter was a Hamas member.[52]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 25.[53] Hezbollah launched two one-way attack drones at Israeli Iron Dome air defense batteries in Kfar Blum.[54] Hezbollah has only claimed one other attack on Iron Dome batteries during the Israel-Hamas war.[55] Hezbollah drone attacks into Israel are relatively rare, as the group more commonly uses anti-tank munitions in its regular attacks on Israeli targets.

The IDF Air Force struck a Hezbollah military runway 10 miles from the Israel-Lebanon border shortly after Hezbollah conducted the drone attack into Israel.[56] The IDF said that Hezbollah’s air unit uses the runway and its facilities to conduct attacks into Israel.[57] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant released Israeli intelligence in September 2023 that demonstrated the IRGC’s role in constructing the airstrip.[58]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah called for expanding the scope of militia attacks to include additional US interests in Iraq and the Middle East in response to the January 23 US airstrikes targeting three Kataib Hezbollah facilities.[59] The United States conducted the airstrikes in response to a Kataib Hezbollah ballistic missile and rocket attack targeting Ain al Asad airbase that left four US personnel with traumatic brain injuries.[60] Kataib Hezbollah is part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraqa coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that have conducted over 150 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began.[61]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for four attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria on January 24 and 25.[62] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed attacks targeting US forces at US Conoco Mission Support Site in northeastern Syria, Erbil International Airport in Erbil Province, Iraq, and Ain al Asad airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, on January 24.[63] The group did not specify what munitions it used in these attacks. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq separately claimed a drone attack targeting US forces at Erbil International Airport on January 25.[64]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed that it conducted a drone attack targeting the Israeli port of Ashdod, south of Tel Aviv, on January 25.[65] The group targeted Ashdod for the first time on January 23.[66]

The United States and United Kingdom sanctioned four Houthi officials on January 25.[67] The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) stated that the US and UK designated these individuals for supporting the recent Houthi attacks targeting commercial vessels in the Red Sea. The US and UK designated the following individuals:

  • Houthi “Defense Minister” Mohamed al Atifi
  • Houthi “maritime forces commander” Muhammad Fadl Abd al Nabi
  • Houthi “coastal defense forces chief” and “naval college director” Muhammad Ali al Qadiri
  • Houthi “procurement director” Mohammad Ahmad al Talibi

OFAC noted that Talibi coordinates with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) to smuggle Iranian-provided drones, missiles, and other weapons components into Yemen.[68] US outlet Semafor reported on January 15 that the IRGC Quds Force has overseen the transfer to Yemen of the drones and missiles that the Houthis have used in their attacks targeting maritime shipping in the Red Sea.[69] Semafor also reported that the IRGC Quds Force placed drone and missile operators and trainers as well as intelligence personnel on the ground in Houthi-controlled Yemen to direct Houthi drone and missile attacks and provide tactical intelligence support to the Houthis.[70] UK outlet Daily Telegraph reported on January 10 that the IRGC trained a group of 200 Houthis at the Khamenei Academy of Naval Sciences and Technology in northern Iran prior to the Houthi attacks.[71]

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that the United States secretly warned Iran that the Islamic State was preparing to conduct the January 3 terrorist attack in Kerman.[72] WSJ reported that the United States passed actionable intelligence to Tehran prior to the attack. Anonymous US officials said that the information provided regarding the location and time were specific enough that the regime could have thwarted the attack. The Islamic State killed at least 94 people in the Kerman attack.[73]

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan issued a joint statement on the Israel-Hamas war and Iranian-Turkish relations after Raisi’s visit to Ankara on January 25.[74] The joint statement condemned Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip. The statement noted the need for “decisive measures” to stop Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip. Raisi and Erdogan expressed their desire for unspecified “competent courts” to try Israeli military and political leaders. The two leaders also expressed Iran’s and Turkey’s willingness to jointly combat terrorism.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi discussed the Israel-Hamas war with Nigerien Prime Minister Ali Lamine Zeine on January 25.[75] Raisi condemned the humanitarian disaster in the Gaza Strip.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian threatened in a press conference on January 25 that any country normalizing ties with Israel will pay a “heavy price” on January 25.[76] Abdollahian was responding to a reporter asking whether Iran supported the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Iran and Saudi Arabia resumed diplomatic relations in March 2023.[77]

The Iranian deputy foreign affairs minister discussed the Israel-Hamas war with the Norwegian deputy foreign affairs minister on January 24.[78] The Iranian deputy foreign affairs minister condemned the war and called for an immediate ceasefire. Norway’s special representative for Yemen and the Middle East also attended the meeting.

The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry senior adviser discussed the Israel-Hamas war in separate meetings with senior Turkish and UN officials during the latest round of Astana talks in Kazakhstan on January 25.[79] The Iranian official criticized the United States over its support for Israel. He said that all regional countries have been negatively impacted by the Israel-Hamas war. Representatives from Iran, Russia, and Turkey released a joint statement at the end of the talks on January 25, condemning Israeli airstrikes in Syria.[80] Israeli airstrikes in Syria on January 20 killed at least five IRGC officers in Syria.[81]

Iran Update, January 24, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps.

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 215th Artillery Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) directed airstrikes to kill many Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip in the past 24 hours.
  • Central Gaza Strip: Israeli forces destroyed an underground tunnel route 1.5 kilometers from the Israeli border that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli clearing operations in western, southern, and eastern Khan Younis on January 24.
  • Political Negotiations: Israel and Hamas continued indirect talks regarding a ceasefire on January 24. Hamas demanded a total Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
  • West Bank: CTP-ISW did not record any clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militias in the West Bank on January 24.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 24.
  • Iraq: The United States conducted airstrikes targeting three Kataib Hezbollah facilities in Iraq in al Qaim, Anbar Province, and Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, on January 23.
  • Yemen: Houthi fighters fired three anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting two US-flagged ships transporting US military supplies through the Gulf of Aden on January 24
  • Iran: Iranian officials discussed the Israel-Hamas war with senior Russian officials on January 24.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 215th Artillery Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) directed airstrikes to kill many Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip in the past 24 hours.[1] CTP-ISW previously reported that Hamas fighters are already reinfiltrating areas that Israeli forces cleared in the northern Gaza Strip, which will facilitate Hamas’ reconstitution.[2] The Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) military wing published footage on January 24 of its fighters firing mortars targeting an Israeli supply line east of Jabalia.[3] The militia claimed that it targeted an Israeli supply line east of Jabalia in a combined operation with Hamas fighters on January 22.[4]

Israeli forces destroyed an underground tunnel route 1.5 kilometers from the Israeli border that connects the northern and southern Gaza Strip.[5] The IDF 646th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) and engineers destroyed the tunnel system last week during operations north of Bureij, in the central Gaza Strip. Israeli forces located anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers, warheads, and equipment for rocket production and launch systems in the tunnels. The 646th Brigade previously located an underground tunnel route beneath Salah al Din Road on January 16, which the IDF said Palestinian militias used to move fighters between the northern and southern Gaza Strip.[6]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip. The Yiftach Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) fired at an armed Palestinian fighter who was observing them on January 24.[7] Palestinian militias did not claim any attacks targeting Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip on January 24.

Palestinian fighters defended against Israeli clearing operations in western, southern, and eastern Khan Younis on January 24. Hamas and other Palestinian militias claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces in western Khan Younis where Palestinian militias are continuing to execute a deliberate defense against Israeli offensive operations.[8] Hamas claimed that its fighters detonated explosives that Israeli forces had planted to demolish a building in western Khan Younis.[9] The group conducted a similar attack on January 22 that killed 21 Israeli soldiers in the central Gaza Strip.[10] Hamas and PIJ also conducted a combined attack that targeted an Israeli tank with an anti-tank RPG in western Khan Younis on January 24.[11] Hamas mortared Israeli forces advancing east of al Fukhari in southern Khan Younis.[12] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) reported that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces as they advanced in western, southern, and eastern Khan Younis.[13]

The IDF reported on January 24 that the 98th Division continued to conduct clearing operations in western Khan Younis.[14] Israeli forces are “increasing the pressure” on Hamas and targeting Hamas squads with sniper fire, tanks, and airstrikes.[15] Israeli forces operating in the center of the Khan Younis refugee camp encountered many Palestinian fighters and raided Hamas facilities in the area.[16]

The top US Middle East mediator, National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk, arrived in Qatar on January 24 for negotiations over the release of Hamas-held hostages in the Gaza Strip.[17] McGurk will discuss a new hostage deal with Qatari officials. The discussions will also focus on humanitarian assistance, IDF operations, and the protection of civilian life in the Gaza Strip.

Israel and Hamas continued indirect talks regarding a ceasefire on January 24.[18] Israeli media reported on January 24 that Hamas suspended negotiations for a hostage deal with Israel, according to two sources privy to the details of the negotiations.[19] The sources said that Hamas demanded a total Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[20]

PIJ’s military wing claimed that its fighters fired rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting nearby Israeli towns on January 24.[21]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

CTP-ISW did not record any clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militias in the West Bank on January 24. Israeli forces detained seven wanted individuals across the West Bank.[22] Israeli forces also destroyed the home of a Hamas fighter who killed four Israelis in an Israeli settlement south of Nablus in June 2023.[23]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 24.[24] Israeli forces struck multiple Lebanese Hezbollah military targets in southern Lebanon on the same day.[25]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The United States conducted airstrikes targeting three Kataib Hezbollah facilities in Iraq in al Qaim, Anbar Province, and Jurf al Sakhr, Babil Province, on January 23.[26] The United States conducted the strikes in response to a Kataib Hezbollah ballistic missile and rocket attack targeting Ain al Assad Airbase on January 20 that left four US personnel with traumatic brain injuries and injured at least one Iraqi Security Forces member.[27] The US strikes targeted the 45th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade’s 3rd Regiment in al Qaim and the 46th and 47th PMF brigades in Jurf al Sakhr.[28] US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Kataib Hezbollah commands and mans the 45th, 46th, and 47th PMF Brigades.[29] US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Kataib Hezbollah controls the al Qaim border crossing between Iraq and Syria.[30] The group also committed acts of sectarian cleansing in Jurf al Sakhr, which it now controls.[31] Kataib Hezbollah does not allow the Iraqi government access to Jurf al Sakhr, which is notable because it means that the Iraqi government does not have control over the town.[32] US Central Command reported that the strikes targeted KH's “headquarters, storage and training locations for rocket, missile, and one-way attack UAV capabilities.”[33] Iran uses the al Qaim-Albu Kamal border crossing to transport air defense equipment, precision-guided munitions, and other weapons into Syria.[34]

Numerous Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, such as Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba (HHN), and the Badr Organization reiterated their demand for the removal of US forces from Iraq following the US strikes.[35] HHN repeated the claim that US self-defense strikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militia facilities "violate” Iraqi sovereignty.[36] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conduct attacks targeting US forces, which provoke US self-defense strikes. The militias then incorrectly characterize these self-defense strikes as "violations” of Iraqi sovereignty to pressure the Iraqi federal government to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. The United States reserves the right to protect its forces in Iraq, which are deployed at the invitation of the Iraqi government to fight ISIS.[37]

Iranian-backed political factions also condemned the US strikes. State of Law Coalition member Turki al Utbi stated on January 24 that the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—will meet within 72 hours to discuss efforts to pressure the Iraqi federal government to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[38] The State of Law Coalition is headed by former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and is part of the Shia Coordination Framework.[39] Interim Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi also condemned the US strikes and separately announced that Parliament will hold a session on January 27.[40] Mandalawi is a member of the Shia Coordination Framework and the Independent Iraq Alliance.[41] It is unclear whether the parliament session will focus on the US strikes or another topic, such as the parliament speaker vote.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iran-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for three strikes on US positions in Iraq and Syria on January 24.[42] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq attacked US forces at Erbil International Airport and Ain al Assad Base in Iraq.[43] The group attacked US forces in Syria at Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province.

Houthi fighters fired three anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting two US-flagged ships transporting US military supplies through the Gulf of Aden on January 24.[44] US Central Command reported that the USS Gravely intercepted two of the anti-ship ballistic missiles and one anti-ship ballistic missile landed in the sea.[45] The two ships operated by Maersk’s US subsidiary Maersk Line, Limited (MLL) also reported seeing explosions near the vessels, according to a statement from Maersk.[46] MLL provides transportation for the US government and its vessels are enrolled in the Maritime Security Program (MSP) and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). These programs partner US-flagged merchant vessels with the US Department of Defense (DOD) to support DOD operations in emergency situations.[47] MLL announced that it will suspend transits through the Red Sea until further notice due to increased risk to its vessels.[48]

CENTCOM conducted airstrikes targeting two anti-ship ballistic missiles in Houthi-controlled territory of Yemen on January 23.[49] CENTCOM reported that the missiles were aimed at the southern Red Sea, were prepared to fire, and posed an imminent threat to merchant vessels and the US Navy in the region.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war in separate meetings with the French, Algerian, and Malaysian foreign ministers in New York on January 23.[50]

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi spoke about the Israel-Hamas war and Turkish-Iranian relations at a press conference prior to departing for Turkey on January 24.[51] Raisi called the Israel-Hamas war one of the most important regional issues. Raisi condemned US support for Israel. Raisi reiterated Iranian calls for increased isolation of Israel.[52] Raisi will meet with senior Turkish leaders, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, during his visit to Ankara beginning January 24.[53]

Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi discussed the Israel-Hamas war with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Iran delegation head Vincent Cassard in Tehran on January 24.[54] Safavi called for the ICRC to play a role in bringing about a ceasefire and increasing humanitarian aid to the Palestinian people. Safavi served as the IRGC commander from 1997 to 2007 before becoming the Supreme Leader’s military affairs adviser. [55]

Iranian officials discussed the Israel-Hamas war with senior Russian officials on January 24. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian called for an immediate end to Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip during a meeting with Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Pastrushev in Moscow.[56] A senior Iranian Foreign Ministry official and former Persian Gulf Affairs director general also called for an immediate ceasefire during a meeting with the Russian President's Special Representative for Syrian Affairs in Astana, Kazakhstan.[57] Iranian and Russian officials have engaged in political coordination vis-a-vis the Israel-Hamas war since at least October 26, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[58]

Iran Update, January 23, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian militias claimed attacks in areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. The claimed attacks are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas and other Palestinian militias are likely in the early stages of reconstituting their governance and military capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Central Gaza Strip: Hamas’ military wing conducted a complex attack that killed 21 Israeli soldiers in the deadliest single attack since Israeli ground operations began. The IDF Chief of Staff said that the fallen soldiers were conducting a defensive activity that will allow Israeli residents to return to their homes surrounding the Gaza Strip.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces located an underground weapons production facility that the IDF said is the largest it has found to date. Palestinian militias are continuing to execute a deliberate defense against Israeli operations in western Khan Younis.
  • Political Negotiations: Israel proposed a two-month pause in fighting in exchange for Hamas releasing over several phases the remaining hostages held in the Gaza Strip. An anonymous Egyptian official told the Associated Press that Hamas rejected the proposal.
  • West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters twice in the West Bank. The IDF detained eight wanted individuals and confiscated weapons.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah claimed three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. Israeli media reported that the IDF Air Force destroyed an unspecified military asset used by Hezbollah but operated by Iran.
  • Iraq: The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Shia political factions—discussed Iranian-backed militia efforts to “provoke” US self-defense strikes in a meeting.
  • Syria: Israel likely conducted two airstrikes targeting an IRGC weapons storage facility and an Iranian-backed militia truck transporting weapons around Albu Kamal, Syria.
  • Yemen: US and UK forces conducted combined strikes on eight Houthi military targets in Yemen. The Houthis are harassing UN operations and personnel in Yemen.
  • Iran: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei criticized Islamic countries for not demanding a ceasefire for the Israel-Hamas war during a meeting with the Tehran branch of the Martyrs’ Commemoration National Congress.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias claimed attacks on January 23 in areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. The claimed attacks are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas and other Palestinian militias are likely in the early stages of reconstituting their governance and military capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip.[1] Hamas’ military wing used thermobaric rockets, sniper rifles, and mortars to target Israeli forces southwest of Gaza City.[2] Hamas claimed that its fighters seized three drones south of Zaytoun and detonated a mine field targeting Israeli vehicles in Juhor ad Dik.[3] Several Palestinian militias separately claimed attacks and published footage of their fighters targeting Israeli armor and dismounted infantry east of Jabalia.[4] Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said on January 23 that Israeli forces are continuing to fight in the northern Gaza Strip.[5]

Hamas’ military wing conducted a complex attack that killed 21 Israeli soldiers in the deadliest single attack since Israeli ground operations began. The IDF reported that Palestinian fighters fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli forces near two buildings that the IDF had rigged to demolish and a nearby Israeli tank 600 meters west of Kissufim on January 22.[6] The RPG detonated the IDF explosives on the two buildings, causing the buildings to collapse. The collapsing buildings and firefight killed 21 IDF soldiers.[7] Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack on January 23.[8] The group claimed that its fighters fired an "anti-personnel” rocket at Israeli engineers, causing a secondary detonation that collapsed the building. The fighters simultaneously fired an anti-tank RPG at an Israeli tank and detonated a mine field in the area. Israeli media and Hamas reported that the fighters responsible for the attack escaped.[9]

The IDF Chief of Staff said during a visit to the site of the complex attack on January 23 that the fallen soldiers were conducting a defensive activity in the border area that will allow residents of the towns surrounding the Gaza Strip in Israel to return.[10]

Israeli forces located a large underground weapons production facility in the southern Gaza Strip.[11] The IDF said that this facility is the largest facility it has found to date. The IDF 7th Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) searched the 1.5-kilometer-long tunnel network during clearing operations in Khan Younis.[12] Palestinian fighters opened fire from tunnel entrances and detonated improvised explosive devices at tunnel entrances to prevent Israeli forces from entering the complex. Israeli forces captured the weapons production facility and a large lathe for producing rockets. Israeli forces destroyed the underground tunnel system as part of their effort to degrade Hamas’ weapons and rocket production capabilities.[13]

Palestinian militias are continuing to execute a deliberate defense against the Israeli ground operation in western Khan Younis. The military wings of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Fatah, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) claimed most of their attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on January 23 in western Khan Younis.[14] PIJ claimed that it targeted an Israeli tank with an explosively formed penetrator (EFP).[15] Hamas fighters prevented an Israeli quick reaction force from removing an immobile tank after the fighters fired an RPG at it on January 21.[16]

The IDF reported on January 23 that its 98th Division encircled Khan Younis.[17] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari said that Israeli forces killed more than 100 operatives in western Khan Younis on January 23.[18] The 98th Division is executing an “expanded” clearing operation in western Khan Younis to “dismantle” Hamas’ military forces in Khan Younis.[19]

Israel proposed a two-month pause in fighting in exchange for Hamas releasing over several phases the remaining hostages held in the Gaza Strip.[20] The first phase would have Hamas return women, men over 60 years old, and hostages in critical medical condition. Israeli media reported that the "next phases" would include the release of female IDF soldiers, civilian males under the age of 60, Israeli male soldiers, and the bodies of hostages. An anonymous Israeli official told an Israeli journalist that the proposal includes redeploying the IDF out of main population centers in the Gaza Strip to allow Palestinian civilians to return to these areas. The official added that this proposal does not include the release of all 6,000 Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons. An anonymous Egyptian official told the Associated Press that Hamas rejected the proposal, likely because it included no measures to end the Israeli effort to destroy Hamas.[21] Egyptian Intelligence Minister Abbas Kamel accused the Israeli government of “not being serious” about the negotiations because the proposal did not include an agreement to end the war, according to the Wall Street Journal.[22]

The Israeli proposal is very similar to the US-Egyptian-Qatari plan that the Wall Street Journal reported on January 21.[23] The Wall Street Journal reported that Hamas would release all remaining Israeli hostages under this plan in exchange for Israel releasing an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners over a 90-day pause in fighting. This pause—according to the US-Egyptian-Qatari proposal—would lead to a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations, and the relaunching of the process to form a Palestinian state.

Unspecified Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal that four unspecified Arab states and Saudi Arabia proposed a separate plan for the Gaza Strip’s post-war governance.[24] Egyptian and Saudi officials said that the primary obstacle is the creation of a Palestinian state—a step that Israel has continually rejected.[25] The five Arab countries said that they will train Palestinian security forces, “revive and reform” the Palestinian Authority, and eventually “help organization elections,” according to the Arab officials. Egyptian and Saudi officials said that they are still finalizing the plan.[26]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson posted new evacuation orders covering specific areas in western Khan Younis on X (Twitter) at 03:52 EST on January 23.[27] The orders highlight specific blocks and neighborhoods in al Nasr, al Amal, the city center, and the refugee camp. The spokesperson told residents to immediately move to the al Mawasi Humanitarian Zone.

The Gaza Strip is experiencing the tenth telecommunications blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began. NetBlocks reported on January 23 that the Gaza Strip entered the second day of the telecommunications blackout.[28]

The al Quds Brigades and al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades launched mortars from the Gaza Strip in a combined operation targeting Nahal Oz in southern Israel on January 23.[29] The al Quds Brigades is the militant wing of PIJ. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades is the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters two times in the West Bank on January 23.[30] The IDF detained eight wanted individuals and confiscated weapons during operations in the West Bank.[31] The IDF said that Israeli forces shot an individual armed with a knife as the individual approached an Israeli post near Ramallah.[32]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah claimed three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 23.[33] Hezbollah launched at least 15 rockets targeting an IDF base on Mount Meron that hosts air traffic control, radar, surveillance, communication, and jamming facilities.[34] The IDF stated that the attack caused minor damage to the base but that it did not impact the base’s reconnaissance capabilities.[35] Hezbollah stated that it targeted Mount Meron ”in retaliation“ for recent unspecified assassinations in Lebanon and Syria.[36] Israel has targeted Iranian and Hezbollah military commanders responsible for facilitating the movement of Iranian-provided materiel that Hezbollah uses to target northern Israel. Hezbollah targeted Mount Meron for the first time on January 6 after Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri in Beirut on January 2.[37]

Israeli media reported that the IDF Air Force destroyed an unspecified military asset used by Hezbollah but operated by Iran.[38] Israeli media has provided no further details on the incident at the time of writing.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraqa coalition of Iran-backed Iraqi militiasclaimed responsibility for two one-way drone attacks and a rocket attack targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria. The group claimed two one-way drone attacks targeting US forces at Ain al Assad airbase in western Iraq on January 23.[39] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also fired a rocket salvo targeting US forces at the Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province on January 22, after CTP-ISW’s data cutoff that day.[40] CTP-ISW reported on January 22 that the group fired two previous barrages of rockets targeting US forces at the Conoco Mission Support Site earlier on January 22.[41]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also launched one unspecified drone targeting the Israeli port of Ashdod, south of Tel Aviv.[42] This is the first Islamic Resistance in Iraq attack targeting Ashdod during the war.

The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Shia political factions—discussed Iranian-backed militia efforts to “provoke” US self-defense strikes in a meeting on January 22.[43] Coordination Framework leadership discussed “solutions” to the Iranian-backed militia ”provocation” of US forces. An MP from the Iranian-backed Badr Organization’s Fatah Alliance said that these solutions include the removal of US forces from Iraq. Many parties within the Shia Coordination Framework, including the Fatah Alliance, are political wings of Iranian-backed militias that have been waging a campaign combining political and military pressure to remove US forces from Iraq.[44] Iranian-backed Iraqi groups and politicians frequently frame US self-defense strikes as crimes and violations of Iraqi sovereignty to pressure the Iraqi government to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[45]

Israel likely conducted two airstrikes targeting an IRGC weapons storage facility and an Iranian-backed militia truck transporting weapons around Albu Kamal, Syria, on January 23.[46] Israeli media reported that the strike on the truck killed at least two Iranian-backed militia members.[47] Syrian media reported that the militia members belonged to the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces.[48] Israel has conducted a series of airstrikes since early December 2023 targeting IRGC Quds Force weapons shipments and personnel responsible for supplying Lebanese Hezbollah through Syria.[49] Israeli media said on December 29 that Israel’s strikes are responding to Iranian efforts to accelerate the supply of military equipment to Lebanese Hezbollah, which is using the Iranian-provided equipment to support attacks into northern Israel.[50]

US and UK forces conducted combined strikes on eight Houthi military targets in Yemen on January 22.[51] Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands supported the operation, which targeted Houthi missile systems and launchers, air defense systems, radars, and deeply buried weapons storage facilities. The UK Defense Ministry stated that four of its aircraft struck targets near ”Sanaa airfield.”[52] Sanaa airfield probably refers to Dailami airbase, which is north of Sanaa. The Houthi military spokesperson claimed that US and UK forces struck targets in four governorates.[53] The spokesperson also stated the Houthis will respond to the strikes. US CENTCOM stated that the strikes aimed to degrade the Houthi capability to conduct attacks on international commercial shipping and US and UK ships. CENTCOM added that the strikes “are separate and distinct” from Operation Prosperity Guardian, which is a multinational coalition protecting freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, Bab al Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden.

The Houthis are harassing UN operations and personnel in Yemen. The Houthi Foreign Affairs Ministry ordered on January 20 the UN resident coordinator in Sanaa to expel all UN humanitarian workers with US or UK citizenships by February 18.[54] The Houthi ministry also ordered the United Nations to stop recruiting US and UK citizens as employees within Yemen. The internationally recognized Yemeni government’s information minister separately claimed that Houthi air traffic control threatened to shoot down a UN plane that was en route to Marib Governorate on January 23.[55]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei criticized Islamic countries for not demanding a ceasefire for the Israel-Hamas war during a meeting with the Tehran branch of the Martyrs’ Commemoration National Congress on January 23.[56] Khamenei urged Islamic countries to take actions, such as severing their respective political and economic relations with Israel.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed recent Israeli airstrikes targeting IRGC assets in Syria with UN Special Representative for Syria Geir Pederson in New York on January 23.[57] Abdollahian called on the international community to halt the Israeli strikes in Syria.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, at a meeting in New York on January 23.[58] Abdollahian demanded that Russia use its role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to more actively secure a ceasefire to the war. Lavrov criticized the United States for obstructing the previous ceasefire resolution in the UN Security Council on January 9.[59] Abdollahian said that he hopes that Russian President Vladimir Putin would sign a bilateral comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement with Iran during Putin’s upcoming visit to Tehran.

Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war in a meeting with Lebanese Foreign Affairs Minister Abdallah Bou Habib in New York on January 23.[60] Abdollahian condemned Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip. 

Iran Update, January 22, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Brian Carter, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Amin Soltani, and Kathryn Tyson

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  • The Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces “expanded” ground operations in Khan Younis to “dismantle” Hamas’ military forces in Khan Younis.
  • The Northern Gaza Strip: Hamas and other Palestinian fighters are likely in the early stages of the reconstitution of their military and governance capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • The West Bank: Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters seven times across the West Bank on January 22.
  • Northern Israel and Southern Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 22.
  • Iraq: The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned Iraqi airline Fly Baghdad for aiding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force and its militias in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for three attacks targeting US positions in Syria and Iraq on January 22.
  • Yemen: The Houthis claimed that they conducted a missile attack targeting an American military cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden on January 22.
  • Iran: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) held a funeral ceremony in Tehran on January 22 for three IRGC Quds Force officers that Israel killed in Syria. Israel’s strike on January 20 was a response to Iran’s efforts to accelerate its supply of military equipment to Hezbollah, which is using the equipment to support attacks into northern Israel.

Israeli forces “expanded” ground operations in Khan Younis to “dismantle” Hamas’ military forces in Khan Younis.[1] The IDF 98th Division is executing the “expanded” ground operation in western Khan Younis. Palestinian militias are continuing to execute a deliberate defense against the Israeli ground operation in western Khan Younis. Israeli media described the operation as the “fiercest battle” between the IDF and Palestinian militias.[2] The operation aims to “dismantle” Hamas’ military forces in Khan Younis over “several days” by raiding Hamas outposts, “strongholds,” and capturing Hamas infrastructure.[3] An Israeli military correspondent reported that the 98th Division isolated the Khan Younis Refugee Camp after airstrikes overnight on January 21 and 22.[4] See the Gaza Strip Axis for more details on this development.

The IDF told the military correspondent that it is “aware of the sites where civilians are sheltering” in Khan Younis.[5] The IDF also told the Washington Post that it still considers Mawasi a “safer zone.”[6] Israeli forces are operating along the easternmost edge of the al Mawasi Humanitarian Zone. See the Gaza Strip Axis for more details on this development.

Hamas and other Palestinian fighters are likely in the early stages of the reconstitution of their military and governance capabilities in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF has decreased its footprint in the northern Gaza Strip since December 31, which created an absence of authority in some areas of the Gaza Strip.[7] There is no functioning civil authority in the northern Strip, which permits Hamas-backed governing structures to reemerge in some areas. The Israeli Army Radio’s military correspondent reported on January 16 that Hamas is attempting to reconstitute its local Police in the northern Gaza Strip and that the humanitarian aid arriving in the northern Strip comes immediately “into the hands of Hamas.”[8]

Hamas and other Palestinian fighters are already contesting Israeli raids into the northern Gaza Strip, which indicates that Hamas is reconstituting some of its military capabilities. A local Gazan activist reported on January 20 that Israeli forces reentered the Strip east of Jabalia from the Gaza “envelope.”[9] The Gaza Envelope describes populated areas in southern Israel that are within seven kilometers of the Israel-Gaza border. Hamas and other Palestinian fighters have engaged Israeli forces east of Jabalia since January 18, when Hamas claimed five attacks targeting Israeli forces.[10] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a Palestinian Islamist group backed by Iran and aligned with Hamas, mortared an Israeli supply line east of Jabalia in a combined operation with Hamas fighters on January 22.[11] PIJ fighters also fired small arms at an Israeli combat outpost near the Eastern Cemetery east of Jabalia on January 22.[12]

Hamas and other Palestinian militias are also reconstituting militarily elsewhere in the northern Gaza Strip. Local Gazan activists and journalists reported heavy fighting in Tel al Hawa near the al Katiba Square in southwestern Gaza City on January 21.[13] Israeli forces are continuing to conduct operations in southern Gaza City, as CTP-ISW has previously reported.[14]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The IDF Yiftach Brigade engaged two Hamas cells in the central Gaza Strip on January 22.[15] The IDF said that the brigade killed both groups of Hamas fighters. 

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)’s military wing claimed two attacks targeting Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip on January 22. PIJ published a video on January 22 that showed its fighters firing a sniper rifle from a hide site targeting several Israeli soldiers east of Bureij.[16] PIJ also launched one Badr-1 rocket targeting Israeli soldiers east of Maghazi.[17] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in this war, ambushed an Israeli infantry unit that breached a house in Bureij on January 22.[18]

The IDF withdrew the 900th “Kfir” Brigade from Bani Suheila for a “short [rest and recuperation] and training period.”[19] Unspecified Israeli forces backfilled the brigade. An Israeli military correspondent reported that the Kfir Brigade will resume its operations according to the IDF’s requirements.

For Israel’s “expanded” operation in Khan Younis, see topline.

Palestinian militias are continuing to execute a deliberate defense against the Israeli ground operation in western Khan Younis amid the IDF’s “expanded” ground operation in Khan Younis. Palestinian militias claimed 11 attacks targeting Israeli forces in western Khan Younis city.[20] Israeli media and Palestinian militias both reported “fierce” combat in western Khan Younis on January 22.[21] The DFLP claimed that it clashed with Israeli forces near al Aqsa University, which is on the edge of the al Mawasi Humanitarian Zone.[22] The al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, which is a nationalist militia aligned with Hamas in this war, also said that it engaged Israeli forces operating in the Austrian Quarter, near Nasser Hospital.[23] Local Palestinian sources also claimed that IDF armor deployed “near” Nasser Hospital in western Khan Younis.[24]

Protesters and relatives of the hostages stormed the Israeli Knesset to demand the government do more to secure the release of the hostages held in the Gaza Strip on January 22.[25] Knesset security staff were unable to prevent the entry of protesters to the Knesset Finance Committee session. Many protesters wore photos of family members being held in the Gaza Strip on their shirts. This protest follows an earlier demonstration calling for new elections outside the Knesset on Monday morning.[26] Non-voting Israeli war cabinet member Gadi Eisenkot stated on January 19 that the only way to secure the release of the hostages is with a ceasefire.[27]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters seven times across the West Bank on January 22.[28] This number of attacks is consistent with the daily attack rate over the past week. The military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—claimed on January 22 that it conducted a combined attack with the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades south of Jenin. This is the group’s first attack in the West Bank since October 12.[29]

Israeli forces arrested 15 wanted individuals in raids across the West Bank.[30]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 22.[31] The Israeli Air Force responded by striking Lebanese Hezbollah military infrastructure in multiple areas in southern Lebanon.[32]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for three attacks targeting US positions in Syria and Iraq on January 22.[33] The group fired two barrages of rockets targeting US forces at the Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province.[34] The group separately claimed a drone attack targeting US forces at Ain al Asad airbase in western Iraq.[35] The drone attack is the first on Ain al Asad airbase since the Islamic Resistance in Iraq fired multiple ballistic missiles at the base on January 20. The missile strikes injured US and Iraqi service members.[36]

The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned Iraqi airline Fly Baghdad for aiding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and its militias in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon on January 22.[37] The Department of the Treasury stated that Fly Baghdad has carried weapons and military personnel to the Damascus International Airport for a range of Iranian-backed groups over the past several years. Fly Baghdad has supplied these groups with Iranian-made Fateh missiles, Zulfiqar missiles, al Fajr rockets, as well as AK-47s, RPG-7s, grenades, and machine guns. Kataib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al Haq used the airline to transport fighters, weapons, and US currency to Lebanon and Syria.

The Houthis claimed that they conducted a missile attack targeting an American military cargo ship in the Gulf of Aden on January 22. The group claimed to fire missiles at the US-flagged heavy load carrier Ocean Jazz but did not state whether they hit the vessel.[38] Shipping monitors did not report an incident in the Gulf of Aden on January 22 and unidentified US defense officials said the Ocean Jazz was not targeted by the Houthis.[39] The group’s military spokesperson threatened that the Houthis intend to respond to US and UK strikes on Houthi naval missiles and other military targets in Yemen.[40]

EU member states “agreed in principle” to deploy military assets to protect merchant shipping in the Red Sea on January 22.[41] The German outlet Der Speigel citing unspecified diplomats reported that the EU-led operation will ”ideally start next month” and will involve sending European warships and early warning systems to the region.[42] The planned operation does not include participation in US strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen.[43] EU Foreign Affairs Representative Josep Borrell said after a meeting with European foreign ministers that the operation’s details still require unanimity.[44] The Houthi military spokesperson said on January 22 that the group would target all threats in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The Houthis would likely interpret the EU‘s protection of merchant shipping as a threat to its anti-shipping campaign. Italy, France, and Spain did not join the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian in December, despite a contradictory announcement from the US Defense Secretary.[45]

The Houthis are seeking new weapons from Iran, according to a January 21 report by Politico. Politico cites US and Western intelligence that the Houthis are lobbying Iran for additional weapons needed to launch missiles at freighters.[46] US naval forces seized an illegal shipment of Iranian-made ballistic and cruise missile components en route to Yemen on January 11.[47] Iran’s provision of these kinds of weapons to the Houthis enables their attacks on international shipping around the Red Sea. Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi claimed on January 21 that US strikes on the Houthis will develop the group’s military capabilities, instead of degrading the Houthi’s military capacity to target global shipping routes.[48]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) held a funeral ceremony in Tehran on January 22 for three IRGC Quds Force officers that Israel killed in Syria.[49] The IRGC announced on January 20 that Israel killed five IRGC officers in an airstrike on al Mazzah, Damascus.[50] Among the killed were Brigadier General Sadegh Omid Zadeh, who was the IRGC Quds Force’s intelligence deputy in Syria, and his deputy, ”Haj Gholam.”[51] Omid Zadeh, also known as Hojjat Ollah Omidvar and ”Hajj Sadegh,” was reportedly an adviser to former IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani and responsible for directing Iranian-backed militias in Syria to conduct attacks against US forces.[52] High-ranking IRGC officials, including IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, attended the ceremony.[53]

Iranian officials and state media vowed retaliation against Israel for killing the five IRGC officers.[54] Israel previously conducted strikes targeting senior IRGC officers involved in transferring military equipment to Lebanese Hezbollah through Syria on December 2 and 25, 2023.[55] Israel was responding to Iran accelerating its supply of military equipment to Hezbollah, which is using the equipment to support attacks into northern Israel.[56]

An Iranian soldier shot and killed five fellow soldiers at an Artesh military facility near Kerman on January 21.[57] The Artesh is Iran‘s conventional military and is separate from the IRGC. The Artesh Southeastern Regional Headquarters commander said that the Artesh and Law Enforcement Command arrested and interrogated the individual. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said that the incident was not terrorism.[58] Iranian officials and state media have provided no further information on the individual and his motive at the time of writing.

The Iranian and Pakistani foreign affairs ministries announced on January 22 that the two countries plan to renormalize diplomatic relations.[59] Iran conducted drone and missile strikes on Salafi-jihadi, Baloch militant headquarters inside Pakistan on January 16.[60] Pakistan recalled its ambassador and expelled the Iranian ambassador on January 17. Both sides adopted de-escalatory rhetoric following the strikes.[61] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the renormalizing diplomatic ties and his upcoming visit to Pakistan on January 29 during a phone call with his Pakistani counterpart before the foreign affairs ministries’ announcements on January 22.[62] Pakistan responded by conducting strikes on Baloch separatists inside Iran on January 17.[63]  Ambassadors from both countries will return to their posts on January 26.[64]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with the Kuwaiti Parliamentary Friendship Group head in Tehran on January 22.[65] Abdollahian praised Kuwait for its position in support of the Palestinian people and claimed that Israel is attempting to compensate for its failures in the Israel-Hamas war by resorting to acts of “blind” terrorism.

Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with Algerian Parliament Deputy Speaker and Algerian-Iranian Parliamentary Friendship Group head Moussa Kharfi in Tehran on January 22.[66] Abdollahian thanked Algeria for its support of the Palestinian people and emphasized that the Palestinian issue is of strategic importance to Algeria.


Iran Update, January 21, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Brian Carter, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

CTP-ISW published abbreviated updates on January 20 and 21, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, January 22, 2024.

Key Takeaways:

  • The United States, Egypt, and Qatar are pushing a new, multi-part plan to end the Israel–Hamas war. The US-Egyptian-Qatari plan will enable Hamas to reconstitute and present a continued threat to Israel. This proposed plan, as reported, does not include any provisions to disarm Hamas.
  • Israeli forces raided an underground tunnel in a civilian area of Khan Younis that previously held Israeli hostages.
  • Palestinian militias conducted five indirect fire attacks targeting southern Israel on January 21.
  • Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in four locations across the West Bank on January 20 after CTP-ISW's data cutoff.
  • Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel targeting Israeli towns and military facilities on January 21.
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for two one-way drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria on January 21.

The United States, Egypt, and Qatar are pushing a new, multi-part plan to end the Israel–Hamas war.[1] The plan contains three parts that will occur over a 90-day period, according to the Wall Street Journal. Hamas would first release all civilian hostages in return for Israel releasing “hundreds” of Palestinian prisoners. Israel would also withdraw its forces from population centers in the Gaza Strip, allow freedom of movement throughout the Gaza Strip, end “surveillance,” and double the flow of humanitarian aid into the strip. Hamas would release all female Israeli soldiers and return the bodies of dead hostages to Israel in the second stage. Finally, Hamas would release the remaining Israeli soldiers and fighting-age males, while Israeli forces withdraw from the strip completely. An Egyptian official told the Wall Street Journal that the parties to the agreement are considering “safety guarantees” for Hamas’ political leadership and the formation of an “international fund” for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. After the 90-day period, the plan would lead to a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the relaunching of a process to form a Palestinian state.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his rejection of a “ceasefire” in exchange for the release of all Israeli hostages held by Hamas in a video published on January 21.[2] Netanyahu was not explicitly responding to the US-Egyptian-Qatari plan. Netanyahu noted that an end to the war that leaves Hamas intact means that the next October 7 attack is “a matter of time.” Netanyahu laid out the Israeli war aims—"deradicalization” of Palestinian society, demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, and the destruction of Hamas—in the Wall Street Journal on December 25, 2023.[3]

The US-Egyptian-Qatari plan will enable Hamas to reconstitute and present a continued threat to Israel. This proposed plan, as reported, does not include any provisions to disarm Hamas. Hamas will be able to rebuild its governance capabilities in the Gaza Strip, which allowed it to generate funds for its operations prior to its October 7 attack.[4] Hamas would essentially have access to the same resource pools that it had prior to the war. Hamas fighters are already reinfiltrating areas that Israeli forces cleared in the northern Gaza Strip, which will facilitate Hamas’ reconstitution.[5] This reinfiltration process would accelerate under the implementation of the first phase of the proposed plan, in which Israeli forces would leave Gazan cities and towns.[6] “Safety guarantees” for Hamas’ political leadership would protect some of the planners of the October 7 attacks, possibly including Yahya Sinwar. Sinwar is Hamas’ political leader in the Gaza Strip. He closely collaborates with Hamas military leaders Mohammad Deif and Marwan Issa.[7] Sinwar also founded and led Hamas’ internal security apparatus and is responsible for the deaths of many Palestinians and Israelis in that role.[8]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces raided an underground tunnel in a civilian area of Khan Younis that previously held Israeli hostages.[9] Palestinian fighters moved the hostages prior to the tunnel’s capture by Israeli forces. The IDF said that the tunnel entrance was inside the home of a Hamas fighter. Palestinian fighters placed boobytraps inside the tunnel and posted guards outside the tunnel. The IDF killed the guards to make entry into the tunnel system. Israeli forces discovered five prison cells where Hamas kept the hostages. Israeli forces also captured Hamas intelligence documents and weapons inside the tunnel. The IDF said that there were 20 hostages held in the tunnel system at a time, according to unspecified testimonies. The IDF said that Hamas held some of the hostages who it released in the November 2023 exchange deal inside this tunnel.[10] The IDF published children’s drawings as proof the hostages had been held there. Israeli media reported that the drawings belonged to five-year-old Emilia Aloni, one of the hostages freed in November 2023.[11] The IDF destroyed the tunnel after IDF forces searched it.

The Yiftach Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) conducted clearing operations in Maghazi in the central Gaza Strip.[12] Yiftach Brigade armor and engineers destroyed a Hamas weapons factory and a rocket launch site in Maghazi camp.[13] Palestinian fighters fired rocket-propelled grenades at the brigade during the operation. The IDF said that the brigade killed over 30 Palestinian fighters during the engagement.[14] The military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al Quds Brigades, conducted indirect fire attacks on Israeli armor and infantry advancing north from Bureij, roughly a kilometer north of Maghazi.[15] Al Quds Brigades “snipers” fired at Israeli forces northeast of Bureij camp.[16]

Palestinian militias claimed attacks targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia on January 21. The al Qassem Brigades—the military wing of Hamas—fired anti-tank munitions at Israeli armor in Jabalia City. The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—and the National Resistance Brigades—the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed that it clashed with Israeli dismounted infantry east of Jabalia refugee camp.[17] The National Resistance Brigades also fired thermobaric rockets at Israeli infantry.[18]

Palestinian militias conducted five indirect fire attacks targeting southern Israel on January 21. This is the largest number of indirect fire attacks into Israel since January 7.[19] Three Palestinian militias mortared Israeli armor at the Sufa military site near the southern tip of the Gaza Strip.[20] The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the military wing of the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, the Mujahideen Brigades, launched rockets at Nahal Oz in a combined operation on January 21.[21] The al Quds Brigades launched rockets at Kissufim.[22]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in four locations across the West Bank on January 20 after CTP-ISW's data cutoff.[23]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted four attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel targeting Israeli towns and military facilities on January 21.[24] LH said it fired rockets at a civilian area in retaliation for an Israeli strike in southern Lebanon that unsuccessfully targeted a senior LH field commander.[25]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting an unspecified Israeli military site in the Golan Heights.[26] The group said that the attack occurred on January 20.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for two one-way drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria on January 21.[27] The group claimed a one-way drone attack targeting US forces stationed at al Shaddadi in Hasakah Province and US forces stationed at al Omar oil field in Deir ez Zor Province.

Iran Update, January 20, 2024


Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Key Takeaways:

  • Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in eastern Jabalia on January 20. A local Gazan activist also reported that an Israeli armor convoy reentered eastern Jabalia from the Gaza “envelope.”
  • The IDF 7th Armored Brigade continued clearing operations in Khan Younis City on January 20.
  • Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces three times across Nablus Governorate in the West Bank on January 19.
  • Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel targeting Israeli military facilities.
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a missile attack targeting US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, on January 20.
  • The IRGC announced on January 20 that Israel killed five IRGC “advisors” in an airstrike on Al Mazzah, Damascus, Syria
  • US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces conducted two separate preemptive airstrikes on January 19 and 20 targeting anti-ship missiles that the Houthis had prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen towards the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in eastern Jabalia on January 20. The al Qassem brigades fired small arms and Yasin-105 rockets at Israeli forces in the al Jaabari area of eastern Jabalia.[1] A local Gazan activist also reported that an Israeli armor convoy reentered eastern Jabalia from the Gaza “envelope.”[2] The Gaza Envelope describes populated areas in southern Israel that are within seven kilometers of the Israel-Gaza border. Commercially available satellite imagery also shows fresh tank tracks east of Jabalia, corroborating this report.

The al Quds Brigades, the military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, fired small arms at Israeli forces advancing in Bureij and Maghazi in the Gaza Strip’s Central Governorate.[3]

The IDF 7th Armored Brigade continued clearing operations in Khan Younis City on January 20.[4] Israeli forces raided a militia compound, destroyed six rocket launchers, and found a tunnel shaft in the surrounding area.

Palestinian fighters conducted multiple mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in Khan Younis. The al Quds Brigades fighters mortared an Israeli combat outpost in southern Khan Younis and an Israeli position at Rumaydah, east of Khan Younis City.[5] The al Qassem Brigades mortared Israeli forces advancing in the northern and southern areas of Khan Younis.[6]

The Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigade—the militant wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine —claimed one rocket attack targeting unspecified targets in Israel.[7]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces three times across Nablus Governorate in the West Bank on January 19.[8]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel targeting Israeli military facilities.[9]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a missile attack targeting US forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq, on January 20.[10] A US official told Reuters that “multiple theater ballistic missiles” hit the airbase, causing several minor injuries to US personnel and “severe injuries” to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) members.[11]

The IRGC announced on January 20 that Israel killed five IRGC “advisors” in an airstrike on Al Mazzah, Damascus, Syria.[12] Among the killed individuals were Brigadier General Sadegh Omid Zadeh, the IRGC Quds Force’s intelligence deputy in Syria, and Omid Zadeh’s deputy, Haj Gholam.[13] A June 2023 Washington Post article citing leaked documents, which CTP-ISW has not reviewed, reported that Omid Zadeh worked with Iranian proxies in Syria, such as LH, to develop EFPs to target US forces.[14] The Washington Post reported, citing the leaked documents, that Omid Zadeh was responsible for “identifying US Humvee and Cougar armored vehicles in Syria” as EFP targets.

Iranian officials vowed retaliation against Israel for the killing of the five IRGC officers. Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani stated that Iran reserves the right to respond to Israel’s “organized terrorism” at an “appropriate time and place.”[15] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf similarly stated that Israel will face a “harsh punishment” for killing the IRGC officers.[16]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces conducted two separate preemptive airstrikes on January 19 and 20 targeting anti-ship missiles that the Houthis had prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen towards the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.[17] CENTCOM conducted the self-defense strikes after determining that the anti-ship missiles presented an "imminent threat” to merchant vessels and US Navy ships.

Iran Update, January 19, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, and Brian Carter 

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  • The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Marshall Islands-flagged, US-owned, Greek-operated Chem Ranger commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden on January 18. 
  • The Houthis continued to frame US airstrikes in Yemen as part of a US regional “escalation” on January 19. The Houthis and their allies throughout the region—including Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq—threatened on January 17 and 18 to expand the war in the Middle East by targeting other US and UK interests outside of the Red Sea region. 
  • Iranian officials explicitly stated on January 19 that the January 15 IRGC missile strikes in Idlib Province, Syria, were meant to signal Iran’s ability to attack Israel directly. 
  • Iranian-backed political actors are continuing to try to pressure the Iraqi federal government to expel US forces from Iraq.  
  • Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are continuing to try to install their preferred candidate as Iraqi parliament speaker. 
  • Palestinian fighters continued to attack Israeli forces in three areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. 
  • Israeli forces under the command of the Menashe Brigade concluded a 45-hour counter-terrorism operation in Tulkarm on January 19. 
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it shot down a US Air Force (USAF) MQ-9 Reaper drone in Diyala Province, Iraq, on January 18. 
  • Iran and Pakistan continued to deescalate tensions following the exchange of strikes on each other’s territory in recent days. 

The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Marshall Islands-flagged, US-owned, Greek-operated Chem Ranger commercial vessel in the Gulf of Aden on January 18.[1] The missiles landed in the water near the ship but did not damage the ship or its crew.[2] This attack marks the third Houthi attack on a US-owned ship this week.[3] The Houthis have conducted 30 attacks targeting international shipping in the Red Sea and surrounding waters since October 17.[4]

The Houthis continued to frame US airstrikes in Yemen as part of a US regional “escalation” on January 19. The Houthis and their allies throughout the region—including Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq—threatened on January 17 and 18 to expand the war in the Middle East by targeting other US and UK interests outside of the Red Sea region.[5] Houthi spokesperson Mohammad Abdulsalam said that the United States is protecting Israel by conducting airstrikes in Yemen.[6] US airstrikes seek to degrade the Houthis’ ability to conduct piratical and terrorist attacks on global shipping in the Red Sea.[7] The United States conducted preemptive strikes on January 17 targeting 14 missiles that the Houthis had prepared to fire on commercial vessels in the Red Sea.[8] Abdulsalam said that the Houthis do not want the conflict to expand but that the Houthis will continue targeting Israeli ships.[9] Abdulsalam also said that the Houthis do not intend to target Saudi Arabia or the UAE and added that the Houthis' truce process with Saudi Arabia is ongoing.[10] Abdulsalam acknowledged that the Houthis have benefitted from Iranian military support but that the Iranians do not control Houthi decision-making.[11]

A senior Houthi official claimed that the Houthis will provide safe passage to Chinese and Russian ships in the Red Sea.[12] Houthi official Mohammed al Bukhaiti told Russian media that the Houthis would only target ships linked to Israel and its allies. The Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile targeting a Russian tanker south of Yemen on January 12, however.[13]

Iranian officials stated on January 19 that the January 15 IRGC missile strikes in Idlib Province, Syria, were meant to signal Iran’s ability to attack Israel directly. Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media said that IRGC missile strikes in Idlib targeted the Islamic State (IS), “Jabhat al Nusra,” and the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).[14] Jabhat al Nusra rebranded as Hayat Tahrir al Sham in 2017.[15] Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Kazem Sedighi said during his sermon on January 19 that the IRGC launched the missiles from Khuzestan Province in southwestern Iran—rather than Kermanshah Province in western Iran—to demonstrate that IRGC missiles can reach Israeli territory.[16] Western media noted on January 17 that the range at which the IRGC fired the Kheibar Shekan missile toward Idlib is nearly the range required for Iran to target Tel Aviv, Israel.[17] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf warned on January 19 that the IRGC will “change the angle” of its missiles to target Israel if Israel “makes a mistake.”[18] Ghalibaf was implying that Iran has the capability to strike Israel directly but has thus far chosen not to.  

Iranian-backed political actors are continuing to try to pressure the Iraqi federal government to expel US forces from Iraq. Labor and Social Affairs Minister Ahmed al Asadi claimed that US forces have committed “repeated crimes” in Iraq during an interview with Asaib Ahl al Haq-controlled Al Ahed on January 18.[19] Asadi also stated that Iraqi sovereignty is “a red line.” Iranian-backed Iraqi actors frequently frame US self-defense strikes against Iranian-backed Iraqi militias as crimes and violations of Iraqi sovereignty to pressure the Iraqi federal government to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[20] Asadi is a member of the We Build Coalition, a political party headed by Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri.[21] Asadi previously served as the spokesperson for the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, an Iraqi security service containing several Iranian-backed Shia militias.[22] He also leads the 6th PMF Brigade (Kataib Jund al Imam).[23] The Fatah Alliance, which is also headed by Ameri, appointed Asadi as its spokesperson in 2018.[24]

State of Law Coalition member Adnan al Sayadi claimed that the presence of US forces in Iraq is “absolutely unjustified” and that Iraq can solve its “crises and problems” without foreign support during an interview with Al Ahed on January 18.[25] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors frequently argue that the presence of US-led coalition forces is no longer justified because the Iraqi Security Forces can independently protect Iraq from threats such as ISIS. The Iraqi Security Forces still face significant deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics that will impede their ability to defeat ISIS alone.[26]

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are continuing to try to install their preferred candidate as Iraqi parliament speaker. Iraqi parliamentarians voted for a new speaker on January 13, but no candidate won the 165-vote majority required.[27] The National Progress Alliance candidate, Shaalan al Karim, was 13 votes short of winning the speakership.[28] The National Progress Alliance is headed by former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi, whom the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court dismissed in November 2023.[29] Iraqi media previously reported that members of the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—are trying to prevent Karim from becoming parliament speaker and instead install their preferred candidate, Mahmoud al Mashhadani.[30] Mashhadani is a member of the Azm Alliance, which is headed by Muthanna al Samarrai.

Iranian-backed Badr Organization member Yousef al Kalabi accused Karim of “glorifying” Saddam Hussein’s regime during an interview with Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH)-controlled Al Ahed on January 18.[31] Iranian-backed politicians in Iraq frequently use accusations of ”terrorism” or ”support for Saddam Hussein” to enflame anti-Sunni sectarian sentiment.[32] Several representatives, including a member of AAH’s political wing, similarly called for referring Karim to the Accountability and Justice Commission for “promoting and glorifying Saddam Hussein’s regime” on January 14.[33] Kalabi also claimed that two representatives supporting Karim offered bribes to other representatives to sway the election results in favor of Karim.[34]

Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri claimed on January 18 that a new parliament speaker will soon be elected “within the [Shia Coordination] Framework.”[35] Ameri’s statement is noteworthy given that the Shia Coordination Framework is not responsible for and does not have the authority to choose the parliament speaker. Iraqi parliament speakers are elected by the Council of Representatives and must win an absolute majority of 165 votes to win the speakership.[36]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters continued to attack Israeli forces in three areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. CTP-ISW previously assessed on January 16 that Hamas is likely reinfiltrating some of these areas.[37] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 5th Infantry Brigade (assigned to the 143rd Division) clashed with several armed Palestinian fighters on January 19 in unspecified areas of the northern Gaza Strip.[38] The IDF used air support and tank fire to assist its forces during the clashes.[39] A Palestinian activist reported on January 19 that Israeli vehicles reentered several towns and neighborhoods of the northern Gaza Strip and engaged Palestinian fighters.[40]

The military wing of Hamas, the al Qassem Brigades, claimed that it detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) and anti-personnel improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Israeli forces east of Jabalia.[41] Palestinian militias have sustained daily attacks on Israeli forces around Jabalia since January 16.[42] The last time Palestinian militias claimed attacks in the Jabalia area for four consecutive days was between December 24 and 27, 2023.[43] The al Qassem Brigades detonated an anti-personnel IED and fired small arms at Israeli soldiers inside and around a building in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood of Gaza City on January 19.[44]

Palestinian militias are also attacking Israeli forces in southwestern Gaza City, namely in Zaytoun and Sheikh Ijlin neighborhoods. The al Qassem Brigades conducted multiple attacks targeting Israeli forces and armor in southern Gaza City on January 19.[45] The military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Quds Brigades, mortared an IDF position in Zaytoun.[46] A Palestinian activist noted on January 19 that Israeli forces had advanced into Sheikh Ijlin and that IDF ”snipers” remained in Zaytoun.[47]

The IDF 179th Armored Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 19.[48] Palestinian fighters fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting the 179th Armored Brigade during its operations, according to the IDF. Israeli forces captured small arms, RPGs, and other unspecified military equipment in the building that the Palestinian fighters fired from.[49]

The IDF 7th Armored Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 19.[50] Israeli forces raided a training camp of Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade and located tunnels, weapons, and life-size models of Israeli tanks and military vehicles.[51] The IDF reported that the camp served as a meeting place for senior Hamas officials.

Palestinian fighters continued their attempt to defend against Israeli clearing operations in several sectors of Khan Younis. The al Qassem Brigades reported on January 19 that its fighters returned from the front lines in eastern Khan Younis City and reported that they fired an anti-tank guided RPG at an Israeli tank.[52] The militia also claimed that it detonated a Shawaz EFP targeting three Israeli tanks. Al Qassem Brigades fighters also fired a sniper rifle targeting Israeli ground forces in the same sector.[53] The self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the National Resistance Brigades claimed separate attacks on Israeli forces and armor south of Khan Younis City.[54]

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin discussed regional security Israel’s shift to “low-intensity operations” in the Gaza Strip in a phone call with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on January 18.[55] The pair also discussed humanitarian aid distribution in the Gaza Strip and “instability in the West Bank.” Austin “emphasized” the importance of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip and “acknowledged” Israeli security “concerns” on the Israel-Lebanon border.

Hamas International Relations head Musa Abu Marzouk met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov on January 19 to discuss “achieving a ceasefire.”[56] Bassem Naim, a member of Hamas’ Political Bureau in the Gaza Strip, accompanied the Hamas delegation.[57] Russian officials “stressed the need for the speedy release of civilians, including three Russian citizens,” held hostage by Hamas since October 7, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry.[58] Bogdanov added that Russia “supports the rights of the Palestinian people.”[59]

The Gaza Strip continues to experience the longest, largest-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began. NetBlocks reported on January 19 that the Gaza Strip entered the eighth day of the telecommunications blackout.[60] The director of a Palestinian telecommunication provider told CNN on January 19 that Israeli military activity has severed the underground fiber optic line connecting internet and cellphone towers in the Gaza Strip to Israel and the West Bank.[61]

The al Quds Brigades launched one rocket salvo from the Gaza Strip targeting an unspecified location in southern Israel on January 18 after CTP-ISW's data cutoff.[62] CTP-ISW previously reported that only the al Qassem Brigades launched a rocket salvo into southern Israel on January 18.[63]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces under the command of the Menashe Brigade concluded a 45-hour counter-terrorism operation in Tulkarm on January 19. Israeli forces “searched” approximately 1,000 buildings and arrested over 37 wanted individuals, including several unidentified senior militia members.[64] IDF engineering forces identified “dozens” of IEDs buried under roads in Tulkarm.[65] Unspecified Palestinian fighters detonated multiple IEDs targeting Israeli vehicles in Tulkarm. Palestine media claimed that one IED disabled an Israeli armored vehicle.[66] Israeli forces destroyed five weapons manufacturing facilities, four militia observation posts, and over 400 charges, and seized various small arms and military equipment.[67] Israeli forces also directed an airstrike that targeted Palestinian fighters who had targeted Israeli forces with IEDs.

Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces three times across the West Bank.[68] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that its fighters attacked an Israeli vehicle outside Ramallah.[69] Unidentified Palestinian fighters set fire to tires in the street in an attempt to restrict the movement of Israeli forces operating in Tammoun, Tubas.[70]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) claimed three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 19.[71] LH continued to target Israeli military positions along the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF Air Force struck LH military infrastructure, including rocket launch sites, in multiple locations in southern Lebanon.[72]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it shot down a US Air Force (USAF) MQ-9 Reaper drone in Diyala Province, Iraq, on January 18.[73] The group claimed that the USAF launched the drone from Ali al Salem Airbase in Kuwait. An unspecified Pentagon official confirmed to Kurdish media that a US drone “crashed” in Diyala Province.[74] IRGC-affiliated media published videos of the MQ-9 crashing in Diyala Province.[75]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting US forces at Erbil International Airport in Erbil Prvince, Iraq, on January 18.[76]

Iran and Pakistan continued to de-escalate tensions following the exchange of strikes on each other’s territory in recent days. The IRGC conducted drone and missile strikes on two Jaish al Adl headquarters in Koh Sabz, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan on January 16.[77] The Pakistani armed forces responded with cross-border strikes targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran, on January 17.[78] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian reiterated Iran’s respect for Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and emphasized that Pakistan is Iran’s “friend, brother, and neighbor” during a phone call with his Pakistani counterpart Jalil Abbas Jilani on January 19.[79] Iranian state media reported that Abdollahian and Jilani "agreed to reduce tensions.”[80] The Pakistani Foreign Ministry similarly reported that Jilani underscored the "close brotherly relations” between Iran and Pakistan and called for cooperation between the two countries based on the "spirit of mutual trust and cooperation.”[81]

The Sistan and Baluchistan Province Law Enforcement commander announced the arrest of four individuals who shot at an unspecified “military headquarters” in Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 19. The commander said that Law Enforcement Command officers found handguns and a Kalashnikov rifle.[82] The shooting follows a rise in insecurity and terrorist activity in southeastern Iran since mid-December. The Baloch Salafi Jihadi group Jaish al Adl has conducted three attacks in Sistan and Baluchistan since December 15.[83] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State—named the Islamic State Khorasan Province—conducted a suicide attack on January 3 during a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of the United States killing Qassem Soleimani in Kerman Province.[84]

 

Iran Update, January 18, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps 

Ashka Jhaveri, Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl 

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  • The Pakistani armed forces conducted cross-border attacks targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran. Iranian officials and state media attempted to deescalate after the Pakistani airstrikes.
  • The Houthi supreme leader, Abdulmalik al Houthi, stated that US and UK vessels have become legitimate targets for Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi said that the group would interpret an attack on the Houthis as an attack on KH in a letter to the Houthi supreme leader.
  • Palestinian fighters are attacking Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. This activity is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas is likely reinfiltrating some of these areas.
  • Israeli forces destroyed Hamas’ main weapons manufacturing facility in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip. Israeli clearing operations are likely one of the factors constraining Palestinian militias‘ ability to conduct indirect fire attacks into Israel.
  • The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) raided an outpost of Hamas’ Southern Khan Younis Battalion in southern Khan Younis City. Palestinian fighters launched multiple attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around Khan Younis City.
  • Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters six times across the West Bank. Israeli forces continued raids targeting Palestinian fighters in the Tulkarm refugee camp.
  • Lebanese Hezbollah claimed five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. Unspecified fighters launched three rockets into the Golan Heights from Syria as well.
  • Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri, and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki discussed efforts to “strengthen national sovereignty” in a meeting.
  • Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reiterated that he seeks to restructure the presence of US-led coalition forces in Iraq during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.
  • Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian discussed the January 15 IRGC drone and missile strikes in Erbil, Iraq, with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji in a phone call.
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting US forces in Himu, northeastern Syria.
  • The Jordanian Royal Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian-linked drug smuggling operations in southern Syria.

The Pakistani armed forces conducted cross-border attacks targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran, on January 17.[1] Pakistan announced that it fired a combination of drones, rockets, and air-launched standoff munitions to target Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF) sites in Iran.[2] The BLA and BLF are Baloch ethno-separatist groups that maintain ongoing insurgencies inside Pakistan. Pakistan framed the strikes as responses to Iran’s failure to prevent Baloch separatist groups based in Iran from conducting attacks inside Pakistan.[3] Pakistani media reported that the strikes killed and/or injured seven BLF fighters.[4] Pakistani Foreign Affairs Ministry officials emphasized that the strikes did not target the Iranian regime. The Pakistani strikes follow the IRGC’s drone and missile strikes on two Jaish al Adl headquarters in Koh Sabz, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan on January 16.[5]

Iranian officials and state media attempted to deescalate after the Pakistani airstrikes on Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 18. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry summoned the Pakistani Charge d’affaires and condemned the Pakistani strikes but added that Iran will not allow unspecified “enemies” to strain the “good and brotherly” relations between Iran and Pakistan.[6] Media outlets tied to the Iranian armed forces highlighted that the Pakistani strikes did not target the Iranian state, referencing the statement from the Pakistani Foreign Affairs Ministry. The outlets also emphasized that Pakistan respects Iran’s territorial integrity.[7] Several national and provincial Iranian security officials reported that there were 10 to 12 civilian causalities from the strikes but added that those individuals were not Iranian nationals.[8]

The Houthi supreme leader, Abdulmalik al Houthi, stated that US and UK vessels have become legitimate targets for Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[9] Abdulmalik made the statement in a speech criticizing US support for Israel on January 18 after US strikes targeted 14 ready-to-launch missiles in Houthi territory on January 17.[10] The Houthis claimed that they attacked an “American ship” for the first time on January 15.[11] The group previously claimed falsely that it targeted only vessels that aided Israel, were bound for Israel, or were Israeli-owned.[12] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted merchant vessels without connections to Israel, however.[13] Abdulmalik made veiled threats on January 11 that the Houthi attacks would target the vessels of other countries that supported US strikes on Houthi military targets.[14]

Kataib Hezbollah (KH) Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi said that KH would interpret an attack on the Houthis as an attack on KH in a letter to the Houthi supreme leader on January 17.[15] Houthi Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister and influential powerbroker Hussein al Ezzi threatened on January 16 that the Houthis could expand their targeting of commercial shipping beyond the Bab al Mandeb through coordination with unspecified actors.[16] These statements are meant to underscore further to the international audience the extent to which Iran’s ”Axis of Resistance” can fight as a regional coalition. KH is a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which has claimed over 100 attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began.[17]

The United States conducted preemptive strikes on January 17 and 18 that targeted Houthi missiles prepared to fire on merchant vessels.[18] CENTCOM stated the missiles posed an imminent threat to merchant vessels and US Navy ships in the region and that the US strikes will degrade the Houthi’s capability to continue attacks on international shipping. Local Yemeni sources reported that the first round of strikes hit five governorates in Yemen.[19]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters are attacking Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. This activity is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Hamas is likely reinfiltrating some of these areas. Palestinian militia activity increased slightly during the past week in the northern Gaza Strip after Israeli forces reduced their presence there and transitioned to targeted raids. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli armored personnel carriers east of Tuffah neighborhood in Gaza City.[20] The militia also fired a thermobaric rocket at Israeli forces in Sheikh Ijlin.[21] The militia separately claimed five attacks targeting Israeli armor and dismounted infantry east of Jabalia using mortars and RPGs.[22] The military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al Quds Brigades, fired anti-tank guided missiles and small arms targeting Israeli forces as they advanced east of Jabalia.[23] A Palestinian activist reported on January 18 that Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters clashed on the outskirts of Jabalia.[24]

Israeli forces continue to operate in the northern Gaza Strip to destroy militia infrastructure and locate remaining Palestinian fighters. The IDF Air Force conducted several airstrikes on January 18, targeting Palestinian fighters who posed a threat to Israeli ground forces.[25] The Yiftach Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) identified Palestinian fighters rigging a vehicle to explode, which later detonated during a firefight.[26] The 179th Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) located explosively formed penetrators (EFP), RPGs, and military equipment in Sabra neighborhood of Gaza City on January 18.[27]

Israeli forces destroyed Hamas’ main weapons manufacturing facility in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip. The facility included weapons manufacturing sites, including some meant for rockets, and a command-and-control site located along the Salah al Din Road west of Bureij.[28] Israeli forces recently located additional manufacturing facilities in Maghazi, Bureij, and Nuseirat.[29] The IDF 36th Division, Yahalom Combat Engineering Unit, and Israeli air elements discovered and destroyed dozens of tunnel shafts that connected hundreds of kilometers of underground passages.[30] The New York Times reported on January 16 that the IDF now believes that there are more tunnels underneath the Gaza Strip than previously thought.[31]

Israeli clearing operations are likely one of the factors constraining Palestinian militias‘ ability to conduct indirect fire attacks into Israel. Israeli forces have destroyed several rocket launchers and stockpiles during clearing operations in the Gaza Strip.[32] The rate of cross-border indirect fire attacks claimed by Palestinian militias from the Gaza Strip decreased from an average of roughly 13 daily attacks between October 11 and November 23 to an average of roughly 4.6 attacks between December 1 and January 18. The humanitarian pause lasted from November 23 to December 1. Militia fighters continue to use mortars and rockets to defend against Israeli ground operations in the Gaza Strip, however.[33]

The IDF Givati Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) raided an outpost of Hamas’ Southern Khan Younis Battalion in southern Khan Younis City on January 18.[34] The battalion‘s outpost included office space and multiple training facilities. The outpost served as the office for the battalion‘s commander and other unspecified Hamas commanders. The IDF seized intelligence files, "combat management documents,” and various small arms and explosives. Israeli forces conducted airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters while operating in southern Khan Younis area.[35]

Palestinian fighters launched multiple attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around Khan Younis City on January 18. The al Qassem Brigades targeted Israeli armored and engineering units in Khan Younis City using Yassin 105 anti-tank RPGs.[36] The al Qassem Brigades claimed that it detonated a house borne IED (HBIED) in Bani Suheila, killing and wounding 30 Israeli soldiers clearing the building.[37] The al Qassem Brigades did not provide evidence for its assertion. Al Qassem Brigades fighters targeted Israeli forces in a house in eastern Khan Younis using a thermobaric munition, killing five Israeli soldiers.[38] The National Resistance Brigades—the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed that its fighters targeted an Israeli armored vehicle using a tandem charged rocket in Batn al Sameen in western Khan Younis City.[39] The al Quds Brigades claimed its fighters fought Israeli forces advancing in central, eastern, and southern Khan Younis City.[40]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) released evidence of Gazan Education Ministry staff participating in military training as part of the al Qassem Brigades.[41] The IDF posted three images showing official al Qassem Brigades documents requesting certain teachers be given leave for training. The IDF said that the al Qassem Brigades delivered the letters directly to the head of the Gazan Education Ministry in Khan Younis.[42]

Israeli forces killed the Hamas officer responsible for interrogating suspected spies in the Gaza Strip on January 17. The IDF reported that the officer's death “significantly impacts” Hamas’ ability to develop and enhance its capabilities to strengthen and improve itself as an organization.[43] 

The Gaza Strip continues to experience the longest, largest-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began. NetBlocks reported on January 18 that the Gaza Strip entered the seventh day of the telecommunications blackout.[44]

The al Qassem Brigades fired rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Kissufim in southern Israel on January 18.[45]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters six times across the West Bank on January 18.[46] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces in Zawata, near Nablus. The group also clashed with Israeli forces in Qalqilya, injuring an Israeli Border Police officer.[47]

Israeli forces continued raids targeting Palestinian fighters in the Tulkarm refugee camp on January 18.[48] The operations have been ongoing for over 35 hours at the time of writing. The IDF said that it has arrested 15 wanted individuals and destroyed weapons, explosives, and military equipment.[49] The IDF also said that Israeli forces have killed eight Palestinian fighters during operations in the Tulkarm camp, including in an Israeli airstrike.[50] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and al Quds Brigades clashed with Israeli forces in Tulkarm and the Tulkarm refugee camp, respectively, during the operations.[51]

An attacker attempted to stab Israeli police officers at a bus stop in Jerusalem on January 18.[52] The attacker wounded two people before Israeli police killed the attacker. An Israeli source said that the attacker is suspected of carrying out a separate attack on a tourist in Tel Aviv earlier on January 18. The motive of the attack is unclear.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) claimed five attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 18.[53] LH continues to target Israeli military positions along the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF Air Force attacked LH military infrastructure, including rocket launch sites, in multiple locations in southern Lebanon.[54]

Unspecified fighters launched three rockets into the Golan Heights from Syria on January 18.[55] Israeli forces responded by shelling the rocket launch sites in southern Syria.[56]

Unnamed Lebanese officials stated that LH rebuffed US proposals to deescalate fighting along the Israel-Lebanon border. Western media reported that LH rejected a US proposal to pull LH fighters seven kilometers away from the border with Israel.[57] Israeli and Western media reported that LH said that it will continue launching rockets targeting Israel until there is a full ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[58] Unnamed Lebanese officials stated LH is open to the Lebanese government mediating a deal with Israel over unspecified disputed areas along the Israel-Lebanon border once the Israel-Hamas war ends.[59]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh, Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri, and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki discussed efforts to “strengthen national sovereignty” in a meeting on January 18.[60] Fayyadh, Ameri, and Maliki probably discussed the ongoing Iranian-backed military and political campaign to expel US forces from Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has attacked US positions in Iraq and Syria over 100 times since the Israel-Hamas war began.[61] Several of these militias, such as Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, are part of the PMF.[62] The militia attacks on US forces prompt US self-defense strikes, which Iranian-backed Iraqi actors then misrepresent as “violations” of Iraqi sovereignty. They use these supposed “violations” to pressure the Iraqi federal government to order the complete removal of US forces from Iraq. The United States reserves the right to protect its forces in Iraq, which are deployed at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government to fight ISIS.[63]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reiterated that he seeks to restructure the presence of US-led coalition forces in Iraq during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on January 17 and 18. Sudani stated that he plans to end the presence of US-led coalition forces in Iraq but remains open to cooperating with countries in the US-led coalition on “armament, training, and equipment.”[64] Sudani made this statement during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on January 17. NATO has a separate mission in Iraq that does not operate under the US-led coalition. Sudani similarly said in an interview with Reuters on January 10 that Iraq remains open to engaging in security cooperation with the United States, including with the United States advising and training the Iraqi Security Forces.[65] Sudani also told European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on January 18 that he hopes to engage in “bilateral security coordination” with “friendly countries” following the withdrawal of US-led coalition forces.[66] These statements are consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Sudani is trying to retain some international military presence in Iraq, such as through bilateral security agreements with International Coalition member countries.[67] The continued presence of US forces would fail to meet Iranian-backed Iraqi militia demands for a complete and immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Iraq.

Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian discussed the January 15 IRGC drone and missile strikes in Erbil, Iraq, with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji in a phone call on January 18.[68] Araji is also a member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[69] The IRGC conducted drone and missile strikes targeting what it claimed were Israeli Mossad-affiliated facilities and individuals in Erbil.[70] Ahmadian emphasized that Iran will not tolerate any Israeli operation in Iraq. Iranian officials said on January 17 that the IRGC strikes in Erbil were targeting “Mossad agents,” not Iraq.[71] Iranian leaders have long accused Mossad of maintaining a network in Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations into Iran. Iraqi state media did not widely cover the phone call between Ahmadian and Araji.

IRGC-affiliated media claimed that it likely killed a second Mossad-linked individual in the January 15 IRGC drone and missile strikes in Erbil, Iraq.[72] Iran did not provide evidence for these claims. Iraqi federal and Kurdish regional officials called Iran’s claims that Mossad operated a headquarters in Erbil as ”unfounded” and " baseless.”[73] Iranian state media alleged that Iraqi citizen Suleiman Amin Nader, also known as Azhi Amin, directed terrorist operations in Iran, including by aiding the assassination of senior Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhri Zadeh in November 2020. An Erbil-based, Kurdistan-focused freedom of expression and human rights watchdog reported that Azhi Amin was a PUK intelligence official who defected.[74] Amin began supporting Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) official and Kurdish Regional Prime Minister Masoud Barzani after his defection, according to the watchdog.[75] The watchdog also reported Amin was not present where the IRGC struck with drones and missiles. KDP media reported on January 17 that the strike in Erbil killed a prominent businessman, his daughter, and one of his employees at his house.[76]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting US forces in Himu, northeastern Syria, on January 18.[77] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq last targeted US forces in Himu on January 10.[78]

The Jordanian Royal Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian-linked drug smuggling operations in southern Syria on January 17.[79] The strikes targeted two sites in Suwayda Province—one warehouse and two houses.[80]

Iranian Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan traveled to China to increase security and law enforcement cooperation.[81] Radan met with Chinese Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong and Chen Wenqing, a member of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Politburo who oversees intelligence, law enforcement, and legal affairs.[82] Radan discussed strengthening cooperation to combat cybercrimes, drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism.[83] Chinese state media reported that Radan and Wang side a memorandum of understanding to strengthen law enforcement cooperation.[84] Radan commented that he hopes the agreement will facilitate Sino-Iranian cooperation to combat terrorism.[85] Wang additionally proposed the formation of a trilateral security institution between China, Iran, and Pakistan to combat terrorism.[86]

Radan’s visit could be part of the Iranian effort to build an increasingly adaptive and sophisticated police and surveillance state.[87] Iranian leaders have tried to replicate the success that the CCP has had imposing social control over its respective population.[88] Iranian leaders have, in particular, embraced emerging technologies, such as advanced algorithms, artificial intelligence, and facial recognition, to this end.[89] Radan traveled to Moscow in June 2023 for similar discussions on increasing Iranian law enforcement and security cooperation with Russia.[90]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron in Davos on January 18.[91] Abdollahian said that the United States and United Kingdom have no right to hold the security of the region “hostage” to benefit Israel. Cameron asked Abdollahian to use Iran’s influence to stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.

Abdollahian discussed fighting regional terrorism with the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan on January 18.[92] Abdollahian stated that it was necessary to maintain good relations between Iran and Turkey in light of ”some issues of recent days.” Abdollahian stated it was the responsibility of every country in the region to decisively fight terrorism. The Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister gave a statement following the call and urged Iran and Pakistan to avoid escalation in the region.[93]

Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Erani announced on January 18 that the Alborz destroyer is escorting Iranian commercial ships in the Red Sea.[94] IRGC-affiliated media previously reported that the Alborz destroyer entered the Red Sea on January 1.[95] The Artesh is Iran’s conventional military and has larger surface combatants than the IRGC Navy. The Alborz has routinely conducted “anti-piracy” operations in the area since 2010 and operated around the Red Sea at least since December 2023.[96]

 

Iran Update, January 17, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

  • Palestinian fighters are attacking Israeli forces in areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces conducted clearing operations previously.
  • The Gaza Strip is experiencing the longest, largest-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began.
  • Israel and Hamas began implementing a deal on January 17 that aims to supply medicine for Israeli hostages in exchange for additional humanitarian flow into the Gaza Strip.
  • IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said that the likelihood of war in northern Israel is “higher than before” on January 17 while attending IDF drills simulating an offensive in Lebanon.
  • Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani is attempting to retain some US presence in Iraq by restructuring Iraq’s security agreement, despite pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi groups to expel US forces entirely. This policy is at odds with Iranian-backed Iraqi actors’ maximalist demands to immediately remove all US forces from Iraq.
  • The US State Department redesignated the Houthis as specially designated global terrorists on January 17.
  • The Pakistani government has strongly condemned and warned of possible retaliation for the IRGC strikes.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters are attacking Israeli forces in areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces conducted clearing operations previously. CTP-ISW reported on January 16 that Palestinian militias have renewed attacks in the northern Gaza Strip, particularly around Jabalia and Sheikh Radwan.[1] Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, conducted five attacks in Jabalia, Sheikh Radwan, and Karama neighborhoods on January 17.[2] The self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and small arms at Israeli forces in Karama as well.[3] A Palestinian journalist reported on January 17 that Israeli forces entered Rimal neighborhood in southwestern Gaza City. CTP-ISW assessed on January 16 that Palestinian militias are likely reinfiltrating this area.[4] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on January 17 that its forces directed an airstrike that targeted two Palestinian fighters in Sheikh Ijlin neighborhood in southwestern Gaza City. The IDF also found large amounts of weapons in the area.[5]

Palestinian militia activity renewed slightly during the past week in other locations where Israeli forces have conducted clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip, as well. The al Qassem Brigades and the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the National Resistance Brigades, claimed that they attacked Israeli forces east of Tuffah.[6] The IDF conducted raids in Tuffah up until January 7.[7] The National Resistance Brigades also fired small arms at Israeli infantrymen north of Shujaiya.[8] 

The IDF 646th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) located rocket launchers that Hamas used to attack Israel on January 16.[9] The 99th Division has been conducting clearing operations in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip for nearly a week.[10] Israeli media reported that the al Qassem Brigades fired the rocket salvo into southern Israel from areas in the central Gaza Strip where Israeli forces recently withdrew.[11]

Palestinian militias launched several attacks on Israeli forces operating in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 16. The al Qassem Brigades reported on January 16 that its fighters returned from the areas of fighting in Maghazi and reported several different attacks in the area on Israeli infantry and armor.[12] The militia targeted an Israeli military bulldozer with an anti-tank improvised explosive device in a combined attack with the military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al Quds Brigades.[13] The al Quds Brigades fighters returned from areas of fighting in Bureij and reported that they conducted several attacks using rocket-propelled grenades and mortars targeting IDF forces near Bureij using rocket-propelled grenades and mortars.[14] A Palestinian journalist reported on January 17 that Israeli forces are operating in Deir al Balah, Nuseirat, Bureij, and Maghazi.[15]

The IDF 98th Division continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 17. Israeli forces resupplied the 98th Division by airdrop in southern Khan Younis City sometime in the last few days.[16] The IDF has conducted five aerial supply operations since the beginning of the fighting.[17] The 7th Armored Brigade directed a helicopter attack targeting two Palestinian fighters who launched mortars at them in Khan Younis.[18]

Hamas and other Palestinian militias are continuing their efforts to defend against Israeli armor and dismounted infantry since December 3. The al Quds Brigades fired an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) that targeted an IDF combat outpost in southern Khan Younis City on January 17.[19] The al Qassem Brigades also targeted Israeli armor and other IDF units using anti-tank RPGs and mortars in and south of Khan Younis City.[20] A Palestinian journalist reported on January 17 that fighting between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis was the most intense in over two months of fighting.[21]

The Gaza Strip is experiencing the longest, largest-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began.[22] A Palestinian telecommunications company said that the blackout was a result of damaged infrastructure in the southern city of Khan Younis.[23] Repair crews are unable to reach the damaged sites due to airstrikes and fighting between the IDF and Palestinian fighters in the city according to the company.[24] NetBlocks reported on January 17 that telecommunications have been offline in the Gaza Strip for six days.[25]

Israel and Hamas began implementing a deal on January 17 that aims to supply medicine for Israeli hostages in exchange for additional humanitarian flow into the Gaza Strip.[26] An anonymous Israeli official told the Washington Post on January 17 that at least one plane carrying medicine landed in Egypt. The Washington Post reported that Hamas Politburo member Musa Abu Marzouk said on X (formerly Twitter) that the delivery of humanitarian aid includes 140 types of medicine that the Red Cross will deliver to four hospitals in the Gaza Strip. The medicine will then be distributed to additional, unspecified locations, including to hostages.[27] The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), a unit in the Israeli Ministry of Defense, reported on January 17 that trucks carrying medicine will undergo a security check at the Kerem Shalom crossing.[28]

Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon Osama Hamdan delivered a speech that criticized Israel’s “third phase” of operations in the Gaza Strip.[29] Hamdan said that the United States and Israel are falsely describing the third phase of operations in the Gaza Strip to mislead the public. Israeli media began reporting in December 2023 that the IDF would transition to a third phase of operations that includes securing a buffer zone in the northern Gaza Strip and transitioning to targeted raids.[30] Israeli officials have confirmed that the IDF is shifting to fewer ground forces and airstrikes in the Gaza Strip.[31]

Palestinian militias did not claim any indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on January 17.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in four locations across the West Bank. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades detonated IEDs and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces during Israeli raids in Tulkarm and Nour Shams refugee camp on January 17.[32] The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters who detonated explosive devices targeting Israeli forces during the fighting in Tulkarm.[33] The IDF also conducted another airstrike targeting an al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades commander in Balata camp, Nablus, who the IDF said was planning an attack against an unspecified target.[34] Palestinian media reported the two airstrikes in Tulkarm and Nablus killed a total of 11 people, including nine fighters.[35] Palestinian fighters detonated an IED targeting Israeli vehicles in Nablus on January 16.[36]

Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon, Osama Hamdan, called for Palestinian militias to escalate operations against Israel in the West Bank on January 17.[37] Hamdan also called on Palestinian Authority security forces to join Hamas. The Jenin Battalion of the al Qassem Brigades claimed that repeated IDF operations in the last three years failed to weaken Palestinian militias in Jenin and that now Palestinian militia groups are expanding into Tulkarm.[38]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 17.[39] The al Qassem Brigades said that it fired 20 rockets targeting Israeli forces in Liman.[40] The group said that the attack was in response to Israeli "massacres” against civilians in the Gaza Strip and Israeli attacks targeting Iranian-backed fighters in southern Lebanon.[41] The al Qassem Brigades also said that it fired a rocket salvo towards Liman on December 25.[42] The IDF said that the Israeli Air Force attacked LH infrastructure in multiple locations in southern Lebanon on January 17.[43]

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said that the likelihood of war in northern Israel is “higher than before” on January 17 while attending IDF drills simulating an offensive in Lebanon.[44] Israeli officials, including Halevi, have expressed concerns about the threat that LH poses to Israel and the potential for LH to conduct an attack into Israel like Hamas’ attack on October 7.[45] Israeli officials have said repeatedly that they seek a diplomatic solution to push LH fighters north of the Litani River, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, but that Israel will use military force if diplomatic efforts fail.[46]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani is attempting to retain some US presence in Iraq by restructuring Iraq’s security agreement, despite pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi groups to expel US forces entirely. Sudani said that his administration would review Iraq’s relationship with the International Coalition and establish bilateral agreements with member countries. Iraq discussed this measure with the United States during the US-Iraq Strategic Dialogue in August 2023.[47]  The US-Iraq Strategic Dialogue in August 2023 included the discussion of expanding US-Iraq security cooperation beyond the current counter-ISIS framework under Operation Inherent Resolve to include joint military exercises, training, and officer exchange programs.[48] The diplomatic advisor to the prime minister stated that "the goal is not to get the [United States] out,” but that Iraq needs to “set a timetable” to transition from the US-led anti-ISIS coalition to a "bilateral agreement.”[49]

This policy is at odds with Iranian-backed Iraqi actors’ maximalist demands to immediately remove all US forces from Iraq. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have fueled an escalation cycle that aims to prompt US self-defense strikes, which they then misrepresent as violations of Iraqi sovereignty.[50] They use these supposed “violations” to demand the complete removal of US forces from Iraq. The Conquest Alliance, the Iranian-backed Badr Organization’s arm in parliament, submitted a draft law to the Council of Representatives on January 13 that would require Sudani to detail plans to end the US presence in Iraq.[51] The inclusion of this requirement is a key difference between the draft law and the 2020 nonbinding resolution that called for the expulsion of US forces.[52] The draft law was 77 signatories short of a majority needed to be presented for a vote.[53] Sudani’s current policy leaves open the possibility for continued US military cooperation in Iraq, though it is still unclear what that bilateral relationship would look like.

The US State Department redesignated the Houthis as specially designated global terrorists (SDGTs) on January 17.[54] The designation requires US financial institutions to freeze any Houthi assets, but it will not take effect until mid-February. The State Department said that this 30-day delay would ensure the sanctions do not hinder humanitarian aid going to the Yemeni people.[55] US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated that the United States would reevaluate this designation if the Houthis halted their attacks in the Red Sea.[56] The United States briefly listed the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization from January to February 2021. The Biden Administration lifted the designation in February 2021, citing humanitarian concerns.[57]  

Houthi Deputy Foreign Minister and powerbroker Hussein al Ezzi threatened on January 16 that the Houthis would consider any measure that harmed Yemeni interests as a declaration of war.[58] Ezzi warned that the Houthis could expand their targeting of commercial shipping beyond the Bab al Mandeb through coordination with unspecified actors.[59] Ezzi controls the Houthi foreign affairs file, not the official foreign minister.[60] The Houthi spokesperson further reiterated that the US SDGT designation would not change Houthi support for Palestine on January 17.[61]

The Houthis said that they fired an unspecified missile that hit a US-owned Marshall Islands-flagged commercial vessel while the vessel transited the Gulf of Aden on January 17.[62] The UK Maritime Trade Operations reported that the vessel briefly caught fire but was able to continue to its next port of call.[63]  The UK Maritime Trade Operations said that a drone targeted the vessel, not a missile.

Syrian, Western, and Iranian media provided further details on January 17 about the January 15 Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps missile strike on Syria. UK-based Syrian opposition media Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and a Syrian humanitarian organization reported that the Iranian missile strike targeted an empty, non-operational medical clinic in Idlib.[64] Bloomberg reported that the range at which the IRGC fired the Kheibar Shekan missile on January 15 is nearly the range required for Iran to target Tel Aviv, Israel.[65] Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled media highlighted that the missile’s name references a Jewish fortress captured by Muslim armies during the Battle of Kheibar in 628. AFGS-controlled media also noted that the purpose of the missile is to target Israel.[66] Israeli media and Iranian officials and media said on January 16 that the IRGC ballistic missile attacks in Idlib, Syria were the furthest that Iran has ever fired a missile.[67]

Western media reported on January 17 that India is attempting to persuade Iran to help shield Indian exporters from Iran-backed Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea.[68] Reuters said that the Indian defense ministry improved its surveillance capabilities in the region and that Indian naval vessels are escorting Indian container ships transiting the Red Sea. The Indian foreign minister met with the Iranian president, Supreme National Security Council secretary, and foreign minister in Tehran on January 15.[69] The Iranian and Indian foreign ministers discussed maritime security in the Red Sea during their meeting.[70] The Houthis conducted a drone attack targeting the Gabon-flagged Sai Baba commercial vessel with 25 Indian crew members on December 24.[71]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the IRGC’s January 15-16 strikes in Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria with US media during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The IRGC struck actors in Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria that Iranian leaders accused of trying to destabilize and undermine the regime.[72] Abdollahian described the strikes to CNBC on January 16 as acts of “legitimate self-defense" aimed at combatting terrorism.[73] Abdollahian separately told CNN on January 17 that Iran respects Iraq and Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, but it will not allow terrorists in Pakistan or “Israeli currents” in Iraqi Kurdistan to threaten Iran’s national security.[74] Abdollahian emphasized that the IRGC drone and missile strikes in Erbil targeted “Mossad agents,” not Iraq. Abdollahian also claimed that the IRGC acted within the framework of the March 2023 security agreement between Tehran and Baghdad. The March 2023 agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups away from Iran’s borders.[75] Abdollahian may have made this statement in response to Iraqi Defense Minister Thabet al Abbasi’s warning on January 17 that the Iraqi federal government may suspend the agreement with Iran in response to the IRGC’s strikes in Erbil.[76] Abbasi is a member of a Sunni coalition named the National Resolution Alliance (Al Hasm Alliance).[77]

Abdollahian also claimed that Pakistan is Iran’s “friend and brother” and that the IRGC strikes in Pakistan did not kill any civilians. Abdollahian likely made this last statement in response to the Pakistani government’s claim that the airstrikes killed two children.[78] Abdollahian similarly emphasized that the IRGC strikes only targeted members of the Baloch Salafi-Jihadi group Jaish al Adl in a phone call with Pakistani Foreign Affairs Minister Jalil Abbas Jilani on January 17.[79] The Iranian readout of this phone call emphasized Iran’s respect for Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, while the Pakistani readout focused on Jilani’s condemnation of the strikes as “an egregious violation of international law and the spirit of bilateral relations between Pakistan and Iran.”[80]

The Pakistani government has strongly condemned and warned of possible retaliation for the IRGC strikes. The Pakistani Foreign Ministry warned on January 17 that Pakistan retains the right to “respond” to the strikes and that “the responsibility for the consequences [of the strikes] will lie squarely with Iran.”[81] Pakistan also recalled its ambassador to Iran and expelled the Iranian ambassador to Pakistan on January 17.[82] Pakistan media reported that Pakistan also closed its border with Iran.[83] The Pakistani Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee held a meeting on January 17 to discuss possible responses to the strikes.[84]

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war with various foreign leaders while attending the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 16 and 17. Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war and bilateral counterterrorism efforts with the interim Prime Minister of Pakistan hours before the IRGC strike on Pakistan on January 16.[85] Abdollahian said fighting terrorism was one of the most important issues facing Iran and Pakistan. Abdollahian discussed Palestinian self-determination with Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati on January 17.[86] Abdollahian also discussed the need for a ceasefire with the Norwegian Foreign Minister on January 17.[87] Abdollahian further reiterated the need for a Palestinian-led effort to decide the governance of the post-war Gaza Strip and warned that the Israel-Hamas war could spread throughout the Middle East during the meeting.

Iranian security forces repulsed three Jaish al Adl fighters who attempted to cross the Iran-Pakistan border on January 17.[88] Iranian media reported that the Jaish al Adl fighters planned to conduct attacks in Iran.[89] Iranian security forces killed one fighter. Iranian forces injured two other fighters, who escaped. Iranian security forces captured weapons, ammunition, explosives, and hand grenades that the trio attempted to bring across the border.

Jaish al Adl claimed responsibility for killing an IRGC Ground Forces Colonel in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 17.[90]  Colonel Hossein Ali Javadanfar was a member of the IRGC Ground Forces 110th Farsi Independent Special Forces Brigade.  Jaish al Adl conducted at least four other attacks targeting Iranian security personnel inside Iran between December 15, 2023, and January 16, 2024.[91]

 

Iran Update, January 16, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Amin Soltani, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

Key Takeaways:

  • Palestinian militias are likely re-infiltrating into areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations.
  • The IDF 646th Paratroopers Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
  • The New York Times reported that the IDF now believes that there are more tunnels underneath the Gaza Strip than previously thought.
  • The 98th Division conducted clearing operations focused on locating Hamas leadership and degrading Hamas’ Khan Younis Battalion in the southern Gaza Strip.
  • The IDF announced Special Forces Unit 217 (Duvdevan) operating under the 89th Commando Brigade withdrew from the southern Gaza Strip.
  • A low-level Palestinian Islamic Jihad commander told Israeli intelligence he received military training in Iran before Hamas’ October 7 attack.
  • Hamas and Israel reached a deal to supply medicine to Israeli hostages in exchange for additional humanitarian aid inflows to the Gaza Strip.
  • The al Qassem Brigades fired rockets from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel.
  • Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters four times across the West Bank.
  • Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Iran conducted three drone and missile strikes abroad.
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted a long-range cruise missile attack targeting Israel.

Palestinian militias are likely re-infiltrating into areas of the northern Gaza Strip where Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations. CTP-ISW has observed renewed militant activity in several neighborhoods across the northern part of the strip in recent weeks, as Israeli forces have transitioned to less intense fighting there. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed on December 31, 2023, that it withdrew five brigades from the northern Gaza Strip and said that it would transition to targeted raids with its remaining forces.[1] CTP-ISW assessed on January 2 that the IDF transitioning to this new phase of operations will very likely enable Hamas to reconstitute itself militarily.[2]

Palestinian militias have renewed attacks particularly around Jabalia, Sheikh Radwan, and southern Gaza City.[3] Palestinian militias have claimed several attacks on Israeli forces in Jabalia, despite the IDF reporting on December 19, 2023, that it “dismantled” Hamas’ three battalions there.[4] There are similar reports of militant activity around Sheikh Radwan after there has been no major activity there since December 30, 2023.[5] A Palestinian journalist reported on January 9 clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters in Sheikh Radwan.[6] The military wing of Hamas, the al Qassem Brigades, claimed to have conducted an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attack on January 16 targeting an Israeli armored personnel carrier in Sheikh Radwan. CTP-ISW previously reported that the al Qassem Brigades and other Palestinian militias are not destroyed around southern Gaza City, where Palestinian militias have continued to attack Israeli forces.[7]

There is a similar but more limited renewal of Palestinian activity in other locations that Israeli forces previously conducted clearing operations around the northern Gaza Strip as well. The militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al Quds Brigades, fired a rocket salvo from Beit Hanoun toward Sderot in southern Israel on January 15.[8] The IDF separately engaged Palestinian fighters in Shaati refugee camp and Beit Lahia on January 16.[9] Israeli Army Radio furthermore reported on January 16 that the Israeli military establishment believes that Hamas is trying to restore its control over the civilian population in the northern Gaza Strip, in part, by rehabilitating local police there.[10]

Israeli forces are returning to areas that they had recently left, according to Reuters, which is consistent with the likely re-infiltration of Palestinian militants.[11] A Palestinian journalist similarly reported on January 9 and 16 that Israeli forces have “repositioned” themselves in Gaza City after they had withdrawn earlier.[12]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The IDF 646th Paratroopers Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 16. The Israeli forces, including Yalam forces and engineering elements from the 99th Division, destroyed a Hamas underground tunnel route beneath Salah al Din Road.[13] The IDF reported that the tunnel is about nine meters deep and used to transport fighters between the northern and southern Gaza Strip. The al Qassem Brigades mortared Israeli forces as they advanced into Nuseirat on January 16.[14]

The New York Times reported on January 16 that the IDF now believes that there are more tunnels underneath the Gaza Strip than previously thought. Anonymous senior Israeli defense officials speaking to the New York Times increased their estimate of the tunnel network’s length to between 350 and 450 miles from 250 miles in December 2023.[15] The defense officials assessed there are close to 5,700 separate tunnel entrance shafts in the Gaza Strip.[16] Israeli forces have discovered many of the tunnels through documents uncovered during their ground operations in the Gaza Strip.[17]

The 98th Division conducted clearing operations focused on locating Hamas leadership and degrading Hamas’ Khan Younis Battalion in the southern Gaza Strip on January 16. IDF commando forces raided the offices of senior Hamas commanders in the South Khan Younis Battalion and found weapons, ammunition, grenades, and surveillance cameras[18]. Israeli Defense Minster Yoav Gallant stated on January 15 that IDF operations in the southern Gaza Strip are “focused on the head of the snake, the Hamas leadership.”[19][20] Israeli artillery shelled a PIJ headquarters in Khan Younis.[21] The IDF 7th Brigade Combat Team directed several airstrikes on Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis, and the IDF 35th Paratroopers Brigade Combat Team killed Palestinian fighters with tank fire.[22]

Palestinian militias continued to attack Israeli forces operating in the Khan Younis area on January 16. Palestinian militias claimed seven mortar attacks on Israeli armor and dismounted infantry in eastern, southern, and central Khan Younis.[23] The National Resistance Brigades was the only group to claim close-range small arms clashes and IED attacks on Israeli forces in Khan Younis on January 16.[24] The militias’ high proportion of mortar attacks compared to other weapons systems in Khan Younis is anomalous. The IDF published documentation that Palestinian fighters launched rockets from the premises of Nasser Hospital at Israeli forces conducting clearing operations in northern Khan Younis at some point in the last week.[25]

The IDF announced Special Forces Unit 217 (Duvdevan) operating under the 89th Commando Brigade withdrew from the southern Gaza Strip on January 16.[26] The Duvdevan Unit will conduct operations in the West Bank. The unit raided Palestinian militant infrastructure in southern Khan Younis and clashed with a militia squad before withdrawing from the strip. The IDF withdrew the 36th Division from the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip a day prior on January 15.[27]

A low-level Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) commander told Israeli intelligence he received military training in Iran before Hamas’ October 7 attack. The platoon-level commander from Sheikh Radwan was detained by Israeli forces on December 20, 2023, and made the statements during recorded questioning by Israeli intelligence service Shin Bet.[28] The PIJ fighter stated that he and 15 to 20 other PIJ members from the Gaza Strip, Syria, and Lebanon were sent to a 15-day sniper training course at an Iranian base.[29] He alleged that other PIJ fighters received artillery and officer command courses at unspecified military bases in Iran. The US State Department and Treasury Department said in November 2023 that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps enables PIJ’s operations through the transfer of funds and the provision of both weapons and operational training.[30]

Several drug smugglers exchanged fire with Israeli forces on the Egypt-Israel border on January 15.[31] The IDF reported the clash along the Nitzana border area lightly injured one soldier as about 20 people approached the border.[32] The Egyptian army spokesperson said Egyptian authorities thwarted the smuggling attempt after the cross-border fire.[33] The Nitzana border area is about 40 kilometers from the Gaza Strip.

Hamas and Israel reached a deal to supply medicine to Israeli hostages in exchange for additional humanitarian aid inflows to the Gaza Strip on January 15.[34] The Qatari Foreign Ministry announced Israel will permit higher levels of medicine and humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip in exchange for Qatari representatives delivering medicine to Israeli hostages under the agreement.[35] Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's office said two Qatari Air Force planes are expected to arrive in Egypt on January 17, after which Qatari representatives will transfer the medicine to the hostages inside the Gaza Strip.[36] The agreement comes as Hamas heightened its effort to spread hostage propaganda.[37] CTP-ISW assessed on January 15 that Hamas’ increased hostage propaganda was likely intended to generate public pressure on the Israeli government to stop operations in the Gaza Strip and agree to a hostage/prisoner swap.[38]

The Gaza Strip is experiencing the longest, large-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began. NetBlocks reported on January 16 that telecommunications have been offline in the Gaza Strip for over 96 hours.[39]

The al Qassem Brigades fired rockets from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on January 16.[40] Israeli media reported that the militia fired a rocket salvo into southern Israel from areas in the central Gaza Strip where Israeli forces recently withdrew.[41] The IDF withdrew the 36th Division from the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 15.[42]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters four times across the West Bank on January 16.[43] This rate of kinetic activity is a decrease from the average, as Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters have clashed around nine times per day over the past week.[44] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades engaged Israeli forces in small arms clashes in three locations.[45] Palestinian fighters separately detonated an IED targeting Israeli vehicles, including a bulldozer, in Nablus.[46]

The IDF arrested over 20 wanted individuals across the West Bank on January 16.[47] The IDF said that it questioned dozens of suspects in Bnei Naim in relation to a car-ramming attack in Ranaana, Israel, on January 15.[48]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.[49] LH targeted Israeli forces and military infrastructure. Israeli forces struck LH positions, including munitions storage facilities in Wadi Saluki, southern Lebanon.[50] Israeli aircraft targeted LH anti-tank guided missile teams in Kafr Kila as well.[51]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iran conducted three drone and missile strikes abroad on January 15-16. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) struck actors in Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan that Iranian leaders have accused of trying to destabilize and undermine the regime. Iranian officials and media have portrayed these groups as agents and/or accomplices of Israeli intelligence services.

  • The IRGC conducted drone and missiles strikes targeting what it claimed to be Israeli Mossad-affiliated facilities and individuals in Erbil, Iraq on January 15.[52] The IRGC stated that the attacks were meant to retaliate for recent terror attacks inside Iran and for Israel killing senior IRGC commanders in Syria.[53] Iranian officials and state media have accused Israel of supporting the December 15 and January 3 terror attacks in Rask and Kerman. IRGC-affiliated media also claimed that the strikes around Erbil targeted an Iraqi Kurdish businessman whom the IRGC accused of protecting Mossad agents, providing unspecified logistical support for Mossad operations inside Iran, and transferring Iraqi oil to Israel.[54] Iran similarly targeted an Iraqi Kurdish businessman whom it had accused of cooperating with Israel when it conducted missile strikes around Erbil in March 2022.[55] Iran has historically accused anti-regime Kurdish militant groups and Israel of jointly using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations into Iran.[56] Iran has previously attacked Iraqi Kurdistan to counter these perceived threats.[57]
  • The IRGC similarly claimed that it conducted missile strikes targeting the Islamic State (IS), the al Nusra Front, and the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) in Haram, Idlib Governorate, Syria, on January 15.[58] The IRGC justified its strikes on the basis that the above groups use their facilities to train IS fighters before transporting them to Afghanistan to then conduct attacks into Iran.[59] CTP-ISW previously reported that the Afghan branch of IS, named the IS Khorasan Province (ISKP), has command and control over IS cells composed of Uzbek and Tajik nationals in Idlib.[60] ISKP fighters, including two Tajik nationals, have conducted three terrorist attacks inside Iran since October 2022.[61] Iranian officials accused Israeli intelligence services of directing ISKP to conduct these attacks.[62] Iran also accuses Israel and the United States of having created IS and affiliated organizations to undermine Iran’s stability and create divisions between Muslims in the region.[63]
  • The IRGC conducted drone and missile strikes on two Jaish al Adl headquarters in Koh Sabz, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan on January 16.[64] The strikes follow an uptick in terrorist activity in southeastern Iran in recent weeks. Jaish al Adla Balochi, Salafi-jihadi group operating on the Iranian border with Pakistanconducted at least four attacks targeting Iranian security personnel inside Iran between December 15, 2023, and January 16.[65] Iranian officials blamed Israel for the attack on December 15.[66]

It is noteworthy that the IRGC used the Kheibar Shekan ballistic missile for the first time since it entered production in 2022 in Syria on January 15.[67] The name of the missile, translatable as “Fortress Breaker,” notably references a Jewish fortress conquered by Muslim armies during the Battle of Kheibar in 628.[68]2 Israeli media noted and Iranian officials and media emphasized that the IRGC ballistic missile attacks on Syria constituted the greatest distance that Iran has ever fired a missile.[69] The Kheibar Shekan missile is also the progenitor model of the Houthi Hatem ballistic missile.[70] The Houthis have used missiles of Iranian origin in their ongoing attacks on commercial and naval vessels in the Red Sea.[71]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted a long-range cruise missile attack targeting Israel on January 16.[72] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq did not specify where exactly in Israel the attack targeted. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq stated that it used an “Arqab” cruise missile in the attack. The group last claimed that it used an “Arqab” missile in an attack targeting Haifa, Israel, on January 7.[73]

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi praised the Houthis for supporting Palestinians during a phone call with Houthi President Mehdi al Mashat on January 14.[74] Raisi stated that the US-UK combined strikes on Houthi facilities revealed the “aggressive” nature of the United States.

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned the United States and the United Kingdom “to stop the war” against the Houthis during a press conference with his Indian counterpart, Subramaniam Jaishankar, in Tehran on January 15.[75] Abdollahian reiterated the false Houthi narrative that the Houthis only target Israeli ships. Abdollahian added that the Houthis will stop their anti-shipping attack campaign when the Israel-Hamas war ends. Jaishankar also met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian during his visit to Tehran.[76]

US naval forces seized an illegal shipment of Iranian missiles sailing to Yemen on January 1.[77] US forces seized Iranian-made ballistic and cruise missile components, including warheads for Houthi medium-range ballistic missiles. Iran providing these kinds of weapons to the Houthis continually enables their attacks on international shipping around the Red Sea.

IRGC advisers and officers are operating on the ground in Yemen to directly facilitate Houthi attacks targeting international shipping and Israel, according to US outlet Semafor.[78] The IRGC placed drone and missile trainers and operators in Houthi-controlled Yemen, according to unspecified US and Middle Eastern officials. IRGC personnel on the ground are providing tactical intelligence support to the Houthis. Semafor reported that the IRGC Quds Force has overseen the transfer of the drones and missiles that the Houthis have used in their attacks targeting maritime shipping in the Red Sea and targets in Israel in recent weeks.

The Houthis continued their attack campaign targeting international shipping on January 16. The Houthis launched anti-ship ballistic missiles into international shipping lanes in the southern Red Sea.[79] A missile launched from the Houthi-controlled area of Yemen separately hit a Maltese-flagged bulk carrier in the Red Sea.[80]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei praised the Houthis during a speech to Friday prayer leaders in Tehran on January 16.[81] Khamenei stated the Houthi attacks against shipping done on behalf of the Palestinian people deserve admiration and appreciation.[82] Khamenei claimed the Houthis struck an “existential blow” to Israel. Khamenei voiced his support for the Houthis continuing their destabilizing regional activities against maritime shipping in the Red Sea.

Several international companies halted operations in the Red Sea on January 16. Japanese shipping company Nippon Yusen announced its suspension of shipping through the Red Sea.[83] British energy company Shell similarly halted all shipping operations through the Red Sea indefinitely.[84] The US Department of Transportation renewed its warning to American merchant ships to avoid the southern part of the Red Sea until further notice.[85]

The United States conducted a strike targeting four Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles in Yemen on January 16.[86] An unnamed US official told Reuters that the Houthis were preparing the missiles to target ships.


Iran Update, January 15, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Annika Ganzeveld, Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  • Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are trying to install their preferred candidate as Iraqi parliament speaker as part of their ongoing campaign to expel US forces from Iraq.
  • Israeli forces have continued targeting the remaining Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • The IDF announced that it withdrew the 36th Division from the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
  • The IDF 646th Paratroopers Brigade Combat Team (assigned to the 99th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in Nuseirat in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
  • The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in the southern Gaza Strip.
  • Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Hamas’ “Khan Younis Brigade is gradually disintegrating as a fighting force.”
  • The Gaza Strip is experiencing the longest, large-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began.
  • The al Quds Brigades fired rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Sderot in southern Israel.
  • The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades announced the establishment of a “military council” to plan attacks on Israeli targets “in every corner of the Earth.”
  • Two West Bank residents conducted a car-ramming attack in Raanana, killing one civilian and wounding 17 others.
  • Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters five times across the West Bank, compared to the weekly average of nine attacks per day.
  • Lebanese Hezbollah conducted eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech detailing the state of the Israel-Hamas war and ongoing Iranian-backed escalation against the United States throughout the region.
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed four attacks on three US positions in Iraq and Syria.
  • The Houthis continued attacking and harassing US naval forces and commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are trying to install their preferred candidate as Iraqi parliament speaker as part of their ongoing campaign to expel US forces from Iraq. Iraqi parliamentarians voted for a new speaker on January 13, but no candidate won the 165 votes required.[1] Parliament has had an acting speaker since the Federal Supreme Court dismissed Mohammad al Halbousi in November 2023.[2] The following candidates won the highest number of votes:

  • National Progress Alliance (headed by Mohammad al Halbousi) candidate Shaalan al Karim: 152 out of 165 votes;
  • Sovereignty Alliance (headed by Khamis al Khanjar) candidate Salem al Issawi: 97 out of 165 votes;
  • Azm Alliance (headed by Muthanna al Samarrai) candidate Mahmoud al Mashhadani: 48 out of 165 votes.[3]

The Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties—is maneuvering to prevent Karim from becoming parliament speaker. Iranian-backed Badr Organization member and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) spokesperson Yousef al Kalabi and Fatah Alliance member Faleh al Khazali filed a lawsuit to the Federal Supreme Court on January 13 to invalidate Karim’s candidacy for parliament speaker.[4] Several representatives, including a member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s (AAH) political wing, separately called for Karim to be referred to the Accountability and Justice Commission for “promoting and glorifying Saddam Hossein’s regime.”[5] The Accountability and Justice Commission was formed in 2008 to prevent “the return of the Baath’s ideology, power, or practices.”[6] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani promised Sunni politicians in October 2022 that he would dissolve the commission when he came to power because Sunni politicians had accused Shia political actors of using the commission to sideline them from decision making.[7] The Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission recently prevented former Ninewa Governor Najm al Jubouri from running in the provincial council elections due to corruption charges brought up against him by the Accountability and Justice Commission.[8]

The Shia Coordination Framework likely views blocking Karim as necessary to expel US forces. AAH-controlled outlet Al Ahad interviewed a “political analyst” on January 13 who implied that the election of Karim as parliament speaker would impede efforts to expel US forces from Iraq.[9] An independent Iraqi outlet reported on January 13 that former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and AAH Secretary General Qais al Khazali want Mashhadani to become parliament speaker.[10] Maliki and Khazali may regard Mashhadani as more amenable to pursuing the expulsion of US forces than Karim. The Iranian-backed Badr Organization announced on January 13 the submission of a draft law that requires the removal of US forces from Iraq, which CTP-ISW assessed was meant to increase pressure on Sudani to facilitate a US exit.

The Shia Coordination Framework also appears to be maneuvering to consolidate its control over the Iraqi Parliament. Unspecified members of the Shia Coordination Framework submitted a request to interim Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi on January 13 to “limit” the parliament speaker’s powers.[11] It is unclear exactly what these proposed limitations involve. Mandalawi is affiliated with the Shia Coordination Framework. Iraq has an informal sectarian power-sharing system, in which the parliament speaker is always Sunni, the prime minister is always Shia, and the president is always Kurdish.[12] Iranian-backed actors already control large parts of Iraq’s executive, judiciary, and legislative branches and security services.[13] Diluting the authorities of the parliament speaker may further facilitate Iranian encroachment into Iraq.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces have continued targeting the remaining Palestinian fighters and militia infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on January 13 that it activated its joint special operations multidimensional unit in the northern Gaza Strip.[14] The unit uses advanced drones and a combination of technological capabilities to identify targets and direct fire. It has destroyed dozens of anti-tank positions, observation posts, and weapons warehouses, and killed Hamas fighters. Israeli forces directed an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip on January 15.[15]

Palestinian militias, including Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades, are not destroyed in the northern Gaza Strip and maintain a presence there, however. The military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the National Resistance Brigades, claimed six attacks on Israeli forces around Gaza City on January 15, using a man-portable air-defense system, mortars, and an unspecified explosive.[16] The military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al Quds Brigades, fired rockets at Israeli positions in the northern Gaza Strip.[17]

The IDF announced on January 15 that it withdrew the 36th Division from the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.[18] Israeli media began reporting in December 2023 that the IDF would transition to a third phase of operations that includes securing a buffer zone in the northern Gaza Strip and transitioning to targeted raids.[19] Israeli media reported that the IDF will decide where the 36th Division will deploy after a period of rest and training.[20] The 36th Division, which includes the Golani Infantry Brigade and 188th Armored Brigade, operated in several neighborhoods of Gaza City and the central Gaza Strip for over 80 days.[21] The 36th Division is normally assigned to the IDF Northern Command, which oversees Israel's northern borders. The withdrawal follows the IDF’s confirmation on December 31 that it withdrew five brigades from the northern Gaza Strip.[22] Three IDF divisions remain in the Gaza Strip.

CTP-ISW warned on January 2 that the third phase of Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip, as described, will very likely enable Hamas to reconstitute itself militarily.[23] Israeli forces have degraded several Hamas units in the Gaza Strip. But Hamas’ military forces are neither defeated nor destroyed at this time. Palestinian militias continue to operate across the Gaza Strip and have targeted Israeli forces in areas where Israel has degraded the local Hamas units.

The IDF 646th Paratroopers Brigade Combat Team (assigned to the 99th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in Nuseirat in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 15.[24] Israeli forces located facilities for constructing mortar shells and rockets. The IDF also located eight Hamas fighters hiding in a school area and a nearby weapons storage facility. The al Qassem Brigades mortared Israeli forces east of Bureij.[25] The National Resistance Brigades fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) at an advancing Israeli vehicle northeast of Nuseirat and mortared Israeli armor and dismounted infantry elsewhere in the central Gaza Strip.[26]

The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in the southern Gaza Strip on January 15. The 7th Armored Brigade raided a Hamas operational headquarters and confiscated small arms, grenades, RPGs, and diving equipment belonging to Hamas’ naval force.[27] Fighters of the 98th Division directed an airstrike on two Hamas operatives loading ammunition onto a truck in Khan Younis.[28] Israeli forces also destroyed two weapons depots and attacked Hamas military buildings in Khan Younis.[29] Four Palestinian militias claimed to attack Israeli forces with RPGs, mortars, small arms, and anti-personnel shells on January 15, which is consistent with the weaponry Israeli forces have located during clearing operations in the southern Gaza Strip.[30]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on January 15 that Hamas’ “Khan Younis Brigade is gradually disintegrating as a fighting force.”[31] Gallant added that the IDF’s “intensive phase” in the southern Gaza Strip will end soon and that the IDF is focused on targeting Hamas leadership there.[32] The al Qassem Brigades claimed five attacks on Israeli forces operating in Khan Younis.[33] Hamas and other Palestinian militias are conducting a deliberate defense in Khan Younis, conducting daily attacks on Israeli armor and dismounted infantry since December 3.[34]

Current and former Israeli and Egyptian officials told the Wall Street Journal that Israel informed Egypt that it is planning a military operation to secure the Egypt-Gaza Strip border.[35] The IDF refers to the 14-kilometer stretch of land between Egypt and the Gaza Strip as the “Philadelphi Corridor.”[36] The operation would involve replacing Palestinian border authorities with Israeli ones. The Wall Street Journal reported that the timing of the Israeli operation will depend on negotiations with Egypt regarding Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip and a ceasefire.[37] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that Israel must control the border area to block Hamas from smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip.[38] Unspecified Egyptian sources told Reuters on January 9 that Egypt rejected an Israeli proposal for greater Israeli oversight over the buffer zone on the Egypt-Gaza Strip border.[39]

Hamas resumed issuing Israeli hostage propaganda on January 14 and 15. The al Qassem Brigades published a series of videos of three Israeli hostages that raise questions about whether the hostages are alive.[40] The final video revealed that two of the hostages had died from what Hamas claimed were Israeli airstrikes on the Gaza Strip, while the third sustained a head injury. The remaining hostage, Noa Argamani, narrated how she purportedly survived two Israeli airstrikes with help from al Qassem Brigades fighters and appealed to the Israeli government to “stop this madness and bring us home to our families.”[41] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari said Hamas’ claim that the IDF targeted a building where three Israeli hostages were being held is a lie.[42] Al Qassem Brigades military spokesperson Abu Obeida similarly spread hostage propaganda on January 14, claiming that the al Qassem Brigades had lost track of many of its hostages in tunnels in the Gaza Strip due to Israeli airstrikes.[43] Hamas last issued these types of videos and other hostage related propaganda during hostage negotiation talks in mid-December 2023.[44]

Hamas’ video campaign is likely intended to generate public pressure on the Israeli government to stop operations in the Gaza Strip and agree to a hostage/prisoner swap. Palestinian militias’ demands for a renewed hostage-for-prisoner deal include the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and an end to the war, neither of which are compatible with stated Israeli war aims.[45] The newly issued propaganda is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that both Hamas’ political leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, and Hamas’ external political leaders seek to use their Israeli hostages as leverage to maintain their influence in negotiations.[46] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on January 15 that only military pressure will enable Israel to free the hostages held by Hamas.[47]

The IDF published on January 15 a data set summarizing its operations in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Lebanon since the war began.[48] Israeli forces have killed over 9,000 Palestinian fighters in the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ military force is approximately 40,000.[49] The data shows that Israeli forces have killed two Hamas brigade commanders, 19 battalion commanders, and over 50 company commanders as part of its effort to destroy Hamas’ command-and-control network in the Gaza Strip. 188 Israeli troops have died in the ground offensive and 1,113 sustained injuries.[50]

The Gaza Strip is experiencing the longest, large-scale internet blackout since the Israel-Hamas war began. NetBlocks reported on January 15 that telecommunications have been offline in the Gaza Strip for over 72 hours.[51]

The al Quds Brigades fired rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Sderot in southern Israel on January 15.[52]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades announced the establishment of a “military council” on January 14 to plan attacks on Israeli targets “in every corner of the Earth.”[53] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that it would exact a severe cost on Israelis and that the United States would not be able to intervene. The militia also warned that its fighters would target Israeli civilians living in settlements until they all leave or are killed. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades reaffirmed its coordination with all other Palestinian militias and called on Palestinian political factions to unite against Israel.

Two West Bank residents conducted a car-ramming attack in Raanana on January 15, killing one civilian and wounding 17 others.[54] The driver of the vehicle stabbed one woman and hijacked her vehicle before conducting the ramming attack. The driver crashed the vehicle, hijacked a second vehicle, and continued to target civilians. No Palestinian militia has claimed responsibility for the attack. Hamas celebrated the attack and framed it as a “natural response” to Israeli activity in the West Bank.[55] Hamas frequently characterizes similar acts of violence as a consequence of Israeli activity in the West Bank.

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters five times across the West Bank, compared to the weekly average of nine attacks per day.[56] Palestinian militias in the West Bank did not claim any of the attacks.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.[57] LH targeted Israeli forces and military infrastructure along the Israel-Lebanon border.

LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech on January 14 detailing the state of the Israel-Hamas war and ongoing Iranian-backed escalation against the United States throughout the region.[58] Nasrallah claimed that Israel has failed to achieve any of its objectives in the Gaza Strip. Nasrallah added that Palestinian militias are still present in the Gaza Strip and that Hamas continues to administer the northern Gaza Strip as a governing body.[59] The United States reportedly warned Lebanon that Israel will launch a war if attacks into northern Israel do not stop according to Nasrallah.[60] He stated that LH attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel will continue. Nasrallah claimed the Houthi anti-shipping attack campaign in the Red Sea has dealt a severe blow to the Israeli economy.[61] He argued that the US and UK strikes on Houthi targets on January 11 will not deter this campaign.[62] Nasrallah reiterated the false, Houthi claim that the United States is threatening freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, not the Houthis.[63] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Houthis have conducted ”hundreds” of attacks targeting international shipping in the Red Sea with Iranian military and intelligence assistance.[64]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed four attacks on three US positions in Iraq and Syria on January 14 and 15.[65] The militia claimed that its fighters fired drones and rockets targeting Erbil International Airport in Iraq and Rmelan Landing Zone Conoco Mission Support Site in Syria on January 14.[66] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted a second attack targeting the Conoco Mission Support Site in eastern Syria on January 15.[67]

The Houthis continued attacking and harassing US naval forces and commercial shipping in the Red Sea on January 14 and 15. US fighter aircraft shot down an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) fired from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen toward the USS Laboon in the southern Red Sea on January 14.[68] The ASCM did not cause any injuries or damage. Houthi militants also fired an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) toward the Marshall Islands-flagged, US-owned and operated Gibraltar Eagle on January 15.[69] This attack marks the first time the Houthis have successfully attacked a US-owned or operated commercial vessel since the Israel-Hamas war began.[70] The ASBM struck the port side of the vessel but did not cause significant damage.[71] US forces detected a separate anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) fired toward commercial shipping lanes in the southern Red Sea on January 15.[72] The ASBM failed in flight and did not cause any injuries or damage.

These attacks followed the US and UK combined airstrikes on Houthi military facilities on January 11, which destroyed 20-30 percent of the Houthis’ offensive capability.[73] Houthi officials have vowed to continue attacking Israeli-owned and Israel-bound vessels following the airstrikes. Houthi spokesperson Mohammad Abdul Salem stated on January 15, for example, that US “threats and attacks” will not deter the Houthis from targeting Israel-linked ships.[74]

Two US Navy SEALs went missing on January 11 due to a mishap while searching for smuggled Iranian weapons intended for the Houthis in Yemen, according to two US officials familiar with the incident.[75] The two service members were preparing to board a ship off the coast of Somalia when one of them slipped from a ladder and another jumped into the water to help.[76] Two current and two former Pentagon officials told the New York Times on January 15 that the whereabouts of the two service members are still unknown.[77] US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby told CBS News on January 14 that the United States is working to disrupt Iran’s shipment of weapons to the Houthis.[78] Iran has provided technology, equipment, intelligence, and information to the Houthis for attacks targeting shipping in the Red Sea.[79] CTP-ISW assessed on December 31 that this Houthi campaign is part of a wider regional escalation by Iran and its so-called Axis of Resistance, which is intended to support Iranian strategic objectives in the region.[80]


Click here to read the full report.

Brian Carter, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  1. Israel Defense Forces units in the central Gaza Strip are isolating Maghazi.
  2. The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis City.
  3. The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip around Atatra and Beit Lahia.
  4. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated that Israel will continue its fight against Hamas until the IDF achieves a “complete victory.”
  5. Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s al Quds Brigades each conducted one rocket attack targeting southern Israel.
  6. Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces in five locations across the West Bank.
  7. Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  8. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks on US forces in northwestern Syria.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) units in the central Gaza Strip are isolating Maghazi. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on January 14 showed flattened terrain north, east, and south of Maghazi, indicating that Israeli armor and bulldozers operated in the area. The IDF Golani Brigade directed an airstrike targeting two Palestinian fighters who were moving toward Israeli troops in a building in Maghazi.[1]

The IDF continued clearing operations in Khan Younis City on January 14. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on January 14 showed flattened terrain southeast of Khan Younis City and within the city, indicating that Israeli armor and bulldozers operated in the area. The IDF 7th Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) captured a tunnel shaft in Khan Younis City on January 14.[2] Palestinian media reported IDF forces fighting south of Khan Younis City on January 13 and 14.[3]

The IDF continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip around Atatra and Beit Lahia on January 14. The IDF 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) destroyed rocket launch sites near Atatra on January 14.[4] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on January 14 showed flattened terrain northwest of Beit Lahia, indicating that Israeli armor and bulldozers operated in the area.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated on January 14 that Israel will continue its fight against Hamas until the IDF achieves a “complete victory.”[5] Netanyahu said that he told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken that the Israel-Hamas War is also the United States’ war because Israel is fighting Iran’s Axis of Resistance. Netanyahu’s stated war aims are destroying Hamas as a governing body and military force, rescuing the Israeli hostages, and “deradicalizing Palestinian society.”

Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s al Quds Brigades each conducted one rocket attack targeting southern Israel on January 14.[6]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces in five locations across the West Bank on January 14.[7] The al Qassem Brigades’ Jenin Battalion and the Jenin Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed multiple shooting and IED attacks targeting Israeli forces in Jenin.[8]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 14.[9] LH fighters killed an Israeli civilian and a member of the local security forces in Kfar Yuval.[10] Islamic Azz Brigades fighters, which may be front for LH, infiltrated into northern Israel under the cover of dense fog and clashed with Israeli forces at close range.[11] Five IDF soldiers were injured in the clashes and three infiltrating fighters were killed.[12]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks on US forces in northwestern Syria on January 13.[13] The group fired rockets at Rumaylan Landing Zone in Hasakah Province and launched drones at al Omar oil field in Deir ez Zor Province.

Iran Update, January 13, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Brian Carter, Ashka Jhaveri, Peter Mills, Amin Soltani, and Alexandra Braverman

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

CTP-ISW will be publishing an abbreviated update today, January 13, 2024 and tomorrow, January 14, 2024, pending regional events. We will cover major events on both days. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, January 15, 2024.

Key Takeaways:

  • The Iranian-backed Badr Organization announced the submission of a draft law that requires the removal of US forces from Iraq. This law aims to increase pressure on Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani and to force him to expel US forces from Iraq.
  • Israeli forces destroyed military infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip.
  • Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces in three locations across the West Bank.
  • Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  • The USS Carney launched Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles targeting a Houthi radar site at Dailami Airbase near Sana’a.
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a rocket attack targeting US forces at the Conoco facility in northwestern Syria

The Iranian-backed Badr Organization announced the submission of a draft law that requires the removal of US forces from Iraq. This law is part of Iran’s decades-old effort to expel US forces from Iraq and the region. Conquest Alliance MP Faleh al Khazali said that the law is the result of “the Americans’ continued violations of Iraqi sovereignty.”[1] The United States has not violated Iraqi sovereignty because it is conducting self-defense strikes against militias firing at US servicemembers. Khazali announced a draft law on January 13 that requires the removal of US forces from Iraq.[2] Conquest Alliance is the Badr Organization’s political arm in parliament. Eighty-eight parliamentarians signed the draft law, which is 77 signatures short of a majority. The law calls for the removal of US forces and the formation of a committee led by the prime minister to implement the law. The committee will present a report to the Iraqi parliament that will describe the “requirements for ending” the US force presence in Iraq.

This law aims to increase pressure on Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani and to force him to expel US forces from Iraq. Politico reported on January 9 that senior Iraqi advisors to Sudani told the US State Department that Sudani does not seek the expulsion of US forces.[3] The draft law’s inclusion of a prime minister-led committee increases the pressure on Sudani by forcing him to author a report detailing how Iraq would end the US presence in Iraq. The inclusion of this requirement is a key difference between the draft law and the 2020 nonbinding resolution that called for the expulsion of US forces.[4] Iranian-backed Iraqi proxy militias like the Badr Organization have been increasing political and military pressure on the United States in Iraq since late November 2023 as part of their effort to expel US forces from Iraq.[5]

The expulsion of US forces from Iraq will likely allow ISIS to resurge in Syria and then threaten Iraq within 12 to 24 months. The expulsion of US forces from Iraq would benefit ISIS by preventing US support to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The ISF still faces deficiencies in intelligence, logistics, and fire support.[6] The expulsion of US forces from Iraq would also require the US to end operations in Syria because US forces in Syria rely on Iraqi bases for their logistics and other support. CTP-ISW continues to assess that ISIS would likely resurge within 12-24 months in Syria without a US force presence and then threaten Iraq.[7]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces destroyed military infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said on January 13 that there are still Palestinian fighters operating in the northern Gaza Strip.[8] He added that Israeli forces are working to destroy them and the remaining military infrastructure there. The 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) located and destroyed rocket launchers during searches in Atatra.[9] The 646th Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) combat team located and destroyed two more rocket launchers in Mughraqa.[10]

The IDF 99th Division conducted clearing operations in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 13. The 179th Armored Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) ambushed a Hamas squad equipped with small arms in the central strip.[11] Geolocated footage posted on January 13 shows Israeli forces remotely demolishing a Hamas complex east of Deir al Balah.[12]

The military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Quds Brigades, clashed with Israeli forces using small arms, anti-armor munitions, and mortars in Bureij and Maghazi.[13] Palestinian media and locals reported that Israeli tanks advanced in Deir al Balah near the Shuhada al Aqsa Hospital on January 13.[14] The hospital is the last functioning hospital in the central Gaza Strip.[15]

The IDF 7th Armored Brigade is conducted clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 13. Israeli forces destroyed a tunnel shaft containing weapons and improvised explosive devices (IED) in Khan Younis.[16]

Palestinian militias used a variety of weapons to disrupt Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis city and east of the city on January 12. The al Qassem Brigades claimed nine attacks east of Khan Younis which suggests that the fighters belong to Hamas’ Eastern Khan Younis Battalion.[17] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on January 6 that Israeli forces are close to dismantling Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigades’ northern and eastern battalions.[18]

Palestinian militias conducted at least one indirect fire attack from the Gaza Strip into Israel on January 13. The al Quds Brigades fired rockets at Erez in southern Israel.[19] The al Qassem Brigades published footage of its fighters' firing rockets from the northern Gaza Strip toward unspecified locations in Israel.[20]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces in three locations across the West Bank on January 13.[21]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 13.[22]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The USS Carney launched Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles targeting a Houthi radar site at Dailami Airbase near Sana’a on January 13.[23] This attack is part of the United States’ effort to degrade the Houthi’s ability to attack maritime vessels transiting the Red Sea.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a rocket attack targeting US forces at the Conoco facility in northwestern Syria on January 12.[24]

Iran Update, January 12, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Peter Mills, Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Brian Carter, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, and Amin Soltani

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

Key Takeaways:

  1. The United States and the United Kingdom conducted joint strikes on January 11 that targeted Houthi military facilities to degrade the group’s capability to attack ships transiting the Red Sea.
  2. The Houthis will likely continue to attempt attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea because the January 11 airstrikes do not sufficiently threaten the Houthis’ position within Yemen.
  3. Palestinian militias in the northern Gaza Strip are disrupting Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations to destroy military infrastructure and secure areas bordering Israel.
  4. The IDF is conducting clearing operations in Bureij and Maghazi in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
  5. The IDF continued clearing operations in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip.
  6. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks targeting Israel on January 12.

The United States and the United Kingdom conducted joint strikes on January 11 that targeted Houthi military facilities to degrade the group’s capability to attack ships transiting the Red Sea. US aircraft, surface, and subsurface vessels launched over 100 precision-guided munitions that targeted more than 60 Houthi command and control, munitions depots, production facilities, air defense radar systems, and drone and missile launching systems in 16 locations across Yemen.[1] The UK Defense Ministry reported that four RAF Typhoons used precision-guided bombs to target Houthi drone and cruise missile launching positions in northwest Yemen.[2] The Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea said that US and UK forces carried out 73 raids across Yemen which killed five Houthi fighters and wounded six more.[3] The UK Defense Ministry reported that the Houthis’ ability to threaten international shipping "has taken a blow.”[4]

The Houthis will likely continue to attempt attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea because the January 11 airstrikes do not sufficiently threaten the Houthis’ position within Yemen. The Houthis said after the attacks that they would retaliate against the United States and the United Kingdom.[5] The Houthis aim to control all of Yemen. Houthi spokespersons said on January 12 that the airstrikes will not deter Houthi forces from supporting Palestine.[6] The Houthis launched an anti-ship ballistic missile targeting a Russian tanker south of Yemen on January 12.[7] The Houthis believe that attacks on international shipping help the group solidify its control in Yemen by demonstrating Houthi support to the Palestinian cause.[8]

The Houthis and their Iranian patrons continue to blame the United States for “escalating” in the region in response to the airstrikes.[9] Houthi spokespersons said on January 11 that the Houthis do not threaten international shipping in the Red Sea.[10] A former IRGC commander also warned that the strikes could escalate tensions in the region.[11] The United States and the United Kingdom did not escalate against the Houthis. The Houthis have conducted 27 piratical and terrorist attacks targeting international shipping in the Red Sea since October 17 without a response.[12] The United States and 11 partners warned the Houthis against further attacks on international shipping on January 3.[13] The Houthis conducted their largest and most complex attack to date on January 9 targeting HMS Diamond and US naval vessels after the warning.[14] The United States and the United Kingdom repeatedly called upon the Houthi movement to cease attacks prior to the strikes, including through a UN Security Council Resolution that called upon the Houthis to cease attacks in the Red Sea on January 10.[15]

Iranian officials and state media condemned the US-UK strikes on Houthi targets inside Yemen as a violation of international law and Yemen's sovereignty on January 12.[16] The Houthis are not the internationally recognized government of Yemen.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias in the northern Gaza Strip are disrupting Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations to destroy military infrastructure and secure areas bordering Israel. An Israeli Army Radio defense correspondent reported on January 6 that Israeli forces no longer permanently operate in the entire area of the northern strip and have moved to the border with Israel.[17] Israeli media began reporting in December that the IDF would transition to a third phase of operations that includes securing a buffer zone in the northern Gaza Strip and transitioning to targeted raids.[18] Palestinian militias are not destroyed in the northern Gaza Strip and maintain a limited presence in the northern Gaza Strip. The Economist reported on January 12 that Israeli forces recently found a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) underground tunnel network in Shujaiya neighborhood of Gaza City.[19] The Economist noted that Israeli forces were not previously aware of the network in the neighborhood, which is one kilometer from the border with Israel. An Israeli colonel said that the IDF has killed most of the local Hamas battalion commanders, but that dozens of fighters remain there and are now in “guerilla mode.”[20]

Other Palestinian militias threaten Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip. The military wing of the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, the Mujahideen Brigades, mortared Israeli forces west of Beit Lahia on January 12.[21] PIJ‘s military wing, the al Quds Brigades, claimed to conduct a multi-stage combined arms attack on an Israeli supply route south and east of Gaza.[22] The militia did not specify the exact location of the attack. The al Quds Brigades’ footage shows fighters observing Israeli armor, jeeps, and personnel and its fighters' firing mortars and rockets.[23] The militia claimed that it detonated a minefield targeting Israeli armor along the supply route. The military wing of Hamas, the al Qassem Brigades, has likely used a rear area in the central Gaza Strip to conduct several attacks on Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip since mid-December.[24] Israeli forces are actively clearing in the central Gaza Strip to dismantle the four Hamas battalions there.

The IDF is conducting clearing operations in Bureij and Maghazi in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 12. The IDF 414th Reconnaissance Battalion conducted a drone strike targeting a Palestinian fighter who fired at them from a building in Bureij.[25] The IDF 36th Division killed 20 Palestinian fighters on January 11 and 12, including a commander of Hamas’ Nukhba (Elite) Forces, and captured many weapons during clearing operations in Maghazi.[26]

Palestinian militias are attempting to defend against Israeli clearing operations in the Central Governorate. The self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli infantry as they advanced in Maghazi.[27] Palestinian media reported that Israeli bulldozers and tanks operated north of Nuseirat on January 12.[28] The military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the National Resistance Brigades, fired an RPG at an advancing Israeli vehicle northeast of Nuseirat.[29] The Mujahideen Brigades claimed that it clashed with Israeli forces and targeted Israeli armor using unspecified weapons east of Nuseirat.[30]

The IDF continued clearing operations in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on January 12. The IDF 98th Division directed airstrikes targeting a Hamas-controlled building and killed a commander in Hamas’ Nukhba Forces and six other Hamas fighters.[31] The IDF said that the Hamas Nukhba commander participated in attacks on Israeli towns near the Gaza Strip on October 7.[32] The 89th Commando Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) also killed three Hamas fighters in Khan Younis.[33] Israeli forces located weapons and RPGs in the area and destroyed a weapons cache.[34]

Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 12. The al Quds Brigades engaged Israeli forces in small arms clashes and fired an RPG targeting an Israeli bulldozer in Khan Younis City.[35] The al Quds Brigades also fired mortars targeting Israeli forces in central Khan Younis.[36] The al Quds Brigades said that it mortared Israeli forces in central Khan Younis in a combined operation with the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.[37]

The IDF said that Israeli forces have destroyed over 700 Hamas rockets and rocket launchers in the Gaza Strip since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.[38] The IDF said on January 12 that the IDF Golani Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) destroyed rocket launchers in a cemetery in the Gaza Strip.[39] The IDF said that it aims to destroy Hamas’ rocket launching capabilities in the Gaza Strip and stop Hamas rocket attacks into Israel.[40] The al Qassem Brigades have only conducted five rocket attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip since December 21, indicating that Israeli operations have degraded Hamas’ rocket capability.[41]

The IDF said on January 11 that Israeli forces continue to locate and destroy Hamas tunnels in the Gaza Strip.[42] The IDF reported that Hamas has spent tens of millions of dollars constructing hundreds of kilometers of tunnels.[43] Unspecified senior Israeli officials told The Economist on January 11 that the IDF has yet to destroy half of Hamas’ tunnels in the Gaza Strip.[44]

The Gaza Strip is experiencing a large-scale internet blackout. A Palestine-based communication company announced a complete interruption of cellular, fixed, and internet services on January 12.[45] NetBlocks later confirmed that most residents are unlikely to have telecom services.[46]

The al Quds Brigades fired rockets from the Gaza Strip targeting Ashdod in southern Israel on January 12.[47]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Several Palestinian militias targeted Israeli forces conducting a raid in Nour Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm on January 12. The al Qassem Brigades said that its fighters, alongside other militias, clashed with Israeli forces in Nour Shams refugee camp.[48] The Tulkarm Battalion of the al Quds Brigades detonated two types of IEDs on Israeli armor and a bulldozer operating in the camp.[49] The al Quds Brigade also fired small arms at Israeli infantry during the multi-hour Israeli operation.[50] The Tulkarm Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades targeted Israeli forces in the camp with IEDs and small arms.[51] The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade said that it prepared to confront the Israeli operation after a raid killed three militants in Tulkarm on January 9.[52]

Palestinian fighters also attacked Israeli targets elsewhere in the West Bank on January 12. Unspecified Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces with IEDs and small arms in two towns in Jenin Governorate on January 12.[53] Three Palestinian fighters infiltrated into an Israeli settlement west of Hebron and fired small arms at an IDF force and a civilian there.[54] Israeli forces arrested four people in the overnight West Bank raids.[55]

Palestinians demonstrated in Ramallah in support of Gaza, Lebanon, and the Houthis on January 12.[56] Hamas called for the Ramallah demonstrations.[57]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) claimed five attacks into northern Israel targeting Israeli forces on January 12.[58]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks targeting Israel on January 12. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq stated that it attacked an unspecified Israeli military target in the Golan Heights and an unspecified target in Eilat.[59]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Bart Eide discussed the combined US-UK airstrikes targeting Houthi military positions in Yemen during a phone call on January 12.[60] Abdollahian emphasized that the Houthis are a permanent actor in the Middle East’s regional security and reiterated prior calls for providing humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip. The Houthis are not the internationally recognized government in Yemen.

Abdollahian and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan discussed the Israel-Hamas war during a phone call on January 11.[61] The two discussed the provision of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, the South Africa-led International Court of Justice case against Israel. The two also discussed efforts to bring about an end to the Israel-Hamas War.

 

Iran Update, January 11, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  1. Israeli forces continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.
  2. The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in Khan Younis.
  3. Hamas and other unspecified Palestinian political factions discussed the state of the Israel-Hamas war in an “emergency national meeting,” which may signal that Palestinian political factions are considering re-opening indirect talks with Israel after talks froze on January 2.
  4. Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 11 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  5. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a rocket attack targeting US forces at al Shaddadi, Hasakah Province, Syria.[1]
  6. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stated that the Iraqi federal government will announce a start date soon for talks to remove US forces from Iraq during an interview with Saudi-owned al Arabiya.
  7. Houthi Spokesperson Mohammad Abdulsalam rejected United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2722 and announced that the Houthis will continue to target Israeli ships in the Red Sea.
  8. An online shipping tracker organization reported that the IRGC spy ship Behshad, which provides the Houthis with real-time intelligence has left the Red Sea and is en route to Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, Iran.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias claimed several attacks in the northern Gaza Strip on January 11. The military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al Quds Brigades, claimed to fire tandem-charge anti-tank rockets at an Israeli tank in Jabalia City. The group also said that it shot down an Israeli tactical reconnaissance drone in the same area.[2] A Palestinian journalist reported on January 9 that Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters clashed in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood bordering Jabalia City as Israeli forces “repositioned” in Gaza City.[3] Palestinian militias conducted nearly daily attacks targeting Israeli forces throughout December in Jabalia City, Jabalia refugee camp, and Sheikh Radwan.[4] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported on January 6 that it had “dismantled” the 12 Hamas battalions in the northern Gaza Strip.[5] Palestinian militias operating in the northern Gaza Strip remain capable of disrupting Israeli operations there, however.

The al Quds Brigades claimed on January 11 that its fighters returned from the front lines in Jabalia City and reported that they fired anti-tank rockets at Israeli armor and clashed at close range with Israeli ground forces.[6] The inability of these fighters to communicate with higher headquarters until returning to rear areas indicates that their commanders may be unable to transmit orders to fighters that are engaged with Israeli forces. Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) military wing, the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, have similarly reported that their fighters resumed contact with their command after returning from the front lines in the northern Gaza Strip.[7]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on January 11. The Golani Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) directed airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters in the Maghazi area.[8] A Yiftach Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) unit killed Palestinian fighters operating near a school in Maghazi that Palestinian fighters used for military activity.[9] The al Qassem Brigades conducted a multi-stage attack in Nuseirat targeting Israeli armor on January 11. The al Qassem Brigades first targeted Israeli armor with anti-tank rockets before mortaring the Israeli quick reaction force that responded to the initial engagement.[10] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades acknowledged the group’s military media commander was killed by an Israeli airstrike in Deir al Balah on January 11.[11]

The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 11. Israeli forces published footage of a tunnel system in Khan Younis that connects to an extensive underground network.[12] The IDF said that the tunnel is in the heart of a civilian area and cost Hamas hundreds of thousands of dollars to construct.[13] Israeli ground, engineering, and special operating forces (SOF) are leading the effort to locate and destroy tunnels in Khan Younis.[14] The IDF has located over 300 tunnel shafts and destroyed 100 of them.[15] Palestinian militias use the tunnels to conduct hit-and-run attacks targeting Israeli forces and to store weapons. The IDF Givati Brigade directed several airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis who were planting improvised explosive devices, observing Israeli forces, and exiting buildings where Israeli forces had found weapons.[16] The IDF 4th Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) engaged Palestinian fighters who previously fired anti-tank rockets at IDF forces.[17]

Palestinian militias continued to attempt to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis city and sectors south and east of the city on January 11. The al Qassem Brigades claimed that it detonated a Shawaz explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting an Israeli bulldozer east of Khan Younis City.[18] The al Qassem Brigades and al Quds Brigades conducted a combined attack on an Israeli command center east of Khan Younis City.[19] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah—published a video compilation on January 11 that showed its forces firing rockets and mortars at Israeli forces east of Khan Younis and in the central city area.[20] The al Qassem Brigades targeted an Israeli bulldozer surrounded by ground forces with an anti-tank IED and an anti-personnel IED south of Khan Younis City.[21] Israeli forces expanded clearing operations in southern Khan Younis on January 8.[22]

Hamas and other unspecified Palestinian political factions discussed the state of the Israel-Hamas war in an “emergency national meeting” on January 11.[23] The meetings and the statement that the parties issued afterward may signal that Palestinian political factions are considering re-opening indirect talks with Israel after talks froze on January 2.[24] The factions emphasized their continued unity and responded to Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s four-pronged security and governance plan for the Gaza Strip floated on January 4 that would place a US-led multinational task force in charge of “running civil affairs and the economic rehabilitation” in the strip.[25] The Palestinian factions emphasized that the governance of the Gaza Strip is a Palestinian issue. The factions said that this meant Israel and its supporters cannot ”impose guardianship” over the Palestinian people.[26] The Palestinian political factions last issued a joint statement on post-war plans and stipulations on December 27, which was before indirect talks between Israel and Hamas froze.[27]

The al Quds Brigades fired mortars from the Gaza Strip targeting Kissufim in southern Israel on January 11.[28] The number of indirect fire attacks conducted daily by Palestinian militias has decreased significantly since early December, which is consistent with the assessed degradation of their indirect fire capacity.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli forces in seven locations across the West Bank.[29] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed small arms clashes and IED attacks targeting Israeli forces during Israeli raids in Qalqilya and Jaba, south of Jenin on January 11.[30] The IDF stated that it killed a senior PIJ operative during the Jaba raids.[31] The al Quds Brigades separately claimed small arms clashes targeting Israeli forces in Jenin.[32] Other unspecified Palestinian fighters detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces during the Jenin raid.[33] Palestinian fighters threw explosives targeting an Israeli settlement near Hebron.[34]

Hamas called for Palestinians to march on the al Aqsa Mosque on January 12.[35] Hamas stated that this protest would challenge Israel’s restrictions on the number of people allowed to perform Friday prayers at the al Aqsa Mosque since October 7.[36] Hamas separately called for marches in solidarity with Gaza January 12-14.[37]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 11 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 11.[38] This number of attacks is consistent with daily attack rates in northern Israel during the past week. The IDF said that unspecified fighters fired 10 rockets from Lebanon into Kiriyat Shmona and that Israeli forces shot down three of the rockets.[39] A video of the attacks shows rockets damaging buildings in the town.[40] LH claimed the attack, adding that it launched dozens of rockets on Kiriyat Shmona in retaliation for an Israeli strike that killed two paramedics in Lebanon.[41] Unspecified fighters conducted anti-tank guided missile attacks targeting Israeli forces in Metulla and Adamit.[42] The IDF conducted multiple strikes on LH military infrastructure in southern Lebanon on January 11.[43]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

A member of the Iraqi Sovereignty Alliance, Youssef al Sabaawi, told Iraqi media on January 10 that the Iraqi parliament has reduced the list of potential candidates to replace former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi to three individuals.[44] The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court issued a ruling to remove Halbousi from Parliament in November 2023.[45] CTP-ISW assessed that the court removed Halbousi as part of Iranian-backed efforts to reduce US influence in Iraq.[46] The Council of Representatives will vote for a new speaker on January 13.[47] Sabaawi told Iraqi media that the following individuals are among the three candidates most likely to become parliament speaker:

  • Mahmoud al Mashhadani: Mashhadani was elected to the Council of Representatives in 2005 as a member of the Iraqi Accord Front, also known as Tawafuq.[48] Mashhadani co-founded the Iraqi National Dialogue Council (INDC), a Sunni political party.[49] Mashhadani served as parliament speaker between April 2006 and December 2008 under former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and reportedly has a strong relationship with Maliki.[50] Maliki heads the State of Law Coalition. Iraqis elected Mashhadani as an MP representing Baghdad Governorate in October 2021.[51] Mashhadani is currently part of the Sunni-dominated Azm Alliance, which is headed by Muthanna al Samarrai.[52] The Shia Coordination Framework supports Samarrai.[53] Samarrai supports Mashhadani to become parliament speaker.[54] The Azm Alliance won 14 seats in the October 2021 parliamentary elections.[55] An individual needs an absolute majority (50 percent plus 1) of votes to become parliament speaker.[56]
  • Salem al Issawi: Issawi was a member of the Anbar Governorate Council between 2010 and 2014.[57] Issawi is a member of US-sanctioned and Iran-linked businessman Khamis al Khanjar’s Sovereignty Alliance[58] He is also a member of the Leadership Alliance, which includes both the Sovereignty Alliance and Halbousi’s National Progress Alliance.[59] Khanjar—who is a longtime rival of Halbousi—supports Issawi.[60] Issawi served in the Council of Representatives between 2014-2018.[61] Former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi reportedly prevented Issawi from obtaining a seat in parliament in 2018 although he was a winner in the 2018 elections.[62] Issawi has been a representative for Fallujah, Anbar Province, in the Council of Representatives since 2021 and is a member of the Integrity Committee.[63]

Iraqi media reported that a third likely candidate to replace Halbousi is Shaalan al Karim.[64] Karim is the head of the Albu Issa tribe, an important Sunni Arab tribe in Iraq.[65] Karim was born in Samarra, Salah al Din Province, and heads Halbousi’s National Progress Alliance in this province.[66] Iraqi state media reported on January 11 that Halbousi supports Karim to become parliament speaker.[67]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a rocket attack targeting US forces at al Shaddadi, Hasakah Province, Syria, on January 11.[68]

Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stated that the Iraqi federal government will announce a start date soon for talks to remove US forces from Iraq during an interview with Saudi-owned al Arabiya on January 11.[69] Hussein described both Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and US self-defense strikes on these militias as “unacceptable.” Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on January 5 the formation of a committee to facilitate the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. US forces are deployed in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government to fight ISIS.[70]

Houthi Spokesperson Mohammad Abdulsalam rejected United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2722 and announced that the Houthis will continue to target Israeli ships in the Red Sea.[71] The UNSC passed Resolution 2722 on January 10. The resolution demands that the Houthis cease all attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea.[72] Abdulsalam claimed that there is no threat to international navigation in the Red Sea. The Houthi movement claims that it is only targeting Israeli-owned or Israel-bound vessels.[73] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted ships with no connection to Israel.

The resolution also condemned unspecified actors for violating UNSC Resolution 2216 by directly or indirectly supplying military materiel and/or personnel to the Houthi Movement.[74] US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken reported that Iran has provided technology, equipment, intelligence, and information to the Houthis for attacks targeting shipping in the Red Sea.[75] Blinken said that the Houthis have conducted “hundreds” of attacks in the Red Sea since November 2023. CTP-ISW assessed on December 31 that this Houthi campaign is part of a wider regional escalation by Iran and its so-called Axis of Resistance which is intended to support Iranian strategic objectives in the region.[76]

The Artesh Navy seized the Greek-owned, Marshall Islands-flagged Saint Nikolas crude oil tanker in the Gulf of Oman on January 11.[77] Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled media said that the seizure was a retaliation against the United States after the US Navy seized the same tanker and then offloaded the ship’s Iranian crude oil in April and August 2023.[78] The Saint Nikolas was formerly known as the Suez Rajan. The United States seized the Suez Rajan in April 2023 and offloaded its oil in August 2023 to enforce US unilateral sanctions on Iranian oil exports.[79] Senior Iranian military officials vowed in July and September 2023 that Iran would retaliate against the United States after the US Navy seized and offloaded Iranian oil from the tanker in April and August 2023.[80]  The Artesh and IRGC navies seized several commercial tankers in the Persian Gulf from April to July 2023 in response to the US seizure. These seizures caused a US military buildup in and around the Persian Gulf during the same period.[81] CTP assessed in August 2023 that the Iranian regime may seize additional commercial vessels in response to the US Navy’s seizure of the Suez Rajan.[82]

An online shipping tracker organization reported that the IRGC spy ship Behshad has left the Red Sea and is en route to Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, Iran on January 11.[83] The Behshad is an IRGC intelligence gathering ship stationed off the Dahlak archipelago in the Red Sea.[84] The Wall Street Journal reported on December 22, 2023 that the Behshad provides the Houthis with real-time intelligence, which enables the Houthis to target ships that have gone silent to avoid detection.[85] Western media and officials also said that the IRGC is helping the Houthi forces plan and execute the movement’s drone and missile attacks on ships in the Red Sea.[86] The IRGC has likely used the Behshad and its predecessor, the Saviz, to provide new systems and intelligence to the Houthis to facilitate Houthi operations in the Red Sea prior to this round of escalation.[87] Iran and the IRGC have also hosted and trained Houthi military forces.[88]

The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence provided a detailed report on January 11 covering the ISKP fighters who conducted the January 3 Kerman attack.[89] Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi claimed that the Ministry thwarted “thousands” of operations like the ISKP attack in Kerman.[90]  The Intelligence Ministry claimed a Tajik national was the main planner of the attack. The ministry claimed that local smugglers helped the ISKP-affiliated individual enter Iran illegally on December 19 from Iran’s southeastern border. The Intelligence Ministry further claimed that one of the suicide bombers was an Israeli national with Tajik citizenship, which is a continuation of Iran’s information effort to link Israel and the Islamic State.

The Intelligence Ministry also linked the ISKP terror attack in Kerman to Afghanistan.  The Ministry claimed that ISKP trained one of the attackers at an ISKP training camp in Badakhshan Province, Afghanistan. Badakhshan borders Tajikistan. CTP-ISW previously assessed that ISKP established a support zone in Badakhshan Province.[91] CTP-ISW previously assessed that ISKP terrorist attacks inside Iran will likely exacerbate tensions between Iran and the Afghan Taliban.[92]


 

Click here to read the full report with maps.

Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Nicole Wolkov, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

Key Takeaways:

  1. Hamas published several videos of its operations in the northern Gaza Strip, messaging that it still has a military presence there. The al Qassem Brigades and other Palestinian militias are not destroyed in the northern Gaza Strip and maintain a limited presence there, especially around southern Gaza City.
  2. A Palestinian journalist reported that Israeli forces “repositioned” themselves in Gaza City after withdrawing from several areas in the city over the past two weeks.
  3. The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip. Palestinian militias continued attempting to defend against Israeli clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.
  4. The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip. The Israel Defense Forces said that it completed operations in Khuzaa, south of Khan Younis.
  5. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in an interview with NBC News that normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel is still possible.
  6. Israeli media reported that the latest Qatari proposal for a ceasefire agreement would include exiling Hamas leaders from the Gaza Strip.
  7. Palestinian fighters attacked Israeli forces conducting raids in five locations in the West Bank. Hamas Political Bureau leaders have in recent days called attention to violence and Israeli raids in the West Bank.
  8. Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted two attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 10, compared to the weekly average of around nine attacks.
  9. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani is attempting to balance pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi actors to expel US forces from Iraq with his administration’s reported desire to sustain the US-led coalition presence in Iraq.
  10. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for three attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria.
  11. The Houthis conducted their largest and most complex attack yet into the Red Sea.
  12. Iran has reportedly developed a new Shahed drone for Russian forces to use against Ukraine and is “close” to providing Russia with surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and systems.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Hamas published several videos of its operations in the northern Gaza Strip, messaging that it still has a military presence there. Hamas’ military wing—the al Qassem Brigades—published these videos on January 9 and 10.[1] The footage features various al Qassem Brigades operations, including the capture of an Israeli drone in Beit Lahia, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks on Israeli armor and dismounted infantry in the northwestern Gaza Strip and southern Gaza City, and an ambush on Israeli soldiers in a tunnel in Sheikh Radwan dating to late December 2023.[2] Hamas’ political wing similarly messaged on January 9 that the group retains a strong and cohesive command-and-control network in the Gaza Strip.[3] CTP-ISW has repeatedly assessed, however, that Hamas has lost command-and-control over some units that are engaged with Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip.[4]

The al Qassem Brigades and other Palestinian militias are not destroyed in the northern Gaza Strip and maintain a limited presence there, especially around southern Gaza City.[5] Israeli forces began clearing operations in southern Gaza City in late October 2023 to isolate the northern Gaza Strip from the rest of the territory.[6] The IDF announced on November 18, 2023, that Israeli forces expanded clearing operations to Zaytoun and began targeting fighters and infrastructure belonging to the Hamas’ Zaytoun Battalion.[7] Palestinian militias have continued conducting occasional attacks on Israeli forces in Zaytoun since then, despite the IDF announcing on January 6 that it had “dismantled” the 12 Hamas battalions in the northern Gaza Strip.[8] The commander of the Zaytoun Battalion is one of the three Hamas commanders remaining in the Gaza City Brigade, who held their current positions before the war began, according to IDF reports on December 21, 2023.[9] Palestinian fighters in the Zaytoun Battalion probably have access to a rear area and safe haven in the Gaza Strip’s Central Governorate, given its proximity to where the battalion operates and the fact that the IDF has not completed clearing operations.[10]

A Palestinian journalist reported on January 9 that Israeli forces “repositioned” themselves in Gaza City after withdrawing from several areas in the city over the past two weeks.[11] The journalist said that Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in Sheikh Radwan and Zaytoun in Gaza City.[12] The IDF confirmed on December 31 that it withdrew five brigades from the northern Gaza Strip and said that it would transition to limited raids in the area.[13] Israeli forces have degraded several Hamas units and rendered others combat ineffective since the beginning of the clearing operations, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip. Hamas’ military forces are neither defeated nor destroyed at this time, however.

Hamas fighters in the northern Gaza Strip may be attempting to fix Israeli forces in the area to prevent any Israeli attempt redeploy forces southward. A fix is a tactical mission task wherein “a commander prevents the enemy from moving any part of that force from a specific location for a specific period.”[14]

The IDF continued clearing operations in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 10. The IDF Golani Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) directed an airstrike targeting fighters in Maghazi and located over 15 militia tunnels in the area.[15] The Golani Brigade also located platforms for launching rockets, missiles, and drones and destroyed an RPG manufacturing system in Maghazi. Palestinian sources said that an Israeli airstrike targeted an ambulance in Deir al Balah and killed four members of the ambulance crew.[16]

Palestinian militias continued attempting to defend against Israeli clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on January 10. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah—clashed with Israeli forces in central Maghazi.[17] The al Quds Brigades—the military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—fired an RPG at an Israeli Merkava tank north of Nuseirat.[18] The National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—fired mortars at Israeli vehicles northwest of Bureij.[19]

The IDF continued clearing operations in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on January 10. The IDF 55th Brigade (assigned to the 98th Paratroopers Division) has targeted fighters from Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade in recent days.[20] The IDF located a drone launch site, weapons, and a tunnel shaft in Khan Younis. The IDF also directed airstrikes on four Hamas sites in the area, including a Hamas operational headquarters.[21] The IDF 4th (Kiryati) Brigade Combat Team identified a Palestinian fighter who planted an IED in Khan Younis and directed an airstrike to eliminate the fighter.[22] The IDF Air Force conducted strikes killing over ten Palestinian fighters in Khan Younis.[23] The 98th Paratrooper Division also killed dozens of fighters during clashes in Khan Younis.[24]

The IDF engaged several Palestinian militias in clashes in Khan Younis. The al Qassem Brigades fired mortars at Israeli forces south of Khan Younis.[25] The al Quds Brigades fired mortars at Israeli forces in Khan Younis.[26] The National Resistance Brigades clashed with Israeli soldiers in the Jourat al Lot neighborhood of Khan Younis.[27]

The IDF said that it completed operations in Khuzaa, south of Khan Younis, on January 10.[28] The IDF began combat operations in Khuzaa on December 27, 2023.[29] The IDF said that its 5th Brigade (assigned to the 143rd Division) killed dozens of Hamas fighters and destroyed hundreds of Hamas infrastructure, including weapons depots, rocket launching positions, and tunnels in Khuzaa.[30] The IDF said Hamas’ fighters used the infrastructure in Khuzaa to conduct attacks on Nir Oz, Nirim, and Ein HaSlosha in southern Israel on October 7.[31]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in an interview with NBC News on January 10 that normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel is still possible.[32] Blinken said that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman supports advancing the normalization process in a recent meeting.[33] An Israeli journalist reported that Blinken told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during their meeting on January 9 that Saudi Arabia intends to continue normalization with Israel only if Israel agrees to a two-state solution after the Israel-Hamas war.[34] Blinken said in a press conference after meeting with Netanyahu that Israeli leaders will have to make ”difficult decisions” if Israel “wants its Arab neighbors to make difficult decisions to ensure its security.”[35]

Israeli media reported on January 10 that the latest Qatari proposal for a ceasefire agreement would include exiling Hamas leaders from the Gaza Strip.[36] The Israeli security cabinet is discussing the proposal, which also involves Hamas releasing all Israeli hostages in stages and Israeli forces withdrawing from the Gaza Strip.[37] The proposal is incompatible with Israel’s stated war aims, which includes the destruction of Hamas, demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, and “deradicalization of Palestinian society.”[38]

Palestinian militias did not claim any indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on January 10.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters attacked Israeli forces conducting raids in five locations in the West Bank on January 10.[39] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed a series of small arms clashes and IED detonations targeting Israeli armor and dismounted infantry in Jenin, Nablus, and al Dhahiriya.[40] The Nablus Battalion of the al Quds Brigades also participated in the Nablus clashes.[41] Israeli forces uncovered over 180 IEDs during the raids and detained 14 wanted Palestinians.[42]

Hamas Political Bureau leaders have in recent days called attention to violence and Israeli raids in the West Bank. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh claimed on January 9 that Israeli forces have killed over 350 Palestinians in the West Bank since October 7, describing Israeli actions there as “dangerous and major.”[43] Osama Hamdan—Hamas’ senior representative to Lebanon—similarly condemned on January 10 Israeli raids that destroy homes and infrastructure in the West Bank.[44] Israeli forces uncovered over 80 road buried IEDs intended to target Israeli armor and dismounted infantry in Jenin on January 10.[45]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah on January 10. Blinken told Abbas that the United States supports “tangible steps” toward establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel.[46] The leaders also discussed reforming the PA and improving how it governs.[47] Palestinians demonstrated against Blinken’s visit in Ramallah.[48] A Fatah leader separately called for Abbas to cancel his meeting with Blinken.[49]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted two attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 10, compared to the weekly average of around nine attacks. LH conducted attacks both targeting Israeli military facilities near Margaliot and al Jardah.[50] The IDF reported that the LH attack targeting al Jardah did not cause any damage.[51]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani is attempting to balance pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi actors to expel US forces from Iraq with his administration’s reported desire to sustain the US-led coalition presence in Iraq. Sudani stated that his administration seeks a “quick and orderly” exit of US-led coalition forces from Iraq during an interview with Reuters on January 9.[52] Sudani described the presence of US-led coalition forces as “destabilizing” and claimed that Iraq can fight terrorism without international support. This claim ignores the fact that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) still faces significant deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics that inhibit their ability to defeat ISIS alone.[53] CTP-ISW continues to assess that an Iraqi decision to expel US forces from Iraq would very likely create space for ISIS to rapidly resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq.[54] Sudani also stated that Iraq remains open to engaging in security cooperation with the United States, including having the United States advise and train the ISF. The United States formally ended its combat mission in Iraq in December 2021 and transitioned to a solely advisory role.[55]

Sudani’s statements to Reuters contradict a report from Politico on January 9 that said that Sudani has privately informed US officials that he wants US forces to remain in Iraq.[56] Politico, citing a US State Department cable, reported that Sudani announced on January 5 the formation of a committee to facilitate the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in order to "satisfy domestic political audiences." The Politico report is consistent with US Department of Defense Press Secretary Major General Patrick Ryder’s saying on January 8 that the Iraqi federal government has not notified the department about any decision to expel US forces from Iraq.[57]

This episode is the latest in the long-standing Iranian effort to drive US forces out of Iraq. Iran and its Iraqi clients and partner groups have tried repeatedly in recent years to catalyze a US exit. Each attempt to remove US forces from Iraq since they returned to fight ISIS has failed up to this point. The most recent efforts have involved Iranian-backed factions and militias using attacks and legal mechanisms to force the United States to withdraw militarily, on which CTP-ISW has reported extensively.

There is no guarantee that these latest Iranian-backed efforts will continue to fail, as they have historically. Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are pursuing their campaign to catalyze a US departure with renewed energy. US policymakers cannot assume that the US military position in Iraq is secure, as the Middle East has undergone tectonic shifts in recent months.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for three attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria on January 10. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed that it conducted an unspecified attack targeting US forces near Himu in northeastern Syria.[58] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has not claimed an attack on Himu since the Israel-Hamas war began. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed a rocket attack targeting US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor Province, Syria, and a drone attack targeting US forces at Erbil International Airport in Erbil Province, Iraq.[59]

The Houthis conducted their largest and most complex attack yet into the Red Sea on January 9.[60] The Houthis claimed that they targeted an unspecified US naval vessel and framed the attack as retaliation for the United States killing 10 Houthi fighters as they tried to hijack a commercial vessel on December 31.[61] US and UK naval forces intercepted 18 one-way attack drones, two anti-ship cruise missiles, and an anti-ship ballistic missile fired by the Houthis.[62] CENTOM reiterated that the Houthis bear responsibility for any of the consequences for their continued attacks in the Red Sea.[63]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war and security in the Red Sea in a phone call with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, on January 9.[64] Abdollahian called for an end the fighting in the Gaza Strip. Abdollahian also implicitly blamed Israel for Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. Lavrov claimed that the United States is using the Houthi attacks as a pretext to expand its military presence in the Middle East. The Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry’s readout of the call did not include Abdollahian’s statements regarding a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[65]

The PIJ Representative to Iran, Nasser Abu Sharif, discussed the Israel-Hamas war in an interview with IRGC-affiliated media on January 10.[66] Sharif claimed that Israel is in a state of weakness and will become even weaker if it decides to fight Iran and LH. Sharif further claimed that Israel does not have the power to confront LH and cannot expand the war into Iraq, Lebanon, or Yemen. Sharif emphasized that LH will never allow Israel to ”change the rules of the game.”

Salafi-jihadi group Jaish al Adl claimed responsibility for an attack on a police outpost near Rask, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on January 10.[67] This attack marks the third that Jaish al Adl has conducted since December 2023.[68] Jaish al Adl killed one Iranian Law Enforcement Command officer in the attack. Iranian state media reported that Jaish al Adl militants tried and failed to enter the police station. Jaish al Adl previously claimed responsibility for an attack on a Rask police station, killing 11 Iranian security personnel on December 15, 2023.[69] CTP-ISW assessed that Jaish al Adl was also responsible for an IED targeting an IRGC special operations forces unit in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on December 19, 2023.[70]

Note: The following text also appears in CTP-ISW's Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 10, 2024 update.

Iran has reportedly developed a new Shahed drone for Russian forces to use against Ukraine and is “close” to providing Russia with surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and systems. An unspecified security source told Sky News in an article published on January 10 that Iran has developed an “explosive and reconnaissance” Shahed-107 drone and has offered “a few units” to Russia for over $2 million.[71] The source stated that the Shahed-107 has a range of up to 1,500 kilometers and has a video livestream transmitter.[72] ISW recently observed reports that Russian forces had launched a new Shahed model, the Shahed-238, which is different from the Shahed-107, against Ukraine.[73] Sky News’ source also stated that Russia is expecting to receive surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and systems from Iran ”sometime soon.”[74] US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby reported on January 4 that Russian officials continue efforts to buy ballistic missiles from Iran.[75] ISW assessed that Russia may be intensifying efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad because these missiles appear more effective at striking targets in Ukraine in some circumstances.[76] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the development of a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, trade cooperation, the construction of the Rasht-Astara railway in Iran, and the Israel-Hamas war among other topics in a January 9 phone call.[77]



Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  1. A Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organization invited Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh to deliver a major speech at its General Assembly in Doha. Haniyeh laid out his most comprehensive argument to date about Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel and appealed for donations and weapons transfers.
  2. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed several attacks on Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.
  3. The Israel Defense Forces continued clearing operations in Maghazi and Bureij in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
  4. Israeli forces expanded clearing operations in some urban areas of southern Khan Younis City. Palestinian militias continued attempting to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis.
  5. Israeli and Egyptian delegations met in Cairo to discuss resuming talks on the release of hostages and a ceasefire agreement.
  6. Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip.
  7. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in nine locations across the West Bank.
  8. Lebanese Hezbollah conducted a one-way drone and rocket attack targeting the IDF Northern Command headquarters in Safed, Israel. Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine other attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  9. The Israel Defense Forces killed Lebanese Hezbollah Air Force Commander for Southern Lebanon Ali Hussein Burji in an airstrike in southern Lebanon.
  10. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reiterated that Israel’s top priority is enabling displaced Israeli citizens to return to their homes in northern Israel in a meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
  11. The Iraqi federal government continues to fail to protect US forces, who are deployed to fight the Islamic State, from Iranian-backed militia attacks while also rejecting the United States’ right to defend its servicemembers in Iraq. Politico reported that senior advisers to the Iraqi prime minister privately told US officials that he seeks to keep US forces in Iraq.
  12. Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Jafar al Husseini warned that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would help Lebanese Hezbollah fight Israel if war erupted between Israel and Hezbollah.
  13. The Jordanian Royal Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian-linked drug smuggling operations in southern Syria. This airstrike is part of growing Jordanian operations against these smuggling networks.

A Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organization invited Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh to deliver a major speech at its General Assembly in Doha on January 9.[1] Haniyeh spoke at the International Union of Muslim Scholars’ “Al Aqsa Flood and the Role of the Ummah” conference.[2] A senior Muslim Brotherhood scholar founded the International Union of Muslim Scholars in 2004 in DublinThe scholar later moved the organization to Qatar.[3]  Anti-Muslim Brotherhood countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, have listed the organization’s founder on their terror lists before his death.[4]  Hamas released pictures of Haniyeh seated beside the organization’s president, highlighting Haniyeh’s prominence at the conference.[5]

Haniyeh laid out his most comprehensive argument to date about Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel and appealed for donations and weapons transfers during his speech.[6] He claimed that Hamas was forced to employ “non-traditional means” against Israel due to 1) the local and international marginalization of the Palestinian issue, 2) the election of an “extremist” Israeli government that wanted to further displace Palestinians and control the al Aqsa Mosque, and 3) the regional normalization and integration of Israel.[7] Other Hamas officials have made similar arguments about the regional and international marginalization of the Palestinian issue since October 7.[8] Haniyeh framed supporting Hamas as a religious duty and asked the international audience at the conference to give Hamas financial and military support[9] He also called for the conference attendees to form delegations to lobby governments in their respective countries to support Hamas.[10]

Haniyeh also reiterated Hamas’ negotiating position. Haniyeh said that Hamas’ hostage negotiation position remains “all for all,” meaning that Hamas wants Israel to release all its Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Hamas releasing the Israeli hostages.[11] He also claimed Israel that had not freed a single hostage alive through military means in the Gaza Strip.[12] Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have repeatedly emphasized that Israel’s ground and air campaign in the Gaza Strip is killing Israeli hostages rather than freeing them.[13] Haniyeh asserted that Hamas’ command-and-control networks remain strong and cohesive.[14] CTP-ISW has contrastingly assessed that Hamas faces command-and-control issues with its fighters in some areas of the Gaza Strip.[15] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said that it has ”dismantled” 12 Hamas battalions in the northern Gaza Strip, and an Israeli “surgical strike” killed Haniyeh’s deputy, Saleh al Arouri, in Beirut on January 2.[16] Haniyeh claimed that Israel’s objective to destroy Hamas is unattainable, primarily because ”Hamas exists in Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and in the diaspora.”[17]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed several attacks on Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on January 9. The al Qassem Brigades fired small arms, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli dismounted infantry and vehicles in Zaytoun.[18] The group published an undated video on January 9 that showed an al Qassem Brigades fighter detonating an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) from a tunnel, targeting Israeli forces in Zaytoun.[19] The al Qassem Brigades also said that it exploded two tunnel entrances south of Zaytoun as Israeli forces approached them.[20]

The IDF continued clearing operations in Maghazi and Bureij in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 9. The IDF Golani Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) directed an airstrike in Maghazi targeting al Qassem Brigades fighters in Hamas’ Central Gazan Brigade.[21] The al Qassem Brigades said that it fired sniper rifles targeting Israeli forces east of the Bureij refugee camp.[22] The al Quds Brigadesthe militant wing of PIJ—claimed separately that it fired RPGs targeting Israeli forces east of the Bureij refugee camp.[23] The al Quds Brigades also published a video on January 9 that shows its fighters firing mortars targeting Israeli dismounted infantry and vehicles in the eastern and northern areas of the central Gaza Strip.[24]

Israeli forces expanded clearing operations in some urban areas of southern Khan Younis City on January 9. The al Qassem Brigades began claiming attacks on Israeli armor and dismounted infantry south of Khan Younis City on January 9.[25] Commercially available satellite footage shows flattened terrain that is consistent with the movement of Israeli armor in southern Khan Younis City. Israeli forces frequently use bulldozers to clear terrain to establish defensible positions in urban environments in the Gaza Strip. The IDF published videos on January 9 that showed its troops “deepening the operational grip in the south of the Gaza Strip” on January 9.[26] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on January 9 that the IDF would intensify its operations in the southern Gaza Strip until it frees hostages and kills Hamas leaders.[27] 

Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis destroyed Palestinian militant infrastructure and weapons on January 9. The IDF 98th Division killed approximately 40 Palestinian fighters and located tunnel shafts and weapons caches during clearing operations in Khan Younis.[28] The IDF Givati Brigade captured Hamas ammunition, small arms, and paraphernalia during a raid targeting the Islamic University in Khan Younis.[29] The brigade also located near the university weapons caches that contained about 100 mortars, four EFPs, grenades, and Hamas battle maps.[30] The 900th Kfir Brigade Combat Team ([BCT] Assigned to the 99th Division) clashed with Palestinian fighters as the BCT raided buildings containing weapons.[31] The Maglan Unit captured small arms, grenades, ammunition and Hamas intelligence and military manuals in civilian homes in Khan Younis.[32]

Palestinian militias continued attempting to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 9. The al Qassem Brigades claimed attacks on Israeli armor and dismounted infantry south and east of Khan Younis City.[33] The spokesperson of the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—said on January 9 that its fighters had conducted 25 ”combat missions” with a range of weapons against Israeli forces in central and eastern Khan Younis.[34] The al Quds Brigades mortared an Israeli field headquarters northeast of Khan Younis.[35] The al Quds Brigades also targeted Israeli infantry in a house with thermobaric grenades and small arms.[36] The National Resistance Brigade—the militant wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—detonated an IED targeting Israeli forces during fighting in central Khan Younis.[37]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli War Cabinet in Tel Aviv on January 9.[38] Blinken stressed the need to avoid civilian harm and protect civilian infrastructure in the Gaza Strip. Blinken and Netanyahu also discussed efforts to release Israeli hostages and increase humanitarian aid to civilians in the Gaza Strip.

Israeli and Egyptian delegations met in Cairo on January 9 to discuss resuming talks on the release of hostages and a ceasefire agreement.[39] Indirect talks between Israel and Hamas froze on January 2 after Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri in Beirut.[40]

Three senior Egyptian officials told Reuters on January 9 that Egypt rejected an Israeli proposal for combined Israeli-Egyptian monitoring of the Philadelphi Corridor, which is a narrow land route dividing Egypt from the Gaza Strip.[41] Israeli officials “asked to participate“ in monitoring the corridor with Egypt using new, Israeli-procured monitoring technology. The Egyptian sources said that Egypt is prioritizing a new ceasefire agreement as “the necessary foundation for discussions about post-war Gaza,“ including discussions on the corridor.

The Egyptian position on a ceasefire is similar in some respects to Hamas‘ position on negotiations in that both seek a ceasefire before further discussions on the post-war Gaza Strip. Hamas has repeatedly demanded that Israel agree to a ceasefire and to withdraw its forces from the Gaza Strip before any further discussions on Israeli hostages and the war. The ceasefires proposed by both Hamas and Egypt are incompatible with Israel’s stated war aims, which includes the destruction of Hamas, demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, and “deradicalization of Palestinian society.”[42] The ceasefire proposed by Egypt would leave room for Hamas to insert itself into discussions on the post-war Gaza Strip. CTP-ISW assessed on December 28, 2023, that previous Egyptian peace efforts would allow Hamas to influence a post-war Gaza Strip.[43]

Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on January 9. The National Resistance Brigades fired rockets barrages at unspecified locations in southern Israel.[44] Israeli media separately reported a rocket attack on Sderot.[45]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in nine locations across the West Bank.[46] The IDF conducted raids in Tulkarm overnight on January 9.[47] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that its fighters ambushed Israeli forces in Tulkarm refugee camp, killing and wounding an unspecified number of Israeli soldiers.[48] The Tulkarm Battalion and Rapid Response unit of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces in Tulkarm and Tulkarm refugee camp during the raids.[49] The al Quds Brigades similarly said that its fighters attacked Israeli forces in Tulkarm refugee camp. The brigades also claimed that it damaged at least one military vehicle during the fighting.[50] The IDF reported that it killed several Palestinian fighters who attacked Israeli troops in Tulkarm on January 9.[51] Several hundred Palestinian men demonstrated during a funeral procession for the fighters. The Palestinian Authority identified the fighters as members of the al Quds Brigades.[52]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted a one-way drone and rocket attack targeting the IDF Northern Command headquarters in Safed, Israel, on January 9.[53] LH said that the attack was retaliation for Israel killing Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri and LH Radwan Unit Deputy Commander Wissam Hassan al Tawil on January 2 and 8, respectively.[54] IDF Army Radio acknowledged that a drone exploded at the IDF Northern Command headquarters but caused no casualties.[55]

Iranian-backed militias, including LH, conducted nine other attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 9.[56] LH targeted Israeli forces and military infrastructure and surveillance equipment with anti-tank guided munitions and other unspecified weapons. The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting LH headquarters and other unspecified military infrastructure in Yaroun and Kafr Kila in southern Lebanon.[57]

The IDF killed LH Air Force Commander for Southern Lebanon Ali Hussein Burji in an airstrike in southern Lebanon on January 9.[58] The airstrike targeted Burji while he attended the funeral for LH Radwan Unit Deputy Commander Wissam Hassan al Tawil.[59] Israeli media reported that Burji was responsible for dozens of drone attacks into northern Israel since the Israel-Hamas war began, including the January 9 LH attack on the IDF Northern Command headquarters.[60] 

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reiterated that Israel’s top priority is enabling displaced Israeli citizens to return to their homes in northern Israel in a meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on January 9.[61] Gallant warned on January 4 that there is little time left for Israel and LH to find a diplomatic solution that would satisfy Israel’s security concerns around the Israel-Lebanon border and allow Israeli citizens to return to their homes in northern Israel.[62]  Israeli officials have said repeatedly that they aim to find a diplomatic solution to push LH forces north of the Litani River, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, but that Israel will resort to military force if diplomatic efforts fail.[63]

Lebanon’s caretaker prime minister, Najib Mikati, told senior UN officials on January 9 that he is ready for talks regarding long-term stability along the Israel-Lebanon border.[64] The Lebanese government has thus far failed to compel LH to implement UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Israel-LH war and mandates LH’s withdrawal north of the Litani River.[65]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Iraqi federal government continues to fail to protect US forces, who are deployed to fight the Islamic State, from Iranian-backed militia attacks while also rejecting the United States’ right to defend its servicemembers in Iraq.

  • The United States struck a rocket launcher in al Baghdadi, Anbar Province on January 8 to thwart an attempted Iranian-backed attack on US forces at Ain al Asad airbase.[66] The rocket launcher had at least two rockets prepared to launch toward the base.[67] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed responsibility for 28 attacks targeting US forces at Ain al Asad airbase since October 2023.
  • Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid met with US Ambassador Alina Romanowski on January 9 to discuss the presence of US-led coalition forces in Iraq.[68] Rashid stated that the presence of US-led coalition forces in Iraq “must be within the framework of supporting the [Iraqi] Security Forces in the areas of training and providing consultations.” Iranian-backed Iraqi actors, including Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, have frequently accused the United States of exceeding its advisory capacity and conducting “military actions” that “violate” Iraqi sovereignty.[69] These claims ignore the fact that the United States has the right to act in self-defense to protect its forces deployed in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government to fight ISIS.[70] The United States ended its combat mission in Iraq in December 2021 and currently provides operational and logistical support to the Iraqi Security Forces.[71]

Politico reported on January 9 that senior advisers to the Iraqi prime minister privately told US officials that he seeks to keep US forces in Iraq.[72] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani formed a committee on January 5 to facilitate the expulsion of US-led coalition forces from Iraq. Politico reported that it “obtained” a January 6 US State Department cable that said that senior Sudani advisers told US officials that he was trying “to satisfy domestic political audiences,” which likely referred at least in part to Iranian-backed militias and political factions. but that Sudani sought to negotiate the US-led coalition’s continued presence in Iraq.[73]

US Department of Defense Press Secretary Major General Patrick Ryder stated on January 8 that the Iraqi federal government has not notified the department about any decision to expel US forces from Iraq.[74] Ryder added that the United States does not have any “plans to plan” for the withdrawal of its approximately 2,500 troops from Iraq. Ryder emphasized that the United States remains “very focused on the defeat-ISIS mission.” US forces are present in Iraq for counter-ISIS operations at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government.[75] CTP-ISW previously assessed that an Iraqi decision to expel US forces will very likely create space for ISIS to rapidly resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq.[76]

Kataib Hezbollah spokesperson Jafar al Husseini warned that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would help LH fight Israel if war erupted between Israel and LH during an interview with LH-affiliated outlet al Maydeen on January 9.[77] Husseini stated that Iraqi militias would be “present in the field in numbers and equipment” and stand “shoulder to shoulder with the Lebanese people” in the event of an Israel-LH war.[78] Husseini also warned the United States against attacking the Houthis in Yemen.

Husseini added that Iraqi militias will continue to confront US forces in the region even after the end of the Israel-Hamas war.[79] This statement is consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iran and the Axis of Resistance are exploiting the Israel-Hamas war to try to fulfill Iran’s longstanding strategic objective of forcing a US military withdrawal from Iraq and Syria.[80]

Husseini discussed the expansion of the Axis of Resistance in the coming years. Husseini said that “resistance” groups in Bahrain will play a “clearer” role in the Axis of Resistance in the coming years and “upcoming confrontations.” Husseini also indicated that unspecified countries in East Asia and the Caucasus may join the Axis of Resistance in the “next decade.” Husseini may have been referring to Azerbaijani Shia militants, such as those in the IRGC-affiliated Husseiniyoun Brigade, when he mentioned the Caucasus.[81] Husseini finally claimed that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will “confront” the United Arab Emirates for playing a “malicious role” in helping Israel establish a transit corridor between Haifa and Dubai.

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh expressed support for the transfer of security responsibilities from the Defense Ministry to the Interior Ministry in a statement on January 9.[82] The Iraqi Army Chief of Staff recently announced that the Iraqi army will complete the transfer of security responsibilities from the Defense Ministry to local police in 2024.[83] Fayyadh additionally praised the Iraqi federal government for its efforts to expel US forces from Iraq.

The Jordanian Royal Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting Iranian-linked drug smuggling operations in southern Syria on January 8.[84] The strikes targeted a farm that Jordanian officials suspected of storing drugs in Malah, Suwayda Province and Iran-linked drug smugglers in Shaab and Arman, Suwayda Province.

This airstrike is part of growing Jordanian operations against these smuggling networks. Jordanian forces have clashed with Iranian-backed smugglers along the Jordan-Syria border twice in recent weeks—once in December 2023 and again on January 6, 2024.[85] The Jordanian Royal Air Force has similarly conducted three strikes targeting Iranian-backed smuggling operations in southern Syria since May 2023, including a strike on January 4.[86] A strike in May 2023 targeted an LH member responsible for smuggling Captagon into Jordan.[87] Western and Jordanian officials blamed LH and other Iranian-backed militias for increased drug smuggling into Jordan.[88] The Syrian regime, LH, and other Iranian-backed militias mass produce Captagon in Syria and smuggle it through Jordan to the Gulf Arab states. This smuggling and distribution cartel generates billions of dollars in revenue for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[89] 

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on January 9 for punishing the “real perpetrators and those behind the scenes” of the December 3 Islamic State terrorist attack.[90] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State, known as Islamic State Khorasan Province, claimed responsibility for the attack on January 5.[91] The Supreme Leader’s website re-emphasized the false regime narrative that United States and Israel created the Islamic State.[92] Khamenei also reiterated his commitment to expelling the United States from the region and destroying the Israeli state.

Iraqi Kurdish media reported that the Iranian naval forces detained an Emirati tanker heading to Iraq.[93] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this report. Iranian state media and officials has not reported on this purported event. Iraq’s only major port is near Basra, which is along the Persian Gulf. Shafaq additionally reported that Iranian naval forces are scrutinizing the tanker’s documents.

Iran Update, January 8, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Ashka Jhaveri, Kathryn Tyson, Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm EST 

 Key Takeaways:

  1. PIJ released a video on January 8 showing one of its Israeli hostages appealing for a renewed hostage exchange with Israel, which is an effort to pressure the Israeli government to agree to a ceasefire.
  2. IDF spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari reported on January 8 that the war “shifted to a stage” that will involve fewer ground forces and airstrikes in the Gaza Strip.
  3. The IDF killed a senior commander in LH’s Radwan Unit, Wissam Hassan al Tawil, in an airstrike on January 8.
  4. Tawil’s death in southern Lebanon indicates that LH is not complying with UNSC Resolution 1701, which mandates that LH cannot deploy military forces south of the Litani River. UNSC Resolution 1701 ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War.
  5. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba spokesperson Hussein Moussawi stated that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted an attack targeting Haifa, Israel, on January 7 to signal to Israel its ability to attack targets “beyond [Haifa].”
  6. An Iraqi official close to the Shia Coordination Framework claimed on January 7 that the framework recently “authorized” Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to discuss the removal of US forces from Iraq with the US Government.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias are continuing to report attacks in the northern Gaza Strip to their higher headquarters after their fighters return to rear areas. The delays in reporting may indicate a loss of command and control over some units that are engaged with Israeli forces, as CTP-ISW previously assessed.[1] Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, claimed on January 8 that its fighters “returned from the [frontlines in northwest Gaza City]” and reported that they fired anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Engineering Corps armored personnel carrier.[2] These fighters' inability to communicate with higher headquarters until returning to rear areas means that their commanders may be unable to transmit orders to fighters engaged with the IDF. These possible difficulties in command and control extend to other Palestinian militia groups fighting in the northern Gaza Strip. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) military wing, the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, claimed on January 8 that it reestablished ”contact with combat units” and confirmed that its fighters targeted three IDF vehicles with unspecified weapons in Tuffah in the northern Gaza Strip.[3]

The IDF continued clearing operations in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 8. The IDF 179th Armored Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) located a tunnel shaft, weapons, and thousands of dollars in an unspecified area in the central Gaza Strip.[4] The Golani Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) and 188th Armored Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) located a weapons production facility in Bureij that the IDF said was the largest weapons facility that Israeli forces have discovered since the Israel-Hamas war began.[5] The IDF reported that the facility included long-range rockets, explosives materiel, drones, light weapons, and tunnel shafts 30 meters underneath the facility. The al Qassem Brigades claimed that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces that attempted to recover a Hamas-held hostage in the central Gaza Strip on January 8.[6] The Golani Brigade called in an airstrike targeting a weapons depot containing long-range rockets in Maghazi.[7]

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (DFLP) military wing, the National Resistance Brigades, was the only militia that claimed attacks on Israeli forces in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 8. The militia said that its forces clashed with Israeli forces with “heavy weapons” northeast of Deir al Balah.[8]

The IDF 7th Armored Brigade expanded clearing operations in southern Khan Younis on January 8.[9] Israeli forces searched military infrastructure near civilian homes and uncovered a tunnel shaft in the area of a school.[10] Palestinian fighters fired RPGs at Israeli forces that returned fire with tanks and air support.[11] Israeli special operations forces (SOF) located more than ten Palestinian fighters who were launching rockets into Israeli territory and directed a drone strike on their position.[12] The IDF 55th Paratrooper Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) targeted several Palestinian fighters who emerged from buildings in Khan Younis on January 8.[13] The Israeli Air Force conducted airstrikes on 30 targets, including underground tunnels and weapons depots, in Khan Younis on January 8.[14]

Palestinian militias continued attempts to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 8. The al Qassem Brigades claimed that it conducted four attacks on Israeli infantry and armor in Khan Younis on January 8.[15] The militia detonated an anti-personnel improvised explosive device and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces inside a school in Khan Younis City.[16] The al Quds Brigades clashed with Israeli forces using small arms and RPGs as Israeli forces advanced in the northern, eastern, and central areas of Khan Younis.[17] The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades fired RPGs at Israeli forces in central and eastern Khan Younis City.[18]

PIJ released a video on January 8 showing one of its Israeli hostages appealing for a renewed hostage exchange with Israel, which is an effort to pressure the Israeli government to agree to a ceasefire.[19] Palestinian militias’ demands for a renewed hostage-for-prisoner deal include the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and an end to the war, neither of which are compatible with Israeli war aims.[20] Israeli Army Radio reported that the hostage referenced information in recent Israeli media.[21]

IDF spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari reported on January 8 that the war “shifted to a stage” that will involve fewer ground forces and airstrikes in the Gaza Strip.[22] Hagari’s comments to the New York Times are consistent with the reports of Israeli forces withdrawing reservists from the Gaza Strip and transitioning to targeted raids in the northern Gaza Strip.[23] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told the Wall Street Journal on January 7 that Israeli forces would shift from the “intense maneuvering phase of the war” to special operations.[24] Gallant cautioned that the conflict “will last for a longer time” as Israel has not abandoned its stated war objectives.

The World Health Organization (WHO) halted a medical aid delivery to the northern Gaza Strip on January 7 in the absence of safety guarantees.[25] This marked the fourth cancellation since December 26 of the mission to sustain operations at five hospitals in the north. The WHO said that heavy bombardment, restrictions on movement, and interrupted communications make delivering medical supplies regularly and safely across the Gaza Strip, particularly in the north “nearly impossible.”[26] Israeli forces are clearing areas in Bureij and Nuseirat In the central Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias conducted three rocket attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on January 8. The al Qassem Brigades fired a rocket salvo targeting Tel Aviv.[27] The al Qassem Brigades have only conducted four rocket attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip since December 21, indicating that Israeli operations have degraded Hamas’ rocket capability.[28] The al Quds Brigades separately fired rockets targeting Sderot and Nir Aam in southern Israel on January 8.[29]

 West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters 13 times across the West Bank on January 8.[30] This level of attacks is consistent with daily attack counts in the West Bank over the past week. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms targeting Israeli forces seven times in major cities in the West Bank including Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarm.[31] The Tulkarm Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms at Israeli forces at an Israeli checkpoint in Tulkarm.[32] Unspecified Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in Beit Ummar, north of Hebron.[33] The IDF said that it arrested ten wanted individuals and seized weapons during operations across the West Bank.[34]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

The IDF killed a senior commander in LH’s Radwan Unit, Wissam Hassan al Tawil, in an airstrike on January 8.[35] LH-affiliated media Al Mayadeen reported that Tawil was a senior commander and that he is responsible for many attacks against IDF targets on the Israel-Lebanon border since the start of the Israel-Hamas war on October 7.[36] LH said that Tawil assisted in planning and reconnaissance operations in southern Lebanon since 1992He also participated in the planning for the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers along the Israel-Lebanon border, which sparked the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.[37]Tawil was involved in LH weapons manufacturing and oversaw the Radwan Unit’s operations in southern Lebanon, according to Israeli and Western reporting.[38] LH denied that Tawil was the commander of the Radwan Unit.[39] LH's Radwan unit was established by the IRGC Quds Force and is the group’s special operations forces unit focused on infiltrating Israeli territory.[40] Israeli media reported that the IRGC Quds Force, particularly the Sabeerin Commando Battalion, provides the Radwan Unit with military and financial support.[41] The Sabeerin Battalion specializes in military intelligence.[42] Anonymous LH officials told the Wall Street Journal that LH transferred Tawil from Syria to southern Lebanon approximately one month ago.[43] The IDF did not confirm if Tawil was the target of an Israeli airstrike.

Tawil’s death in southern Lebanon indicates that LH is not complying with UNSC Resolution 1701, which mandates that LH cannot deploy military forces south of the Litani River. UNSC Resolution 1701 ended the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War.[44] Multiple senior Israeli officials have said that Israel seeks a diplomatic agreement to implement UNSC Resolution 1701 and push LH military units north of the Litani River.[45] These officials have said that they will resort to military means if diplomatic means fail.[46] Israeli media reported in late December that LH began withdrawing its Radwan Unit from the Israel-Lebanon border, and some IDF officials reported that the IDF believed that airstrikes targeting LH fighters had forced LH to withdraw some of its forces northward.[47] Tawil’s presence in southern Lebanon suggests that at least some elements of the Radwan Unit, including senior leaders, remain in southern Lebanon to plan and execute attacks against Israel.

Iranian-backed fighters, including LH, conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 8.[48] LH targeted Israeli military infrastructure and soldiers with anti-tank guided munitions, rockets, and other unspecified weapons.[49] The IDF reported it intercepted a "suspicious aerial target” that crossed from southern Lebanon into Israeli airspace near Kiryat Shmona.[50]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted a one-way drone attack targeting US forces in Syria on January 8. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeted US forces stationed at the Rumaylan Landing Zone in Syria.[51]

The IDF said on January 8 that it killed a Hamas commander in Syria responsible for launching rockets from Syria into northern Syria.[52] The IDF targeted Hamas commander Hassan Akasha in Beit Jin, Rif Dimashq Governorate, Syria. This strike demonstrates that Hamas has the necessary infrastructure and personnel in southern Syria to target Israel.

Western media reported on January 8 that Israel intensified its air campaign in Syria over the last three months, killing 19 LH members there.[53] Reuters reported that the number of LH members killed in Israeli airstrikes over the last three months is double the amount of LH members killed during the rest of 2023 combined. Israeli media reported on December 28 that recent Israeli airstrikes in Syria targeted IRGC and IRGC-affiliated actors facilitating Iranian weapons shipments to LH.[54] Israeli media added on December 30 that Iran accelerated its weapons transfers to LH in anticipation of a wider war with Israel.[55] An Israeli airstrike targeting the IRGC’s military headquarters in Sayyidah Zainab, Syria, on December 25 killed a senior IRGC commander who oversaw Iranian materiel shipments to LH.[56]

President Ebrahim Raisi re-emphasized the Iranian regime narrative that the United States and Israel created ISIS at a meeting with the Speaker of the National Assembly of Tajikistan Rostam Imam Ali on January 8.[57] Raisi said that fighting terrorism, organized crime, and drugs is one of the “requirements” of Iranian-Tajik cooperation.[58] Raisi added that Iran and Tajikistan face “common issues” as neighbors of Afghanistan. The Afghan branch of the Islamic State, known as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), claimed responsibility for the Kerman terrorist attack on January 4.[59] The Iranian Intelligence Ministry said on January 5 that one of the two bombers responsible for the attack was a Tajik national who traveled from abroad to conduct the attack.[60] An ISKP member and Tajik national conducted a separate terror attack targeting the Shah Cheragh Shrine in Shiraz, Fars Province in August 2023.[61] Iran opened a drone production facility in Tajikistan in May 2022 as part of its counterterrorism and security cooperation with Tajikistan.[62]

IRGC-affiliated media reported that Iranian security forces killed a purportedly Jaish al Adl-affiliated individual in Bampur City in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on January 8.[63] IRGC-affiliated media linked the individual to the December 15 Jaish al Adl attack on a police headquarters in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[64] Jaish al Adl was also likely responsible for an IED attack near Zahedan on December 19.[65]Jaish al Adl also attacked a police station in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province in July 2023.[66]

A UK-based, Middle East-focused outlet reported that LH Representative to Iraq Mohammad Hussein al Kawtharani traveled to Baghdad on January 5 to “coordinate an escalation in operations” against US forces in Iraq.[67] The outlet reported that Kawtharani told Iranian-backed Iraqi factions that the Axis of Resistance should do everything possible to remove the United States from Iraq. Kawtharani’s visit to Baghdad on January 5 marks his first trip to Iraq in two years.[68] His visit also coincides with LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s speech on January 5 in which Nasrallah called on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to expel US forces from Iraq.[69] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Kawtharani in August 2013 for promoting LH’s interests in Iraq, including LH’s efforts to provide “training, funding, political, and logistical support to Iraqi sectarian armed groups.”[70] The US State Department announced in April 2020 that Kawtharani “facilitates the actions of groups operating outside the control of the Government of Iraq that have violently suppressed protests, attacked foreign diplomatic missions, and engaged in wide-spread organized criminal activity.”[71]

Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba spokesperson Hussein Moussawi stated that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—conducted an attack targeting Haifa, Israel, on January 7 to signal to Israel its ability to attack targets “beyond [Haifa].”[72] Moussawi made this statement in an interview with LH-affiliated outlet al Mayadeen on January 8. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed on January 7 that it conducted a long-range cruise missile attack targeting Haifa.[73] Moussawi claimed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq seeks to disrupt US “plans” in the Middle East and Israeli “occupation efforts” in the Gaza Strip. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has previously claimed attacks on targets outside of Iraq and Syria. The group claimed an unspecified attack targeting a “vital target” in the Mediterranean Sea in late December 2023, for example.[74] CTP-ISW assessed at the time that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Axis of Resistance more broadly were signaling their capability and willingness to attack maritime targets beyond just the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.[75]

An unspecified source told Iraqi media on January 7 that many “armed Iraqi factions” have vacated their headquarters and military sites in urban areas following the January 4 US self-defense strike that killed a senior Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba (HHN) official.[76] “Armed Iraqi factions” very likely refers to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, given the context of the January 4 US strike that killed a senior HHN official. The unspecified source also told Iraqi media that some Iraqi militia leaders are periodically changing their place of residence to avoid being targeted. The United States reported that the HHN official, Mushtaq Jawad al Jawari, was “actively involved in planning and carrying out attacks against US personnel.”[77]

An Iraqi official close to the Shia Coordination Framework claimed on January 7 that the framework recently “authorized” Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to discuss the removal of US forces from Iraq with the US Government. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties. Members of the framework have increasingly pressured Sudani to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in recent weeks. This statement is noteworthy given that the Shia Coordination Framework does not have the authority to direct Sudani’s actions.

Two unspecified small craft approached a commercial vessel 50 nautical miles southeast of Mokha, Yemen on January 8. Mokha, Yemen is controlled by the UAE-backed, pro-Yemeni government National Resistance Forces. The two boats did not display any weapons and did not engage the commercial vessel.[78]

Iran Update, January 7, 2024

Click here to read the full report with Maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Amin Soltani, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

Key Takeaways:

  1. The Israel Defense Forces announced that it “dismantled” the 12 Hamas battalions in the northern Gaza Strip. CTP-ISW has warned that the third phase of Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip, as described, will very likely enable Hamas to reconstitute itself militarily.
  2. The Israel Defense Forces reported that it uncovered evidence of Iran training Hamas in constructing precision munitions in the Gaza Strip.
  3. The Nahal Brigade Combat Team located a Palestinian compound with dozens of rocket launchers in Beit Lahia.
  4. The Golani Brigade continued conducting clearing operations in Maghazi and Bureij in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
  5. The Kfir Brigade continued conducting clearing operations in Khan Younis.
  6. Former IDF Military Intelligence Directorate chief Amos Yadlin reported that the IDF knows where Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar is located but that he has surrounded himself with many of the remaining hostages, which complicates Israeli targeting.
  7. The al Quds Brigades fired five rocket salvos from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel.
  8. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters ten times across the West Bank.
  9. Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted 14 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  10. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted a long-range cruise missile attack targeting Haifa. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also conducted two one-way drone attacks on US positions in Iraq and Syria.
  11. Unspecified actors conducted an airstrike targeting an Iranian-backed militia convoy reportedly transferring military equipment in Albu Kumal, Syria. Israel has conducted an air campaign in Syria in recent months meant to disrupt Iranian military transfers into the Levant.
  12. The Jordanian armed forces reported that they eliminated five Iranian-backed militia members attempting to smuggle drugs and weapons into Jordan from southern Syria.
  13. IRGC Quds Force officer Brigadier General Eraj Masjedi stated that the Palestinian militias will eventually obtain unspecified “defensive weapons” that would prevent Israel from conducting airstrikes into the Gaza Strip.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on January 6 that it “dismantled” the 12 Hamas battalions in the northern Gaza Strip. IDF officials added that they have dismantled Hamas’ “military framework” in the northern Gaza Strip.[1] An Israeli Army Radio defense correspondent reported on January 6 that Israeli forces no longer permanently operate in the entire area of the northern strip and have moved to the border with Israel.[2] IDF spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari said on January 6 that the IDF would focus on the central and southern parts of the Gaza Strip and strengthen defenses along the Israel-Gaza Strip border fence.[3] These announcements are consistent with the IDF stating that it would establish a security buffer zone in the northern Gaza Strip in the third phase of its operations. This third phase also involved Israeli forces conducting raids against Hamas compounds, destroying tunnels, killing remaining fighters, seizing intelligence and military equipment.[4] CTP-ISW assessed on December 22 that, in Hamas’ Northern Strip Brigade and Gaza City Brigade, three battalions are combat ineffective, eight are degraded, and one is combat effective.[5] CTP-ISW assesses that the al Qassem Brigades’ Radwan Battalion is degraded but not combat ineffective. Israeli forces captured a Hamas compound in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood of Gaza City on January 2.[6] The militia has not claimed attacks in the neighborhood since December 30, 2023.[7]

CTP-ISW warned on January 2 that the third phase of Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip, as described, will very likely enable Hamas to reconstitute itself militarily.[8] Israeli forces have degraded several Hamas units in the northern Gaza Strip, as noted above. But Hamas’ military forces are neither defeated nor destroyed at this time.[9] Palestinian militias continued to operate in the northern Gaza Strip and have targeted Israeli forces in areas where Israel has degraded the local Hamas units.[10]

The IDF reported on January 7 that its forces uncovered indications of Iran training Hamas in constructing precision munitions in the Gaza Strip. The IDF Nahal Brigade Combat Team (assigned to the 162nd Division) conducted raids in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods of Gaza City.[11] The unit and Israeli special operations forces (SOF) located a Hamas tunnel shaft that led to a 100-meter-long tunnel containing a weapons production site. Israeli forces found components of precision weapons and shared images of what it said are the rocket engine and warhead designed for a Hamas cruise missile. The IDF said the components prove that Hamas ”studied under Iranian guidance how to operate and build precision components and strategic weapons.”[12] Iran funded, supported, and provided the weapons and training used in the October 7 attacks, in addition to providing sums of military aid to Hamas in recent years.[13]

The Nahal Brigade clashed with Palestinian fighters in Daraj and Tuffah on January 7 during raids.[14] The brigade commander reported that his forces have encountered many Palestinian fighters in the last few days and found tunnels and rocket launchers. An Israeli drone and combat helicopter provided close air support to the ground forces.

Palestinian militias did not claim any attacks on Israeli forces in Daraj and Tuffah on January 7. Palestinian fighters shot at Israeli forces in Tuffah on January 6, interrupting an interview with an IDF company commander.[15] The interview took place on the Marzouk Street in Tuffah, close to Shujaiya neighborhood in Gaza City.[16]

The Nahal Brigade Combat Team located a Palestinian compound with dozens of rocket launchers in Beit Lahia on January 7. Palestinian fighters had fired rockets into southern Israel earlier this week from the compound.[17] The Nahal Brigade destroyed the compound during the raid.[18] The launch demonstrates that Palestinian militias in the northern Gaza Strip retain some capacity to fire rockets into Israel, despite Israeli operations. Israeli forces advanced into Beit Lahia to conduct clearing operation on December 31.[19]

The IDF Golani Brigade (assigned to the 36th Division) continued conducting clearing operations in Maghazi and Bureij in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 7. Israeli forces located a tunnel shaft containing large quantities of weapons in Maghazi.[20] The IDF 646th Paratroopers Brigade Combat Team (assigned to the 99th Division) also operated in the central Gaza Strip on January 7 to uncover Hamas infrastructure.[21] An Israeli Army Radion correspondent reported on January 6 that Israeli forces are reportedly on the outskirts of Nuseirat and Maghazi.[22]

Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against Israeli clearing operations in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip on January 7. Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, mortared Israeli forces as they advanced into Maghazi.[23] The militia also fired an anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) at Israeli armor and published footage of the attack.[24] The Palestinian Islamic Jihad‘s (PIJ) military wing, the al Quds Brigades, mortared an Israeli position on the forward line of advance in Maghazi.[25]

The al Qassem Brigades reported attacks in Bureij only after its fighters returned to rear areas.[26] CTP-ISW assessed on January 6 that the delays in reporting to higher headquarters may indicate a loss of command-and-control over some al Qassem Brigades units engaged with Israeli forces.[27] An Israeli Army Radio corresponded noted that Israeli forces are still fighting with the Hamas battalion in Bureij on January 6.[28] The IDF reported on January 7 that it identified four Hamas SOF members loading weapons into a vehicle and subsequently conducted a drone strike on their position.[29] Israeli forces also killed an armed Palestinian fighter who advanced toward the Israeli forces in the area.[30]

The IDF Kfir Brigade continued conducting clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 7. Israeli forces operating in Bani Suhaila east of Khan Younis City recently encountered a five-man Hamas cell and directed an airstrike onto their position.[31] In another instance, Israeli forces found a large cache of weapons of grenades, improvised explosive devices (IED) and RPGs hidden inside UNRWA bags.[32] The Kfir Brigade destroyed over 100 targets in Khan Younis, including observation and anti-tank launch positions, tunnel shafts, and underground passages.[33] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on January 6 that Israeli forces are close to dismantling Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigades’ northern and eastern battalions.[34] The IDF reported on January 4 that it has significantly damaged specifically the command-and-control of the Hamas’ northern and eastern battalions.[35]

Palestinian militias continued attempting to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 7. The al Qassem Brigades mortared Israeli forces advancing in Khan Younis City.[36] The al Quds Brigades mortared Israeli soldiers and vehicles in al Katiba, Khan Younis.[37] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) militant wing, National Resistance Brigades, clashed with Israeli forces near Mahatta, Khan Younis.[38]

Former IDF Military Intelligence Directorate chief Amos Yadlin reported that the IDF knows where Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar is located but that he has surrounded himself with many of the remaining hostages, which complicates Israeli targeting.[39] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said that Hamas continues to use civilians as human shields, which intentionally puts these civilians in harm's way, to protect itself.[40] The IDF believes that Sinwar is hiding underground in the southern Gaza Strip.[41]

The Qatari prime minister told families of US and Israeli hostages in Doha that Israel killing of senior Hamas official Salah al Arouri in Beirut has made efforts to secure a hostage-for-prisoner deal much more difficult.[42] A Qatari official and unspecified Israeli source told Axios on January 7 that the Qatari prime minister hosted the families of six hostages in Doha.[43] The prime minister told the families that it is more difficult to talk to Hamas since Arouri's death on January 2. Arouri was involved in Qatar-mediated talks with Israel over a possible ceasefire in the war and further releases of Israeli hostages before his death.[44]

The al Quds Brigades fired five rocket salvos from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on January 7. The militia claimed to target Nahal Oz, Sufa, and Holit in one salvo and Sderot and Nir Aam in others.[45] Israeli Army Radio reported red alerts in town surrounding the Gaza Strip after a 17-hour lull of indirect fire attacks.[46]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters ten times across the West Bank on January 7.[47] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and al Quds Brigades engaged Israeli forces in small arms clashes and detonated IEDs targeting these forces in and around Jenin.[48] The IDF said that an IED attack in Jenin killed an Israeli Border Police officer and wounded several others.[49] Israel responded by conducting a drone strike and killing at least six fighters in Jenin.[50] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, al Quds Brigades, and Hamas released statements mourning the fighters.[51] Hamas called for an escalation in "resistance activities” in the West Bank.[52] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine said that the West Bank is ”entering a new phase” and called on fighters in the West Bank to intensify attacks on Israeli forces.[53]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 14 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 7.[54] LH claimed six attacks targeting Israeli forces and military infrastructure on the Israel-Lebanon border with rockets and anti-tank munitions.[55]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed on January 7 that it conducted a long-range cruise missile attack targeting Haifa.[56] Israel has not commented on the claimed attack at the time of publication. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. Palestinian and LH-affiliated media claimed the cruise missile landed in Haifa bay.[57] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed an attack targeting an unspecified Israeli military target in the Golan Heights.[58]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted two one-way drone attacks on US positions in Iraq and Syria on January 7. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted a one-way drone attack on US forces stationed at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq.[59] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also conducted a one-way drone attack on US forces stationed at Qasrak base, Hasakah Province, Syria.[60]

Unspecified actors conducted an airstrike targeting an Iranian-backed militia convoy reportedly transferring military equipment in Albu Kumal, Syria, on January 7.[61] The truck reportedly entered Deir ez Zor Province from Iraq, which is a common ground route through which the IRGC transfers military equipment and personnel into the Levant.[62] Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish media claimed that the truck was transporting unspecified weapons and that several Iranian-backed militants were injured in the strike.[63]

Israel has conducted an air campaign in Syria in recent months meant to disrupt Iranian military transfers into the Levant.[64] Israel has conducted several airstrikes on the Aleppo and Damascus international airports, which are critical nodes through which the IRGC transfers military commanders and materiel into Syria.[65] Israel also killed Razi Mousavi, a senior IRGC officer who oversaw military transfers to the Levant, on December 25.[66]

Unidentified actors separately hacked the flight schedule monitors at Beirut International Airport on January 7 and displayed messages stating that the IRGC and LH are exploiting the airport for weapons transfers.[67]

The Jordanian armed forces reported that they eliminated five Iranian-backed militia members attempting to smuggle drugs and weapons into Jordan from southern Syria on January 6.[68] Jordanian officials expressed concern at the rise in such incursions and accused the Syrian regime of failing to stem Iranian-run smuggling networks. The Jordanian Air Force similarly conducted counternarcotics airstrikes on two towns in southern Syria on January 4.[69] The Jordanian Air Force last conducted strikes on Iranian-backed targets in Syria on December 18, 2023, and similarly struck the house of another LH-linked drug smuggler in Shaab in May 2023.[70] Iranian-backed militias and parts of the Syrian regime enable and profit from the drug trade in southern Syria.[71]

IRGC Quds Force officer Brigadier General Eraj Masjedi stated on January 7 that the Palestinian militias will eventually obtain unspecified “defensive weapons” that would prevent Israel from conducting airstrikes into the Gaza Strip.[72] Masjedi was presumably referring to air defense systems and implying that the IRGC Quds Force could provide them. Masjedi is a senior and well-connected member of the IRGC Quds Force. He currently serves as a senior adviser to the overall IRGC Quds Force commander and was previously the Iranian ambassador to Iraq.[73] Iranian leaders have long appointed senior IRGC Quds Force officers to this position, demonstrating the control and influence the IRGC Quds Force has over Iranian policy toward Iraq.

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani published an open letter to Ismail Haniyeh discussing the Israel-Hamas war on January 7.[74] Ghaani claimed that Israel is attempting to lessen its defeat in the Gaza Strip and West Bank by assassinating “resistance commanders.” Ghaani expressed his condolences to Haniyeh regarding Israel killing Saleh al Arouri on January 2.[75] Ghaani also claimed that the world will soon witness how the “brothers” of Arouri will become a “nightmare” for Israel.[76]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the Israel-Hamas war during a phone call with his French counterpart, Catherine Colonna, on January 6.[77] Abdollahian said that the only way to prevent the war from becoming a larger regional conflict is by addressing the root causes.[78] Colonna told Abdollahian that Iran and its proxies must stop their destabilizing activities.[79]

Southern Kerman Province Prosecutor Mehdi Bakhshi said that state security services have arrested 23 individuals in connection with the January 3 Islamic State terror attack.[80] The official specified that these individuals have been arrested over several months, implying that they were connected to a broader network rather than a discrete attack. Bakhshi added that security services have found 16 explosive devices throughout the province. [81] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State, named the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), claimed responsibility for the attack on January 5.[82]

Iran Update, January 6, 2024

Click here to read the full report with Maps

Brian Carter, Peter Mills, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  1. Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, is reporting some attacks in the central and southern Gaza Strip only after its fighters return to rear areas. The delays in reporting to higher headquarters may indicate a loss of command-and-control over some al Qassem Brigades units engaged with Israeli forces.
  2. The al Qassem Brigades have only conducted three rocket attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip since December 21, indicating that Israeli operations have severely degraded Hamas’ rocket capability.
  3. The Hamas-run Gazan Health Ministry reported on January 6 that some operating rooms at al Shifa Hospital resumed operations.
  4. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that it clashed with Israeli forces in 7 locations across the West Bank.
  5. Lebanese Hezbollah claimed that it fired 62 rockets and anti-tank guided missiles targeting an IDF facility on Mount Meron.
  6. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for drone attacks targeting two US positions in Syria on January 5.
  7. The Houthis continued attacking and harassing US naval forces and commercial shipping in the Red Sea on January 6. Houthi military leaders signaled on January 6 that they intend to retaliate for the US self-defense fire that killed ten Houthi fighters on December 30.
  8. Iranian officials continued emphasizing the false narrative that the United States created ISIS to blame the United States and Israel for the January 3 terrorist attack in Kerman City, Iran.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued conducting clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on January 6. The IDF said that the 179th Armored Brigade (assigned to the 99th Division) conducted an intelligence-driven raid in an unspecified area in Gaza City.[1] The brigade captured Hamas military equipment in UNRWA bags in a UNRWA clinic.[2] The brigade also captured RPGs, Kalashnikovs, and small arms ammunition in a nearby building.[3] The Nahal Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) engaged several Hamas fighters in Beit Lahia on January 5.[4] Artillery units from the 215th Artillery Brigade and the 143rd (Gaza) Division’s artillery units provided fire support to the Nahal Brigade in Beit Lahia.[5]

The IDF and Shin Bet killed the commander and deputy commander of Hamas’ Nuseirat Battalion on January 6. The IDF killed the previous Nuseirat Battalion deputy commander on October 24.[6] The IDF said that the battalion commander had previously served as a Nukhba company commander and a rocket forces operator.[7] Nukhba units are Hamas’ special operations forces. The IDF reported that the deputy battalion commander held many “field and headquarters positions,” including in the Hamas “training program.”[8] The IDF said that the Nuseirat Battalion previously launched drones at Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip.[9]

Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, is reporting some attacks in the central and southern Gaza Strip only after its fighters return to rear areas. The delays in reporting to higher headquarters may indicate a loss of command-and-control over some al Qassem Brigades units engaged with Israeli forces. The al Qassem Brigades claimed on January 6 that its fighters “returned from the [frontlines in Bureij]” and reported that they detonated one Shawaz explosively formed penetrator and fired one Yassin 105 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) targeting Israeli armor.[10] The inability of these fighters to communicate with higher headquarters until returning to rear areas indicates that their commanders may be unable to transmit orders to fighters that are engaged with Israeli forces. The al Qassem Brigades also said that its fighters reported two attacks after they returned from the frontlines east of Khan Younis.[11]

The IDF continued conducting clearing operations in the southern Gaza Strip on January 6. The 35th Paratroopers Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) captured a weapons cache, including Kalashnikovs, ammunition, RPGs, and remotely detonated explosive devices.[12] An Israeli military correspondent reported on December 31 that the 35th Paratroopers Brigade redeployed from the northern Gaza Strip to the southern Gaza Strip.[13] Israeli forces advanced west on the al Eim road outside the al Amal Hospital on January 6, according to geolocated footage.[14]

Palestinian militias continued to attempt to defend against Israeli advances in Khan Younis on January 5 and 6. The al Qassem Brigades ambushed an Israeli infantry squad in Bani Suheila on January 5. The brigades claimed that they killed and injured multiple Israeli soldiers.[15] The Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) military wing, the al Quds Brigades, fired small arms and RPGs at Israeli forces near Maan, Khan Younis, and in central Khan Younis on January 6.[16] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s military wing, the National Resistance Brigades, detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Israeli armor near Mahatta, Khan Younis.[17]

The IDF Egoz Unit (assigned to the 89th Commando Brigade) conducted several raids in Khan Younis on January 6.[18] The Egoz Unit raided the home of Hamas’ Eastern (Khan Younis) Battalion commander. The IDF did not elaborate on the results of the raid. The Egoz Unit also raided a school in Bani Suheila. The IDF said that the unit killed three Hamas fighters and captured RPGs and intelligence.

The al Qassem Brigades detonated an anti-personnel IED targeting Israeli infantry near Khuzaa on January 6.[19]

The Hamas-run Gazan Health Ministry reported on January 6 that some operating rooms at al Shifa Hospital resumed operations.[20]

The al Qassem Brigades have only conducted three rocket attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip since December 21, indicating that Israeli operations have severely degraded Hamas’ rocket capability. The al Qassem Brigades claimed two rocket attacks targeting Holit and Tel Aviv on December 21 and one attack targeting Tel Aviv on January 1.[21]

The al Quds Brigades conducted two rocket attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on January 6.[22]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that it clashed with Israeli forces in 7 locations across the West Bank. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that it conducted a combined ambush with the al Quds Brigades targeting two IDF soldiers in Tulkarm.[23] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades targeted Israeli forces with small arms fire and IEDs during Israeli raids in Balata, Nablus, for the second consecutive day.[24] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades detonated IEDs and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces during Israeli raids in Qalqilya as well.[25] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms targeting Israeli checkpoints in Gerizim and Jalama.[26]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 14 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 6. LH claimed that it fired 62 rockets and anti-tank guided missiles targeting an IDF facility on Mount Meron.[27] LH said that the base hosts IDF air traffic control, radar, surveillance, communication, and jamming facilities.[28] LH framed the attack as an "initial response” to Israel's killing of Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri in Beirut on January 2.[29] The IDF stated that it conducted retaliatory airstrikes targeting a group of fighters who partook in the attack on Mount Meron.[30] LH claimed six other attacks targeting IDF soldiers and Israeli military positions along the Israel-Lebanon border.[31] Unspecified fighters separately launched three anti-tank guided missiles at towns in northern Israel.[32] Lebanese Sunni militia Jamaa al Islamiya claimed that it fired rockets targeting Kiryat Shmona.[33]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for drone attacks targeting two US positions in Syria on January 5.[34] The group launched one-way attack drones at the al Tanf garrison and al Shadaddi base.

The Houthis continued attacking and harassing US naval forces and commercial shipping in the Red Sea on January 6. CENTCOM said that the USS Laboon, acting in self-defense, shot down a drone launched from Houthi-controlled Yemen in the southern Red Sea.[35] The UK Maritime Trade Operations organization separately reported that US-led coalition forces thwarted a suspected hijacking attempt by six small boats off the coast of Yemen.[36]  Both attempted attacks follow a statement from the United States and 12 of its international partners on January 3 warning that the Houthis will face unspecified consequences if the group continues to attack shipping in the Red Sea.[37]

Houthi military leaders signaled on January 6 that they intend to retaliate for the US self-defense fire that killed ten Houthi fighters on December 30. Houthi fighters fired on a US Navy helicopter on December 30, causing the helicopter to respond in self-defense. Houthi military and political leaders held a meeting to discuss implementing “directives” from Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi. These “directives” are likely a reference to Abdulmalik’s January 4 statement vowing to respond to a US self-defense strike on Houthi naval forces.[38] The Houthi president vowed a “strong response” to the US self-defense strike that he claimed, “launched a new battle with the American enemy.”[39]

Iranian officials continued emphasizing the false narrative that the United States created ISIS to blame the United States and Israel for the January 3 terrorist attack in Kerman City, Iran.[40] Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi claimed that the United States created ISIS and added that ISIS is now an agent of Israel. Vahidi claimed that the actions of ISIS illustrate Israel’s fear of the other countries in the region. Vahidi stated the Ebrahim Raisi administration is working to respond to the enemies of Iran who were responsible for the attack. The Afghan branch of the Islamic State, known as Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), claimed responsibility for the Kerman attack on January 5.[41]

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi discussed the Israel-Hamas war and the ISKP attack in Kerman at an event in Zanjan Province on January 6.[42] Raisi said that Iran will continue to support the Palestinian people and all oppressed people around the world.[43] Raisi also condemned the ISKP attack.

The IRGC Navy commissioned the Shahid Abu Mahdi al Muhandis naval vessel into its fleet on January 6.[44] IRGC commander Major General Hossein Salami and IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri attended the commissioning ceremony in Bandar Abbas. The IRGC Navy said that the vessel has “radar-evading” technologies and can host vertical take-off and landing drones.[45] The commissioning of this vessel is part of the long-standing IRGC effort to strengthen its military capabilities and influence in and around the Persian Gulf.[46]

 

Iran Update, January 5, 2024

Click to Read the Full Report with Maps

Brian Carter, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, and Peter Mills

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST
 
Key Takeaways: 
 
  1. Iran and its proxies—not the United States—are driving escalation in the region to advance their long-held strategic objectives. An end to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip will not on its own stop Iranian escalation because Iran’s effort to expel the United States from the region and decrease US influence transcends the war.
  2. Iran and its Iraqi proxies are advancing their campaign to expel US forces from Iraq.
  3. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant released a four-pronged security and governance plan for the Gaza Strip.
  4. Lebanese Hezbollah continued to signal that it does not seek escalation to a full-fledged war with Israel while Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  5. Iranian state media is downplaying the connection between Afghanistan and the January 3 terrorist attack in Kerman City, Iran, and blaming the United States and Israel for the attack instead.
  6. Iraqi police discovered an Iranian-designed land attack cruise missile in southern Iraq on January 5.

Iran and its proxies—not the United States—are driving escalation in the region to advance their long-held strategic objectives. The Iranian-backed Houthi movement and Iranian-backed Iraqi proxy militias are driving escalation in the region by attacking global shipping and US forces. The United States has so far not responded to Houthi attacks with military action targeting the Houthis’ ability to attack commercial shipping.[1] Iranian-backed proxies started attacking US forces in Iraq on October 22 and conducted 33 attacks without a US response. US forces first responded in Iraq to attacks against US forces after Kataib Hezbollah fired a ballistic missile targeting a US position on November 22.[2] The proxies began conducting attacks against US forces in Syria on October 19.[3] They attacked US forces 9 times before the United States first struck Iranian-backed positions in Syria on October 25. The United States conducted the October 25 strike only after Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched a one-way, explosive-laden drone that landed inside a barracks building occupied by US forces.[4]

An end to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip will not on its own stop Iranian escalation because Iran’s effort to expel the United States from the region and decrease US influence transcends the war. Iran and its partners are using the Israel-Hamas War as a rhetorical cover to pursue their strategic objectives of decreasing US influence in the region by escalating against the United States politically and militarily.[5] Iran and its proxies are using a two-pronged political and military approach to evict US forces from Iraq, for example.[6] This is one step in Iran’s larger goal to expel the United States from the entire Middle East.[7] The attacks in the Bab al Mandeb demonstrate that Iran and its Houthi partner could shut down both the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al Mandeb—a long-held aspiration for both parties that is independent of the Israel-Hamas War.[8]

The United States cannot ignore Iranian and Iranian proxy escalations in the Middle East out of the desire to avoid being drawn into a regional “quagmire.”[9] Iranian-backed attacks in the Red Sea threaten vital shipping lanes and are already affecting global trade. The Iranian-backed Houthi movement has forced global shipping giants to divert shipping away from the Bab al Mandeb.[10] Thirty-three percent of global shipping transits the Bab al Mandeb, meaning that Houthi attacks in the Bab al Mandeb generate global effects that cannot be ignored.[11] Iran’s campaign to expel US forces from Iraq would have dire implications for the defeat of ISIS, for example, an organization that remains committed to attacking the US homeland and retains considerable capability to do so. The expulsion of US forces from Iraq would benefit ISIS by preventing US support to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The ISF still faces deficiencies in intelligence, logistics, and fire support.[12] The expulsion of US forces from Iraq would also require the US to end operations in Syria because US forces in Syria rely on Iraqi bases for their logistics and other support. CTP-ISW continues to assess that ISIS would likely resurge within 12-24 months in Syria without a US force presence and then threaten Iraq.[13]

Iran and its Iraqi proxies are advancing their campaign to expel US forces from Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani formed a committee on January 5 to facilitate the withdrawal of US-led Coalition forces from Iraq.[14] Sudani made the announcement in a ceremony honoring Qassem Soleimani and his top Iraqi lieutenant, Abu Mahdi al Muhandis. Sudani said that only the Iraqi government can “impose the law” in Iraq.[15] Sudani was responding to a US self-defense strike on January 4 that killed a senior official of the Iranian-backed militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba.[16] Sudani also echoed Iranian-backed militia statements that claim that US self-defense strikes in Iraq violate Iraqi sovereignty.[17] The Iraqi government has failed to protect US forces in Iraq, which are deployed in Iraq for counter-ISIS operations at the invitation of the Iraqi government.[18] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have attacked US forces in Iraq and Syria over 100 times since October 2023.[19] The Iraqi government’s failure to protect US forces and prevent further attacks against them has forced the United States to respond in self-defense. Iranian-backed militias misrepresent US self-defense strikes as violations of Iraqi sovereignty. This claim ignores the fact that the United States has a right to self-defense and that Iran’s use of proxies in Iraq to attack US forces in line with Tehran’s regional agenda is itself a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. 

Sudani’s announcement follows weeks of military, political, and legal pressure by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and actors to expel US forces. The Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee announced a draft resolution in December 2023 that would expel US forces from Iraq.[20] The Badr Organization, an Iranian proxy, controls the committee. The same committee called for an emergency parliamentary session following the January 4 US self-defense strike.[21] Sudani announced in late December 2023 that his administration would begin procedures to remove International Coalition forces from Iraq.[22] CTP-ISW assessed at the time that Sudani made the announcement due to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[23]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The Israel Defense Forces reported that the 14th Brigade Combat Team (BCT, assigned to the IDF 162nd Division) discovered and destroyed Hamas tunnels under the Blue Beach Hotel in Shati Camp.[24] The Israeli Defense Minister said on December 31 that the IDF ordered the withdrawal of the 14th BCT from the Gaza Strip, but it is not clear if this order has been executed at the time of writing.[25]  

CTP-ISW's map of IDF dispositions is based on public announcements from the Israel Defense Forces and reports from Israeli military correspondents who have traveled with the IDF into Gaza. We do not use information that has not been released by the IDF in these maps. The unit locations on this map are notional, and the map does not attempt to depict any unit’s precise location.

Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah on January 4 and 5. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)’s military wing, the al Quds Brigades, fired rocket-propelled grenades at Israeli armor in Daraj and Tuffah on January 5.[26] Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, said on January 5 that its fighters “return from Tuffah,” where the fighters had engaged Israeli infantry with sniper rifles and anti-personnel mines.[27]

The IDF 646th Paratroopers Brigade (assigned to the IDF 99th Division) and Yahalom Engineering Unit continued clearing operations in the “Towers Neighborhood” in "central Gaza” on January 5.[28] The IDF said that Palestinian fighters used the neighborhood’s buildings as fighting positions. The 646th Paratroopers Brigade engaged Hamas fighters in a military compound and destroyed several tunnel shafts. The IDF also reported that its forces discovered a facility ”used to manufacture weapons.”[29] Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli clearing operations in central Gaza on January 5. The al Qassem Brigades mortared Israeli vehicles near Maghazi refugee camp, and unspecified Palestinian fighters engaged an IDF tank near Bureij.[30]

The IDF 4th (Kiryati) BCT captured and destroyed multiple Hamas rocket launch sites in Khan Younis on January 5. The IDF said that the Kiryati BCT killed “many” Palestinian fighters in the surrounding area.[31]

Palestinian militias attempted to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 4 and 5. The al Qassem Brigades and the al Quds Brigades conducted a combined attack targeting Israeli armor near Maan, Khan Younis, on January 5.[32] The al Qassem Brigades detonated two separate anti-personnel improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting Israeli forces in the al Zana area of Khan Younis on January 5.[33] Other Palestinian groups, including Hamas and PIJ, mortared Israeli forces in Khan Younis on January 4 and 5.[34] 

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant released a four-pronged security and governance plan for the Gaza Strip on January 4.[35] The plan is the most detailed Israeli description of Tel Aviv’s postwar plan for the Gaza Strip since the ground operation began on October 27. The plan has four pillars. First, Israel will hold an “oversight” role in governance and it will be responsible for inspecting incoming goods. Next, a US-led multinational task force including European and moderate Arab nations will be responsible for “running civil affairs and the economic rehabilitation.”[36] Then, Egypt will assume control of the Rafah border crossing in coordination with Israel. Finally, the plan aims to retain “Palestinian administrative mechanisms” that do not include Hamas officials.[37] It explicitly highlights the authorities responsible for sewage, electricity, water, and humanitarian aid distribution will “continue to operate, in collaboration with the multinational task force.”[38] The plan does not include any confirmation that Gallant or the Israeli government discussed this plan with the United States, Europe, or other Israeli partners prior to its publication.

The al Quds Brigades conducted four rocket attacks targeting southern Israel on January 5.[39] Unspecified Palestinian fighters fired one rocket salvo at Ashkelon.[40]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in nine locations across the West Bank. The al Quds Brigades detonated an IED targeting Israeli forces near Tulkarm on January 4.[41] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades ambushed Israeli forces with small arms fire and IEDs during Israeli raids in Balata, Nablus on January 4.[42] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades attacked Israeli forces in Masliya, Jenin, and Netsani Oz, near Tulkarm.[43] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms at an Israeli settlement near Hebron.[44] The IDF said that Israeli security forces arrested five wanted men across the West Bank.[45]

Palestinians demonstrated in four towns on January 5 following Hamas’ call on January 4 for protests against Israeli operations in Gaza and the killing of Hamas Deputy Political Chairman Saleh al Arouri.[46] Hamas supporters organized marches commemorating Arouri in Arouri’s hometown of Aroura, Tulkarm, and Jenin on January 5.[47] Demonstrators also protested against Israeli operations in Gaza in Ramallah.[48]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) continued to signal that it does not seek escalation to a full-fledged war with Israel. LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah detailed the groups’ attacks on northern Israel since the start of the Israel-Hamas war at a memorial for an LH commander on January 5.[49] Nasrallah claimed that LH did not target civilians in its 670 attacks into northern Israel over the past three months.[50] LH has claimed some attacks on non-evacuated civilian towns, such as Kiryat Shmona, and civilian infrastructure in Avivim.[51] LH also allows Palestinian militias to launch rockets at civilian targets from LH-controlled southern Lebanon.[52] Nasrallah claimed that the only way for civilians to return to northern Israel is to stop Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip, not through war with LH.[53] Nasrallah called on Iranian-backed Iraqi proxy militias to expel US forces from Iraq and he celebrated the Houthi anti-shipping campaign.[54] He reiterated that LH reserves the right to respond to Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Saleh al Arouri in Beirut “in the proper time and place” but he did not make specific threats.[55]

Iranian-backed militias, including LH, conducted six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 5. LH claimed three attacks targeting Israeli military positions using heavy-payload Burkan rockets and artillery shells.[56] This rate of attacks is a decrease from the 13 attacks that LH claimed on January 3 after Israel killed senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri in Beirut on January 2.[57] Unspecified fighters separately launched three rocket barrages at towns in northern Israel on January 5.[58]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iranian officials and state media are emphasizing a longstanding regime narrative that the United States created ISIS to blame the United States and Israel for the January 3 terrorist attack in Kerman City, Iran. Two members of the Afghan branch of the Islamic State—named Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—detonated suicide vests during a ceremony on January 3, 2024, commemorating IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani’s death in a US airstrike in 2020.[59] ISKP claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement on January 4.[60] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency claimed that Israel “ordered” ISKP to claim responsibility for the attack to “escape the consequences” of committing the attack.[61] Tasnim further claimed that Mossad wrote the statement that ISKP released on January 4. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami similarly claimed that ISIS fighters can only act as “agents” of the United States and Israel during a funeral ceremony for the victims of the attack in Kerman City on January 5.[62] The Iranian regime's claim that the United States created ISIS long precedes the Kerman terrorist attack. Regime officials have claimed repeatedly in recent years that the United formed, trained, and provided funding to ISIS to sow instability in the region and harm Iran.[63]

The Iranian Intelligence Ministry announced on January 5 that security forces arrested 11 individuals in six provinces in connection to the January 3 terrorist attack.[64] The ministry confirmed that suicide bombers carried out the attack and revealed that one of the bombers was a Tajik national who had traveled from abroad to conduct the attack.

Ebrahim Raisi administration officials continued to discuss the January 3 terrorist attack with their foreign counterparts on January 4 and 5. President Raisi discussed the attack with his Turkmen and Serbian counterparts in separate phone calls on January 4.[65] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed the attack in separate phone calls with his Qatari, Sri Lankan, Syrian, and Turkish counterparts on January 4 and 5.[66] Abdollahian emphasized the need for regional countries to cooperate to combat terrorism.

Iranian state media is downplaying the connection between Afghanistan and the January 3 terrorist attack. IRGC-affiliated media highlighted that 12 of the victims of the terrorist attack were Afghan nationals and claimed that Iran and Afghanistan share a “blood bond” and “shared grief.”[67] IRGC-affiliated media also described Iran and Afghanistan as “not two nations, but one nation.” Iranian state media previously accused anti-regime outlets of trying to stoke tension between Iran and its neighbors by claiming that one of the suicide bombers in the January 3 attack was a Pakistani national who previously attempted to carry out an attack in Afghanistan.[68]

Iraqi police discovered an Iranian-designed land attack cruise missile in southern Iraq on January 5.[69] US CENTCOM stated that the missile failed to launch towards an unspecified target.[70] The missile is visually similar to the 351/Quds 1 land attack cruise missile, which is an Iranian-made missile that the Houthis use.[71] The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that the missile has a range of at least 700 kilometers.[72]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting US forces at al Harir Airbase in Erbil Province, Iraq.[73]

The shipping company Maersk announced on January 5 that it would divert its ships around the Cape of Good Hope for the foreseeable future.[74] Maersk cited security risks, which is a reference to Houthi attacks that have repeatedly targeted the company’s ships.[75] The company paused shipping through the Red Sea on January 2 after it briefly restarted the route on December 24, when the US established Operation Prosperity Guardian to protect commercial traffic through the Red Sea.[76] Maersk alone accounts for roughly 17 percent of global shipping.[77]

India’s Defense Ministry said that it would provide protective escorts for Indian container ships in the Red Sea on January 05.[78] An Iranian one-way drone damaged a commercial vessel off the coast of India on December 23.[79] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the attack was likely part of Iran and the Axis of Resistance’s efforts to signal their capability and willingness to attack maritime targets beyond just the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.[80] Houthi drones also struck an Indian-flagged Saibaba in the Bab al Mandeb strait on December 23.[81]

The Jordanian Air Force conducted counternarcotics airstrikes on two towns in southern Syria on January 4.[82] The strikes targeted a drug warehouse near the Jordan-Syria border and an Iranian-backed militia drug smuggler‘s house in Shaab, Suwayda Province.[83] The Jordanian Air Force struck the house of another LH-linked drug smuggler in Shaab in May 2023.[84] Jordan last conducted strikes on Iranian-backed targets in Syria on December 18.[85] Iranian-backed militias and parts of the Syrian regime enable and profit from the drug trade in southern Syria.[86]

 

Iran Update, January 4, 2024

Click here to read the full report.

Johanna Moore, Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Peter Mills, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, Riley Bailey, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm EST 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

  1. Iranian-backed actors in Iraq have intensified their effort to expel US forces from Iraq.
  2. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reported that Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip “are completing the current mission” as part of their transition to a third phase of operations there.
  3. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed several attacks on Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip.
  4. Israel moved the evacuation corridor running north-to-south from Salah al Din Road to the coastal road in the Gaza Strip.
  5. Palestinian militias tried to defend against Israeli advances in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip.
  6. Israeli forces have degraded the command-and-control capacity of Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade, according to the Israel Defense Forces.
  7. Hamas’ naval special operations forces have reinforced Palestinian fighters defending Khan Younis via tunnel systems.
  8. The al Quds Brigades fired rockets at Ashkelon from the northern Gaza Strip.
  9. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters 10 times across the West Bank. Hamas called for continued and intensifying anti-Israel demonstrations in the West Bank in response to Israel killing senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri.
  10. Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  11. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria.
  12. US NAVCENT Commander Vice Admiral Brad Cooper stated that the Houthis tried to conduct an unmanned surface vessel attack in the Red Sea, marking the first instance of them doing so since the Israel-Hamas war began.
  13. The Afghan branch of the Islamic State—named Islamic State Khorasan Province—claimed responsibility for the recent terrorist attack in Kerman City, Iran. CTP-ISW previously assessed in August 2023 that ISKP terrorist attacks inside Iran will likely exacerbate tensions between Iran and the Afghan Taliban.
  14. The New York Times reported that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered his military commanders to exercise “strategic patience” vis-a-vis the United States on an unspecified date, citing unspecified sources familiar with internal regime discussions.
  15. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated that Russia has already launched ballistic missiles acquired from North Korea at targets in Ukraine and continues efforts to acquire similar missiles from Iran.

Iranian-backed actors in Iraq have intensified their effort to expel US forces from Iraq. CTP-ISW has assessed that Iranian-backed actors are using almost daily militant attacks and legal and political pressure to force US troops to leave. These Iranian-backed actors have disguised the reason for their attacks, framing them as responses to the Israel-Hamas war. These attacks trigger US self-defense strikes, to which the United States has a legitimate right to protect its servicemembers. The Iranian-backed Iraqi actors exploit these strikes, framing them as violations of Iraqi sovereignty and territorial integrity and thereby pressuring the Iraqi federal government to pursue the removal of US forces.

Iranian-backed actors in Iraq have accelerated these efforts in response to the United States conducting a self-defense strike on January 4, killing a senior official in Iranian-backed militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba (HHN).[1] The United States reported that the HHN official, whose name was Mushtaq Jawad al Jawari, was “actively involved in planning and carrying out attacks on US personnel.”[2] The Washington Institute for Near East Policy similarly reported that Jawari was also responsible for distributing Iranian-supplied advanced conventional weapons to client militias in Iraq and Syria.[3] Jawari was formally the commander of the Popular Mobilization Force’s (PMF) 12th Brigade and the deputy commander of the PMF Baghdad Operations Command.[4] HHN controls the 12th Brigade and has long participated in the Iranian-led attack campaign to expel US forces from Iraq. HHNthrough the 12th Brigadealso advocated for sectarian cleansing as part of its counter-ISIS operations in Tarmiyah, referencing Kataib Hezbollah’s (KH) sectarian cleansing of Jurf al Saqr in 2014 as a model of success.[5]

Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are exploiting this most recent US self-defense strike in Baghdad to add further momentum to their effort to remove US troops. The Parliamentary Security and Defense committee, which is controlled by the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, called for an emergency parliamentary session to discuss repercussions for the strike and how to preserve Iraqi security and sovereignty.[6] The committee previously presented a draft resolution to expel US forces from Iraq to the Iraqi Parliament and its speaker, Mohsen al Mandalawi, on December 6.[7] Mandalawi has condemned the strike and said that the Iraqi federal government must act immediately to remove US forces, indicating his openness to supporting a parliamentary effort to this end.[8] Mandalawi replaced former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi on November 15, after the Iraqi Federal Court removed Halbousi from his position.[9] Halbousi blocked a parliamentary motion to expel the US ambassador to Iraq immediately prior to his removal, suggesting that he was removed at least partly for that reason.[10]

The Mohammad Shia al Sudani administration has similarly begun criticizing the United States and indicating support for the removal of US troops, likely in response to pressure from Iranian-backed actors. The United States currently operates in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government. Sudani announced on December 28 that his administration would begin steps to remove US forces.[11] Sudani’s military spokesperson responded to the latest US self-defense strike by describing it as being “akin to terrorist activities.”[12] The military spokesperson added that the strike was outside the mandate of the International Coalition, which is deployed to Iraq for counterterrorism operations.[13]

An Iraqi decision to expel US forces would very likely create space for ISIS to rapidly resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq. The US military mission in these countries is meant to enable the enduring defeat of ISIS and through cooperation with local partners.[14] The US support to its counter-ISIS partners in Iraq and Syria is instrumental to defeating ISIS.[15] US forces and military infrastructure in Iraq provide the logistical support that enables the presence of US forces in Syria. The expulsion of US forces from Iraq would necessitate a withdrawal from Syria, where ISIS is reconstituting itself in territory held by the Syrian regime.[16] CTP-ISW continues to assess that the United States and its partner in Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS and that the US withdrawal from Syria will very likely cause a rapid ISIS resurgence in Syria within 12 to 24 months.[17] A resurgent ISIS would then be able to threaten Iraq again. The Iraqi Security Forces still face significance deficiencies in fire support, intelligence, and logistics that will impede their ability to defeat ISIS alone.[18]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant reported that Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip “are completing the current mission” as part of their transition to a third phase of operations there.[19] Gallant said Israeli forces “are reorganizing with the intention of carrying out raids and airstrikes soon.”[20] This remark comes shortly after the IDF announced the withdrawal of five brigades from the Gaza Strip on December 31. The third phase of operations in the northern Gaza Strip will reportedly include the end of major combat operations, a “reduction in forces” in the strip, the release of reservists, a “transition to targeted raids,” and the establishment of a security buffer zone within the Gaza Strip.[21] CTP-ISW warned on January 2 that the third phase of operations as described will very likely enable Hamas to reconstitute itself militarily.[22] Israeli forces have degraded several Hamas units in the northern Gaza Strip. But Hamas’ military forces are neither defeated nor destroyed at this time.[23] Palestinian militias continued to operate in the northern Gaza Strip and have targeted Israeli forces in areas where Israel has degraded the local Hamas units.[24] Israel likely faces continued attacks in these areas in part because it is fighting several Palestinian militias, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs‘ Brigades, rather than just Hamas.

The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed several attacks on Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on January 4.[25] The group fired mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli armor and dismounted infantry in Tuffah, where Palestinian fighters have claimed almost daily attacks on Israeli forces since late December 2023.[26] The al Qassem Brigades published footage on January 4 of its fighters firing anti-personnel devices, RPGs, and small arms at Israeli forces in Gaza City.[27] The al Qassem Brigades also targeted Israeli forces in Mughraqa, south of Gaza City, where Israeli forces are continuing clearing operations.[28] The IDF reported on January 4 that it destroyed an underground military compound west of Mughraqa in the past week.[29]

Israel moved the evacuation corridor running north-to-south from Salah al Din Road to the coastal road in the Gaza Strip on January 4.[30] The Salah al Din Road was the primary north-south humanitarian corridor that Israel designated early in the war.[31] Israel designating a new corridor comes as the IDF continues clearing operations in the central and southern parts of the Gaza Strip.

The IDF reported on January 4 that it killed PIJ’s “chief of operational staff,” who operated in the northern Gaza Strip.[32] The IDF stated that the PIJ official, Mamdouh Lulu, worked as an assistant to and was a close associate of PIJ leaders in the northern Gaza Strip. Lulu communicated with PIJ senior officials outside of the Gaza Strip and coordinated attacks on Israel before and during the Israel-Hamas war, according to the IDF. Hamas-affiliated media reported on January 3 that three civilians died in an Israeli airstrike in Rafah, including Lulu.[33]

Palestinian militias tried to defend against Israeli advances in the Central Governorate of the Gaza Strip. A Palestinian journalist reported on January 4 that Israeli forces have surrounded Maghazi “from all directions.”[34] Another journalist reported on January 4 that Israeli bulldozers constructed sand berms in Maghazi.[35] The al Qassem Brigades detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting an Israeli tank west of Maghazi.[36] The group also targeted an Israeli tank with an anti-tank RPG there.[37]

Israeli forces continued operating in Bureij, north of Maghazi on January 4. The IDF located long-range rocket launchers at the center of the city.[38] The al Qassem Brigades detonated a house-borne improvised explosive device (IED) north of Nuseirat, which neighbors Bureij.[39] The group also mortared Israeli forces and vehicles in Bureij.[40] Israeli forces face other Palestinian militias in the central Gaza Strip. The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of PIJ—mortared Israeli dismounted infantry and vehicles in Bureij.[41] The National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces in Bureij and Maghazi.[42] The groups’ fighters detonated an explosive device as Israeli vehicles advanced southeast of Bureij.[43] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—fired an RPG at an Israeli vehicle as it advanced in Bureij.[44]

Israeli forces conducted airstrikes targeting buildings containing anti-tank elements from the Hamas Deir al Balah Battalion, according to an IDF report on January 4.[45]

Israeli forces have degraded the command-and-control (C2) capacity of Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade, according to the IDF. The IDF said that it has significantly damaged specifically the C2 of the brigade’s northern and eastern battalions.[46] This statement is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that these battalions are under active and intense IDF pressure.[47] The IDF reported on January 4 its fighters killed two company commanders from the northern and eastern battalions of the Khan Younis Brigade.[48] The IDF 98th Division has similarly degraded Hamas’ combat effectiveness in Khan Younis by destroying Hamas military sites and an underground tunnel system hundreds of meters long.[49] Israeli forces conducted airstrikes on Hamas weapons depots in Khan Younis as well.[50] The IDF 4th Brigade commander said his forces are fighting on the southern flank of the Hamas Khan Younis Brigade, demonstrating how Israeli forces have surrounded Khan Younis to fight Hamas there.

Hamas’ naval special operations forces (SOF) have reinforced Palestinian fighters defending Khan Younis via tunnel systems. Five naval SOF fighters surrendered themselves to the IDF 55th Brigade Combat Team in Khan Younis, according to the IDF on January 4.[51] This incident suggests that Hamas continues to draw fighters from less active areas to support battalions under active and intense pressure from IDF clearing operations.

At least four Palestinian militias tried to defend against Israeli advances in central Khan Younis City on January 4. The al Qassem Brigades fired anti-tank rockets and mortars at Israeli armor and dismounted infantry in four separate attacks around Khan Younis.[52] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired mortars and RPGs at Israeli forces in separate attacks as well.[53] The National Resistance Brigades targeted Israeli forces with RPGs, and the al Quds Brigades clashed with Israeli infantry in central Khan Younis City.[54] Israeli fighter jets struck Hamas fighters firing anti-tank missiles and planting IEDs near Israeli forces in Khan Younis.[55]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant discussed on January 4 continuing IDF operations against Hamas and other Palestinian militias in the southern Gaza Strip. Gallant said during a visit to the central Gaza Strip border that Israeli operations above and below ground are getting stronger in the southern Gaza Strip.[56] He also said that Palestinian militants’ “countdown” for Israeli forces leaving the Gaza Strip is wrong.[57]

The al Quds Brigades fired rockets at Ashkelon from the northern Gaza Strip on January 4.[58] IDF Home Front Command lifted civilian educational and workplace restrictions in Ashkelon on December 18 after a situational assessment regarding the threat of Palestinian indirect fire from the Gaza Strip.[59]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters 10 times across the West Bank on January 4.[60] The al Quds Brigades and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades engaged Israeli forces with small arms and detonated IEDs, including a ”car bomb,” targeting these forces in Tulkarm.[61] The IDF said that it concluded a 40-hour counterterrorism operation in the Noor Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm on January 4.[62] The IDF said that it destroyed militia infrastructure, detained hundreds of suspects for questioning, and seized weapons during the operation.[63] The IDF also conducted an airstrike on fighters who attacked IDF forces in the camp.[64] The Jenin Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades separately attacked Israeli forces in Sir, south of Jenin.[65] Palestinian fighters engaged Israeli forces in small arms clashes in Sanur, south of Jenin as well.[66]

Hamas called for continued and intensifying anti-Israel demonstrations in the West Bank in response to Israel killing senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri.[67] Hamas called for an escalation in demonstrations and other “solidarity activities” in the West Bank in the upcoming days. Arouri was the deputy chairman of Hamas‘ political bureau and directed Hamas military operations in the West Bank.[68] Arouri also helped found Hamas’ military wing in the West Bank.[69]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.[70] LH claimed that it conducted seven attacks targeting Israeli military positions in northern Israel on January 4.[71] This rate of attacks marks a decrease from the 13 attacks that LH claimed on January 3.[72] LH launched the uptick in attacks on January 3 likely in response to Israel killing senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri in Beirut on January 2. LH acknowledged that nine of its fighters died fighting Israel on January 3.[73] Unspecified fighters separately launched rockets targeting Goren in northern Israel on January 3.[74]

The Economist reported on January 4 that LH withdrew an unspecified number of fighters two to three kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border.[75] The Economist suggested these withdrawals signal that LH seeks to avoid further escalation with Israel.[76] Israeli media previously reported that LH began withdrawing its “Radwan” special forces away from the border on December 24 due to high casualties inflicted by Israeli airstrikes.[77] The Economist reporting did not specify which LH units or how many LH fighters have withdrawn from the border, although it is possible that the Economist was referring to the same event that Israeli media covered. LH’s continued attacks into northern Israel on January 4 demonstrates that LH retains military forces along the border.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told a US envoy on January 4 that Israel needs a “new security reality” on its northern border so that its citizens can return to their homes in northern Israel.[78] Gallant stated that Israel prefers a diplomatic solution but that there is a "short window of time” to find one.[79] LH Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem stated on December 31 that LH will not allow displaced Israeli civilians to return to their homes in northern Israel until Israel halts its military operations in the Gaza Strip.[80] Israeli officials have repeatedly expressed concern about the threat that LH poses to Israel in recent weeks. IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi met with IDF commanders and discussed Israel’s military readiness during a trip to northern Israel on January 3.[81]

Hamas leaders mourned the death of former Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh Arouri during his funeral in Beirut on January 4. Hamas Political Bureau members, including Ismail Haniyeh, Mahmoud Mardawi, and Hossam Badran, eulogized Arouri via recorded video at the ceremony.[82] Hamas West Bank deputy leader Zaher Jabareen spoke in-person at the ceremony.[83] The leaders' emphasized that Arouri’s killing would not weaken the resolve of Palestinian militias against Israel and that the war remains completely active. Several LH officials and Palestinian militia supporters attended the funeral in Beirut.[84]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria on January 4. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeted US forces at Rukban and al Omar oil field.[85]

US NAVCENT Commander Vice Admiral Brad Cooper stated that the Houthis tried to conduct an unmanned surface vessel (USV) attack in the Red Sea on January 4, marking the first instance of them doing so since the Israel-Hamas war began.[86] The Houthi USV traveled around 15 miles before detonating within a “couple of miles” of US Navy and commercial vessels.[87] Cooper stated that the USV attack did not cause any casualties or damage to nearby ships. The attempted attack follows a statement from the United States and 12 of its international partners on January 3 warning that the Houthis will face unspecified consequences if the group continues to attack shipping in the Red Sea.[88] The Houthis conducted the USV attack likely to demonstrate their capabilities in response to the statement from the United States and its partners. The IRGC Quds Force has furnished the Houthi movement with explosive-laden drone boats in recent years, and the Houthis conducted their first waterborne IED attack on a Saudi naval frigate in January 2017.[89]

Cooper additionally discussed Operation Prosperity Guardian on January 4, stating that the United States has intercepted 19 Houthi drones and missiles and that around 1,500 vessels have transited the Red Sea since the formation of the maritime coalition on December 18.[90] The United States established Operation Prosperity Guardian to ensure freedom of navigation and bolster regional security.[91]

Houthi Supreme Leader Abdul Malik al Houthi and senior Houthi official Mohammad Abdul Salam released statements calling for mass demonstrations across Yemen in support of Palestinians on January 5.[92] Both officials warned that the Houthi movement will “respond and punish” the United States for the killing 10 Houthi members on December 31. The United States killed the Houthi militants after they fired at US helicopters trying to aid a commercial vessel under Houthi attack in the southern Red Sea.[93]

The Afghan branch of the Islamic State—named Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—claimed responsibility for the recent terrorist attack in Kerman City, Iran, on January 4.[94] Two ISKP members detonated suicide vests during a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of the United States killing Qassem Soleimani, killing at least 84 civilians and wounding dozens of others, on January 3.[95] This attack marks the third that ISKP has claimed inside Iran in recent years. ISKP previously conducted shooting attacks at a prominent Shia shrine in Shiraz in October 2022 and again in August 2023.[96] ISKP attacks beyond Afghanistan raise the group's profile among Salafi-jihadi organizations, helping ISKP attract financing and recruits.[97] ISKP attacks in Iran also support the group's efforts to undermine the Taliban government by exacerbating divisions within the Taliban movement, which remains divided between those who want to prioritize addressing domestic issues in Afghanistan versus those who wish to continue supporting jihadist movements internationally.[98]

CTP-ISW previously assessed in August 2023 that ISKP terrorist attacks inside Iran will likely exacerbate tensions between Iran and the Afghan Taliban.[99] Tehran has repeatedly pushed the Taliban to adopt stronger counterterrorism measures since the Taliban came to power in August 2021.[100] Iran and the Taliban have previously engaged in counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation vis-a-vis the ISKP, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[101] These attacks compound with additional Iranian grievances toward the Taliban, moreover. Tensions have risen between Iran and the Taliban over water resources in recent months.[102] Iranian state media claimed on January 4 that the enemies of Iran are trying to create tensions between Iran and other Muslim countries, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, where ISKP operates.[103]

Iranian officials discussed the ISKP attack with regional states on January 4. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stated that terrorists will not be able undermine Iran’s security and unity with attacks during a phone call Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[104] Raisi also accused Israel of trying to spread insecurity to Iran due to its failures in the Gaza Strip in a phone call with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamid al Thani.[105] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian emphasized that fighting terrorism is the main priority of Iran and Pakistan during a phone call with his Pakistani counterpart, Jalil Abbas Jilani.[106]

The New York Times reported on January 3 that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered his military commanders to exercise “strategic patience” vis-a-vis the United States on an unspecified date, citing unspecified sources familiar with internal regime discussions.[107] Khamenei reportedly stressed that Iranian military commanders should avoid any actions that would risk direct military confrontation with the United States. It is unclear when Khamanei issued this directive to his military officials, though the reporting is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Iran seeks to avoid a direct military confrontation against the United States and Israel.[108] CTP-ISW has recently assessed, however, that Iran and the Axis of Resistance are trying to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to fulfill Iran’s longstanding strategic objective of forcing a US military withdrawal from Iraq and Syria.[109] Iran will likely pursue this objective in a manner that seeks to avoid a direction confrontation with the United States, namely through proxy and partner militia attacks, exploiting legal mechanisms in host countries, and other coercive measures, consistent with Khamenei’s reported directive.[110]

NOTE: A version of the following text appears in the ISW January 4, 2024, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on January 4 that Russia has already launched ballistic missiles acquired from North Korea at targets in Ukraine and continues efforts to acquire similar missiles from Iran. Kirby stated that North Korea provided Russia with ballistic missile launchers and an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and that Russian forces launched at least one of the North Korean missiles into Ukraine on December 30, 2023.[111] Kirby also stated that Russian officials continue efforts to buy ballistic missiles from Iran. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported earlier on January 4 that unspecified US officials stated that Russia could receive Iranian short-range ballistic missiles as early as spring 2024 but that the officials do not believe that Russia and Iran have yet completed a deal.[112]

Russia may be intensifying efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad because these missiles appear to be more effective at striking targets in Ukraine in some circumstances. Russian forces routinely use short-range ballistic missiles to strike Ukrainian cities closer to the frontline, and these missiles appear to be more effective at penetrating or avoiding Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian air defenses have intercepted 149 of a reported 166 Russian cruise missiles in intensified attacks since December 29, 2023, but have only intercepted a handful of the ballistic missiles that Russia has launched at Ukraine in the same period, for example.[113] Russian forces have repurposed S-300 and S-400 air defense missiles for conducting strikes against surface targets in Ukraine, and Ukrainian officials have acknowledged that Ukrainian air defenses struggle to intercept these unorthodox missile attacks using their own S-300 and S-400 systems.[114] Ukrainian forces have also appeared to be less successful in intercepting Iskander ballistic missiles during recent strikes, although Ukrainian forces did intercept an Iskander-M missile during a less intense series of Russian missile and drone strikes on December 30.[115] Ukrainian forces reportedly intercepted all Iskander-M or S-300/S-400 missiles that Russian forces launched at Kyiv on December 12.[116] Ukrainian forces reportedly also intercepted all 10 Kinzhal missiles that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on January 2 with Western-provided Patriot systems.[117] The effectiveness of Russian ballistic missiles thus appears to depend in part on the configuration of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella in the target area and the strike package of which the missiles are part.

The relative success that Russian forces have had in striking targets in Ukraine with ballistic missiles in combination with cruise missiles and drones may be prompting an intensification of Russian efforts to source ballistic missiles from abroad. Russia can reportedly produce roughly 42 Iskander missiles and four Kinzhal missiles per month, although it is unclear how many S-300/S-400 missiles Russia can produce.[118] Russia‘s defense industrial base (DIB) likely cannot produce ballistic missiles at the scale required for a persistent strike campaign in Ukraine that relies on regularly expending a large volume of ballistic missiles, and Russia likely has to source ballistic missiles from abroad if it wishes to maintain large-scale missiles strikes against Ukraine.

Iran Update, January 3, 2024


Iran Update, January 3, 2024

Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST 

 

Key Takeaways:

  1. Palestinian militias continued to try to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods of Gaza City on January 3. Palestinian militias are attacking Israeli forces behind the Israeli forward line of advance in Gaza City.
  2. Hamas, PIJ, and other Palestinian groups condemned the killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri.
  3. Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah signaled on January 3 that LH will not immediately escalate against Israel for Israel’s “surgical strike” killing Hamas deputy political bureau chairman Saleh Arouri in Beirut.
  4. Senior Iranian and Axis of Resistance leaders condemned Israel’s killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri.
  5. Unspecified fighters conducted a terrorist attack near Qassem Soleimani’s burial site in Kerman on the fourth anniversary of Soleimani’s death. Bloomberg News reported that the United States initially believes that the Islamic State or a related group was responsible for the attack.
  6. The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles at the Malta-flagged commercial vessel CMA CGM TAGE in the Red Sea. US CENTCOM reported that this was the 24th Houthi attack on maritime shipping in the Red Sea since November 19. 
  7. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba warned that Iraqi militias will conduct an “unprecedented escalation” to expel US forces from Iraq if the Iraqi federal government orders US forces to withdraw from Iraq and the United States does not comply with its request.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias continued to try to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods of Gaza City on January 3. Israeli forces in the neighborhoods coordinated with artillery and ground forces to direct a drone strike targeting Palestinian fighters surveilling them with drones.[1] Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, conducted three attacks targeting Israeli forces and vehicles in Daraj and Tuffah.[2] The group claimed that it detonated a Shawaz explosively formed penetrator (EFP) and anti-tank rocket at an Israeli bulldozer and tank east of Tuffah.[3]

Palestinian militias are attacking Israeli forces behind the Israeli forward line of advance in Gaza City. The National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed that its fighters conducted an “elaborate ambush” targeting Israeli ground forces on the outskirts of al Shati refugee camp.[4] The National Resistance Brigades said that its fighters detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Israeli ground forces. The National Resistance Brigades fighters then fired unspecified munitions at the Israeli force.[5] The group also claimed to have shot down an Israeli tactical reconnaissance drone in a separate incident and published pictures of drone pieces.[6] CTP-ISW cannot verify the militia’s claim and the IDF has not commented on the incident. The al Qassem Brigades claimed that it seized an Israeli drone south of Zaytoun neighborhood in the southern Gaza Strip on January 3.[7] The militia fired anti-tank rockets at Israeli armor in Sheikh Ijlin neighborhood, where Israeli forces have not reported on clearing operations since mid-November.[8]

The al Qassem Brigades claimed three combined attacks targeting the IDF in the Gaza Strip with other Palestinian militias on January 3. The al Qassem Brigades have coordinated several attacks in the Gaza Strip with other militias throughout the war.[9]

The al Qassem Brigades and Mujahideen Brigades—the militant wing of the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement—claimed that it fired a surface-to-air missile at an Israeli helicopter in Khan Younis.[10] Neither group provided evidence to corroborate the claim. The Mujahideen Brigades have cooperated with the al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—prior to the Israel-Hamas War.[11]

The al Qassem Brigades and Mujahideen Brigades claimed to shoot down an Israeli Hermes drone with a surface-to-air missile east of Gaza City.[12] Neither group provided evidence to corroborate the claim.

The al Qassem Brigades and al Quds Brigades published footage of their fighters firing mortars together at Israeli vehicles and soldiers in Khan Younis.[13] Hamas and PIJ have coordinated their operations against Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip throughout the Israel-Hamas war.

Palestinian militias continued trying to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis on January 3. The IDF said that Israeli forces continued “intense fighting” in Khan Younis on January 3.[14] The Israeli Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting a PIJ weapons manufacturing facility in Khan Younis.[15] Israeli ground forces directed another airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters who attempted to attach IEDs to an Israeli tank.[16] The al Qassem Brigades targeted Israeli tanks and bulldozers with anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and mortared Israeli soldiers operating in Khan Younis.[17] The al Quds Brigades detonated an EFP targeting an Israeli tank as Israeli forces advanced northeast of Khan Younis.[18]

Other Palestinian militias are also attempting to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis. The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—fired an RPG at Israeli forces in central Khan Younis City.[19] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—mortared a group of Israeli soldiers in Khan Younis City.[20]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Khuzaa southeast of Khan Younis on January 3. An IDF brigade combat team uncovered a tunnel shaft in a school and clashed with Palestinian fighters who attempted to attach IEDs to Israeli vehicles in Khuzaa.[21] Israeli infantry, armor, and engineers raided Palestinian militia infrastructure in the area. The al Qassem Brigades detonated two anti-personnel devices targeting seven Israeli infantrymen operating east of Khuzaa.[22]

Hamas, PIJ, and other Palestinian groups condemned the killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri. Israeli forces conducted a “surgical strike” targeting senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri in southern Beirut on January 2.[23] Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh delivered a speech on January 3 condemning Arouri’s death as a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and an “expansion” of Israeli attacks on the group.[24] The al Qassem Brigades published a statement on January 3 that honored Arouri and the other militia leaders who died in the explosion.[25] PIJ Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah mourned Arouri, calling him a leader who contributed to the Palestinian resistance in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[26] The Palestinian National and Islamic Forces—a coalition of major factions in Palestine—commemorated Arouri’s death and called for “revolutionary action” in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel.[27]

Palestinian militias did not claim any indirect fire attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip on January 3.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces in nine locations across the West Bank.[28] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted nine attacks against military and civilian targets in the West Bank.[29] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades Tulkarm Battalion detonated improvised explosive devices targeting Israeli forces conducting counterterrorism operations in the Nour Shams refugee camp.[30] The IDF ordered an airstrike targeting the fighters who detonated the explosives.[31]

Palestinian shopkeepers closed storefronts in protest of Saleh al Arouri’s death in seven locations across the West Bank on January 3.[32] Palestinian media posted flyers on January 2 calling for supporters to strike and hold demonstrations.[33]

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah signaled on January 3 that LH will not immediately escalate against Israel for Israel’s “surgical strike” killing Hamas deputy political bureau chairman Saleh Arouri in Beirut.[34] Nasrallah blamed Israel for Arouri’s death, describing it as a “dangerous crime that will see response and punishment.” Nasrallah’s speech was in commemoration of the anniversary of the death of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and his top Iraqi lieutenant, Abu Mahdi al Muhandis.[35] Nasrallah said that Israel has not deterred LH and that LH is ready to act against Israel ”without limits” if the country wages war on Lebanon.[36] He added that war with LH would be ”very costly” and a ”regret” for Israel with ”no ceiling” and ”no rules”.[37] Nasrallah’s choice to not immediately signal an escalation is notable, given that LH and Hamas threatened in August 2023 that Israeli strikes targeting Palestinian leadership in Lebanon would spur a regional war.[38] Nasrallah said that he will give another speech detailing LH operations in southern Lebanon on January 5.[39]

LH doubled the number of its cross-border attacks into Israel on January 3. This is notable in the context of Nasrallah’s speech and the Israeli strike that targeted Arouri. LH claimed 13 attacks on Israeli forces and military positions on January 3, compared to an average of six attacks per day during the previous week.[40] LH’s attack claims highlighted their use of anti-tank missiles and heavy-payload Burkan rockets.[41] This is notable given that recent LH attack claims have rarely specifically described the types of weapon systems used in LH attacks.[42]

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi discussed Israel’s military readiness during a trip to northern Israel on January 3. Halevi met with the IDF commander of Northern Command and unit commanders along the Lebanese border. Halevi said the IDF is at the “peak” of its readiness in northern Israel but that his focus is currently fighting Hamas.[43] He also said October 7 was an ”opportunity” for Israel to change the situation in a ”very significant way” in the south, north, and in the region. He added that Israel needs to give a very strong response to the October 7 attack.[44]  Halevi also discussed plans for Israel to deploy more forces along the Israel-Gaza Strip and Lebanese borders over at least the next year.[45]

Iran and Axis of Resistance—

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Unspecified fighters conducted a terrorist attack near Qassem Soleimani’s burial site in Kerman on the fourth anniversary of Soleimani’s death on January 3.[46] The unspecified fighters remotely detonated two improvised explosive devices within twenty minutes of each other. Iranian media has not confirmed the size or type of explosive device. Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi stated that the first explosion occurred at 1500 local time and the second more deadly explosion occurred at 1520.[47] The first explosion occurred within 700 meters of Soleimani’s burial site, and the second explosion occurred within one kilometer of Soleimani’s burial site. Iranian media reported that the two explosions killed 103 people and injured an additional 188.[48] Iranian media emphasized that no IRGC officials were in attendance or injured.[49] The attack killed three Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers.[50]

Bloomberg News reported that the United States initially believes that the Islamic State or a related group was responsible for the attack.[51]  The State Department spokesperson said that the United States does not believe Israel was to blame. The Afghan branch of the Islamic State likely conducted two separate smaller-scale terror attacks in Shiraz, 591 kilometers from Kerman, in October 2022 and August 2023.[52]   CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) maintained ground lines of communication between Iran and Afghanistan.[53]

Iranian officials, including the Security Deputy of Kerman, called the explosion a terrorist attack.[54] The Iranian Interior Minister said that the terrorist attack was a ”continuation of conspiracies” carried out by Iran’s enemies.[55] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressed his condolences to the victims of the terror attack.[56] Khamenei stated that the attack was carried out by the ”evil and criminal enemies” of Iran. Khamenei promised a hard response to the attack.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders and politicians expressed their condolences over the terrorist attack in Kerman on January 3.  Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai condemned the attack in separate statements.[57] Khazali claimed that Israel seeks to drag the region into a “comprehensive and open war” to conceal its “defeats” in the Israel-Hamas war.

Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted two drone attacks targeting US positions in Syria on January 3. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a one-way drone attack targeting US forces at al Omar oil field.[58] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a separate one-way drone attack targeting US forces at the al Tanf garrison.[59]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei praised Palestinians in the Gaza Strip for resisting Israel during a speech to religious eulogists on January 3.[60] Khamenei further condemned the United States for its support of Israel’s “malice and dirty goals.”

Senior Iranian and Axis of Resistance leaders condemned Israel’s killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri. Israeli forces conducted a “surgical strike” targeting Arouri in southern Beirut on January 2.[61] Iranian political officials–including President Ebrahim Raisi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf–said that the assassination was a sign of Israel’s weakness and a violation of Lebanese territory.[62]

Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani warned that the decision would “backfire.”[63] The IRGC published a statement warning that Arouri’s death will inspire further Palestinian resistance against Israel.[64]

The Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada General Secretariat compared Israel’s killing of Arouri to the US killing of Qassem Soleimani and his top Iraqi lieutenant, Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, in January 2020.[65] It claimed on January 2 that the Arouri strike violated Lebanese sovereignty just as the US strike targeting Soleimani in January 2020 violated Iraqi sovereignty.[66] Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militias frequently cite alleged US “violations of Iraqi sovereignty” to try to pressure the Iraqi federal government to expel US forces. The United States has a legitimate right to self-defense as it operates in Iraq to fight ISIS at the invitation of the Iraqi federal government.[67]

Kataib Hezbollah emphasized the US role in Israel’s “dangerous escalations” in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria and renewed its pledge to “defeat” the United States and Israel in a statement honoring Arouri on January 2.[68] Kataib Hezbollah and its partners, not the United States, escalated in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq initiated attacks on US forces after the start of the Israel-Hamas War with attacks in Iraq on October 18 and in Syria on October 19.[69] The United States did not respond with force in Syria until October 26, after an Iranian-backed drone landed in a US barracks in Erbil, and in Iraq until November 21.[70] Lebanese Hezbollah began attacking Israel from southern Lebanon immediately after the October 7 attacks. 

Popular Mobilization Forces Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh warned on January 2 that the “murderous criminals” who killed Arouri will pay for their actions.[71]

Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri emphasized on January 3 his organization’s solidarity with Palestinian and Lebanese “jihadist movements.”[72]

Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary General Akram al Kaabi warned that Iraqi militias will conduct an “unprecedented escalation” to expel US forces from Iraq if the Iraqi federal government orders US forces to withdraw from Iraq and the United States does not comply with its request.[73] Kaabi made this statement on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the US killing of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al Muhandis. Iranian military leaders have previously vowed to expel US forces from the Middle East as part of their revenge for Soleimani’s death.[74] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have been trying to pressure the Iraqi federal government to order the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, particularly in recent weeks. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on December 28, 2023, that his administration will begin procedures to remove International Coalition forces from Iraq.[75] CTP-ISW assessed that Sudani likely made this announcement due to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[76] 

Iraqi Design Alliance member Amer al Fayez stated that members of the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—agreed to replace all current provincial governors in a meeting on January 2.[77] The Design Alliance won 12 out of 23 seats in Basra Province in the recent provincial council elections. Current Basra Governor Asaad al Eidani leads the Design Alliance.[78] Eidani became governor of Basra in 2017.[79] Iraqi media reported on December 27 that members of the Shia Coordination Framework are trying to deprive Eidani’s party of their majority in the Basra provincial council.[80] Fayez criticized the framework’s agreement to remove current provincial governors, describing it as “undemocratic” and a “political decision.”[81] Fayez added that there is “no justification for replacing the successful governors [who were] elected by the people of the governorate.”

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani has demonstrated in recent months that provincial councils do not retain the exclusive authority to appoint and remove provincial governors. Sudani appointed Abdul Qadir al Dakhil as the acting governor of Ninewa following former Ninewa Governor Najm al Jabouri’s resignation in November 2023.[82] Sudani additionally tried to remove the provincial governors of Anbar, Babil, Dhi Qar, and Ninewa in April 2023.[83] CTP-ISW assessed at the time that Sudani was attempting to sideline political opposition, especially Sunnis.[84] Some of the governors he sought to remove supported former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al Halbousi.[85]

The Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Malta-flagged commercial vessel CMA CGM TAGE while it transited the Red Sea. US CENTCOM reported that this was the 24th Houthi attack on maritime shipping in the Red Sea since November 19.[86] CMA CGM stated that the vessel was headed to Egypt. The Houthi movement claimed that the vessel was bound for Israel.[87] The Houthi movement continues to claim that it only targets vessels in the Red Sea that are owned by Israelis or vessels bound for Israel.[88] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted ships with no connection to Israel. CTP-ISW has previously assessed that this Houthi campaign is part of a wider regional escalation by Iran and its so-called Axis of Resistance which is intended to support Iranian strategic objectives in the region.[89]

The United States and 11 partner countries warned the Houthi movement against further attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea in a joint statement on January 3.[90] The statement warned that the Houthis would face unspecified consequences if the Houthi movement does not cease its attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.[91] The Houthi military spokesperson threatened on January 3 that the Houthis would retaliate against any attack by the United States.[92] The US statement also called for the Houthis to release unlawfully detained vessels and crews. The Houthis continue to hold the commercial vessel Galaxy Leader, which the Houthis seized on November 19.[93]

Iran Update, January 2, 2024

Click here to read the full report with maps

Ashka Jhaveri, Brian Carter, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Alexandra Braverman, Peter Mills, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

Key Takeaways:

  1. Israeli forces are transitioning to the third phase of their operations in the northern Gaza Strip, which will very likely enable Hamas to reconstitute itself militarily. Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” will very likely continue their regional escalation against the United States and Israel, despite Israel withdrawing some of its forces from the Gaza Strip.
  2. Israeli forces conducted a “surgical strike” targeting senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri in southern Beirut. LH harbors Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials in Lebanon and permits them to conduct attacks into Israel.
  3. Israeli forces raided a Hamas and PIJ command and control center in Gaza City’s Shujaiya neighborhood.
  4. Israeli forces captured a Hamas compound in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood of Gaza City.
  5. Palestinian militias are attempting to defend against Israeli advances in Bureij in the central Gaza Strip.
  6. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Israeli forces are “isolating” Khan Younis to find Hamas fighters underground.
  7. Israel rejected a Hamas-proposed, three-phase hostage-for-prisoner deal. The proposal is not compatible with Israeli war aims, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.
  8. The al Qassem Brigades fired a large salvo of rockets at Tel Aviv.
  9. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in Jenin following demonstrations organized by Palestinian militia groups on January 1. Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in eight locations across the West Bank on January 2.
  10. Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted at least three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 1 and another eight attacks on January 2.
  11. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted eight drone and rocket attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria. The group also claimed an unspecified attack targeting Eilat in southern Israel.
  12. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with senior Houthi official Mohammad Abdul Salam in Tehran.

Israeli forces are transitioning to the third phase of their operations in the northern Gaza Strip, which will very likely enable Hamas to reconstitute itself militarily. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed that it withdrew five brigades from the northern Gaza Strip on December 31.[1] This reduction in forces is part of what the IDF has described as its third phase in the strip, which also involves ending major combat operations, releasing reservists, transitioning to “targeted raids,” and establishing a security buffer zone within the Gaza Strip.[2] Israeli forces have degraded several Hamas units and rendered others combat ineffective, particularly in the northern Gaza strip, since the beginning of the clearing operations.[3] But Hamas’ military forces are neither defeated nor destroyed at this time. Decreased Israeli pressure would, in fact, allow Hamas to rebuild its military capabilities and infrastructure. Hamas maintains a conventional military structure, meaning that it should be able to quickly replace commanders who have died in the war.[4] Several recently killed Hamas battalion and brigade commanders had led their units for many years, suggesting that they had the ability and time to develop successors to take their place.[5] Such reconstitution is inconsistent with the stated Israeli war aims, which are to destroy Hamas militarily and politically.[6]

Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” will very likely continue their regional escalation against the United States and Israel, despite Israel withdrawing some of its forces from the Gaza Strip. Iran and its regional network of proxies and partners have conducted almost daily attacks targeting American servicemembers and international shipping across the Middle East in recent months. They have framed their attacks as responses to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and US support for Israel. This escalation is, in actuality, meant to support Tehran’s regional project. Iranian leaders have long used their Axis of Resistance to threaten US personnel and commercial traffic in the Middle East because doing so supports the long-standing Iranian objectives of attaining regional hegemony and expelling the US military from the region.

Israeli forces conducted a “surgical strike” targeting senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri in southern Beirut on January 2.[7] Arouri was the deputy chairman of Hamas‘ political bureau and a US-designated global terrorist responsible for “directing Hamas military operations in the West Bank.”[8] Arouri helped found Hamas’ military wing in the West Bank.[9] Hamas confirmed that the strike killed Arouri as well as the top al Qassem Brigades commander for Lebanon.”[10] Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)-affiliated media reported that two al Qassem Brigades commanders in addition to Arouri died in the airstrike.[11] An Israeli journalist reported that a senior IDF official told them that Israeli is prepared "for a very significant response” to the Arouri strike, including from LH.[12]

LH harbors Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) officials in Lebanon and permits them to conduct attacks into Israel. Both Hamas and PIJ have conducted cross-border attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since October 7.[13] LH controls southern Lebanon and probably approved Hamas and PIJ to conduct these attacks, as CTP has previously assessed.[14] Hamas and PIJ’s presences in Lebanon also allow them to coordinate with LH and Iranian officials.[15] One of Arouri’s roles within Hamas was coordinating with Iranian officials and LH on behalf of Hamas, for example.[16]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

The commander of the IDF 460th Brigade reported on January 2 that his brigade completed its mission in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods of Gaza City after destroying militia infrastructure belonging to Hamas’ Gaza City Brigade.[17] The IDF announced that it was operating in Daraj and Tuffah on December 21.[18] Palestinian militias have claimed regular attacks on Israeli forces in the area since then. The IDF reported on January 2 that its forces raided the Hamas Gaza City Brigade commander's home and destroyed several arms caches and tunnels

Palestinian militias claimed several attacks on Israeli forces in Daraj and Tuffah on January 1 before the IDF said that it accomplished its mission there.[19] The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—detonated a minefield targeting Israeli special operations forces (SOF) east of Tuffah.[20] The militia also claimed that it fired a thermobaric rocket at Israeli SOF inside a building in Tuffah.[21] The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of PIJ—published footage of its fighters firing rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli tanks in Tuffah.[22] The IDF published captured footage of Hamas fighters in Hamas’ Daraj wal Tuffah Battalion firing rockets from civilian homes amid fighting between the IDF and Hamas in the past week.[23]

Israeli forces raided a Hamas and PIJ command and control center in Gaza City’s Shujaiya neighborhood on January 1.[24] Hamas and PIJ have coordinated their operations against Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip throughout the Israel-Hamas war.[25] The IDF also said on January 1 that it conducted an airstrike targeting Palestinian fighters who had fired mortars at Israeli forces.[26]

Israeli forces captured a Hamas compound in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood of Gaza City on January 2. The IDF reported that it engaged Hamas fighters inside a tunnel network beneath the compound before capturing it.[27] The complex includes 37 buildings around other residential buildings, schools, and hospitals.[28] Israeli forces uncovered an underground Hamas operations room where commanders ”conducted the fighting in the Gaza Strip.”[29] The Jerusalem Post separately reported that the IDF took over the second most important Hamas intelligence center in the northern Gaza Strip.[30]

Palestinian militias are attempting to defend against Israeli advances in Bureij in the central Gaza Strip. The IDF reported on January 2 that its forces found tunnel shafts, intelligence materials, and weapons in Bureij during clearing operations.[31] The al Qassem Brigades claimed that its forces ambushed Israeli SOF inside a house in Bureij on January 1 using small arms and other unspecified weapons.[32] The militia claimed another ambush targeting five Israeli soldiers using hand grenades and small arms fire.[33] The al Qassem Brigades, al Quds Brigades, and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—separately claimed several other attacks targeting Israeli forces and tanks using anti-tank rockets, mortars, rockets, and small arms.[34]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on January 2 that Israeli forces are “isolating” Khan Younis to find Hamas fighters underground.[35] Gallant added that high-intensity fighting will continue in the southern Gaza Strip for an unspecified period of time.[36] Israeli forces have been conducting clearing operations in Khan Younis City for several weeks at this point.

Palestinian militias are attempting to defend against Israeli forces in Khan Younis City and areas east of the city. The IDF reported on January 2 that its forces engaged Palestinian fighters last week in Bani Suheila after Palestinian fighters fired at Israeli forces and attempted to attach IEDs to Israeli vehicles.[37] The al Qassem Brigades attempted to defend against Israeli advances on January 1 and January 2 in Qarara, which is east of the Salah al Din road.[38] The group targeted Israeli infantrymen by detonating a tunnel rigged with explosives in Qarara. The al Qassem brigades also detonated a house-borne improvised explosive device (IED) targeting Israeli forces holding a building.[39] The al Qassem Brigades and al Quds Brigades claimed attacks on Israeli forces in Maan east of Khan Younis.[40]

Other Palestinian militias are also attempting to defend against Israeli clearing operations in Khan Younis. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared Israeli forces and fired RPGs targeting Israeli tanks in several attacks.[41] The National Resistance Brigades fired RPGs and small arms at Israeli forces in Khan Younis.[42]

The IDF reported on January 1 that its forces killed a regional commander from Hamas’ naval commando forces, the Nukhba forces in Deir al Balah.[43] The commander, Adil Mismash, directed attacks into Kissufim during Hamas’ October 7 attack. [44]

Israel rejected a Hamas-proposed, three-phase hostage-for-prisoner deal.[45] The three-phase process included a pause in fighting for over a month in exchange for Hamas releasing 40 Israeli hostages, according to an Israeli official. Israel would also withdraw its forces from the Gaza Strip during the first phase of the deal. The proposal would end the war following the implementation of the last phase, which would include Hamas releasing Israeli soldiers currently held hostage in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli official said that the Israeli war cabinet rejected the proposal.[46] The proposal is not compatible with Israeli war aims, as CTP-ISW has previously noted.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on January 2 that Hamas’ stance regarding an ultimatum has “slightly softened.”[47] Hamas has repeatedly demanded that Israel must withdraw its forces from the Gaza Strip and agree to a permanent ceasefire as a pre-condition to hostage negotiations.[48]

The al Qassem Brigades fired a large salvo of rockets at Tel Aviv on December 31, 2023.[49] The launch demonstrates that Palestinian militias retain some capacity to reach Tel Aviv with rockets, despite Israeli clearing operations. The militia published a video on December 31 showcasing its rocket arsenal, which included several munitions that are allegedly able to reach Tel Aviv from the Gaza Strip.[50] The IDF found long-range rockets that are capable of hitting Tel Aviv during clearing operations in Bureij in the central Gaza Strip.[51]

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy reported on December 21 that the al Qassem Brigades fired a large salvo of rockets toward Tel Aviv as part of Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar messaging dissatisfaction to Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh. Sinwar was dissatisfied that the peace negotiations with Israel did not include a precondition that Israeli forces would withdraw completely from the Gaza Strip before Hamas released any Israeli hostages, according to the report.[52]

The al Quds Brigades fired several rockets into southern Israel on January 2.[53] An Israeli media military correspondent noted that the attack occurred after a lull of nearly 42 hours.[54]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in Jenin following demonstrations organized by Palestinian militia groups on January 1. The Jenin Battalion organized a demonstration against Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[55] The Hornets’ Nest, which is a militia affiliated with the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, said that its forces fired small arms at Israeli forces in Jenin on January 1.[56]

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in eight locations across the West Bank on January 2.[57] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that they conducted IED and small arms attacks targeting Israeli forces conducting raids in Jenin and Qalqilya on January 2.[58] Unspecified Palestinian fighters detonated IEDs and engaged in small arms clashes with Israeli forces in Azzun on January 2.[59] These attacks injured one IDF officer.  

Hamas supporters demonstrated across the West Bank on January 2, condemning Israel for killing Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri in Beirut.[60] Palestinian fighters fired on an Israeli settlement near Ramallah and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces in Hebron after some of the demonstrations.[61

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted at least three attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 1. LH claimed that it conducted two attacks targeting Israeli military positions in northern Israel.[62] Israeli air defense intercepted one “suspicious aerial target” near Kiryat Shmona in northern Israel.[63]

Iranian-backed militias, including LH, conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on January 2.[64] LH claimed that it conducted six attacks targeting Israeli military positions in northern Israel.[65] Unknown fighters also launched one rocket salvo targeting Margaliot.[66]

Iran and Axis of Resistance—

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed that it conducted eight drone and rocket attacks targeting US positions in Iraq and Syria on January 1 and 2.[67] This attack rate is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the Axis of Resistance would increase its attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria around the anniversary of the United States killing of Qassem Soleimani on January 3.[68]

  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a one-way drone attack targeting US forces at Erbil International Airport in Iraq on January 2.[69]
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed that it fired a rocket salvo at the Conoco Mission Support Site in Syria on January 1.[70]
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a one-way drone attack targeting US forces in al Malikiyah, Syria on January 2.[71]
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a single one-way drone attack targeting US forces at al Shaddadi, Hasakah Province, Syria on January 1 and another one-way drone attack on the same location on January 2.[72]
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted a one-way drone attack targeting US forces at al Omar oilfield in Syria on January 2.[73]
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed two one-way drone attacks targetingUS forces at Rumaylan Landing Zone in Syria on January 2.[74]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq additionally claimed an unspecified attack targeting Eilat in southern Israel on December 31, 2023, in support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[75]

Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh met with interim Ninewa Governor Abdul Qadir al Dakhil on January 1 to discuss plans to transfer security responsibilities from the Iraqi Defense Ministry to Interior Ministry.[76] The Iraqi Army Chief of Staff announced on December 27 that the Iraqi Army will complete the transfer of security responsibilities to local police in 2024.[77] Fayyadh and Dakhil discussed the impact that this transfer of responsibilities will have on Ninewa’s “stability and reconstruction.” Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani appointed Dakhil to replace Najm al Jubouri as the acting governor of Ninewa in November 2023.[78] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah (KH) members escorted Dakhil in Ninewa after his appointment.[79] Dakhil also met with Fayyadh in mid-December 2023 to discuss improving security in Ninewa Province for the provincial council elections.[80]

A legal committee appointed by Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani has submitted to him draft legislation that would empower the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court, according to a constitutional adviser to Sudani.[81] The committee is composed of representatives from the Presidential Office, State Shura Council, and General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers.[82] Sudani stated on December 27 that the draft law will affirm his administration’s commitment to following the Iraqi constitution, which he claimed “grants the Federal Supreme Court more authorities than it currently holds.”[83] Sudani’s claim that the Federal Supreme Court currently possesses insufficient power is surprising given that the court has recently engaged in actions that appear to exceed its constitutional powers. The Federal Supreme Court dismissed then-Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi in November 2023, citing Article 94 of the Iraqi constitution.[84] Article 94 states that “the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court are final and binding for all authorities” but does not explicitly give the court the authority to remove parliament speakers from office.[85] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the court likely removed Halbousi from his post as part of Iranian-backed political efforts to reduce the US presence in Iraq.[86]

Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia actors have historically co-opted elements of the Iraqi judiciary to politically benefit themselves and disadvantage opponents, especially in recent years.[87] Iraq has a sectarian power-sharing system in which the prime minister is always Shia, the parliament speaker is Sunni, and the president is Kurdish.[88] This Iranian-backed control of the judiciary would enable Iranian-backed actors to exercise more power than the power-sharing system currently grants them. Controlling the judiciary would enable these actors to bypass checks and balances, thereby granting them informal control over the Iraqi federal government.

Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) issued fines for electoral campaign violations to four candidates in the Design Alliance on January 2, including current Basra Governor Asad al Eidani.[89] The Design Alliance won 12 out of 23 seats in Basra Province in the recent provincial council elections.[90] IHEC announced that the Integrity Commission and Financial Supervision Bureau will investigate the violations. IHEC’s announcement follows reports that members of the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—are maneuvering to try to prevent Eidani from retaining the governorship in Basra. Informed sources told an independent Iraqi news outlet on December 27 that members of the Shia Coordination Framework are lobbying the Iraqi judiciary to rule that a majority of seats in Basra requires 13—not 12—seats.[91] Such a decision would deprive Eidani’s party of a majority. The independent Iraqi outlet reported that the Shia Coordination Framework is suspicious of Eidani’s ties to rival Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr. Sadr has previously praised Eidani and members of the Design Alliance.[92]

The Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry reiterated that expelling the United States from the Middle East is one of Iran’s primary strategic objectives in a statement commemorating the fourth anniversary of the United States killing Qassem Soleimani.[93] The ministry praised Soleimani for his role in developing the Axis of Resistance and confronting the United States and Israel. Iranian military leaders have repeatedly vowed to expel US forces from the region as part of their revenge for Soleimani’s death.[94]

IRGC-affiliated media reported on January 1 that the Artesh Navy Alborz destroyer entered the Red Sea on January 1.[95] The Artesh is Iran’s conventional military and has larger surface combatants than the IRGC. The Alborz has routinely conducted “anti-piracy” operations in the area since 2010 and operated around the Red Sea at least since December 2023.[96] Both the Artesh and IRGC navies maintain a regular presence in the Red Sea and have done so for over a decade.[97]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with senior Houthi official Mohammad Abdul Salam in Tehran on January 1.[98] Abdollahian thanked Abdul Salam for his “strong” position supporting Palestinians. Abdul Salam thanked Abdollahian for Iran’s continued support for the Axis of Resistance. Abdul Salam is the chief Houthi negotiator engaging Saudi Arabia to end the ongoing war in Yemen.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias praised the Houthi movement for confronting the United States and Israel on December 31, 2023, and January 1, 2024. KH praised the Houthis on December 31 for fulfilling their “legal and moral duty” to confront Israel-linked vessels in the Red Sea.[99] This framing is inaccurate because the Houthis have attacked several vessels with no connection to Israel or Israeli interests in recent weeks. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba separately expressed solidarity with the Houthis on January 1, stating that “the battle is one, the enemy is one, and the fate is one.”[100]


 

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