Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 30, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 30, 2023

Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 30, 2023, 7:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on August 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed four Russian Il-76 planes during a drone strike on a Russian airfield in Pskov Oblast on the night of August 29 to 30. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov stated that the drone strike destroyed four Russian Il-76 planes and possibly damaged two other planes at the Pskov airfield but did not comment on the nature of the strike or claim responsibility for it.[1] Geolocated footage and Russian sources confirmed the strike and the destruction of at least two Russian Il-76 planes.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that over 21 Ukrainian drones struck the Pskov airfield.[3] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems also downed Ukrainian drones over Oryol, Tula, Voronezh, Ryazan, Kaluga, Bryansk, and Moscow oblasts.[4] Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin stated that Russian air defenses repelled a massive Ukrainian drone strike on the Central Federal Okrug (a large administrative area including Moscow but not Pskov) and that at least one of the drones was headed toward Moscow, possibly suggesting that Russian authorities may have initially believed that Ukrainian forces intended to strike Moscow or the region around it.[5] Russian forces may have focused their air defenses on covering Moscow and somehow missed the unusually large number of Ukrainian drones that reportedly struck the Pskov airfield. The Ukrainian drones that Russian air defenses downed over the six other oblasts were likely en route to Moscow or Pskov Oblast and likely were not part of a Ukrainian effort to strike targets in the other oblasts.

Russian propagandists and milbloggers criticized Russian forces for their inability to defend Russian territory and military facilities, while simultaneously criticizing recent Russian MoD censorship efforts. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the Ukrainian strike on the Peskov airfield indicates that Russian air defenses have not adapted to defend against repeated Ukrainian drone strikes, in contrast with how Russian air defenses in Crimea have adapted.[6] The milblogger also criticized Russian authorities for not keeping expensive military aircraft in hangars.[7] Another prominent Russian milblogger expressed concern that there will be no safe places in western Russia due to Ukraine’s growing technical capabilities and suggested that Russian forces need to take this into account when securing military and strategic facilities.[8] Still, another milblogger noted that the requirement for Russian authorities to secure and defend Russian airfields is at a “qualitatively different level” from what it had been.[9] Russian sources also challenged the Russian MoD’s recent censorship efforts by noting the need for truth and honesty in reporting about Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory, including one Russian milblogger who criticized official Russian television channels for not reporting the Ukrainian strikes.[10] Prominent Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov expressed his outrage in response to the drone strike and criticized Russian elites who are calling on the Kremlin to freeze the war in Ukraine and negotiate to save Russia’s economy.[11]

Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile and drone strike predominantly targeting Kyiv on the night of August 29-30, likely in retaliation for the Ukrainian strikes earlier on Moscow and Pskov oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched 28 Kh-101, Kh-555, and Kh-55 air-launched cruise missiles from aircraft operating out of Engels airbase in Saratov Oblast and the Caspian Sea, and 16 Shahed-136/131 drones from Krasnodar Krai and Kursk Oblast.[12] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all 28 cruise missiles and 15 drones over Kyiv, Odesa, Cherkasy, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[13] The Kyiv City Military Administration reported that Ukrainian forces shot down over 20 air targets over Kyiv.[14] This Russian strike was considerably larger than other Russian strikes in recent weeks and was likely in retaliation for the Ukrainian strikes on Moscow and Pskov Oblasts earlier in the night.

Ukrainian light infantry - likely reconnaissance elements - infiltrated east of Russian field fortifications near Verbove as of August 30. Geolocated footage published on August 30 shows Ukrainian infantry on the northwestern outskirts of Verbove, indicating that Russian control over the outskirts of the settlement is degraded.[15] The footage, however, does not indicate that Ukrainian forces established control over the area at this time, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have not yet breached the defensive line around Verbove.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces were successful in the Novodanylivka-Novopokropivka (4-15km south of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka-Verbove (7-18km southeast of Orikhiv) directions.[17] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces continue offensive operations south of Bakhmut, and geolocated footage published on August 28 shows that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced south of Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut).[18] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in the direction of Volodyne (13km south of Velyka Novosilka) on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border and that Russian forces had to retreat from several heights in the area.[19]

The Kremlin has reportedly undertaken several efforts to silence or confuse reports about Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s funeral, which likely indicates that the Kremlin remains worried about Prigozhin’s appeal in Russia and among Wagner forces even after his death. Two acting Russian officials told The Moscow Times that the Russian Presidential Administration and Federal Security Service (FSB) deliberately made Prigozhin’s funeral a secret to avoid further making him a martyr.[20] The officials noted that Russian Presidential Administration’s First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko, officers from several intelligence agencies, and FSB officials met to develop a plan that would prevent any chance of public outcry or protest and mislead the public about the location of Prigozhin’s burial. The Moscow Times added that there were many conflicting reports about the location of Prigozhin’s funeral on August 29. Some Russian Telegram channels noted that Russian federal channels largely ignored Prigozhin’s funeral, likely also as part of the Kremlin’s planned “coverage” of the funeral.[21] ISW continued to observe some Russian Telegram channels baselessly speculating that Prigozhin survived the crash, which may have also been an information operation to overwhelm the Russian information space with misleading reports and deflect from Prigozhin’s funeral.[22]

Some Russian officials may be probing the views of milbloggers about Prigozhin and his death to identify and censor Russian ultranationalists not clearly connected with Prigozhin or Wagner. A Russian milblogger claimed that he received a visit from “aggressive” Telegram channel advertisers who had asked him to promote several Telegram channels that exaggerated the topic of the Wagner leadership’s death in “almost an abusive manner.”[23] The milblogger noted that this request was strange because the Kremlin and the Russian state media had “already closed this topic” and he refused to promote these channels. The refusal reportedly prompted one advertiser to accuse him of supporting the rebellion and opposing Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Constitution.[24] The milblogger noted that division within Russian society would not benefit the Russian war effort. The milblogger has been consistently critical of the Russian military leadership and supportive of Russian Airborne Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky – who had previous links to the Prigozhin but who survived the armed rebellion apparently unscathed and still in power.[25] The incident, at the very least, suggests that prominent milbloggers are self-censoring their discussions about Prigozhin’s death and have modeled their coverage of this subject on the Kremlin. The incident may also support the above outlined hypothesis that certain Russian social media actors may be attempting to overwhelm the Russian information space, or it could indicate that Russian officials are trying to identify other prominent ultranationalist voices who may be promoting insubordination of the regime or the military and tie them in some way to Prigozhin.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov reiterated his loyalty to Russian President Vladimir Putin on August 30 in continued attempts to distance himself from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Kadyrov posted a picture of himself with Putin and proclaimed that he is “an infantryman of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief” and is “ready to fulfill any order” from Putin.[26] Kadyrov has repeatedly attempted to align himself with Putin and the Russian MoD and away from Prigozhin following Prigozhin’s fall from grace.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed four Russian Il-76 planes during a drone strike on a Russian airfield in Pskov Oblast on the night of August 29 to 30.
• Russian propagandists and milbloggers criticized Russian forces for their inability to defend Russian territory and military facilities, while simultaneously criticizing recent Russian MoD censorship efforts.
• Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile and drone strike predominantly targeting Kyiv on the night of August 29-30, likely in retaliation for the Ukrainian strikes earlier on Moscow and Pskov oblasts.
• Ukrainian light infantry - likely reconnaissance elements - infiltrated east of Russian field fortifications near Verbove as of August 30.
• The Kremlin has reportedly undertaken several efforts to silence or confuse reports about Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s funeral, which likely indicates that the Kremlin remains worried about Prigozhin’s appeal in Russia and among Wagner forces even after his death.
• Some Russian officials may be probing the views of milbloggers about Prigozhin and his death to identify and censor Russian ultranationalists not clearly connected with Prigozhin or Wagner.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov reiterated his loyalty to Russian President Vladimir Putin on August 30 in continued attempts to distance himself from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 30 and reportedly advanced.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along at least two sectors of the front on August 30 and advanced near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly banning Wagner Group soldiers from fighting in Ukraine.
• The Ukrainian Crimean-based “Atesh” partisan group claimed that its partisans successfully detonated an explosive at the campaign headquarters of the United Russia party in occupied Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast on August 29.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukranian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 30 and did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove) and Bilohorivka (13km south of Kreminna).[28] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that the most intense sector of the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line is near Raihorodka (13km west of Svatove) and Kovalivka (12km southwest of Svatove), where Russian forces are conducting armored assaults.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces achieved unspecified successes near Novoyehorivka and Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk).[30] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also claimed that Russian forces are intensifying their offensive operations from the Yahidne (22km southeast of Kupyansk) direction.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) and the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) continued to advance in the Kupyansk direction.[32]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 30 and did not advance. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk) in Kharkiv Oblast; Serhiivka (12km southwest of Svatove), Novoyehorivka, and the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna) in Luhansk Oblast; and Bilohorivka (33km south of Kreminna) in Donetsk Oblast.[33] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Press Officer Yaroslav Yakimkin claimed that Russian forces repelled two small Ukrainian counterattacks with tank and artillery support in the Kupyansk direction.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on Bakhmut’s southern flank and continued to advance as of August 30.[35] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces are gradually advancing despite Russian counterattacks.[36] Syrskyi added that the most intense engagements are near Bakhmut, Kurdyumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut), Yahidne (directly north of Bakhmut), and Andriivka (9km southwest of Bakhmut). A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian assault groups attacked Russian positions near Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka.[37]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces regained some previously lost positions on Bakhmut’s southern flank on August 30. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces successfully counterattacked near Kurdyumivka, which allowed Russian forces to expand their area of control in the settlement and push Ukrainian forces to the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal to the west of Kurdyumivka.[38] Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces regained some positions near Klishchiivka.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff, however, reported that Russian forces carried out unsuccessful offensive operations in Kurdyumivka, Ozaryanivka (14km southwest of Bakhmut), and Bohdanivka (7km northwest of Bakhmut).[40]

Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line but did not make new territorial gains on August 30. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces resumed assaults on Marinka (directly west of Donetsk City).[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian attacks on Marinka and Novomykhailivka (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[42]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border and reportedly advanced on August 30. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in the direction of Volodyne (13km south of Velyka Novosilka), and that Russian forces had to retreat from several heights in the area due to the threat of a tactical encirclement.[43] Other Russian milbloggers and Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky claimed that Ukrainian forces are increasing offensive activity on the Pryyutne-Staromayorske (8-18km south of Velyka Novosilka) line.[44]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and near Vuhledar, and reportedly advanced on August 30. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced during a small arms engagement with Ukrainian forces west of Staromayorske.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack near Staromayorske.[46] Khodakovsky claimed that the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) recaptured several positions near Mykilske (27km southwest of Donetsk City) in western Donetsk Oblast on August 30.[47]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and may have advanced west of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) on August 30. Geolocated footage published on August 30 shows that Ukrainian infantry advanced to the northwestern outskirts of Verbove, though the extent of these advances and current control over these positions are currently unclear.[48] Ukrainian forces’ ability to advance so close to Verbove indicates degraded Russian control around the settlement, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces were successful in the Novodanylivka-Novopokropivka (4-15km south of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka-Verbove (7-18km southeast of Orikhiv) directions.[49] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked the outskirts of Verbove overnight on August 29 to 30 and on the morning of August 30, but that Russian forces repelled the attacks.[50] One Russian milblogger characterized the Russian situation in Verbove as difficult but claimed that Ukrainian forces have not yet breached the Russian defensive line in the area.[51] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted armored attacks near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[52]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Mala Tokmachka.[53]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted further limited raids in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on August 30.[54] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces landed northwest of Pidstepne (17km east of Kherson City) and on an island in the Dnipro River delta.[55] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces destroyed the Ukrainian boats as they approached the east bank, however.[56]

Russian forces continued efforts to secure the Kerch Strait Bridge against maritime threats. Satellite imagery dated August 29 and 30 shows that Russian forces have sunk barges near the Kerch Strait Bridge presumably to prevent maritime drones from striking boats near the bridge or the bridge itself.[57] One Russian milblogger criticized this attempt and claimed that the few hundred meters between each barge is sufficient for maritime drones to pass through the barrier.[58]

The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian aviation attack prevented up to 50 Ukrainian troops from landing in occupied Crimea overnight on August 29 to 30.[59] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces denied the Russian MoD’s claim, however.[60]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian MoD is reportedly banning Wagner Group soldiers from fighting in Ukraine. Russian opposition media outlets obtained an audio message in which a Wagner representative encourages Wagner servicemen to look for different work because the Russian MoD is not allowing Wagner forces to fight in Ukraine, citing recent events.[61] The Wagner representative noted that Wagner fighters are also struggling to work in the Middle East or Africa due to “tough competition” with the Russian MoD and National Guard (Rosgvardia) who are trying to operate in those regions.[62] ISW has previously assessed that the Russian MoD and the Kremlin have been destroying the Wagner Group since the June 24 rebellion.[63]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited defense industrial base (DIB) production facilities in Tula Oblast on August 30 and highlighted the importance of counterbattery capabilities in the Russian war effort - likely in response to recent public complaints about poor counterbattery capabilities.[64] Shoigu visited a radar systems production facility of the Almaz-Antey Corporation in Tula Oblast whose general director claimed that the facility has increased its production and supply of modern counterbattery weapons to support the Russian war effort.[65] Shoigu stated that counterbattery combat and the supply of Russian soldiers with counterbattery capabilities play “the most important” role in the war in Ukraine.[66] Russian military commanders, such as “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky and former 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) Commander Major General Ivan Popov, and Russian milbloggers have recently complained about the lack of effective Russian counterbattery capabilities on the battlefield.[67]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

The Ukrainian Crimean-based “Atesh” partisan group claimed that its partisans successfully detonated an explosive at the campaign headquarters of the United Russia party in occupied Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast on August 29.[68] “Atesh” claimed that the resulting fire killed three Russian personnel guarding the headquarters and destroyed documents supporting the upcoming September 2023 regional elections.[69]

Russian authorities continue sending workers from Russia to occupied Ukraine to fill out the workforce and artificially alter demographics. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian authorities are sending Russian locksmiths, welders, and drivers to occupied Ukraine to repair damaged equipment and build fortifications.[70] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Kremlin-managed “Leningradskyi Rubezh” fund organizes the dispatch of these personnel to occupied Ukraine.[71]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian forces reportedly received another Iskander missile system on August 30. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that another Iskander-M missile system arrived in Belarus and deployed to its permanent base.[72] The Belarusian MoD announced on February 1, 2023, that Belarusian forces were independently operating Russian-provided Iskander systems.[73]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://suspilne dot media/561573-ssa-vidilili-novij-paket-dopomogi-ukraini-ukrainski-pidrozdili-na-livoberezzi-hersonsini-553-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1693388119&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/561583-bezpilotniki-atakuvali-aeroport-u-pskovi/; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-drones-attack-russian-air-base-near-estonia-2023-08-30/

[2] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1696666301794591007?s=20; https://twitter.com/Arvelleg1/status/1696640330160882118?s=20; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1696634284763726109?s=20; https://t.me/sprava_groma/14331; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1696666296585240991?s=20 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/4483; https://twitter.com/clashreport/status/1696631538216001935?s=20 ; https://t.me/MV_007_Pskov/3321 ; https://suspilne dot media/561583-bezpilotniki-atakuvali-aeroport-u-pskovi/ ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/52219 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/14695 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/105748 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/105749 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/105755

[3] https://t.me/rusich_army/10615 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/52210 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/24580 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/14690 ; https://t.me/vrogov/11845 ;

[4] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/96212 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/96208 ; https://t.me/rybar/51338 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/29915 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/29917 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/29914 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/29916 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/29912 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/14693; https://t.me/wargonzo/14692 ;

[5] https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/6791

[6] https://t.me/rybar/51327

[7] https://t.me/rybar/51327

[8] https://t.me/sashakots/41926

[9] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/12658

[10] https://t.me/notes_veterans/11856 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/28869

; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/30223

[11] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eWx-8PTRdSM ; https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1696999544150491531

[12] https://t.me/kpszsu/4798 ; https://t.me/CinCAFU/567 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bL7T2Kgh8jPi56Md77raH4GZ6u3zcekXwB8VWJfVvjcCmManSj1qhdYz6NetwUhJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0szdVvpSebBQvm5znnrbDzVS7RAZWtW2ntsxTWbfGXHokJeE6nMespSNPhvdnnrNl

[13] https://t.me/kpszsu/4798 ; https://t.me/CinCAFU/567 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0bL7T2Kgh8jPi56Md77raH4GZ6u3zcekXwB8VWJfVvjcCmManSj1qhdYz6NetwUhJl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0szdVvpSebBQvm5znnrbDzVS7RAZWtW2ntsxTWbfGXHokJeE6nMespSNPhvdnnrNl

[14] https://suspilne dot media/561595-rosijski-vijska-atakuvali-kiiv-e-zagibli-ta-postrazdali/

[15] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1696811846303449093?s=20; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1696799698399396243?s=20; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1696799695648014612?s=20; https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/21326; https://twitter.com/VigorousFalcon/status/1696829973351616731?s=20; https://twitter.com/VigorousFalcon/status/1696832854821658893?s=20

[16] https://t.me/rybar/51312; https://t.me/batalyon15/2793; https://t.me/BalitskyEV/1630; https://t.me/wargonzo/14696; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37820; https://t.me/mod_russia/29934 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/29941

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029at4U2J473WZ5z8L3qaogPVg83sA5X5Nrv5NgdsqBniUqwD8qSL3oEPruZBRonH9l

[18] https://t.me/ShturmovaRota3/853; https://twitter.com/GermanObserver1/status/1696933509107962149?s=20 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029at4U2J473WZ5z8L3qaogPVg83sA5X5Nrv5NgdsqBniUqwD8qSL3oEPruZBRonH9l ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/08/30/oleksandr-syrskyj-vzhyvayemo-vsih-zahodiv-dlya-zryvu-planiv-protyvnyka-i-postupovo-prosuvayemsya-vpered/ ; https://www.facebook.com/easternforces/posts/pfbid02NnzNqjm4cgay1de6yK3WPQrMQpSpA4rEx7BJdNjpXKgyQvv7yJgRMgVegvie2EXGl ; https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2998

[19] https://t.me/wargonzo/14696

[20] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2023/08/30/we-dont-need-heroes-who-marched-on-moscow-how-the-kremlin-silenced-prigozhins-funeral-a82293

[21] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/3241; https://t.me/dva_majors/24611

[22] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/3255; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/3259; https://t.me/vladimirlepehin/1524;

[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/24611

[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/24611

[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2023

[26] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3858

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061223 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071023

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0szdVvpSebBQvm5znnrbDzVS7RAZWtW2ntsxTWbfGXHokJeE6nMespSNPhvdnnrNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026fc6Z86UyNNvU4JmWRqH2JD465Ehq9JPh84zWSGcrw7QoFv1UrVxYSX2Wy6vynkbl

[29] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/08/30/oleksandr-syrskyj-vzhyvayemo-vsih-zahodiv-dlya-zryvu-planiv-protyvnyka-i-postupovo-prosuvayemsya-vpered/ ; https://www.facebook.com/easternforces/posts/pfbid02NnzNqjm4cgay1de6yK3WPQrMQpSpA4rEx7BJdNjpXKgyQvv7yJgRMgVegvie2EXGl ; https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2998

[30] https://t.me/zvofront/898

[31] https://t.me/rybar/51312

[32] https://t.me/notes_veterans/11854

[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/29934 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/29942 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/29934 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/29943 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/29934 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/29940

[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/29931

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029at4U2J473WZ5z8L3qaogPVg83sA5X5Nrv5NgdsqBniUqwD8qSL3oEPruZBRonH9l

[36] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/08/30/oleksandr-syrskyj-vzhyvayemo-vsih-zahodiv-dlya-zryvu-planiv-protyvnyka-i-postupovo-prosuvayemsya-vpered/ ; https://www.facebook.com/easternforces/posts/pfbid02NnzNqjm4cgay1de6yK3WPQrMQpSpA4rEx7BJdNjpXKgyQvv7yJgRMgVegvie2EXGl ; https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2998

[37] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/52288

[38] https://t.me/rybar/51312

[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/14696; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37820

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0szdVvpSebBQvm5znnrbDzVS7RAZWtW2ntsxTWbfGXHokJeE6nMespSNPhvdnnrNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026fc6Z86UyNNvU4JmWRqH2JD465Ehq9JPh84zWSGcrw7QoFv1UrVxYSX2Wy6vynkbl

[41] https://t.me/wargonzo/14696

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0szdVvpSebBQvm5znnrbDzVS7RAZWtW2ntsxTWbfGXHokJeE6nMespSNPhvdnnrNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026fc6Z86UyNNvU4JmWRqH2JD465Ehq9JPh84zWSGcrw7QoFv1UrVxYSX2Wy6vynkbl

[43] https://t.me/wargonzo/14696

[44] https://t.me/voin_dv/4652; https://t.me/rybar/51332; https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2868

[45] https://t.me/rybar/51332

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0szdVvpSebBQvm5znnrbDzVS7RAZWtW2ntsxTWbfGXHokJeE6nMespSNPhvdnnrNl

[47] https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2868

[48] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1696811846303449093?s=20; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1696799698399396243?s=20; https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1696799695648014612?s=20; https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/21326

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029at4U2J473WZ5z8L3qaogPVg83sA5X5Nrv5NgdsqBniUqwD8qSL3oEPruZBRonH9l

[50] https://t.me/rybar/51312; https://t.me/batalyon15/2793; https://t.me/BalitskyEV/1630; https://t.me/wargonzo/14696; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37820; https://t.me/mod_russia/29934 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/29941

[51] https://t.me/zvofront/894; https://t.me/zvofront/895

[52] https://t.me/rusich_army/10614; https://t.me/dva_majors/24576; https://t.me/rybar/51335; https://t.me/wargonzo/14696; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37820; https://t.me/mod_russia/29934 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/29941

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0szdVvpSebBQvm5znnrbDzVS7RAZWtW2ntsxTWbfGXHokJeE6nMespSNPhvdnnrNl

[54] https://t.me/dva_majors/24576

[55] https://t.me/rybar/51337

[56] https://t.me/dva_majors/24576

[57] https://twitter.com/kromark/status/1696832729407434994?s=20; https://twitter.com/MT_Anderson/status/1696912976186622042?s=20; https://twitter.com/CovertShores/status/1696261789435183367?s=20

[58] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/30199

[59] https://t.me/dva_majors/24576; https://t.me/rybar/51340; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/20622; https://t.me/notes_veterans/11855; https://t.me/rybar/51326; https://t.me/mod_russia/29935 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/29913

[60] https://t.me/ukr_sof/718

[61] https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/news/2023/08/30/chvk-vagner-predlozhila-boitsam-naiti-druguyu-rabotu-iz-za-konkurentsii-s-minoboroni-i-rosgvardiei-v-afrike-i-na-blizhnem-vostoke/index.html ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/08/30/v-chvk-vagnera-posovetovali-svoim-boytsam-iskat-drugie-varianty-zarabotka ; https://t.me/istories_media/3518

[62] https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/news/2023/08/30/chvk-vagner-predlozhila-boitsam-naiti-druguyu-rabotu-iz-za-konkurentsii-s-minoboroni-i-rosgvardiei-v-afrike-i-na-blizhnem-vostoke/index.html ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/08/30/v-chvk-vagnera-posovetovali-svoim-boytsam-iskat-drugie-varianty-zarabotka ; https://t.me/istories_media/3518

[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2023

[64] https://t.me/mod_russia/29937

[65] https://t.me/mod_russia/29937

[66] https://t.me/mod_russia/29937

[67] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2023; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2023

[68] https://t.me/atesh_ua/1645 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/4487 ; https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/partyzany-znyshhyly-shtab-okupantiv-u-novij-kahovtsi/ ; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/18613303

[69] https://t.me/atesh_ua/1645

[70] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/okupanty-zvozyat-zarobitchan-na-tot-cherez-vidmovu-mistsevyh-spivpratsyuvaty-z-vorogom/

[71] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/okupanty-zvozyat-zarobitchan-na-tot-cherez-vidmovu-mistsevyh-spivpratsyuvaty-z-vorogom/

[72] https://t.me/modmilby/31236 ; https://t.me/modmilby/31231

[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2023